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ABSTRACT
The theoretical framework for this thesis is provided by a revised version of James 
Gow’s Constructivist Realism, based on Phenomenalist ontology, epistemology and 
causation, that explains the role of social processes in a material world that is socially 
constructed, but available to Positivist verification. After 9/11, the strategic imperative 
to prevent the threat posed by apparently incoercible and unconstrained terrorist 
actors has led to a shift from coercive strategies, which seek to prevent attacks through 
reactive mechanisms, to controlling security strategies that seek to prevent attacks 
through pro-active mechanisms. Although rational, controlling security strategies 
contravene the socially-agreed Caroline formula that underpins international order. This 
situation has led to a rational action/legitimate action astigmatism in international 
society. Controlling security strategies have vital intelligence requirements: an actor is 
incapable of preventing threats unless it is capable o f anticipating threats. The post- 
9711 strategic reality has triggered the need to revise Herman’s concept o f ‘intelligence 
power’, considering the roles o f intelligence in facilitating and legitimising preventive 
responses to threats to international peace and security. These threats to international 
peace and security are posed by the two separate threats presented by ‘new’ terrorism 
and WMD proliferation, as well as a post-9 /11 terrorism-WMD threat nexus. 
However, unlike states such as the UK and US, the UN is incapable of fulfilling the 
intelligence requirements of its controlling security strategy, owing to a lack of an 
intelligence capability. The differentials in the levels of intelligence power between the 
UN and states such as the UK and US entail significant implications for international 
order and intelligence affairs. I f  international order is to be maintained in the post- 
9/11 strategic reality, then the rational action/legitimate action astigmatism needs to be 
corrected. To potentially achieve this, the UNSC needs to develop an intelligence- 
assessment capability that will help enable it to facilitate and legitimise pro-action 
against anticipated threats in line with its and other states’ strategic goals. Collective 
intelligence machinery will need new organisational structures at the international level 
that will encourage the provision of credible intelligence that has a better chance of 
meeting the standards of evidence that are required by the UNSC in determining 
threats prior to their materialisation.
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INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
Aim s and Objectives
This study was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and falls 
within the ESRC theme of ‘Governance and Citizenship: Global Governance and 
Security’. This study also relates to the ESRC’s ‘New Security Challenges’ research 
scheme.
The aim of this study is to increase understanding of the nature and role of 
intelligence in international security affairs after 9/11. In order to achieve this aim, this 
study intends to meet five objectives. The first objective is to add to the literature on 
international relations theory by developing a new and robust theory of Constructivist 
Realism that successfully bridges the gap between Realism and Constructivism without 
incurring logical contradictions. The second objective is to develop a new and robust 
theory o f intelligence power, rooted in international relations theory, based on the 
logical structure of Constructivist Realism that succeeds in explaining Michael 
Herman’s concept of ‘intelligence power’. The third objective is to explain the 
transition from pre-9/11 coercive security strategies that sought to react to coercible 
threats, to post-9/11 controlling security strategies that seek to pro-act against 
incoercible threats that demand prevention. The fourth objective is to provide a clear 
and thorough description of the ‘new’ terrorism-WMD threat to international security. 
The final objective is to address the controversial issue of intelligence and the UN 
through the identification of a rational action/legitimate action astigmatism in 
international affairs, brought about by a disjunction between intelligence-driven 
controlling security strategies and the provisions o f the UN Charter. The overall 
motivation for this research is to root the relatively young academic study of 
intelligence in serious theoretical ground and move forward the debates surrounding 
the issue of intelligence and international peace and security after 9/11.
14
General Issues
This study examines the role of intelligence in facilitating and legitimising controlling 
security strategies that aim to prevent the materialisation of threats to international 
peace and security. The post-9/11 strategic reality has prompted the construction, at 
national and international levels, of security strategies that seek to pro-act against an 
apparendy incoercible and unconstrained ‘new’ terrorism threat that is international in 
scope and reach. The post-9/11 imperative to prevent potentially catastrophic terrorist 
attacks, including those involving the possible use of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), entails the need to respond to threats before, rather than after, they 
materialise. Controlling security strategies that seek to prevent threats, therefore, have 
vital intelligence requirements: a strategy that aims to prevent threats through pro­
action depends on information in order to anticipate threats.
Controlling security strategies that address threats determined through the 
assessment of information, as opposed to observations of actual attacks, represent 
rational action in accordance with the imperative of prevention and the strategic goals 
o f a wide range of political actors, including the UK, US and UN, in the face of post- 
9/11 threats. However, despite the rationality of prevention, intelligence-driven 
controlling security strategies executed in anticipation of threats are not provided for 
by the legitimising institutions of international society, which are configured to allow 
states to react to threats only if an armed attack occurs.1 Indeed, the UN Security 
Council (UNSC), which is uniquely responsible for determining and responding to 
threats to international peace and security, has no strategic intelligence capability. As 
such, the UNSC is incapable of executing a controlling security strategy that aims to 
pro-act against threats that demand prevention. The UNSC, therefore, is effectively 
unable to meet its self-declared ‘challenge of prevention’, or facilitate and legitimise 
national security strategies that seek to prevent anticipated threats prior to their 
materialisation.2 A rational action/legitimate action astigmatism results from a
1 "Article 51." UN Charter, from http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm.
2 (December 2004). A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations.
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disjunction between the post-9/11 strategic goals of a wide range of states and the 
capabilities of the UNSC to facilitate and legitimise rational action (and help avoid 
irrational unilateral action) against anticipated threats within the parameters o f existing 
legitimising processes that only allow reaction to threats that have already actually 
occurred. Examining the nature and implications of the potential power of intelligence 
to facilitate and legitimise controlling security strategies, and thereby help resolve the 
rational action/legitimate action astigmatism, is the principle task of this study.
Particular Focus on the UK> US and U N
This study seeks to address general questions about preventive strategy, intelligence 
power and terrorism-WMD threats in a post-9/11 world, within a Constructivist 
Realist theoretical framework. However, in order to describe and examine the real- 
world relationship between intelligence and post-9/11 controlling security strategies, 
this study focuses particularly on the UK, US and the UN, for practical and historical 
reasons. Firstly, information on the intelligence affairs of the UK, US and UN are the 
easiest to access, given the large quantity of academic literature, media reporting and 
publicly available official documentation before and after 9/11. Secondly, recent 
history involving the UK, US and UN highlights the rational action/legitimate action 
astigmatism in international affairs when, in March 2003, the US and UK invaded Iraq 
in response to a perceivable threat posed by Iraqi WMD programmes without UNSC 
approval.
The US and UK action was unusual in three ways. Firstly, the US and UK action 
against Iraq was pro-active. Force was used in order to prevent the materialisation of a 
potential attack, not to respond to an attack that had already occurred. Secondly, the 
threat posed by Iraq was determined through the assessment of intelligence, not 
through direct observation of an actual attack.3 Intelligence assessments were used by 
the US and UK, to an unprecedented degree, to provide the casus belli that would justify 
the use of force against a sovereign state.4 And, thirdly, assessments of the Iraqi threat
3 Freedman, L. (2004). "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat." Survival 46 (2).
4 Ibid.
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emerged via two distinct processes. One the one hand, overt UN inspections sought 
access to Iraqi documents, facilities, materials, scientists and officials with the aim of 
establishing the status of Iraq’s WMD programmes.5 On the other hand, covert 
national intelligence collection sought to glean information on clandestine Iraqi 
activities with the aim of uncovering Iraq’s WMD secrets.6 On the basis of national 
intelligence assessments, and prior to the announcement of the UN inspectors’ 
findings, the US and UK demanded that the UN Security Council (UNSC) sanction 
pro-active use of force to remove the Iraqi WMD threat.7 The US and UK cited 
intelligence that demonstrated Iraq’s ability to deceive UN inspectors, its enduring 
interest in developing a WMD capability, and willingness to co-operate with terrorist 
groups such as al-Qaida.8 When the UNSC refused to sanction preventive measures, 
the US and UK invaded Iraq without UNSC approval, in contravention of the 
provisions of international law as codified in the UN Charter.9
The U S/UK  invasion of Iraq reflects the imperative of prevention and the 
emergence of intelligence-driven controlling security strategies after 9/11. The 
rationality underpinning the US and UK pro-action over Iraq is a feature of the post- 
9 /1 1 strategic reality, in which apparently incoercible terrorist groups are understood 
to be bent on causing mass destruction. The imperative of prevention, in view of the 
terrorism-WMD threat, is recognised by the UK, US and UN; as such, controlling 
security strategies that seek to prevent terrorist attacks through pro-active mechanisms 
are in line with UK, US and UN strategic goals. The security strategies of the UK, US 
and UN, therefore, have vital strategic intelligence requirements, considering that the 
capability to prevent threats depends on the capacity to anticipate threats.
The U S/UK invasion of Iraq also signified a breakdown of international order. 
Whilst the rationality of prevention is broadly recognised within the international 
community, the legitimacy of controlling security strategies remains highly
5 Freedman, L. (2004). "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat."
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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questionable, if not flatly rejected by existing legitimising processes. The self-defence 
and collective security institutions of the UN Charter permit the use o f force 
exclusively in the event of the occurrence of an actual attack, not in anticipation o f a 
potential attack. Furthermore, the UNSC, which is uniquely responsible for 
determining and responding to threats to international peace and security, is not 
capable of determining threats through the assessment of intelligence. As such, the 
UNSC is limited in its capability to implement an intelligence-driven controlling 
security strategy that seeks to prevent anticipated threats through pro-active measures, 
despite the UN’s acknowledgement of the imperative to prevent threats to 
international peace and security.
STRUCTURE
This study consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 develops a theoretical framework centred 
on a revised version of Constructivist Realism, based on Phenomenalist ontology, 
epistemology and causation. Constructivist Realism attempts to combine the analytical 
strengths of Realism and Constructivism in order to explain the role of social 
. processes in a material world that is constructed, but available to Positivist verification. 
In his book Defending the West, James Gow attempts to develop a theory of 
Constructivist Realism to this end.10 However, Gow’s designation o f necessity in 
Constructivist Realism creates a fatal theoretical dilemma: a theory cannot claim to 
both adhere to Positivist standards of rationality and describe phenomena as necessary. 
Phenomena can be described either in statements of fact, which are empirically 
verifiable, or in tautologies, which do not require empirical verification. It is a breach 
of Positivist rationality to describe necessary phenomena in statements of fact, which 
Gow attempts to achieve. In response to this theoretical dilemma, this thesis revises 
Constructivist Realism with a Phenomenalist ontology, epistemology and causation, in 
order to allow Constructivist Realism to successfully reconcile the analytical strengths 
of Realism and Constructivism, and achieve a theory that explains the international 
system as socially constructed, yet empirically verifiable, without incurring logical 
contradictions.
10 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West. Cambridge, Polity Press.
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Chapter 2 defines the term ‘prevention’ and examines the evolution of security 
strategies through the post-1945, Cold War, post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods. 
Preventive state practice is a phenomenon viewed through the lens of the revised 
theory of Constructivist Realism. After 9/11, prevention reflects rational, not 
necessary, action in light of changing material realities that are available to empirical 
verification. Indeed, the rationality of prevention is empirically rooted, and in line with 
strategic imperatives derived from verification of threats that are perceivable, but not 
necessarily always perceived. The institution of prevention has adapted to meet 
changing material security realities. The post-1945 strategic imperative to react to acts 
o f aggression by coercible and risk-averse states was enshrined in the UN Charter in 
the face of the threat posed by interstate war. The logic of deterrence continued to 
characterise the strategic environment of the nuclear-charged Cold War. In the post- 
Cold War world, transnational, non-state threats to international order prompted the 
construction of the strategic imperative to prevent conflict from occurring within 
states, not just between states. Pro-active, although exclusively diplomatic, measures 
taken to control threats supported the post-Cold War imperative of conflict 
prevention.
After 9/11, however, the strategic imperative to prevent attacks by apparently 
incoercible and unconstrained terrorist actors extended the concept o f conflict 
prevention into the military sphere. Instead of coercive strategies designed to manage 
threats posed by risk-averse states, the emergence of seemingly unconstrained terrorist 
‘gamblers’ prompted the construction of a controlling strategy that sought to address 
threats before they materialised through pro-active mechanisms, including military 
force. Whilst controlling security strategies represent rational action within the post- 
9/11 strategic reality, they do not represent, per se, legitimate action. Action taken in 
anticipation of threats determinable through the assessment of information, as 
opposed to observation of actual attacks, contravenes the socially-agreed Caroline 
formula that regulates the use of force in international society.
Chapter 3 develops a robust theory of intelligence power based on Constructivist 
Realism that explains intelligence in the post-9/11 strategic reality. Post-9/11
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controlling security strategies that aim to prevent threats depend on the acquisition and 
application o f information on phenomena that are perceivable, but not necessarily 
perceived. In order to be able to pro-act to prevent anticipated threats, actors must be 
capable of investigating and empirically verifying these phenomena. As such, 
controlling security strategies have vital strategic intelligence requirements. The 
concept of ‘intelligence power’ developed by Michael Herman describes intelligence as 
a facet of national power. A state’s level of intelligence power reflects the seriousness 
with which a state takes intelligence in achieving national security goals. After 9/11, 
however, perceptions of a ‘new’ terrorism threat have universalized, and the imperative 
to prevent threats has forced an increase in states’ interest in intelligence. Intelligence 
has the potential power to facilitate and legitimise controlling security strategies 
required to manage post-9/11 security challenges, by enabling states to investigate 
‘fuzzy’ threats that, according Constructivist Realism, are perceivable, but not 
necessarily perceived. The post-9 /11 strategic reality has triggered the need to revise 
Herman’s concept of ‘intelligence power’, considering the international roles of 
intelligence in facilitating and legitimising rational responses to new threats to 
international peace and security.
Chapter 4 describes the post-9/11 threats that have prompted the construction of 
controlling security strategies. The threats to international peace and security that 
demand prevention are posed by the two separate threats presented by terrorism and 
WMD proliferation, as well as a post-9/11 terrorism-WMD threat nexus. The al-Qaida 
attacks on 11 September 2001 demonstrated a brutal terrorism threat that was 
international in scope and reach. The threat posed by WMD proliferation has been 
reviewed considering the existence of apparently incoercible, unconstrained and global 
terrorist groups bent on mass destruction. The realistic prospect of terrorism involving 
the use of WMD has given rise to a perceivable terrorism-WMD threat nexus that 
demands prevention through controlling security strategies that seek to mitigate the 
risk of terrorist attack.
Chapter 5 describes the respective capabilities of the UK, US and UN to fulfil the 
intelligence requirements of controlling security strategies, and Chapter 6 examines the
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implications of differentials in intelligence capabilities for international order and 
intelligence affairs. The potential power o f intelligence to facilitate and legitimise 
prevention has direct consequences on intelligence knowledge, activity and 
organisation. In order to facilitate prevention of threats to international security, 
intelligence knowledge needs to be international in scope: international dots require the 
drawing of international lines if they are to be joined and responded against effectively. 
In terms of activity, state-based collection activities need to be complemented by 
international analytical, assessment and dissemination activities, so that the appropriate 
type of intelligence knowledge is produced and the appropriate decision-makers 
become intelligence customers. A collective intelligence machinery will need new 
organisational structures at the international level that will encourage the provision of 
credible intelligence that has a better chance of meeting the standards of evidence that 
are required by the UNSC in determining threats prior to their materialisation.
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES
This study is the product of qualitative research methods, including in-depth interviews 
with UN, US and UK officials. As expected in light of the subject matter of this study, 
it has been difficult to obtain information on intelligence matters, which is normally 
highly classified. Whilst I am confident of the analytical rigour o f this study, there are 
obviously a number of areas that are relevant to this dissertation that I have been 
unable to access. The majority of people who I approached for interview were either 
unwilling to be interviewed or willing to talk strictly off the record. I have attempted to 
compensate for this by publishing externally, including a paper delivered at the 2006 
International Studies Association Convention, and, therefore, providing quotable 
resources that will allow me to bypass the requirement to name sensitive sources in this 
document. These methodological disadvantages are natural consequences of 
conducting a research study of this kind, and there are bound to be gaps and 
inaccuracies. However, I do not believe that these difficulties affect the arguments and 
analysis contained in this dissertation. It is important to note that I have not attempted 
to obtain information from officials through devious means or exploited any security 
clearances I may have held during the writing of this dissertation to obtain and use
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classified material for this study. The following list represents my main sources of
information:
1. Academic books, articles and papers;
2. Media reporting;
3. Official documents and statements, such as the Review of Intelligence on Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (known as the ‘Butler 
Report5), and relevant reports emanating from the UK, US and UN authorities, of 
which there have been many after 9/11 and the Iraq invasion;
4. Interviews: during the course of my research, I spent the five months of March— 
July 2004 as a Visiting Scholar at the Centre on International Cooperation at New 
York University, which provided an extremely valuable springboard for interviews 
with UN and US officials. Eight interviews were completed, including interviews 
conducted in the UK
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CHAPTER ONE
Theory
INTRODUCTION
Traditional theories of international politics are unrealistic and irrational. They fail to 
explain the complex nature of international politics and fall short o f scientific 
standards of reasoning. The most promising theoretical development has been 
Constructivist Realism, developed by James Gow, which attempts to ally the analytical 
strengths of Realism and Constructivism to come up with a theory of international 
politics that explains the role of social processes in a material world that is socially 
constructed, but available to Positivist verification. However, the designation of 
necessity in Constructivist Realism creates a fatal theoretical dilemma that negates its 
use of, and claim to, Positivist rationality. In response to this theoretical dilemma, this 
chapter attempts to revitalise Constructivist Realism with a Phenomenalist ontology, 
epistemology and causation. Doing so allows Constructivist Realism to reconcile the 
analytical strengths of Structural Realism and Social Constructivism and achieve a 
realistic and rational theory that succeeds in explaining the international system as 
socially constructed, but empirically verifiable phenomena.
This chapter has four sections. The first section appraises the logical rigour of 
traditional Realist, Idealist and Constructivist theories of international politics and 
demonstrates fatal theoretical dilemmas that make these theories unrealistic and 
irrational.11 The second section appraises James Gow’s Constructivist Realism, an 
approach that attempts to address the theoretical weakness of Realism, Idealism and
11 This chapter does not examine theories of international relations beyond Realism, Idealism, 
Constructivism and Constructivist Realism. The reason for this is my principle interest in this chapter to 
build on previous work at undergraduate and graduate level on Constructivist Realism, and revise James 
Gow’s theory of Constructivist Realism in order to establish a theoretical framework that is able to explain 
the concepts contained in this study.
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Constructivism.12 The fatal theoretical dilemma entailed by Gow’s designation of 
necessity in a constructed international system is identified and explained. The third 
section outlines Positivist rationality based on Phenomenalist doctrine, which is used 
to resolve the theoretical dilemma identified in Gow’s Constructivist Realist approach. 
The final section develops a revised version o f Constructivist Realism that uses 
Phenomenalist doctrine to achieve a realistic and rational approach to international
SECTION ONE: AN APPRAISAL OF REALISM, IDEALISM AND 
CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Realism
Although political Realism has dominated international relations theory since the end 
of World War II, the philosophical roots o f Realism can be found as far back as the 
400s BC. In his history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides described politics as the 
pursuit o f self-interest and conflict as a product of systemic change.13 In the 15th 
century AD, Nicolo Machiavelli, in his work The Prince, elaborated on Thucydides’ 
Realism by describing virtuous government in terms of a monarch’s ability to act 
selfishly: by ruthlessly pursuing self-interests and the maximisation o f power, the 
prince is able to manoeuvre effectively within the political system.14 In 1651, Thomas 
Hobbes published The Leviathan in which he describes war as the state of nature. 
Hobbes regarded conflict as an inevitable result o f the human condition, and 
considered the political system to be a perpetual struggle of all against all.15 Rational 
behaviour, therefore, meant looking after number one. Politics is about survival.
12 James Gow mentions in Defending the West that he has been informed by Sir Lawrence Freedman that 
Peter Katzenstein called himself a ‘constructivist realist’ at a conference in the mid-1990s, but that 
Katzenstein has not used the term beyond this. Gow’s is the only developed and branded theory of 
Constructivist Realism that is available for appraisal, so his will be the focus of this chapter.
13 Thucydides (2006). The History of the Peloponnesian War. BiblioBazaar.
14 Machiavelli, N. (2003). The Prince. Dante University of America Press.
15 Hobbes, T. (1982). Leviathan. London, Penguin.
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In the 20th century, the introduction of international relations as an academic 
discipline saw political Realism reincarnated as a theory of political science, governed 
by objective laws that, although rooted in human nature, expressed scientifically- 
derived ‘truths’ about the international system. Realism conceives the world as a 
material object that can be known as necessarily true. Political Realism, as espoused by 
theorists such as Hans J. Morgenthau, and the subsequent Neo-Realism of Kenneth 
Waltz and his followers, attempts to achieve philosophy of science standards of 
theorizing by observing and providing facts about the material world, rather than 
express gut-feelings about the metaphysical properties of human nature.16 These ‘facts’ 
substantiate laws that govern state behaviour. The essential laws of Waltz’s Neo- 
Realism are as follows17:
1. Politics is defined in terms of self-help.
2.‘Self-help is necessarily the principle action in an anarchic order’.18
3. Structures cause actions.
These statements expressing laws of international politics are theoretically 
problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Neo-Realism expresses statements of fact in the 
form of tautologies, which is literally nonsensical. The first statement ‘politics is 
defined in terms of self-help’, for example, is a tautology, because it equates literally to 
the statement ‘politics means self-help’. However, the statement is used to describe a 
fact about the world, that is, it is used to provide new information about the 
international system. If  we presently ignore this inconsistency and take the statement as 
tautological, then we are committed to condemn it as useless: we learn nothing from it, 
because it merely unpacks definitions. More significantly, the tautology is obviously 
false: ‘politics’ does not mean ‘self-help’. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
in normal usage of the English language the word ‘politics’ means ‘activities 
associated... with the political relations between states’, not a type of activity. If, on 
the other hand, the statement is taken to be a statement of fact, which Neo-Realism
16 Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York, Alfred
A. Knopf.
17 Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York, McGraw-Hill.
18 Ibid.: I l l
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actually intends it to be, then it is meaningless for two reasons. The first reason is that 
the statement expresses a necessary relationship between politics and the act o f self- 
help. According to the rule of logic, statements of facts express only contingent truths, 
not necessary ones. The second reason (if we pretend for a moment that the statement 
really invokes a contingent relationship, not a necessary one) is that there is no 
conceivable test to confirm whether politics are acts of self-help or not. As such, the 
statement made by Neo-Realism that ‘politics is defined in terms of self-help’ is 
nonsensical.
Secondly, the statement ‘self-help is necessarily the principle action in an anarchic 
order’ is fallacious. This statement does not increase our understanding o f the 
international system, because it is neither a tautology that is known to be true a priori, 
nor a statement of fact that expresses a contingent truth obtained through empirical 
observation. In this case, Neo-Realism claims that there is a necessary relationship 
between ‘anarchical order’ and ‘self-help’ as a principle action. This equates to claiming 
that ‘it is logically impossible for any type of action other than self-help to be the 
principle action in an anarchic order.’ This, again, is clearly meaningless. In the first 
place, the statement is not a logical proposition, so it is not tautological; there is no 
sense in which Neo-Realism can meaningfully claim that a type of state action (self- 
help) logically entails from a type of political order (anarchy). In the second place, 
considering that it is purportedly a statement of fact, the truth that self-help is the 
principle action in an anarchic order is a contingent one, not necessary, and therefore 
subject to verification.
Thirdly, the statement expressing the law ‘structures cause actions’ reveals the 
causality of Neo-Realism. Just like Realism’s conception of the material world, causality 
is understood to be something that can be known. This is despite the fact that 
Kenneth Waltz claimed in his book Theory of International Politics that observation and 
experience never lead direcdy to knowledge of causes.19 This concession by Waltz did
19 Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York, McGraw-Hill.
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not prevent him from creating a causal law between structures and actions that, whilst 
not described as necessary, is still nonsensical; it is impossible to state factually whether 
or not structures do cause actions, because the causal relationship between structures 
and actions is not capable of being perceived. The statement expressing the law that 
‘structures cause actions’, therefore, has equal validity as the statement expressing the 
law that ‘structures do not cause actions’. The causality of Neo-Realism, far from being 
scientifically construed, is a classic example o f metaphysical nonsense that can be 
shown to be neither true nor false.
Idealism
The rise of political Realism to prominence in international relations theory was a 
response to the political approach that had flourished in the inter-war period o f 1919 
to 1939. In 1941, the British historian E.H. Carr coined the term ‘Idealism’ to describe 
the outlook on international politics between the two great wars of the twentieth 
century.20 This so-called ‘Idealism’ expressed the hopes of many, including those 
conveyed by US President Woodrow Wilson in 1919, that mankind was basically 
peaceful, and that harmonious relations between states could be cultivated through 
observation of rules based on common values.21 When World War II broke out in 
1939, these hopes of a naturally peaceful world were dashed, and a more ‘Realistic’ 
understanding of international politics emerged.
Despite the fact that the term ‘Idealism’ was conceived as part o f a Realist attack 
against irresponsible utopianism, the doctrine that claims that mankind, given the 
choice, is fundamentally peaceful represents a long-standing tradition of political 
thought. At its heart is the assumption, directly contrary to the claims of political 
Realism, that values are more important than structure. In 1795, the great German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant published Perpetual Peace, in which he describes how the 
empirical construction of a ‘universal community’, over time, could eradicate war and
20 Carr, E. H. (2001). The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
21 (8 January 1918). "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points." from 
http://usinfo.state.gOv/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/51 .htm.
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consolidate harmonious relations between democratic republics of sovereign 
individuals, who are naturally interested in living in peace.22 The ‘pacific federation’ of 
states would be underpinned by a deontological system of shared values, entered into 
voluntarily, that establishes the rights and duties of all states within an anarchic 
political order. Perpetual peace is achieved when these values are universally-held 
within the international system. In the 20th century, Kant’s ideas inspired the creation 
of the League of Nations and the United Nations, and purportedly moved Woodrow 
Wilson to claim that, ‘Interest does not bind men together: interest separates men. 
There is only one thing that can bind men together, and that is common devotion to 
right.’23
Political Idealism is not as naive as Realists might suggest. Kant was an ardent 
empiricist who accepted that war is a feature of the international system.24 But, he felt 
that peace was rational, given that the goal of all individuals is to enjoy a prosperous 
life.25 Kant claimed that individuals would refuse to wage war for selfish and corrupt 
monarchs were they afforded the choice.26 Woodrow Wilson is also clearly sober to the 
realities of politics by claiming, like Thucydides, that ingrained interests trigger conflict, 
not co-operation. The difference between Thucydides and Wilson is that Wilson had 
faith in mankind’s natural moral inclination to behave peacefully; that is, peace is not 
only, as Kant asserts, rational, it is right.
Whilst it is understandable why Idealism, which is sometimes described as 
Liberalism, is considered to have rhetorical value in society, it mirrors the logical 
dilemmas of Realism as an explanatory theory. As a theory of international politics, it is 
aspirational, rather than descriptive27. The central tenets of Idealism inspire and cajole,
22 Kant, I. (1983). Perpetual Peace, and Other Essays on Politics. History, and Morals. T. Humphrey. 
Indianapolis, Hackett.
23 Cohen, R. (7 December 2005). The U.N.'s Next Problem - Who Succeeds Annan? New York Times. 
New York.
24 Kant, I. (1983). Perpetual Peace, and Other Essays on Politics. History, and Morals
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West.
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but are meaningless as statements that describe facts about the international system. 
The purpose o f Idealism is to state how the world should be, not to state how the 
world is. Idealism does not increase our understanding o f the world, because it does 
not express statements of fact that are empirically verifiable.28
Firsdy, rather than fallaciously claiming, as Realism does, that political structure 
defines values (i.e. ‘self-help is necessarily the principle action in an anarchic order’), 
Idealism claims that values define political structure, which is equally meaningless. 
Moreover, the Kantian claim that co-operation is necessarily the rational action in an 
anarchic order is neither tautological nor a statement o f fact expressing a truth that is 
capable o f empirical verification, so it fails to describe anything at all.
Secondly, the Idealist claim that mankind is basically peaceful is a metaphysical 
proposition, not a statement o f fact. It is on the same theoretical level as Hobbes’ 
assertion that mankind is naturally quarrelsome. As such, the statement is nonsense. 
Similarly, the Idealist claim that to act peacefully is to act morally is logically vacuous, 
and on a par with Machiavelli’s declaration that virtuous government means judicious 
acts of self-help and ruthless maximisation of power.
These criticisms levelled at political Idealism are mitigated somewhat by the fact that 
Idealists do not claim, as Realists do, to practice ‘philosophy of science standards of 
theorising’. The value of Idealism is its rhetorical power, and it is used to inspire action 
rather than describe it. A more sophisticated theory of international politics that asserts 
the primacy o f values and seeks to explain the international system is social 
Constructivism.
28 Some work in the area of Democratic Peace Theory provides case studies that are available for empirical 
verification. However, the structure of Idealist meta-theory, which is what I am referring to here, does not 
meet philosophy of science standards of theorising because its assumptions about human motivations and 
its designation of the necessity of co-operation are not falsifiable. For empirical studies on democratic 
peace building see Chandler, D. (2005). Peace without Politics? Ten Years of State-Building in Bosnia. 
London, Routledge; Paris, R. (2004). At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.
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Constructivism
The term ‘Constructivism’ was coined in international relations literature by Nicholas 
O nuf in 1989.29 It has since attracted a number o f IR scholars including, most notably, 
Alexander Wendt and Emmanuel Adler. Whereas Structural Realism focuses on the 
material world and Idealism focuses on subjective perception, Constructivism focuses 
on inter-subjective ideas shared by groups that shape international politics. Both 
Wendt and Adler reject the claims of the inevitability of self-help in Structural Realist 
theory and highlight the role of social processes in defining and facilitating change in 
the international system. For Wendt in particular, social interactions are considered to 
be wholly constitutive of and efficacious in the international system, given that he 
regards them as having the ability to ‘create and instantiate one structure of identities 
and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart 
from process’.30 In his article ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of World Politics’, Wendt argues that anarchy does not necessarily entail 
self-help. Instead, the logic o f anarchy is practice and process; anarchic political order 
is a permissive environment of self-help and co-operation: it is state interaction, not 
political structure that defines the international system.31
Wendt claims that there exist three major types of international system.32 The first type 
is competitive, in which states compete with each other and look after number one, 
much like in Hobbes’ state of nature. Co-operation between states is impossible for 
fear of back-stabbing. A competitive security system is zero-sum: one state’s gain is 
another state’s loss. The second type of international system is individualistic, in which 
states still act self-interestedly, but are not directly in competition with each other. Co­
operation between states is possible, but limited. An individualistic security system is 
not zero-sum; states are more concerned with achieving absolute gains rather than 
making gains relative to the interests of other states. The third and final type of
29 Onuf, N. (1989). World of Our Making. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press.
30 Wendt, A. (1992). "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." 
International Organisation 46(2): 394.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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international system is co-operative, in which security is seen as the responsibility of all 
states. National interests mean international interests. A co-operative security system is 
sum-sum: one state’s gain is another state’s gain. Collective security is possible because 
politics are based on common values. Anarchy, claims Wendt, is able to accommodate 
different political systems by virtue of inter-subjective understandings that construct 
institutions.33 These institutions describe and facilitate different patterns of state 
behaviour.
Statements that describe institutions are meaningful, because they are capable of 
being empirically verified; Constructivism invokes no necessary relationship between 
structure and action: institutions are conventions constructed through inter-subjective 
agreement. The truth of statements that describe institutions is, therefore, contingent 
upon state practice, not logically necessary. Constructivism does not claim that 
structures cause action; Constructivism claims that structure is permissive of action, 
whether it is self-help or co-operation. The reality o f the world is constructed by 
process, not defined by an external material world.
Institutions are useful concepts for increasing understanding of the world because 
they tell us something new. For instance, the institution of collective security tells us 
something new about the way in which states behave. In this case, the institution tells 
us that states are co-operating to address common security concerns. The truth of the 
statement ‘states are co-operating to address common security concerns’ is empirically 
verifiable; we are able to observe state behaviour to verify whether or not it is true. The 
usefulness of the term ‘collective security’ in describing reality depends entirely on 
whether or not state co-operation to promote security is observed.
Much of Constructivism seems, on the surface, to make sense. Constructivist 
causality seems to use causal laws that are contingent on process, not necessarily 
imposed by objective laws. The epistemology of Constructivism seems coherent; 
knowledge of the international system is not known a priori: reality is constructed
33 Wendt, A. (1992). "Anarchy is what States Make of it"
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through practice. However, the logic of Constructivist theory suffers from an 
ontological dilemma. The Constructivist claim that reality is socially constructed entails 
the possibility that reality can be re-constructed, at any time, according to the whims of 
states.34 This malleable nature o f reality implies a theory whose ontology is at odds with 
its own apparent epistemological and causal frameworks.
Firsdy, reality is conceived by Constructivism as the invention of states, not as 
phenomena that exist independent o f state perception. This means that there are no 
discoverable facts about the world; the world is how states agree to perceive it to be. 
Constructivism uses Idealist ontology by defining reality in terms of subjective values: 
to be is to be perceived. The theoretical problems induced by this ontology are those 
suffered by Idealism. Most damagingly, if Constructivist theory conceives reality as 
dependent on perception, then it is incapable of describing the world in a meaningful 
way: there is no test that is capable o f confirming whether statements describing reality 
in terms of perception are either true or false.
Secondly, Constructivist ontology unravels the apparendy coherent and sensible 
Constructivist epistemology and causality. I f  to be is to be perceived, then there exist 
no phenomena independent o f perception; if there are no phenomena that exist 
independent of perception, then knowledge of them is obtained a priori, not through 
empirical investigation of the material world; and, if knowledge of phenomena is 
known a priori, then statements describing reality are necessarily true, tautological and 
useless for increasing understanding of the world. This applies to statements describing 
causal relationships too.
As a sophisticated liberal response to Realism, seeking to explain the international 
system as a product of state perception is a conscious attempt, by Wendt at least, to 
eliminate the fallacious necessary connection between structure and process, in this 
case anarchy and self-help. By doing so, Constructivism succeeds in demonstrating that 
anarchy is a permissive environment and introduces the useful concept o f a political
34 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West.
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institution. However, Constructivism encounters its own theoretical difficulties by 
going too far. Instead of effectively negating Realism, Constructivism merely replaces a 
bogus ontology with another. Whilst Realists claim, in vain, that the nature of the 
international system is imposed by the political object of anarchy, Constructivists 
engage in a futile attempt to show that the international system is an inter-subjective 
invention.
SECTION TWO: AN APPRAISAL OF CONSTRUCTIVIST REALISM 
Constructivist Realism: Attempting to bridge the Constructivist/Realist Divide
The central claim of Constructivist Realism is that necessity is the mother of invention. 
It maintains that political actors construct international politics in line with what is 
necessary to survive in a material international system. Constructivist Realism 
considers that Realist doctrine should complement Constructivist doctrine, not oppose 
it.35 The theory seeks to combine the analytical strengths of Realist and Constructivist 
concepts to compose an approach to international politics that attempts to explain an 
increasingly ‘fuzzy and complex world’, in which both the Realist necessity to survive 
and Constructivist social processes are constitutive of an international system 
composed of states and non-state actors.36 The difference between Constructivist 
Realism and Structural Realism is that the former considers political structure to be 
constructed by social processes, rather than a rigid object existing independendy of 
social processes, as the latter contends. The difference between Constructivist Realism 
and Constructivism is that the former considers social processes to be necessary and 
part of a material world, rather than contingent and subjectively invented, as the latter 
contends.
A number of IR scholars have recently attempted to bridge the Realist-Constructivist 
divide. Nicholas O nuf has addressed the question of the nature of reality in his 
considerations over the philosophical difference between constructivism and
35 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West.
36 Ibid.
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postmodernism.37 Although Onuf seems to concede that a material world might exist 
to constrain human behaviour, he remains steadfast in his assertion that ‘it could never 
matter to us other than within our constructions’, thus reducing material objects to the 
core Constructivist focus of inter-subjective beliefs.38 Others, such as Barry Buzan, Ole 
Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, have taken Realist and Constructivist elements to produce a 
theory of ‘securitization’ that seeks to marry inter-subjective processes with ‘post­
sovereign realism’.39 On the one hand, ‘securitization’ represents a process of social 
interaction that subjectifies threat perceptions and makes it hard for ‘objective’ threat 
assessments to be made.40 O n the other hand, the approach accepts the need for 
‘reasonableness’ in securitization processes afforded by an appreciation of an objective 
understanding of what constitutes a ‘real’ threat41 However, rather than creating a 
theory that explains inter-subjective processes in a materially objective world the 
‘securitization’ approach aims to tailor Realism to fit a Constructivist framework. 
Instead of situating Realism in an inter-subjective context, Buzan et al appear to want 
to dilute the tenets of Realism with Constructivist assumptions to the point that 
‘securitization’ corresponds with a Wendtian focus on identity and inter-subjective 
belief.
The only self-declared ‘Constructivist Realist’ is James Gow, who, in his book 
Defending the West, aims to amalgamate the Realist focus on necessity with the 
Constructivist focus on inter-subjective social processes. Gow, to an extent, follows on 
the heels of proponents of ‘international society’, such as Hugo Grotius and Hedley 
Bull, who accept the existence of self-interest and power-maximisation in a 
competitive, material world, as well as the efficacy of constitutive socially-constructed 
rules and institutions, such as sovereignty, that are formed and observed through inter- 
subjective agreement. In The Anarchical Society Bull describes the nature of the 
international system as a society o f states that straddles the Realist and Liberalist
37 Zehfuss, M. (2002). Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
38 Ibid.: 195
39 Buzan, B., O. Weaver, et al. (1998). Securitization: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Lynne
Rienner: 47
40 Ibid.: 30
41 Ibid.: 30
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divide.42 The 17th century Dutch legal scholar Hugo Grotdus claimed that although the 
international system was comprised of sovereign states and, therefore, anarchic, it was 
not characterised by a struggle of all against all; all-out competition was constrained by 
common institutions that promoted universal interests.43 These institutions formed an 
international society in which states behaved according to operational ‘rules o f the 
game’, but also values. On the one hand, Bull’s conception of international society 
acknowledges the Grotian conception of the role of institutions in the anarchical 
sovereign state system; on the other hand, Bull does not go so far as Grotius in 
describing the order maintained by institutions as morally virtuous.44 Rather, 
institutions are symbolic of an international order that exists as ‘an actual or possible 
situation or state of affairs, not as a value, goal or objective’.45 As such, the 
international system is capable o f being described in terms of the Hobbesian element 
of war and power, the Kantian element o f solidarity and the Grotian element of co­
operation.46 There is no type of state activity necessitated by values.
The difference between Bull et al and Gow is Gow‘s deliberate attempt to expose the 
weaknesses of Realism and Constructivism and synthesise their respective strong 
elements to create a theory that reconciles, rather than circumvents, traditionally 
opposing Realist and Constructivist approaches in order to explain necessity in a 
constructed world.
Gow’s Constructivist Realism
Gow’s Position on Pealism
In his book Defending the IVest, James Gow, in preparation for his development of a 
Constructivist Realist approach, appraises the analytical strengths and weaknesses of 
Realism and Constructivism.
42 Bull, H. (1995). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London, Macmillan.
43 Grotius, H. (2005). The Rights of War and Peace: Including the Law of Nature and Nations. London,
Cosimo Classics.
44 Bull, H. (1995). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics.
45 Ibid.: xvi
46 Ibid.
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Gow condemns realism as ‘unrealistic’ because it ignores the complexity o f the 
world. Gow recognises that international politics are comprised of a ‘range of factors 
interacting, making interests multiple and varied — and often contradictory’.47 Some of 
these interests do not correspond with the Realist assumption that the State, which is 
viewed by Realists as the only significant type of political actor in the international 
system, is necessarily motivated to vanquish adversaries in an anarchical structure 
where material gains are zero-sum. Gow makes it clear, however, that this failure of 
Realism to adequately describe a spectrum of political motivations does not mean that 
some states and other political actors do not harbour ‘malign intentions’.48 Rather, it 
means that neither innate human selfishness, as Traditional Realists contend, nor the 
anarchic structure of the international system, as Structural Realists contend, 
necessarily entails brutish competition and self-help. Indeed, co-operation, for 
instance, is also possible, even essential, in achieving Realist objectives of maximising 
power and security in a ‘world where threats and challenges entail more flux, can be 
perceived only dimly and certainly do not fall into any particular regular pattern’.49 
Accordingly, neither the nature nor motivation of political actors has a priori status 
incurred by structure or human nature. States and non-state actors, from the United 
States through the UN to al-Qaida, exhibit a range of behaviours designed to achieve a 
range of goals that express a range of interests.
In recognition of this fluid and multi-faceted international environment, Gow claims 
that the Realist assumption of a rigid, structurally-derived pattern of state-centric self- 
help doesn’t apply in a world where the major threats come from non-state actors50. In 
the 21st century, it is impossible to sit in a chair and formulate an equation that 
succeeds in describing or, therefore, explaining the international system where actors 
are ‘fuzzy and hard to perceive’.51 The 9/11 attacks launched by al-Qaida, for instance, 
are not explained by Realism. Realism’s provision of an a priori rationale for state 
behaviour doesn’t fit the contemporary world because non-state actors ‘have no
47 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West: 21
48 Ibid.: 21
49 Ibid.: 29
50 Ibid.: 32
51 Ibid.: 34
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equivalent to the a priori status o f structurally-based states’, and their nature is only 
discerned a posteriori through empirical investigation.52
However, even though the Realist, a priori-known equation of state-centric, self-help 
international politics is unrealistic, Gow identifies Realism’s recognition of the 
importance of the State, structure and material interest in international politics as an 
analytical strength of Structural Realism.53 The State is still the principle political actor 
in the international system; indeed, Gow claims that the predominance of the State has 
been reinforced by challenges that have sought to undermine its importance, from the 
problem of intrastate conflict to the emergence of non-state and transnational political 
actors. Each has served to highlight the importance of the State by harbouring state­
like political intentions and triggering patterns of behaviour within the international 
system designed to protect the stability of a state-centric international order against 
non-state transgressions. For example, intrastate conflict is more often than not about 
concepts of statehood and waged by non-state actors seeking membership to the 
sovereign state ‘club’.54 The occurrence of intrastate conflict waged by sub-state groups 
harbouring statehood ambitions emphasises the centrality of the concept o f the State 
in the international system. Additionally, non-state actors in the international system, 
especially networks such as al-Qaida that seek to impose a political order that 
necessitates the elimination of the sovereign State as the principle political unit, have 
galvanised efforts in the international community to bolster the power of the State and 
reinforce an international order based on state sovereignty.55
The importance of non-state actors is derived from the threat some pose to a state- 
centric international order. The emergence of conditional sovereignty in a globalised,
52 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West; 34
53 Ibid.
54 The literature on political economy and greed in international relations provides further insight into the 
motivations of actors to use force in this regard, especially within the context of civil war. See Collier, P. 
and A. Hoeffler (2001). Greed and Grievance in Civil War, The World Bank Group; Keen, D. (2000). 
Incentives and Disincentives for Violence. Europe's New Nationalism. R. Caplan and J. Feiffer, Oxford 
University Press; Duffield, M. (2001). Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of 
Development and Security. Zed Books; Reno, W. (1999). Warlord Politics and African States. Lynne 
Rienner.
55 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West: 32
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interdependent world, which many commentators cite as evidence of the diminishment 
of the State, represents changes to traditional rules ‘in order to preserve the position of 
the state, rather than to undermine it’ against sub- or non-state threats to the 
international order.56 In response to intrastate conflict and threats posed by sub- and 
non-state actors, states took ‘action within or across borders in order to protect states 
and their order’.57
Other than its recognition of the State as the principle political actor, the strength of 
Realism lies in its identification of structure as a material part of the international 
system. This is important ontologically because it entails the existence of phenomena 
that can be investigated and verified, and hypotheses about the world that can be 
tested. The Realist recognition of a material world enables a rational approach to the 
study of the international system, because it provides an objective reality that is 
available for Positivist testing and scientific falsification, rather than a subjective reality 
that is simply invented by the perceiver and unavailable for empirical verification. The 
Realist recognition of a material world is also important epistemologically, because it 
enables facts about the international system to be described. The Realist need for 
security is one such fact about the international system that Gow accepts. As such, the 
Realist focus on structure allows for necessity in international politics: security, for 
example, is a ‘necessary part of the equation’ of international politics given the nature 
of the ‘real’ world. The difference between Gow and Structural Realists, however, is 
that Gow believes that the structure that necessitates security-maximisation patterns of 
behaviour is a result of processes of construction, rather than a stand-alone object 
devoid of values entailing actors and behaviour which can be known a priori.58
Gow’s Position on Constructivism
The major flaws of Constructivism, as Gow sees it, are two-fold. Firstly, 
Constructivism suffers from the ‘fallacious’ reasoning that says that because reality is
56 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West: 32
57 Ibid.: 32
58 Ibid.: 35
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constructed, it follows that reality can be reconstructed ‘in whichever way a particular 
author or group wishes’.59 This Wendtian position is considered by Gow to be shallow 
and posited exclusively as a counterpoint to Realism.60 Other Constructivists who have 
sought to develop the theory further have failed to strengthen the ontological and 
epistemological aspects of the Constructivist approach.61 Constructivism, according to 
Gow, is far too Reflectivist and normative: Constructivists, akin to their Critical and 
Post-modern counterparts, reject the notion of an independent reality that can be 
empirically investigated and factually verified; instead, they base their rationality on the 
notion that facts are socially-agreed rather than empirically discovered. For Gow, this 
is no rationality at all; it is ideology, considering that it avails no opportunity for facts 
about reality to be falsified through Positivist testing.62
Secondly, the Constructivist identification of construction with subjective invention 
is misguided. ‘Any social construction’, claims Gow, ‘is still ‘real’ in two senses: in its 
underpinnings and in the way it is felt or perceived’.63 Just because something is 
constructed does not mean that something is ‘arbitrary, or necessarily wrong’, 
including the tenets of Realism.64 Gow supports George Schopflin’s response to the 
Constructivist claim that the international system is socially invented: ‘So what? That 
does not make it any less real.’ 65The need for security and the power to achieve it, for 
instance, is still ‘real’ despite being the product of social processes.
Even though it is expressed in an analytically weak, ideological theory, the 
identification and understanding of social processes and values in the international 
system is an analytical strength. For Gow, structure is a product of social processes and 
it is around structure where values are constructed. The a posteriori status of political 
actors and threats within the international system necessitates social processes, such as 
empirical investigation. Political structure is conceived of as a social construct that
59 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West: 27
60 Ibid.: 28
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represents the interaction of agents with each other and with structure, rather than a 
rigid object necessarily entailing strict patterns o f behaviour and political actors that 
can be known a priori.66 As Gow reasons:
If  there is no necessity that can be claimed for the mutual antipathy in al- 
Qaida’s challenge to the West, then the relevant interactions and 
relationships must be constitutive. Only a socially constructed approach, 
based on empirical understanding of the relevant structures or agents, can 
provide the perspective needed to tackle the real security problems in the 
contemporary world.67
Gow’s appreciation of Constructivism’s identification of the role of social processes 
in the international system mirrors the approach taken by proponents of ‘international 
society’, like Bull, who consider that socially constructed rules are both constitutive 
and descriptive of order in a society o f states. Furthermore, Gow agrees with Bull in 
another area that marries values with structure. For Gow, the ‘material world counts 
because that is where value is attributed’: it is the ‘construction of value around the 
material’ that counts.68 Without material structure, values would be inefficacious 
because ideas themselves have no causal properties; it is behaviour necessitated by 
material structure, constructed by social processes, that affects and reflects change in 
the international system, including values. As Gow states: ‘ideas and values make a 
contribution but only when they reflect need and reality’.69 This notion o f a value- 
bound material structure echoes Bull’s concept of institution-dependent mles: rules in 
themselves are merely ‘intellectual constructs’, unless they are enforced and executed 
through institutions — patterns of behaviour that constitute and protect the material 
international order.70 The identification of a material structure that both reflects and 
necessitates the construction of values and social processes forms the basis of Gow’s 
Constructivist Realism approach.
The Weakness of Gow’s Constructivist Realism
66 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West.
67 Ibid.: 34
68 Ibid.: 29
69 Ibid.: 36
70 Bull, H. (1995). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics: 53
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The four tenets of Constructivist Realism, as extracted from Gow’s Defending the IVest, 
can be understood as thus:
1. Political structure is a product of construction;
2. Political structure can change;
3. Change is necessary: people act when they have to act, not because they want to 
ideologically;
4. Necessity is derived from a material structure constitutive o f social processes
Necessity is the key to Gow’s Constructivist Realism. Necessity in the international 
system is created by Constructivist social processes involving Positivist investigation, 
and is derived from Realist material requirements, Constructivist values or both. 
Although Constructivist and Realist concepts are used in this framework, they are 
theoretically allied to complement each other, rather than negate each other. The 
identification of threats, for example, involves a social process (a dynamic ignored by 
Realism), but that process ‘is not without either empirical foundation or rationality’ 
(two requirements for rigorous theory unfulfilled by Constructivism).71 Gow claims 
that only a constructed approach, based on Positivist investigation of a material world, 
can succeed in explaining a complex international system comprising state and non­
state actors harbouring a range of interests and motivations and exhibiting various 
patterns of behaviour. Constructivist Realism intends to provide the perspective 
needed to tackle the real security problems in the contemporary world, where fuzzy, 
fluid and elusive actors abound. The focus on the empirical is fundamental and 
enduring — it applies even when there are problems of perception, where ‘threats might 
exist, which might be unperceived, but nonetheless perceptible in principle’, or where 
threats ‘are perceived by some, but remain imperceptible to others, who might well be 
sceptical’.72
Indeed, it is the focus on the empirical and the identification of the value of social 
processes in the international system that stands out as the principle analytical strength
71 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West: 35
72 Ibid.: 35
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of Constructivist Realism. These elements address and go far to resolve the fatal 
theoretical weaknesses inherent in Structural Realist and Constructivist approaches, as 
identified by Gow. The identification of actors and threats within the international 
system involves a social process that is rooted in Positivist rationality that limits the 
construction of values, rules and institutions to the empirical sphere, which is, in 
principle, observable and available for testing and verification. This adds an analytical 
rigour that is lacking in both Constructivism and Realism. Gow’s recognition that 
actors and threats are perceivable but not necessarily perceived is a useful 
improvement on Realism and Constructivism, ontologically and epistemologically 
speaking. It means that the Realist assumption of a material world can be made 
without negating the importance of the Constructivist role of perception in 
understanding and explaining agents and structures — an especially valuable assertion 
considering the nature of fuzzy and fluid actors that operate and threaten covertly, but 
exist nonetheless. And the focus on the State as the principle political actor in the 
international system is evidently sensible.
However, as useful as Gow’s approach is in these respects, it does suffer from a fatal 
theoretical flaw, and it arises out o f his designation of necessity in his socially 
constructed world. The strength of Constructivist Realism, as mentioned above, is its 
focus on empirical social processes; this development adds Positivist rationality and 
analytical rigour to the Constructivist approach and rids Realism of an unrealistic and 
rigid equation of a priori international politics. By designating constitutive empirical 
social processes as necessary, however, Gow shoots himself in the foot by prohibiting 
Constructivist Realism from accomplishing the Positivist rationality and a posteriori 
status that it sets out to achieve. The reason for this is straightforward: the world 
cannot be both constructed and necessary. According to Positivist rationality, which 
Gow invokes, reality is constructed, empirical and known a posteriori or it is necessary, 
tautological and known a priori. To describe facts obtained empirically as necessary 
truths, as Gow does, entails a fundamental and irreversible contradiction in the 
Positivist rationality that he seeks to deploy.
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In the first instance, statements of fact that result from empirical investigation are 
not, and can not, be necessary. The very point of Positivist rationality is to verify and 
falsify facts that are contingent on observation, not necessarily the case. This is not to 
say that contingent facts are subjectively invented, arbitrary and meaningless, as Gow’s 
critique of Constructivism suggests; it is to say that meaningful statements of fact 
require processes involving empirical verification. Necessary truths do not require 
empirical verification, because they are not falsifiable. If  facts about the international 
system are necessarily true, as Gow claims, then Gow inadvertently dispenses with the 
need to apply Positivist rationality to investigate the international system, which lies at 
the heart of his Constructivist Realist approach. Gow’s claim of necessity negates the 
raison d'etre of his theory that focuses on empirical social processes in a material world 
by removing the utility o f Positivist rationality — Constructivist Realism’s greatest 
analytical strength.
In the second instance, Gow’s claim of necessity means that Constructivist Realism 
maintains an a priori status for the international system, despite claims that it resolves 
this Realist analytical shortfall through Positivist rationality involving empirical 
processes. According to the logic of Positivism, necessity, as a property, is known a 
priori. Gow’s designation of necessity in the international system, therefore, means that 
the international system and the actors, processes and threats within it, are known a 
priori. For example, if prevention, a major theme in this thesis, is as Gow claims, 
‘necessary and inevitable’ in the face of threats in the contemporary international 
system, then the threats that necessitate prevention have a priori status, contrary to 
Gow’s claims, because they are part of a necessary relationship with a constitutive 
social process. Because prevention is necessary, so must be the threats that necessitate 
it. As such, threats, as well as other constitutive social processes like prevention, are 
not known a posteriori, through empirical investigation, but a priori, by definition. This 
internal inconsistency reduces Constructivist Realism to Structural Realist levels of 
rationality, which, by Gow’s admission, are flawed and in need of remedy.
Making Constructivist Realism Rational
43
The intentions of Constructivist Realism are worthy and its overall approach is useful. 
As such, it remains for this chapter to solve the theoretical dilemmas of Gow’s 
Constructivist Realist approach and provide a coherent theoretical framework that 
identifies empirically constructed social processes in a material world, in line with 
Positivist rationality.
The key to improving Gow’s approach is replacing the concept of necessary action 
with the concept of rational action. The designation of rational action in the 
international system, as opposed to necessary action, will demonstrate the utility of 
Positivist rationality. It will also avoid the empirical/necessity dilemma, but still 
maintain the Constructivist Realist focus on the construction o f non-arbitrary 
structures in a material political world, in accordance with strategic imperatives 
discovered through empirical investigation of social processes that threaten the security 
of political actors. According to Positivist ontology, the social processes constitutive of 
structure are phenomena existing independently of perception: they are capable of 
being perceived, but are not necessarily perceived, in line with Gow’s ontology. These 
phenomena, however, are not themselves necessary, as Gow claims. Rather, empirically 
derived phenomena cause other phenomena, contingent on observations of fact that 
enable rational action, rather than entail necessary action. In order to make 
Constructivist Realism rational, a Phenomenalist ontology, epistemology and causation 
must be used. Material reality is socially constructed through empirical processes; the 
identification of actors and threats within the international system involves a social 
process that is rooted in Positivist rationality that limits the construction of values, 
rules and institutions to the empirical sphere, which is, in principle, observable and 
available for verification.
Adopting a Phenomenalist framework succeeds in explaining rational action and 
legitimate action in international society through the identification of Realist strategic 
imperatives and the role of socially-agreed values. Rational action represents behaviour 
designed to achieve basic security demands arising out of empirical investigation of 
material realities. As material realities changes, so does the rationale of action that seeks 
to achieve security aims. The strategic imperative to achieve security represents the
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Realist identification of enduring self-interest to survive in a material international 
system. Rational action is about what is logical, given the strategic imperative to 
survive, in the face of security threats, be they caused by interstate war, intrastate war, 
terrorism or any other phenomena. Legitimate action reflects values that are 
constructed around the material reality that seek to enforce rational action and shape 
state practice in line with strategic imperatives. Whilst both rational action and 
legitimate action are constructed, the focus on the empirical is less important for 
legitimacy which tends to be codified in static, legal frameworks that serve the purpose 
of providing a normative, value-driven structure within which state practice can be 
judged. International order depends on rational action and legitimate action coinciding 
to the point that legitimising institutions have authority and control over patterns of 
state behaviour that are constitutive and descriptive of international order. Legitimising 
institutions lose authority and control if the values underpinning legitimate action do 
not reflect rational action in the face of strategic imperatives derived from empirical 
investigation of material realities.
Section three of this chapter examines in detail the Phenomenalist approach at the 
heart of Positivist rationality. The final section will outline a revised theory of 
Constructivist Realism that meets Positivist standards o f rationality and achieves what 
Gow originally sought to accomplish — a theory of international politics synthesising 
the strengths of Realism and Constructivism that eliminates a priori Structuralism and 
provides Positivist rationality to social construction.
SECTION THREE: PHENOMENALISM 
Logical Positivism: Setting the Parameters of Rationality
Logical Positivism refers to a philosophical movement that was created in the 1920s by 
a group of philosophers and scientists that took the name of the ‘Vienna Circle’. The 
term ‘logical’ was appended to the term ‘Positivism’ by the Vienna Circle to reflect 
advances made in philosophical logic, in particular the work on symbolic logic by 
Gotdob Frege and Bertrand Russell, that added considerable value to the Positivist
45
approach. The outlook shared by members of the Vienna Circle was of philosophy as 
an analytic discipline that had the sole function of making the meanings of 
propositions clear. This approach to philosophy as an analytical activity, rather than a 
speculative doctrine, flew in the face of the traditional view of philosophy as a resource 
o f moral guidance and a vehicle for metaphysical enquiry that sought answers to 
questions about the hidden depths of reality that science was unable to answer.73 It was 
the intention of logical Positivists to eliminate metaphysics by imposing a limit on what 
philosophy could talk about, which, as Ludwig Wittgenstein described it, was to say 
nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science.74 Leading 
members of logical Positivism included Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, 
Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Carl Hempel and A. J. Ayer. Past 
philosophers such as David Hume, Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill are considered to 
have been Positivist in outlook.75
Indeed, it was David Hume, writing two hundred years prior to the formation of the 
Vienna Circle, who declared in his major work Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding:
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc 
must we make? If  we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school 
metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning 
concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental 
reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to 
the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.76
This quote, as Alfred Ayer once noted, is as an excellent description of the Positivist 
position.77 Positivism claims that the only meaningful types of statement that purport 
to contain truths about the world are either tautologies (that is, self-referential 
propositions, as explained below), or empirically verifiable propositions of fact. I f  a 
statement is neither tautological nor empirically verifiable then it is, quite literally,
73 Schlick, M. (1959). What is the Aim of Ethics? Logical Positivism. A. J. Ayer. London, The Free Press.
74 Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. London, Routledge.
75 Ayer, A. J. (1959). Logical Positivism. London, The Free Press.
76 Ibid.: 10
77 Ibid.: 10
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meaningless. The Positivist outlook on the world is based on an utter rejection of 
metaphysics, which, being expressed neither in tautological statements nor in verifiable 
propositions of fact is considered to be nonsense.78 Metaphysics, unlike the 
investigative endeavour of science, does not deal in facts that can be tested and 
confirmed. That being the case, metaphysics does not contribute to our knowledge of 
the world, because we are unable to learn anything that we can show to be true. As 
Hume so instructed, the logical Positivists of the 20th century sought to commit 
metaphysics ‘to the flames’.
This is not to say that metaphysics was perceived by members of the Vienna Circle 
to have no value at all.79 The language of metaphysics often contains a beauty that is 
absent in scientific propositions. Many philosophers and scientists who have been 
inclined to take a Positivist outlook on the world concede that the metaphysical prose 
of poetry, for instance, inspires and cajoles in important ways.80 Other forms of 
unverifiable forms of expression have merit in society, such as words of 
encouragement that do not relate to any facts, but may succeed in making a depressed 
friend, for instance, feel better. The central point that Positivists make is that 
metaphysical statements do not say anything that is either true or false, so, whatever 
value metaphysics has, it is not in increasing our understanding of the world. As Alfred 
Ayer pointed out, ‘Metaphysical utterances were condemned [by logical Positivists] not 
for being emotive... but for pretending to be cognitive, for masquerading as 
something that they were not’.81 In terms of gaining knowledge of things, metaphysical 
statements are insignificant because they break the rules that any statement must satisfy 
in order to be to be meaningful.
Language and Meaning
78 Carnap, R. (1959). The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language. Logical 
Positivism. A. J. Ayer. London, The Free Press.
79 Ayer, A. J. (1959). Logical Positivism: 10
80 Ibid.: 10
81 Ibid.: 10
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The logical Positivist attack on metaphysics was launched from a position that viewed 
reality as something that could be described, not directly known. Any statement that 
seeks to describe reality must obey certain rules in order to be literally meaningful. 
These rules are based on the assumption that truth can be expressed only in language 
that relates either to logic or to facts. It has already been said that Positivism considers 
only two types of proposition meaningful: tautologies and statements that are 
empirically verifiable. Tautologies are statements of logic in which the subject of a 
sentence is contained in the predicate; instead of giving us new information, 
tautologies dismande concepts we already know about. For instance, ‘a triangle is a 
three-sided shape’ is an example of a tautology. The statement is meaningful, in that it 
expresses a truth about the world. But it doesn’t tell us anything new about triangles, it 
merely clarifies their definition. Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead contended that 
beyond formal logical truths, even mathematical statements such as ‘2 + 2 = 4’ were 
tautological.82 Truths expressed in tautologies are necessary because they refer to 
identities and definitions; a ‘triangle’ necessarily is a ‘three-sided shape’, because the 
term ‘triangle’ means ‘a three-sided shape’: it is logically, factually and linguistically 
impossible for a triangle not to be a three-sided shape. Knowledge of necessary truths 
expressed in tautologies is obtained a priori
, that is, by analysis alone. No empirical verification is required to give meaning to a 
tautology.
Truths expressed in statements of fact, on the other hand, do need to be empirically 
verifiable in order to be meaningful. Statements of fact differ from tautologies in that 
they tell us something new about the world. If  someone tells us that ‘the candle is 
triangular’ we are being told something new about the candle. Knowledge of the truth 
that the candle is triangular is not derivable from mere analysis of the statement 
purporting to express it. For us to know that the candle is triangular, we are required to 
empirically verify the truth of the statement by observing the shape of the candle. It is 
the verifiable nature of this fact that gives the statement ‘the candle is triangular’ 
meaning. Truths expressed in statements o f fact are not logically necessary — the word 
‘candle’ does not mean ‘triangular’, and the candle could turn out to be square upon
82 Russel, B. (1959). Logical Atomism. Logical Positivism. A. J. Ayer. London, The Free Press.
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inspection; knowledge of them is obtained a posteriori, that is, after they have been 
observed. Someone (most likely a metaphysician) who claims that statements o f fact 
are either necessarily true or are contingent, but known to be true without empirical 
verification is literally speaking nonsense.
Although it has been said that tautologies can tell us nothing new about the world 
and still be meaningful, some logical Positivists contended that tautologies are 
poindess statements because they fail to contribute to an increase in knowledge.83 
Tautologies say nothing, so nothing can be learned from them. What, then, is the 
purpose of tautologies in our quest for knowledge? Apart from the poindessness of 
tautologies, Wittgenstein identified the uselessness of contradictions in providing new 
information about the world.84 Whereas a tautology would claim that ‘arsenic is 
poisonous or not’ and tell us nothing about the properties of arsenic at all, a 
contradiction would state that ‘arsenic is and is not poisonous’, which is equally 
hopeless in telling us facts about arsenic. In contrast, the statement ‘arsenic is 
poisonous’ tells us something about arsenic that, whether true or not, is at least 
verifiable. In terms of being able to describe reality through language, statements of 
fact mean more, or at least are more powerful, than tautologies, which are as useful as 
contradictions in increasing knowledge of the world. However, whilst tautologies may 
represent ‘degenerate cases of factual statements’, they are still o f a higher order than 
metaphysical propositions, which bear no relation to fact whatsoever85.
The Verification Principle’
It has been explained that different statements are available to different methods of 
verification, and that the type of method of verification provides a statement its type of 
meaning. If a statement is verifiable through analysis and known to be true or false a 
priori, then it is a tautology expressing a necessary truth or falsehood. Whilst such 
statements are meaningful, they do not tell us anything new. We are unable to learn
83 Hempel, C. G. (1959). The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning. Logical Positivism. A. J. Ayer. London, The
Free Press; Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Tractatus Logico Philosonhicus.
84 Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Tractatus Logico Philosonhicus.
85 Ayer, A. J. (1959). Logical Positivism: 12
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about the world from them. If, on the other hand, a statement is empirically verifiable 
and known to be true or false only after investigation, then it is a statement of fact 
expressing a contingent truth. This type of statement is meaningful because it tells us 
something new about the world, the truth of which we are able to test through 
observation. A statement that is neither a tautology nor a statement of fact is 
meaningless, because it is neither analytically nor empirically verifiable. It is the 
intimate relationship between meaning and verification that underpins the ‘verification 
principle’, as summarised in the famous slogan: ‘the meaning of a proposition is its 
method of verification’.86
The verification principle is a tool used by logical Positivism to build meaningful 
statements that describe everyday things. It is also used to evaluate the worth of other 
theories that seek to increase understanding of the world. The two rival philosophical 
doctrines, Realism and Idealism, are vulnerable to attack. Crudely speaking, the central 
claim of Realism is, ‘reality exists beyond perception’. Conversely, the doctrine of 
Idealism claims that ‘reality exists as perception’. According to the verification 
principle, both statements are meaningless because neither statement is verifiable. The 
kind of question put forth on this matter by Alfred Ayer is, ‘What empirical test could 
decide whether things we perceive do or do not exist outside someone’s mind?’87 The 
statements made by Realism and Idealism are examples of statements of fact that are 
held to be necessarily true without being either tautological or empirically verifiable. 
According to logical Positivists, these statements are meaningless; accordingly, the 
doctrines of Realism and Idealism are nonsensical.
Whether or not a statement is capable of being verified is the key criterion for logical 
Positivists. It is in not being available to scrutiny that makes a proposition insignificant. 
It is a statement’s availability to verification that is essential to the Positivist conception 
of knowledge and reality, and to the success of any theory that seeks to explain the 
nature of the world.
86 Ayer, A. J. (1959). Logical Positivism: 13
87 Ayer, A. J. (2001). Language. Truth and Logic. London, Penguin.
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It follows, then, that for something to be considered real, it must be capable of being 
perceived. As such, a statement describing something must be verifiable. Critically, it is 
the capability possessed by something of being perceived that gives meaning to the 
statement expressing it; it is not in being perceived that makes something real. To say 
something is real because it is perceived is to endorse the unverifiable, metaphysical 
claim of Idealism that the world is a product of private perception. Logical Positivism, 
rather, renders the object of analysis and the analyst interdependent: the ontological 
meaning of something depends on its being observable by someone, and someone’s 
knowledge of something depends on whether or not something is capable of being 
perceived. In other words, for someone to claim that something exists, it is required 
that the observer and the observable collude. The private perceptions of the observer 
and the public availability of the observable combine to construct a human conception 
of existence that is expressible in statements of fact. This is the Positivist approach to 
reality as something that we can describe, rather than something that we can ‘know’ in 
the Realist or Idealist sense of the word; rather than being either entirely objective or 
subjective, reality is a ‘construction’ of language, described through meaningful 
statements of verifiable fact. Material things are ‘permanent possibilities o f sensation’ 
that human observation makes ‘real’.88
The way in which Positivists construct reality requires explanation. The ontology, 
epistemology and causation o f Positivism are Phenomenalist. The doctrine of 
Phenomenalism is an approach taken by Positivism that attempts to avoid the 
theoretical problems suffered by Realism and Idealism in describing the nature of 
knowledge and existence.
Phenomenalism: The Construction of the Material World
The term ‘Phenomenalism’ refers to a philosophical doctrine that deals with 
phenomena. The central claim o f Phenomenalism is that it is impossible to separate 
material things from ‘sense-data’, or phenomena that are capable of being perceived.89
88 Mill, J. S. (2002). A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive. University Press of the Pacific.
89 Ayer, A. J. (1940). The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London, Macmillan.
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The ontological relationship between material things and phenomena reflects the 
epistemic relationship between the private observer and the publicly observable: to say 
that something materially exists is to say that something is capable of being perceived. 
Considering that there is no conceivable test to ascertain whether a material thing 
exists outside of someone’s mind, it is necessarily the case that a material thing is 
indistinguishable from what we perceive: we are unable to confirm the existence of 
something that lies beyond our senses, because the existence of something depends on 
our being capable of sensing it. But, to reiterate, this is not to say that material things 
are the products of perception, for such a claim is unverifiable and equally 
meaningless.
Instead of attempting to show that there exists either an external or an imaginary 
world, which is futile, Phenomenalism claims that there is simply no difference 
between material things and how we describe what we perceive. Material things are 
phenomena. Any statement that describes reality as something other than what is 
perceivable is nonsense, because the meaning of any statement that expresses a truth 
depends on verification. As Ayer declared:
It is indeed logically necessary that any situation that in any degree 
establishes the existence of a material thing should also establish the 
existence of a sense-datum; for we have constructed the sense-datum 
language in such a way that whenever it is true that a material thing is 
perceived, it must also be true that a sense-datum is sensed.90
The constructed ‘sense-datum language’ to which Ayer refers is the type of 
statements that are meaningful according to the verification principle. In order for a 
statement that describes the existence of a material thing to be meaningful, phenomena 
relating to the material thing must be available so that verification of the statement can 
take place. The relationship held between a material thing and phenomena is necessary, 
in much the same way that the relationship between ‘triangle’ and ‘a three-sided shape’, 
as expressed in a tautological statement, is necessary. The type of relationship held 
between a material thing and phenomena is not factual, in the sense that it is factually
90 Ayer, A. J. (1940). The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge: 79
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the case that material things consist of phenomena; rather, it is linguistic: statements 
expressing sentences that describe material things can be expressed equally successfully 
by sentences that describe phenomena.
In addition to the interdependent relationship between the observer and the 
observable, relations held between phenomena themselves facilitate the ‘construction’ 
of a material world. The nature of things as ‘permanent possibilities of sensation’ is 
presented by the appearance of ‘constancy’ and ‘coherence’.91 ‘Constancy’ refers to the 
permanence of things. Say, for instance, that I am in a room and I observe a brown 
table. I then decide to leave the room for a few minutes. On re-entering the room I 
observe the table again, much as it was a short while ago. The existence of the brown 
table appears to be constant and presents itself to the mind as permanent.92 Over time, 
similar experiences of other things lead me to ‘construct’ an idea of a material world 
that consists of things that exist constantly, that is, independent of my sensing them.
‘Coherence’ refers to our sense of consistency about the material world. When, for 
example, I re-enter the room and re-observe the brown table, I perceive similar 
phenomena as I perceived before. The phenomena in this case are a collection of 
rectangular shapes, varying shades of brownness of colour and a hardness of touch, 
arranged in a way that can be described as ‘a brown table’. Sitting at the table I am able 
to look out of a window onto a group of silver birches. If  I decide to turn my head a 
little to the left, different phenomena present themselves. In this instance, I see a fully- 
laden bookshelf and a lamp. When I turn my head further to the left the bookshelf 
disappears from view and I see a guitar. If  I decide to turn my head back to the right, 
the bookshelf reappears much as it was a moment ago. When I reassume my original 
position I am able to see through the window onto a group of silver birches, as before. 
N ot only do the phenomena seem to have repeated themselves, but the phenomena 
occurred in similar contexts. It is the ability to sense in reverse order similar 
phenomena within similar contexts that enables me to ‘construct’ an understanding of 
a permanent material world that endures through time and in space. My construction
91 Ayer, A. J. (1940). The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge: See Chapter 2
92 Ibid.: See Chapter 2
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of reality as a constant and coherent material world enables me to describe it in a 
meaningful way and interact with it in a rational way.
Phenomenalist Ontology
Ontology refers to the existence of things in the ‘real’ world. It describes the objects of 
analysis that theory seeks to explain. It has been said that material things are 
phenomena. The objects of analysis that Positivism seeks to explain, therefore, are 
things that are observable. For instance, for me to say that ‘there is a brown table’ is 
for me to claim that I am able to observe phenomena and describe them in a statement 
of fact. As I have already described, the phenomena in this case are a collection of 
rectangular shapes, varying shades o f brownness of colour and a hardness of touch, 
arranged in a way that can be described as ‘a brown table’. I am able to claim the table 
exists because I am able to perceive these phenomena and describe them in a 
meaningful way. Furthermore, when I leave the room I am still able to claim that ‘there 
is a brown table’, because the table remains, in principle, perceivable. All I need to do 
is to re-enter the room in which I observed the table before and observe it again. The 
existence of the table is not dependent on being perceived, it is dependent on being 
perceivable. The table does not cease to exist when I stop observing it. The statement 
‘there is a brown table’ only becomes meaningless when the table is incapable of being 
observed. O f course, it is possible that on re-entering the room I find that a vandal has 
smashed the table and that the table is no longer there. In which case, the statement 
‘there is a table’ is false. The statement is still meaningful, however, because it is 
verifiable.
To claim that to be is to be perceivable is to describe the Phenomenalist ontology of 
Positivism. Positivism avoids the theoretical problems suffered by Realism and 
Idealism in explaining the world by describing reality as a construct contingent on 
empirical verification, rather than as a necessary truth that is neither tautological nor 
ever capable of being observed.
Phenomenalist Epistemology
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Epistemology refers to how we obtain knowledge of things in the ‘real’ world. 
Positivism approaches reality as something that can be described. Accordingly, the 
Phenomenalist epistemology of Positivism is guided by the verification principle. 
Knowledge of reality is arrived at by verifying the truth of the statements expressing 
facts about the world. Whether the statement is judged to be meaningful depends 
entirely on its method of verification. If, for instance, a statement is analytically 
verifiable, then the statement describing reality is meaningful because it is a tautology 
expressing a necessary truth about the world. However, the statement is utterly useless 
for increasing knowledge, because it can only describe something that is already known 
about. In terms of its epistemic power, tautologies are insignificant. Only empirically 
verifiable statements of fact, such as ‘the table is brown’, enable someone to describe 
the ‘real’ world.
It is because material things are conceived to endure when unperceived that the 
material world can be thought o f as a construction. Reality is constructed through the 
perception of phenomena that are available to the senses, but exist independent of 
them. The conception of reality as a construction designates the epistemic relationship 
between the mind that observes and the world that is observable: someone can state to 
know something when someone is capable of observing something. It is by perceiving 
phenomena, and constructing reality, that someone is able to describe the material 
world.
Phenomenalist Causation
Causation is the relationship been causes and effects. The causation of Positivism is 
the way in which Positivists understand the relationship between causes and effects in 
a world consisting of phenomena.
Like all statements that seek to describe things, statements that express causal 
relationships must fulfil the criterion of the verification principle in order to be 
meaningful. The difficulty in describing causality, however, is that the idea of a ‘cause’ 
is not a tangible thing that can be empirically observed. The idea of a cause is also
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dissimilar from ideas like ‘a triangle’, knowledge of which can be acquired through 
logical analysis alone. A causal relationship seems, rather, to be a sort of ‘secret 
connexion’ held between objects and events, the nature of which is epistemologically 
elusive.93 In order to solve the theoretical problem of causation, Positivists avoid 
asking unanswerable questions. Positivists approach causality as something that can be 
described, not as something that can be directly known; there is no test conceivable 
that can verify the nature of causality that exists beyond the senses, so causality can 
only be described in terms of phenomena. As Ayer wrote in The Foundations of 
Empirical Knowledge, ‘To the question, What are the causes of sense-data in general? 
there can indeed be no significant answer. For it does not make sense to postulate a 
cause of phenomena as a whole.’94 Ayer concludes that ‘if a sense-datum has any cause 
at all it is to be sought among other sense-data’.95
Causal relationships are inferred by observing the behaviour of things that are 
capable of being perceived. It is the consistency of one thing constantly following 
another that forms the impression of a causal relationship. According to the 
verification principle, statements that describe causal relationships must be either 
tautologies or statements of facts. The impression of one thing inevitably following on 
from something else, and the occurrence of one event being indispensable for the 
occurrence of another, is formed by observation of phenomena that follow a pattern 
of behaviour. For example, when I throw a ball up in the air, I expect it to fall back to 
the ground. My expectation of this has arisen because every time I have thrown a ball 
up in the air, I have observed it falling to the ground. My repeated observation of the 
relationship between the two events has led me to believe that it is inevitable. My belief 
of this causal relationship fits with my general understanding of the world. I am able to 
describe the causal relationship between the two events through statements expressing 
the law of gravity: what goes up must come down.
93 Strawson, G. (1989). The Secret Connexion: Causation. Realism and David Hume. Clarendon Press.
94 Ayer, A. J. (1940). The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge: 220
95 Ibid.: 225
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However, whilst the impression of necessity is formed through repeated observation 
of phenomena, the law of gravity is not expressible as a tautology; it is only expressible 
as a statement of fact. The statement ‘what goes up must come down’ is not a logical 
proposition that merely unpacks definitions: ‘what goes up’ does not mean ‘must come 
down’, if one can put it that way. The statement is not verifiable through analysis 
alone: the truth of the statement ‘what goes up must come down’ is not known a priori, 
it requires us to investigate and see whether what goes up does, indeed, come down. 
The statement also tells us something new about the way objects behave; we learn 
from it something about the nature o f the world. As such, the statement ‘what goes up 
must come down’ is a statement of fact that describes phenomena that are capable of 
being perceived. And, like truths expressed in all statements of fact, the truth expressed 
in the statement is contingent, not necessary: it is logically possible that one day what 
goes up is observed to not come down. Indeed, the counter-statement ‘what goes up 
does not come down’ may be false, but it is meaningful because it is, in principle, 
verifiable. Causal relationships are constructed through language; they enable people to 
describe, explain and predict phenomena, and act rationally within the world. Someone 
who claims that a statement expressing a causal relationship is necessarily true is 
literally speaking nonsense.
SECTION FOUR: A REVISED THEORY OF CONSTRUCTIVIST 
REALISM
As has been explained, Constructivist Realism does not consider that Realism and 
Constructivism need to be at loggerheads. Constructivist doctrine should not be 
posited as a counterpoint to Realism, it should be developed to complement Realist 
doctrine and add value to the Realist approach by identifying the role of social 
processes in a material world. By attempting to apply Positivist rationality to 
Constructivism, James Gow tries to show how the Realist concepts of self-help and 
security are necessary within a socially constructed world. However, by designating 
necessity within a constructed international system, Gow fails to reach the Positivist 
standards of rationality he set out to achieve and, therefore, fails to make 
Constructivist Realism rational or realistic.
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The Phenomenalist version of Constructivist Realism
A Phenomenalist ontology, epistemology and causation resolves the theoretical 
dilemmas suffered by Gow’s Constructivist Realism, whilst maintaining the central 
tenets of his theory regarding the centrality of the State and the ‘fuzzy and complex’ 
nature of the world where threats are perceivable, but not necessarily perceived — a 
distincdy Phenomenalist perspective. As such, the main political claims of Gow’s 
theory are not disputed; only the logical construction of his theory needs 
improvement. A Phenomenalist approach succeeds in describing the existence of 
security threats that lie beyond the perceptions of political actors, and in explaining the 
construction o f institutions, the constitutive social processes of the international 
system, in response to empirical investigations of phenomena in line with Positivist 
rationality. The designation of rational action in the international system avoids the 
fatal necessity/construction contradiction that debilitates Gow’s approach. It also 
enables Constructivist social processes to be allied with Realist concepts of security 
and survival by conceiving institutions as rational patterns of behaviour constructed to 
deal with threatening phenomena in the material world that exist independently of 
perception. Empirically derived strategic imperatives to deal with phenomena are not 
necessary, but the construction of institutions that serve strategic imperatives resulting 
from empirical investigation of reality represent non-arbitrary, rational action in 
response to verifiable, though ‘fuzzy’, security threats.
Revised Ontology
In terms of ontology, the reality of the international system is our description of it; to 
understand the international system is to be capable of describing it. Constructivist 
Realism should increase our understanding of the international system by describing it 
in statements that make sense. Phenomenalist ontology, when applied to the 
international system, mirrors the Social Phenomenalist assumption of a material world 
existing independently of political actors, and societies as socially agreed patterns o f 
behaviour constructed over time. The existence of phenomena, including those that 
threaten international society, that exist beyond the perceptions of political actors gives
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rise to the impression of risk in the international system. However, the reality of risk 
does not mean the perception of risk as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens argue.96 
Rather, risk is rooted in the impact caused by phenomena that are capable of being 
perceived, but not necessarily perceived, and can be fully explained by a Phenomenalist 
approach (an in-depth examination of the concept of risk and its place in the 
Phenomenalist approach occurs in chapter 4).
The assumption of phenomena in a material world that exist independendy of 
perception demonstrates the value of social processes involving empirical investigation 
in enabling rational behaviour. Indeed, the relationship between empirical verification 
of phenomena and the ability to act rationally is intimate: to act rationally is to 
understand reality; to understand reality is to describe facts; and, to describe facts is to 
be capable of verifying statements by observing phenomena that exist independent of 
perception. The ability of political actors to act rationally in the face of fuzzy security 
challenges depends on their capability of investigating and verifying phenomena that 
represent ‘permanent possibilities’ of harm. The value of empirical investigation in 
enabling political actors to construct rational institutions in the face of threats that are 
agreed to require prevention is even greater than its basic function in Positivist 
rationality (the role of empirical investigation as an enabler of rational action is 
examined in chapter 3).
Revised Epistemology
In terms of epistemology, knowledge of the international system is obtained 
exclusively through empirical investigation of phenomena that can be described in 
statements of fact. This approach succeeds where Gow fails in giving the international 
system a posteriori status. Because there is no designation of necessity in the 
international system, the international system cannot be known a priori — facts about 
the international system must be observed, verified and are, in principle, falsifiable.
96 See, for example, Giddens, A. (1990). Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge, Polity Press; Beck, U. 
(1998). World Risk Society. Cambridge, Polity Press.
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Revised Causation
The causation of the revised Constructivist Realist approach flows from its ontology 
and epistemology, and is thus: phenomena cause phenomena. The causal connections 
between phenomena are contingent, not necessary. Prevention, for example, is not, 
contrary to Gow’s claim, necessitated by threats. However, it is possible for prevention 
to represent rational action in line with strategic imperatives derived from empirical 
investigation of threats (prevention as rational action will be examined in chapter 2, 
and the causal properties of threats will be looked at in chapter 4).
Again, proponents of ‘international society’ offer a useful insight into the nature of 
causation in the international system. Bull claims that ‘institutions are part o f the 
efficient causation of international order... they are among the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of its occurrence’.97 Bull explicidy rejects the notion of a necessary causal 
relationship; institutions are among the necessary conditions that cause international 
order, but institutions themselves are not necessary. Indeed, it is the socially contingent 
nature of institutions that leads Bull to dismiss ‘structural-functionalist’ conceptions of 
causality, as used in Gow’s Constructivist Realism:
In ‘structural-functionalist’ explanation the statement that these rules and 
institutions fulfil ‘functions’ in relation to international order might be 
taken to imply that international society, for its own survival or 
maintenance, has certain ‘needs’, and that the rules and institutions in 
question are fulfilling those needs. If  we can make the additional 
assumptions that fulfilment of these needs is essential to the survival of 
international society, and that fulfilment of them cannot be carried out in 
any other way, then to say that these rules and institutions fulfil these 
functions is tantamount to endorsing them.98
International Order
97 Bull, H. (1995). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics: 71
98 Ibid.: 72
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According to Hedley Bull, order is ‘a pattern that leads to a particular result, an 
arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values’." Institutions 
are symbolic of an international order that exists as ‘an actual or possible situation or 
state of affairs, not as a value, goal or objective’. The particular patterns of state 
behaviour observable in international society lead to three general states of affairs. The 
first is the primacy of sovereign states and the preservation of international society 
itself; states are capable of being observed to behave in a way that protects their ability 
to manage the international system.100 The second is independence; states are capable 
o f being observed to behave in a way that protects their independence within the 
international system from outside interference.101 The third is peace; states are capable 
of being observed to behave in a way that encourages peace by restricting the 
occurrence of violence.102 These three states of affairs — primacy, independence and 
peace — can be described as the primary goals of the society of states, because it is a 
matter of observable fact that states collaborate in a way such that it actively promotes 
their existence. Accordingly, the concept of international order can be understood as 
being ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals o f the society 
of states, or international society’.103 International order is maintained by institutions, 
or a ‘set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals’.104
The revised version of Constructivist Realism developed here regards international 
order to be based on security imperatives encapsulating the goals of primacy, 
independence and peace, as described by Bull. The Realist imperative for states to 
achieve security within the international system is assumed to be universal and 
enduring, notwithstanding changes in material realities. The social construction of 
institutions that seek to achieve these strategic aims, however, do change in line with 
evolving material realities and the emergence of new security challenges.
99
100
101
102
Bull, H. (1995). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics: 3
Ibid.: 16 
Ibid.: 16 
Ibid.: 17
103 Ibid.: 8
104 Ibid.: 71
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Threats are phenomena that cause other phenomena. As such, threats cause the 
construction of institutions in line with strategic imperatives. Institutions that seek to 
maintain international order through the facilitation and legitimisation of state practice 
undertaken ‘towards the realisation of common goals’ adapt to the demands of 
changing material realities. For example, the institution of sovereignty has continually 
adapted to fit evolving situations comprising different threats, from religious conflict 
and war in the national interest to intrastate war and terrorism. The erosion of states’ 
right to exercise absolute sovereignty in the post-Cold War period, for instance, 
reflected the strategic imperative to intervene in conflict occurring inside state borders 
— a situation that was anathema to the authors of the treaties of Munster and 
Osnabriick at the 1648 Peace of Westphalia who established sovereignty as a political 
and legal principle.
The Rational Action I  Legitimate Action Astigmatism
Accordingly, institutions can be described as rational but not necessary. The 
rationality of state behaviour is derived from empirical investigations of ever-changing 
phenomena that are perceivable, but not necessarily perceived. State practice is rational 
when it succeeds to facilitate action that achieves security aims within material 
situations. Rational action represents logical behaviour in line with strategic imperatives 
and the nature of observable security threats. Prevention, for instance, in the face of 
unconstrained phenomena that are not subject to coercion or deterrence, is rational 
given the material need to address threats pro-actively. However, prevention is not 
necessary because the preventive state practice is contingent on empirical investigation 
o f threats that cannot be determined a priori. Legitimate action represents state practice 
that observes the social agreement o f values that seek to enforce rational action 
through legal and socio-political instruments, in support of the strategic imperatives 
essential to international order. Legitimising institutions, such as the self-defence and 
collective security institutions enshrined in the UN Charter are contingent on social 
agreement of what valid and acceptable behaviour is and what is not. I f  legitimising 
institutions, such as the UN Charter, do not reflect rational action in light o f material 
realities — such as prevention in the face of unconstrained threats — then a rational
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action/legitimate action astigmatism ensues. In this case, international order is hard to 
sustain considering the emergence of state practice that challenges legal notions of 
valid and acceptable behaviour and, therefore, the authority and control of 
international law.
CONCLUSIONS
The principle analytical strength of Constructivist Realism is its focus on the empirical 
and its identification of the value o f social processes in the international system. 
Recognising that actors and threats are perceivable but not necessarily perceived, as 
well as the continued importance of the State, are particularly useful insights given the 
complexities and nuances of the contemporary international system. The target to 
provide analytical rigour to Constructivism and make Realism realistic is correct, but 
Gow falls short of it by inflicting his theory with a fatally problematic relationship 
between necessity and construction. The revitalisation of Constructivist Realism with 
Phenomenalist ontology, epistemology and causation, means, however, that the target 
can be reached. The elimination of necessity from Constructivist Realism means that 
phenomena in the international system can be meaningfully described, and rational 
action in a constructed world can be explained.
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CHAPTER TWO
Prevention
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of prevention as rational action in international society reflects the 
construction of institutions in line with changes in material realities. Prevention is not, 
however, necessary.105 The rationality of prevention is empirically rooted and in line 
with strategic imperatives derived from investigation of threats that are perceivable, 
rather than perceived. Empirical verification of the existence of unconstrained and 
extremely violent terrorist groups operating covertly in the post-9/11 era has led to a 
re-rationalisation o f the principles of sovereign independence and the non-use of force 
that underpin international order, as well as a re-conceptualisation of the danger posed 
by WMD proliferation.
Indeed, the institution of prevention has adapted to meet evolving material security 
demands. The post-World War One strategic imperative to react to occurrences of 
attack by coercible, risk-averse states was enshrined in the UN Charter in the face of 
the threat posed by interstate war. Subsequently, the logic of deterrence that 
characterised the Cold War situation supported a coercive strategy that relied on 
reactive mechanisms to protect a UN order based on the mutual recognition of 
sovereignty. In the post-Cold War world, however, an observable material reality 
consisting of non-state threats to international order operating inside and across state 
borders prompted the construction of a new strategic imperative to prevent conflict 
from occurring within states, not just between states. Pro-active mechanisms taken as 
part of a strategy to control threats supported the post-Cold War imperative of conflict
105 As explained in Chapter 1, necessity is a metaphysical claim that can be expressed only in tautological 
statements. Since politics cannot be expressed in tautological statements, but only in statements of fact, 
institutions cannot be described as necessary.
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prevention, which, although preventive in ambition, was strictly limited to the 
diplomatic sphere. After 9/11, however, the strategic imperative to prevent attacks by 
unconstrained actors has made prevention more urgent. A coercive strategy in the face 
of risk-taking, non-state terrorist groups that embrace death and aim to cause mass 
destruction fails to make sense106. Rather, a controlling strategy that seeks to address 
threats before they materialise through pro-active mechanisms, including the option of 
military force, represents rational action in recognition of undeterrable and incoercible 
threats of potentially catastrophic magnitude107.
However, despite its strategic rationality, prevention does not represent, per se, 
legitimate action in the post-911 era. The establishment o f strategic imperatives based 
on empirical verification of the post-9/11 material reality has not been accompanied by 
social agreement on the rules that regulate action taken in anticipation of threats that 
are determinable through the assessment of information, as opposed to action taken in 
reaction to actual attacks. Socially-agreed values have not been constructed around the 
post-9 /11 material reality. Consequently, preventive state action represents defacto state 
practice that tests the authority and control of the legitimising institutions in light of 
new strategic imperatives.108 This situation marks a rational action/legitimate action 
astigmatism in the face of ever-changing strategic realities. Resolving this astigmatism 
by reconstructing legitimising institutions to enable states to take rational action based 
on the assessment of information is the foremost challenge for states seeking to 
maintain international order against unconstrained threats that demand prevention.
This chapter has four sections. Section one examines the concept of prevention and 
establishes a definition of ‘prevention’ that is to be used in this thesis.109 Section two 
examines the status of prevention in the post-1945 and Cold War eras. Section three
106 Freedman, L. (2004). Prevention, Not Preemption. Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption. Regime
Change, and US Policy toward Iran. Iraq and North Korea. A. T. J. Lennon and C. Eiss. London, MIT
Press.
107 Ibid.
108 The concepts of ‘authority’ and ‘control’ of international law are contained in Arend, A. C. (2004).
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force. Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption. Regime Change.
and US Policy toward Iran. Iraq and North Korea. A. T. J. Lennon and C. Eiss. London, MIT Press.
109 The definition of ‘prevention’ used in this study builds on the definition of ‘prevention’ used by
Lawrence Freedman. See Freedman, L. (2004). Prevention, Not Preemption.
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examines the status of prevention in the post-Cold War era. And, section four 
examines the status of prevention in the post-9 /11 era.
SECTION ONE: DEFINING PREVENTION 
Prevention vs. Pre-emption
In a way, prevention has been the strategic imperative of international society since its 
inception at the Peace of Westphalia. The principle of sovereignty was constructed, 
and has since been re-constructed, to prevent war from occurring for a variety of 
reasons, ranging from religion and dynasties to national interests. However, 
‘prevention’ in strategic terms means something more than the wish to avoid violence. 
Prevention is action taken in anticipation of threats, rather than in reaction to the 
materialisation of threats. The term encapsulates action that seeks to both prevent and 
pre-empt threats, as each action is often understood. This broad definition of 
‘prevention’ is important because it diminishes the starkness of the distinction cited by 
scholars between preventive and pre-emptive action, and enables a clearer distinction 
to be made between coercive, reactive action and controlling, proactive action, which 
is the important dichotomy in strategic terms.110 This approach does not ignore the 
differences between prevention and pre-emption, it merely subordinates the 
importance of these differences to the more crucial distinction between coercive 
strategies designed to react to attacks by risk-averse actors that are, in principle, 
deterrable, and controlling strategies taken proactively in anticipation of attacks by 
unconstrained actors.111 These concepts will be explored below.
Before the differences between coercive/reactive and controlling/proactive 
strategies are examined, the distinction between prevention and pre-emption is worth 
noting, if only to affirm the range and type of action that is meant by ‘prevention’ here. 
Lawrence Freedman offers the most effective description o f the differences between 
action that intends to pre-empt threats and action that intends to prevent threats, and
110 Freedman, L. (2004). Prevention, Not Preemption.
111 Ibid.
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he articulates it along the following lines.112 Imagine State A is in conflict with State B. 
State A’s firm intentions and robust capabilities to defend its interests have made State 
A feel confident that it has deterred State B, given that State B knows that it would 
face either tough resistance from State A (Freedman calls this deterrence by denial) or 
‘punitive retaliation’ (deterrence by punishment) if it launched an attack. Now imagine 
State A perceives State B is growing stronger to the point that State B would soon be 
powerful enough to overwhelm State A’s resistance or effectively cushion the blow of 
any retaliatory action. State A may decide to take action in order to prevent State B 
from reaching the position of being able to feel bold enough to strike. Freedman 
claims that State A’s action would qualify as prevention if, at a minimum, it had the 
objective of either disarming State B in order to keep it militarily less powerful, or 
changing the character of the political regime of State B so that whatever State B’s 
military capability, it would no longer pose a threat.113 On the other hand, State A 
might decide to not take preventive action and, in doing so, might allow State B to 
acquire a superior capability. At this stage, State A might judge that State B is no longer 
subject to deterrence, regret not taking action before and decide to take action 
immediately in order to pre-empt an imminent attack. Freedman claims that ‘a pre­
emptive war takes place at some point between the moment when an enemy decides to 
attack — or, more precisely, is perceived to be about to attack — and when the attack is 
actually launched’.114
For Freedman, preventive action and pre-emptive action have different rationales 
and cause different effects. Prevention is ‘cold-blooded’ and ‘intends to deal with a 
problem before it becomes a crisis’.115 Preventive action nips inferior threats in the bud 
before they grow in strength by exploiting ‘existing strategic advantages by depriving 
another state of the capability to pose a threat’, or by bringing about regime change.116 
The desired effect of addressing factors that may contribute to the development of 
threats is the creation of situations where threats do not have the chance to become
112 Freedman, L. (2004). Prevention, Not Preemption.
1.3 Ibid.
1.4 Ibid.: 39
115 Ibid.: 39
116 Ibid.: 38
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imminent, and deterrence is maintained. In contrast, pre-emption is ‘a more desperate 
strategy employed in the heat of crisis’.117 Pre-emptive action is more likely to trigger 
unintended consequences, including starting a possibly unnecessary and undesirable 
war with a highly capable adversary, and creating an adverse change in the very balance 
of power that pre-emption sought to protect.118
Whilst Freedman makes it clear that prevention and pre-emption are different, their 
differences exist really as tactical variations of the same strategy, namely to deal with 
threats ‘as they develop rather than after they are realised’.119 The substantial difference 
between prevention and pre-emption is that prevention is taken to address threats 
early, whilst pre-emption is taken to address threats later.120 Preventive action and pre­
emptive action represent two tokens o f a single type of strategy that anticipates attack, 
and seeks to control events by pro-acting against perceivable threats. This type of 
controlling, proactive strategy stands in contrast with the type of strategy that reacts to 
attack.121 In the contemporary strategic environment, it is the dichotomy between 
controlling/proactive strategies taken against a range o f adversaries, including non­
state actors, and coercive/reactive strategies executed primarily in the face of state 
adversaries that is important. However, it is understanding the rationale of preventive 
action as a type of strategy vis a vis deterrence, rather than as a means of reinforcing 
scenarios governed by the logic of deterrence, whether it is taken early to address a 
weak but strengthening threat or later to address a strong threat that is perceived to be 
imminent, that is essential to succeeding in defining prevention as an institution that 
represents rational action in the face of perceivable non-state threats that are 
unconstrained by balance of power politics, undeterrable in principle and potentially 
catastrophic if allowed to materialise. The definition of ‘prevention’ used here 
encapsulates both preventive action and pre-emptive action as described by Freedman, 
and is used to describe controlling strategies that seek to pro-act, at either early or late 
stages of development, threats that require tackling prior to their realisation.
117 Freedman, L. (2004). Prevention, Not Preemption: 39 - 40
118 Ibid.: 40
119 Ibid.: 37
120 Ibid.
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Coercion vs. Control
In order to understand prevention, it is important to explain the differences between 
coercive and controlling strategies.122 The aim to control events and situations is an 
essential feature of strategies that seek to prevent threats, and it constitutes one of the 
two major qualitative differences between prevention and the coercive security strategy 
that is currendy codified in international law. The other major difference is pro-action, 
which, along with the reactive self-defence and collective security institutions that are 
enshrined in the UN Charter, is examined later below.
Coercive Strategies
Coercive strategies, such as deterrence, aim to maintain existing balances o f power by 
containing threats through the instilment of fear over potential adverse consequences 
of non-compliance with the status quo. As such, coercive strategies assume the existence 
of threats and adversaries that are, both in principle and practice, deterrable.
Consider State C and State D. State C is confident that it has the might to coerce 
State D into observing the status quo, despite the fact that State D is developing a 
strong military capability. In recognition of this security dilemma, State C, in response 
to State D ’s rate and scale of military growth, acquires a nuclear weapon in order to 
deter State D from launching an attack. State D mirrors State C’s behaviour and 
develops a nuclear capability of its own. In time, State C and State D  have 1,000 
nuclear weapons each, some of which are hidden. State C considers pre-empting a 
nuclear attack by State D  by attacking and eliminating State D ’s nuclear capability, but 
decides that the approach is too risky: if the attack fails to destroy all o f State D ’s 
nuclear assets, then State D could retaliate with its remaining nuclear weapons to 
potentially catastrophic effect and bring about the very war that State C’s pre-emptive 
action sought to prevent. As such, State C and State D remain locked in a symmetrical 
military stand-off, each afraid of attacking the other for fear of assuring its own 
destruction.
122 See Freedman, L. (2004). Prevention, Not Preemption.
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Actors that adopt coercive strategies such as deterrence outlined above ‘assume that 
an adversary’s relevant calculations can be influenced’ in light of the self-interest of the 
adversary to survive and prosper.123 An adversary is deterred when the potential cost of 
attacking outweighs the benefits of not attacking, in line with its self-interest to ensure 
its own well-being. Its decision-making processes err on the side of caution, and its 
cost-benefit strategic calculations are informed by the context within which they make 
them. Deterrence works between two or more risk-averse adversaries whose power 
relations are balanced either in favour of one power, which is able to coerce other 
powers to comply with the status quo, or symmetrically where powers are equally 
matched and coerced to maintain the status quo through fear of mutually assured 
destruction.124
Controlling Strategies
In contrast, controlling strategies, as the name suggests, aim to control adversaries that 
cannot be relied upon to take cautious decisions. The type of anticipatory strategy 
represented by State A’s preventive and pre-emptive actions against State B, in 
Freedman’s scenarios, is a controlling strategy, in that each action seeks to deal with 
actors that are not risk-averse. In Freedman’s example, State A perceives State B to be 
developing, or to have developed, a military capability that would enable it to fend off 
concerns over State A’s ability to resist or retaliate against an attack. As such, State A 
takes action early to prevent a weak threat from becoming stronger, or later to pre­
empt an attack that is deemed to be imminent. To continue Freedman’s narrative 
further, were State A to decide to take neither preventive nor pre-emptive action, and 
State B were to invade State A, then State B’s victory reflects the result of 
unconstrained behaviour: State B decides to attack State A because it judges that the 
benefits o f attack outweigh the potential costs. In this case, the originally weak and 
coerced State B becomes undeterred in practice as the balance of power changes and 
circumstances allow State B to become a risk-taker. However, State B remains 
undeterrable in principle; even after State B’s victory, another State could emerge as a
123 Freedman, L. (2004). Prevention, Not Preemption: 38
124 Ibid.
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stronger rival in the balance of power and deter State B in the way that State A had 
succeeded previously. Furthermore, to clarify the status of State B as deterrable in 
principle, the preventive and pre-emptive actions taken by State A to avoid a scenario 
where it is invaded by State B, in Freedman’s original illustration, are examples of a 
controlling strategy taken solely in support of a coercive one. State A uses force to 
prevent or pre-empt an attack by State B in order to maintain the status quo in which 
State A is able to coerce State B in the existing balance of power. This 
controlling/coercive strategic mix works because State B is deterrable in principle, 
considering State B’s enduring self-interest to survive and the ever-present constraint 
placed on its behaviour by context-dependent cost-benefit calculations.
Indeed, the fundamental difference between coercive and controlling strategies is 
that controlling strategies are taken against actors that are not afraid of any adverse 
consequences entailing  from non-compliance with the status quo. Controlling strategies 
can support coercive strategies, as explained above. However, in the face of actors that 
are undeterrable in principle — not just sometimes in practice — controlling strategies 
are taken as the primary means o f maintaining the status quo against threats that cannot 
be coerced by the prospect o f either tough resistance or punitive retaliation. 
Unconstrained non-state actors, such as al-Qaida, represent a different type of 
adversary. They gamble rather than mitigate risk.125 They embrace death through 
martyrdom rather than maximise chances of self-survival. And, they view weapons of 
mass destruction as weapons of choice, rather than devices that entail deterrence based 
on the fear of mutually assured destruction.126
Consider again State A, this time pitted against non-state adversary Terrorist E. State 
A’s firm intentions and robust capabilities to defend its interests have, nevertheless, 
made State A feel vulnerable to Terrorist E, given that Terrorist E has been shown to 
be undeterred by the prospect o f tough resistance or punitive retaliation. Unlike State 
A, Terrorist E has no territorial integrity and population to protect, or international 
laws to observe, and is motivated by the prospect of achieving death through a
125 Freedman, L. (2004). Prevention, Not Preemption.
126 Stem, J. (1999). The Ultimate Terrorists. London, Harvard University Press.
71
martyrdom operation whose end objective is to cause the utmost destruction and loss 
of life. State A’s calculations are no longer context-dependent, as they were against 
State B. A coercive strategy is irrational by virtue of the existence of an adversary that 
is undeterrable in principle, not because of the emergence of an undeterred adversary 
within a shifting balance of power. Terrorist E ’s behaviour is not influenced by balance 
of power cost-benefit calculations, nor is it constrained by warnings of punishment 
were it not to comply with the status quo.
In this context, the usefulness of the distinction made by Freedman between 
prevention and pre-emption is eliminated, considering that the corresponding 
distinction between weak and strong threats disintegrates with regard to 
unconventional, undeterrable adversaries whose conventional military weakness 
constitutes their main operational strength. Any variation of a controlling strategy that 
anticipates an attack by Terrorist E seeks to eliminate the threat of attack at whatever 
stage of development, rather than support a coercive strategy that either reinforces or 
re-establishes a balance of power governed by deterrence, because the assumption that 
Terrorist E cannot be coerced endures. The important dichotomy here is between 
coercive and controlling strategies, not between prevention and pre-emption. In the 
case of State A against Terrorist E, State A’s use o f a controlling strategy is the only 
rational option open to it, given that any coercive activity by State A will not enable it 
to achieve its security goals. State A will not profit by waiting to see whether Terrorist 
E will be deterred; the onus on State A is to deny Terrorist E the capability to carry out 
the attack it intends to launch. This is not to say longer-term, diplomatic initiatives by 
State A to counter the root causes o f terrorism are not rational; it is to say that if 
Terrorist E  is perceived to constitute a threat, notwithstanding its stage of 
development, it would be irrational to attempt to coerce Terrorist E to comply with 
the status quo. Only a controlling strategy that addresses the threat posed by 
undeterrable Terrorist E  before it materialises makes sense.
Re-visiting the scenario involving nuclear powers States C and D, with the 
involvement of Terrorist E, clarifies the rationale of controlling strategies in the face of 
an undeterrable terrorism threat. Consider State C and Terrorist E. State C and State D
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are locked in a symmetrical nuclear stand-off, each afraid o f attacking the other for fear 
of assuring its own destruction through retaliatory strikes. Now consider Terrorist E, 
who is perceived by State C to be seeking, or perhaps possessing, a nuclear weapon. 
State C is not certain whether Terrorist E has a nuclear weapon or not, but it is certain 
that Terrorist E wants one. The rational choice faced by State C between prevention 
and pre-emption dissolves in this case; what matters is not whether the threat posed by 
Terrorist E is at its early or late stage o f development, but whether the threat posed by 
Terrorist E can be controlled. State C will glean no strategic benefit by choosing to act 
either early or late against Terrorist E, because coercion is not a factor in State C’s 
strategic calculation. The assumption is that Terrorist E will use a nuclear weapon if it 
acquires one — it is assumed that for Terrorist E, unlike States C and D, acquisition of 
a nuclear weapon means deployment.127 Therefore, strategically-speaking, there is no 
distinction between prevention and pre-emption when it comes to addressing the 
threat posed by Terrorist E. Preventing Terrorist E  from acquiring a nuclear capability, 
and pre-empting an imminent attack by Terrorist E  involving a nuclear weapon, are 
equivalents given the assumption that acquisitions means deployment. The crucial 
security imperative for State C is to control the enduring and constant threat posed by 
Terrorist E in order to prevent the threat from materialising.
The nuclear deterrent that balances power between States C and D does not explain 
the strategic relationship between State C and Terrorist E, for two reasons. Firstly, 
Terrorist E is a risk-taker who is not motivated by self-survival. Whereas State D 
considers it too risky to attack State C for fear of triggering a potentially catastrophic 
response and bringing about a situation it seeks to prevent, Terrorist E  is constrained 
neither by fears of retribution nor by concerns over an undesirable war, considering 
Terrorist E plans to die in the attack. Secondly, State C and Terrorist E  hold an 
asymmetric strategic relationship. In addition to being unconstrained by fear over 
punitive responses, Terrorist E ’s strategic goals are served best through the use of 
nuclear weapons, not through their exhibition for deterrence purposes. In order to
127 Benjamin, D. and S. Smith (2005). The Next Attack: The Globalization of Jihad. London, Hodder and 
Stoughton. Kenneth Waltz’s argument that the very possession of WMD imposes constraints on their use 
does not apply to ‘gambler’ actors, like al-Qaida, that are assumed to view WMD as offensive weapons.
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compensate for its lack of any second-strike capability and its weak conventional 
military power, Terrorist E is willing to use its nuclear capability as an offensive 
weapon in support of its strategic objective to maximise fear and destruction. A 
nuclear weapon is useful to Terrorist E as an offensive instrument in a way that it is 
not useful to both States C and D. As such, State C assumes that Terrorist E, a 
conventionally-weak actor unconstrained by the laws of war or the logic of deterrence, 
and motivated by the desire to die whilst causing wanton mass destruction, will use a 
nuclear weapon given the opportunity.
The assumption that an adversary will use force given the chance makes preventing 
that adversary from acquiring the means to do so a strategic imperative. This 
imperative is all the more important considering the prospect on an unconstrained 
actor utilising weapons of mass destruction. In the case o f State C vs. Terrorist E, as 
with the case of State A vs. Terrorist E, a controlling strategy represents rational action 
in support of the goal of achieving security against an undeterrable and incoercible 
adversary that, it is assumed, will use force once the means to do so are acquired. The 
imperative to control this type o f threat entails the need for a strategy that pro-acts to 
address potential attacks, rather than one that reacts to attacks that have already 
occurred.
Reaction vs. Pro-action
After control, the second definitive characteristic of prevention is pro-action. In order 
to be effective, controlling strategies that are designed to prevent threats need to be 
capable of pro-acting against undeterrable adversaries. A controlling strategy that 
reacts to an attack signals a strategic failure. The capability to pro-act against 
adversaries in order to prevent attacks before they materialise is essential to the success 
of controlling strategies against threats that cannot be coerced through deterrence. 
Indeed, it is impossible to control undeterrable threats without pro-acting; acting 
rationally to control undeterrable threats, therefore, requires the capability to act pro­
actively. The strategic requirement to pro-act to control contemporary threats is
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highlighted further by the recognition of the potentially catastrophic WMD terrorism 
threat.
'Reactive Mechanisms
Reactive mechanisms facilitate coercive strategies such as deterrence, which are based 
on the assumption that adversaries are deterred from attacking by the prospect of 
potentially damaging reactions to non-compliance with the status quo. The fear of 
potential reaction by others is an essential feature of coercive strategies: nuclear 
deterrence, as illustrated in the scenario involving States C and D above, works 
because State C and State D  each fear the reactions of the other to a nuclear attack. 
The risk of second strike capabilities reacting to a first strike deters each state from 
using nuclear weapons offensively. As such, the threat posed by nuclear war between 
States C and D is contained. Coercive strategies, such as nuclear deterrence, therefore, 
operate through reactive mechanisms. Security and stability are maintained by the 
effect o f deterrence caused by the mechanisms in place to react to non-compliance 
with the status quo.
Reactive mechanisms are also at play in the scenario involving States A and B, as 
illustrated above. State A is able to deter State B from attacking because it is capable of 
coercing State B into complying with the status quo by threatening it with tough 
resistance or punitive measures if  and when it decides to launch an attack. State A is 
confident that it can deter State B because State A knows that State B fears its military 
capability to react powerfully against any potential attack. State A might wish to 
reinforce or re-establish this coercive strategy by taking preventive or pre-emptive 
measures in order to showcase its power and demonstrate the type of reaction State B 
would face if it chose to launch an attack. Were State A to implement a controlling 
strategy in this way, the pro-active measures taken would be in support of State A’s 
over-arching coercive strategy that operates on reactive mechanisms.128
128 Freedman, L. (2004). Prevention, Not Preemption.
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Reaction is important not only as a facilitating mechanism for coercive strategy; the 
concept of reaction also represents legitimacy within contemporary international 
society. International law regulating the use of force between states remains based on 
the principle of ‘strike if and when struck upon’. Reaction defines the kind of military 
action that is legitimate. A state acts legitimately only if an armed attack occurs against 
it. This precept underpins the self-defence and collective security institutions that are 
enshrined in the UN Charter and, thus, codified in international treaty law. State A, for 
example, is able to use force in self-defence against State B only if State B first attacks 
State A. The type of preventive and pre-emptive actions taken by State A against State 
B, as illustrated in Freedman’s original scenario, are illegitimate uses of force, according 
to the self-defence criteria. For State A to act legitimately, State A would need to be 
reacting to an actual attack by State B in order to use force against it. The condition 
that states use force only in reaction to attack is also fundamental to the UN’s 
collective security institution. The UN Security Council, the body uniquely responsible 
for maintaining international peace and security, is, too, constrained by the self-defence 
criteria. The UNSC is able to authorise the use of force only in the event of a material 
breach of the peace, namely an act o f aggression involving armed force by one state 
against another. Reactive mechanisms frame the entire legitimising framework for the 
use of force in the international system. As such, reactive mechanisms facilitate 
coercive strategies between deterrable actors, as well as define the type of action, as 
prescribed by international law, that is legitimate. Section two examines further the 
concept of legitimacy in international relations and the institutions enshrined in the 
UN Charter that regulate the use of force between states and sustain international 
order.
Pro-active mechanisms
In contrast with reactive mechanisms, pro-active mechanisms facilitate controlling 
strategies in the face of unconstrained adversaries. As explained above, unconstrained 
adversaries, such as death-embracing non-state terrorist phenomena like al-Qaida, 
cannot be coerced and deterred from attacking by the prospect of potentially damaging 
reactions to non-compliance with the status quo. As such, threats posed by
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unconstrained actors must be controlled through pro-active mechanisms. Pro-action is 
action that is taken in advance to deal with an expected difficulty, and is anticipatory in 
nature. Unlike the use of force in coercive strategies, force in controlling strategies 
operating through pro-active mechanisms is not used in reaction to the occurrence of 
an attack, but in anticipation of an attack, in order to prevent a threat from 
materialising in the first instance. Pro-action is an essential component of controlling 
strategies.
Imagine again State A and Terrorist E. State A’s perceived vulnerability to 
unconstrained Terrorist E means that State A’s use of a controlling strategy against 
Terrorist E  is the only rational option open to it, given that any coercive activity be 
State A will not enable it to achieve its basic security goals. As explained above, only a 
controlling strategy that addresses the threat posed by Terrorist E  before it materialises 
makes sense for State A, because Terrorist E  is assumed to be undeterrable by either 
the prospect of tough resistance or punitive retaliatory action. Accordingly, State A 
cannot afford to rely on reactive mechanisms to ensure reasonable levels of security in 
the face of Terrorist E  — State A must take pro-active measures in order to control the 
threat before it has a chance to materialise. These pro-active measures do not share 
with reactive mechanisms the principle of ‘strike if and when struck upon’; rather, they 
are guided by the imperative to strike unconstrained adversaries prior to the launch of 
an attack, based on the empirically-derived impression that unconstrained adversaries 
will use force once they have the capability to do so.
The strategic imperative to prevent threats that drives pro-action applies to an even 
greater degree in the scenario involving State C and Terrorist E. Terrorist E  is 
perceived by State C to be seeking, or perhaps possessing, a nuclear weapon. Given 
that Terrorist E  is considered by State C to be undeterrable, the rational option for 
State C is to act pro-actively in order to prevent Terrorist E from achieving the means 
to deploy a nuclear capability. Calculations assessing first and second-strike capabilities 
do not feature in State C’s strategic planning. The perception that Terrorist E will use a 
nuclear weapon if it possesses it is a strategic corollary, and the onus is on State C to 
ensure its own security by anticipating an attack and acting forcefully in advance o f its
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occurrence. As with State A, State C cannot rely on reactive mechanisms to ensure 
Terrorist E ’s compliance with the status quo, since Terrorist E  does not share State C’s 
interest in survival and prosperity that may entail from any balance of power. As such, 
Terrorist E is incoercible; the crucial security imperative for State C is to prevent the 
threat posed by Terrorist E from materialising. The only way for State C to deal with 
the perceived threat posed by Terrorist E is to control it, and the only way to control it 
is through pro-active mechanisms.
Pro-action facilitates controlling strategies that define rational action in the face of 
unconstrained threats that demand prevention. However, pro-action does not define 
legitimate action as prescribed by international law, in the way reaction does. Indeed, 
pro-action contravenes the self-defence and collective security institutions, codified in 
Articles 39 and 51 of the UN Charter respectively, which govern the use of force in 
international society. The material reality of threats posed by unconstrained, non-state 
actors in the international system has no corresponding value system, as the material 
reality of threats posed by interstate war has. The UN Charter reflects values 
constructed around the material reality that existed in the wake o f the First and Second 
World Wars. The principle threat to international security at that time was interstate 
war, and reactive mechanisms to regulate the use of force between war-weary, 
deterrable states were developed to maintain international security in the face of that 
threat within a coercive framework. If  a state breached the peace through the use of 
force, it would face harmful consequences. The Cold War reinforced this coercive 
framework by upping the ante: if a state used nuclear force, it could face consequences 
that might assure its own destruction. Pro-active mechanisms constructed by states to 
deal with a different reality contravene this coercive framework by supporting an 
approach that seeks to control adversaries that can’t be trusted to obey the rules.
Indeed, the relationship between current international law and pro-action is highly 
problematic. First and foremost, pro-active measures contravene the condition that 
force may be used only £if an armed attack occurs’.129 For a controlling strategy, such a
129 Article 51 of the UN Charter states that ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations..
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condition is irrational; unconstrained threats that demand controlling require pro­
active action that seeks to prevent armed attacks from occurring in the first place. 
Secondly, demonstrating the necessity of pro-action against a threat that has yet to 
materialise is more difficult than demonstrating the necessity of a reaction against an 
attack that has already happened. The necessity requirement for self-defence is hard to 
fulfil in the face of threats that risk damage. In relation to this, it is difficult to ascertain 
what proportion of threat is necessary to eliminate threats like terrorism that endure 
(see Section Two).
Indeed, pro-active measures are generally not accepted as legitimate strategic 
mechanisms. The controversy surrounding pro-active measures taken by states in 
support of controlling strategies indicate that pro-action is an exception in 
international relations that proves the rule that reactive mechanisms, not pro-active 
ones, define the legitimising institutions of international society. The 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis involving the US and the Soviet Union, the 1967 Six-Day War between 
Israel and the United Arab Republic, the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak Reactor, 
N ATO’s 1999 Kosovo campaign, and US and UK’s 2003 action against Iraq all 
exemplify controversial threatened or actual pro-active uses of force. Today, in a world 
where threats posed by unconstrained non-states actors demand prevention, a fault 
line exists between not only coercive/reactive strategies and controlling/pro-active 
strategies, but between rational action and legitimate action in a material reality where 
values underpin legitimising institutions that fail to reflect rational action in line with 
contemporary strategic imperatives.
To conclude and reiterate, ‘prevention’ is defined here as a controlling strategy that 
seeks to address through pro-active mechanisms unconstrained threats, at whatever 
stage of development, before they materialise. Prevention represents rational action in 
the face of undeterrable and incoercible threats of potentially catastrophic magnitude.
The remaining sections of this chapter examine threats, rational action, legitimate 
action and the status of prevention in three different eras: the post-1945/Cold War era; 
the post-Cold War era; and, the post-9 /11 era. They show how prevention evolved
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from pariah activity to a strategy that influenced and then later defined rational action, 
against the backdrop of a static legitimising institutional framework that created a 
rational action/legitimate action astigmatism in the face of ever-changing strategic 
realities.
SECTION TWO: THE UN ORDER AND PREVENTION
In 1945, the reality of the devastating threat posed by interstate war led to the 
construction of an international order designed to prevent conflict between states. This 
international order was codified in the UN Charter, a treaty that was signed by 50 
states in June 1945 and ratified by the leading founding states — the US, UK France, 
China and the Soviet Union — and other signatories in October of that year. The UN 
Charter enshrined customary laws governing, for instance, the use of force in self- 
defence, and established an order that was based on the mutual recognition of 
sovereignty and protected by a system o f collective security. Today, the UN order 
endures; over 60 years after its foundation, the UN has 192 member states bound by 
the provisions o f its Charter. The US, UK, France, China and, now, Russia, remain as 
the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the body uniquely responsible to 
authorise action to protect order against threats in line with a coercive security strategy 
that uses reactive mechanisms to address material breaches of the status quo.
Threats
The horrors of the First and Second World Wars caused states to take steps to build 
institutions that made interstate war less likely. At the cost of 60 million lives, war 
between states in the first half of the 20th century had left states war-weary and 
reluctant to accept war as normal practice, especially in light of the invention o f highly- 
destructive weaponry that was capable of being produced on an industrial scale. By 
1945, the cost of war had come to outweigh its benefits in human, political and 
economic terms, and states sought to establish both practical and normative measures 
in support of the strategic imperative to prevent interstate conflict. The declared aim 
of the UN to ‘save successive generations from the scourge of war’ reflects this
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strategic imperative, and the institutions constructed to achieve this aim — self-defence 
and collective security — represented rational action in light of this strategic imperative. 
Rules were imposed on all UN signatories to ensure compliance with the post-1945 
status quo as represented by the new UN order based on the mutual recognition of
130sovereignty.
In addition to the threat posed by conventional interstate conflict, the post-1945 
material reality involved the existence of a threat posed by nuclear war. Whilst Cold 
War competition between the US and the Soviet Union led to paralysis in the UN 
Security Council, the East-West nuclear rivalry underscored the rationality of the UN 
institutions. The value of observing the principles of sovereign independence and the 
non-use of force in international relations was bolstered by the threat of nuclear 
Armageddon. Whilst states remained averse to the risk of engaging in costly 
conventional war, the prospect of a nuclear exchange was an unacceptable risk that 
neither the West nor the East was prepared to countenance as a viable strategic end­
game. The imperative to prevent interstate war, which provided the rationale for the 
UN order and the rules and institutes that maintained it, was reinforced by a strategic 
situation in which war between states could entail the destruction of both victim and 
aggressor in a single exchange.
Rational Action
Faced by a post-1945 material reality comprising threats posed by conventional and 
nuclear interstate war, risk-averse states constructed rules and institutions that sought 
to prevent conflict from occurring. The ensuing rational framework that supported the 
strategic imperative to prevent war between states was based on a coercive strategy 
designed to deter states from non-compliance with the post-1945 international order. 
It operated on mechanisms that were set to react, possibly through force, to any 
occurrence of attack.131 The mantra ‘strike only if struck upon’ represented the central
130 Roberts, A. and B. Kingsbury, Eds. (2000). United Nations. Divided World: The UN's Role in 
International Relations. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
131 Ibid.
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pillar of the UN order entailed from the principles of sovereignty and the non-use of 
force, and codified by the self-defence and collective security institutions. These are 
detailed below.
Sovereignty
The UN order was constructed around the principle of popular national sovereignty. 
The predominance of sovereignty in the UN order reflects the evolution of the 
sovereignty principle as the primary organising concept in international politics. 
Sovereignty was first established in 1648 at the Peace of Westphalia. The treaties of 
Munster and Osnabriick, which marked the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648, 
created a number of governing provisions for the conduct of international relations, 
given the strategic imperative to prevent religiously-motivated war. The most 
significant of these provisions were the principles of self-determination and non­
intervention. These principles came to constitute the internal and external aspects of 
sovereignty: the internal aspect allows the sovereign to determine the political 
governance and religious disposition of a state within demarcated territorial 
boundaries; the external aspect disallows any sovereign to interfere with the internal 
religious practices or political governance of another sovereign power.132 This dual­
aspect principle of sovereignty provided the building block for a new international 
order based on the ‘mutual recognition of sovereigns’ that was codified by 
international legal practice.133
Although it removed religion as a casus belli, the Westphalian international order did 
not prevent war between states from breaking out — Princes’ ambitions and dynastic 
interests provided ample motivation to justify war in the name of the state in the post- 
Westphalian period. In 1789, the notion that war should be fought in the name o f the 
dynastic state was challenged by French revolutionaries. Indeed, the French Revolution 
triggered a seismic shift in the sovereignty principle away from governing dynasties and
132 Shaw, M. (1997). International Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
133 Ibid.
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toward governed populations.134 The replacement of dynastic sovereignty with popular 
sovereignty relocated the source of sovereignty to the people, but did not alter the 
nature of sovereignty as a political and legal precept. The mutual recognition of 
sovereignty, based on self-determination and non-intervention, endured as the basis of 
international order throughout the great wars of the first half of the 20th century, which 
were fought in accordance with the notion that war in the name of the nation was a 
justifiable enterprise.135 In the wake of the First World War, efforts by the League of 
Nations to promote national self-determination whilst enforcing non-intervention 
failed, as testified by the further loss of life incurred by the Second World War.
In line with the strategic imperative to prevent interstate war and maintain 
international order based on the mutual recognition of sovereignty, the UN was set up 
to enshrine the two aspects of the sovereignty principle in conjunction with serious 
punitive mechanisms that would react to state aggression. The two relevant articles of 
the UN Charter that codified the internal and external aspects o f the sovereignty 
principle were articles 2(7) and 2(4), respectively. Article 2(7) reads:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Whilst Article 2(4) reads:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.
The strategic imperative to maintain a UN order based on self-determination and the 
non-use of force reflected the type of threats perceived by states in the post-1945
134 Gow, J. (2000). "A Revolution in International Affairs?" Security Dialogue 31(3): 293 -306.
135 Howard, M. (1994). War and Nations. Nationalism. J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
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environment. In the face of the threat posed by interstate war, the strategic imperative 
was to construct an order founded on territorial independence and the prohibition of 
force in international relations with the aim of preventing the ‘scourge’ of conflict 
between states. Rational action in line with this strategic imperative was 
institutionalised to protect the UN order. The right to self-defence and collective 
security machinery, the ‘enforcement measures under Chapter VH’ as referred to in 
Article 2(7), were codified to enable states to act against the threat posed by interstate 
war in support of rational framework based on the mutual recognition of sovereignty.
Self-defence
The principle of self-defence, as codified in the UN Charter, presents the clearest 
indication of the coercive nature of UN security strategy and the reactive mechanisms 
that states have at their disposal to act against threats that fail to observe the rules.
The roots of the self-defence principle can be traced back to the early 19th century 
when, in 1837, the British attacked a ship called the Caroline™ At the time, Britain, 
who enjoyed peaceful relations with the US, was engaged in conflict with 
insurrectionists in Canada, over which it then ruled. British authorities learned that a 
ship owned by US nationals and moored on the US side of the Niagara River, the 
Caroline, was providing assistance to the anti-British rebels in Canada. On 29 December 
1837, British forces entered the US by crossing the Niagara River, boarded the Caroline, 
killed several US nationals, set the ship ablaze and despatched it over Niagara Falls.137 
The British claimed that they had acted in self-defence, to the protests of US Secretary 
of State Daniel Webster.138 In order to resolve the ensuing British-US dispute, and 
avoid any similar disputes in the future, Britain and America arrived at an agreed 
determination over what constituted acts of self-defence.139 Two criteria that entitled a 
state to act in self-defence — necessity and proportionality — came to be recognised as
136
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the fundamental elements of the right to self-defence and formed the basis of
W 140
The requirement to prove that the use of force in self-defence is necessary was laid- 
out by Webster in a letter to Lord Ashburton, a British representative in Washington, 
in the wake of the Caroline crisis.141 In it, Webster declared that a state seeking to claim 
the right to act in self-defence would need to demonstrate that the ‘necessity of that 
self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment 
o f deliberation’.142 In other words, the threat against which self-defence is sought must 
be shown to be imminent and serious, and a military response must be taken as a last 
resort. In addition, states would be required to respond in a way that was 
proportionate to the threat it perceived. Any action that was taken in self-defence 
should not be ‘unreasonable or excessive’, and the act ‘justified by the necessity o f self- 
defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it’.143 The parameters 
of the use of force in self-defence were thus cast, and they remain in place today. 
According to the current international legal framework, a state uses force legitimately 
in response to a perceived threat if and when that state is able to demonstrate the 
necessity of such action; any response taken by a state must be the last resort and not 
exceed what is necessary to relinquish the immediate threat. A state would be acting 
illegitimately were these conditions not met (see Legitimate Action, below).
The Caroline formula that underpins the self-defence institution is provided for by 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, which protects ‘the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs’:
Article 51 reads:
140 Arend, A. C. (2004). International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force. The condition of ‘necessity’ in 
this context is not a metaphysical claim, as discussed in Chapter 1, but a principle in international law 
relating to the use of armed force in international relations. This thesis refers to ‘necessity’ as a 
metaphysical claim and a legal principle in different contexts, and these usages should not be confused.
141 Shaw, M. (1997). International Law.
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member o f the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in 
the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.
Given the strategic imperative to prevent the use of force between states, the self- 
defence institution as codified in Article 51 represents rational action. It services the 
strategic imperative to prevent interstate war and supports the UN order. The right to 
self-defence is limited by the duty of states to observe the sovereignty of others. The 
use of force in self-defence is allowed only if and when it is in reaction to an attack that 
has already taken place. Any use of force taken by a state against another state prior to 
the occurrence to an attack violates the pivotal UN articles 2(7) and 2(4), and 
challenges, rather than supports, that rationale and aims o f the UN order. The self- 
defence institution, as codified in Article 51, provides an exclusively reactionary 
mechanism that supports an order that seeks to coerce states that are assumed to be 
interested in maintaining order and, therefore, deterred from breaking the rules.144
Collective Security
The other pillar of the UN security framework is collective security. Whilst the right to 
self-defence provided for by Article 51 codifies a customary law that evolved from the 
Caroline case, the UN’s collective security machinery is enshrined in treaty law as an 
institution established specifically to maintain the UN order. The concept of collective 
security is based on the logic that an attack against one is an attack against all. The UN 
Security Council was created to assume the responsibility to determine threats to 
international peace and security and take action to maintain order in the face of 
breaches of the peace.145 The UNSC held its first session in London in 1947; the five
144 Gow, J. (2000). "A Revolution in International Affairs?"
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permanent members of the UNSC at that time were the US, UK, France, the Republic 
of China and the Soviet Union. Today the ‘P5’ remain the same, except that the 
People’s Republic of China and Russia have succeeded the Republic of China and the 
Soviet Union, respectively. Each permanent member has power of veto over UNSC 
decisions. The veto overrules any majority decision arrived at by the ten elected 
members of the UNSC, which are elected by the UN General Assembly to serve two- 
year terms each on a rotational basis.146
Like the self-defence provisions of Article 51, collective security is provided for by 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Article 39 of Chapter VII reads:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.
The corresponding Articles 41 and 42 read, respectively:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
and,
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, 
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of 
the United Nations.
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The rationale of the UNSC is derived from the strategic imperative to prevent 
interstate war, and it represents the institutionalisation of the UN’s coercive strategy to 
deter states from fighting each other by making available punitive mechanisms that are 
designed to react to attacks. The UNSC’s responsibility to determine and take action 
against threats to peace and security is qualified by the same requirements of necessity 
and proportionality that limit the right to self-defence. The authority of the UNSC 
under Article 42 to ‘take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security’ is, as indicated, restricted by the 
requirement to demonstrate the necessity of force. In accordance with articles 2(7), 
2(4) and 51, the use of force is necessary only if and when an armed attack occurs. In 
the event of an attack, the UN’s collective security machinery can kick to life. In 
addition to the requirement to demonstrate necessity, the UNSC’s action must be 
proportionate to what is required to achieve what is it is that is necessary ‘to maintain 
or restore international peace and security’.
The Cold War Situation
The Cold War situation provided another raison d'etre for an international security 
framework based on a coercive strategy and reactive mechanisms. The existence of 
two rival nuclear blocks engaged in ideological competition, spearheaded by the United 
States and the Soviet Union respectively, paralysed the UN’s collective security 
machinery for most of the latter half of the 20th century.147 The Cold War conflict 
between the US and the Soviet Union meant that the power of veto possessed by these 
two permanent members of the UNSC caused the UNSC to lock-down. Indeed, 279 
vetoes cast by a divided Permanent 5 rendered the UNSC powerless to prevent over 
100 major conflicts during the Cold War era, at the cost of 20 million lives.148 
However, the logic that underpinned the UN order was reinforced by the Cold War 
strategic situation. The coercive strategy that drove the UN order, and the reactive
147 Gazarian, J. (2007). The Role of the Secretary-General: Some Reflections from the Past. UN Chronicle 
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mechanisms that protected it, corresponded with the reality of deterrence ensued by 
the logic of mutually assured destruction.
Although best described as a situation rather than a strategy, nuclear deterrence 
shared the same assumptions as the UN’s coercive strategy. States were risk-averse 
actors that were deterrable in the face of the prospect of punitive action taken in 
reaction to any non-compliance with the status quo.u<) However, the consequences for 
Cold War protagonists were greater than the consequences provided for by the authors 
of the UN Charter; instead of the prospect of ‘such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’, nuclear states 
that entertained the idea of launching an attack faced the prospect of nuclear 
retaliation. Like the UN strategy, the Cold War situation coerced states into observing 
the principles of sovereign independence and the non-use of force through fear of 
severe punitive reactions to occurrences of attack.150 Reaction represented rational 
action given the strategic imperative to prevent nuclear exchange between coercible 
states.
Legitimate Action
Reaction represented not only rational action in the post-1945 era; it also defined 
legitimate action. The UN Charter was developed to achieve the strategic aim of 
preventing the ‘scourge of war’ between states and to provide a normative framework 
that sought to shape state practice based on socially-agreed values. The international 
legal precepts enshrined in the UN Charter represent the values that were constructed 
around the post-1945 material reality. These values, based on the principles of 
sovereign independence and the non-use of force, were instilled in the self-defence and 
collective security mechanisms. These serve as the legitimising institutions in 
international society. However, the UN order was not created on the assumption that 
interstate war was wrong; on the contrary, the use of force by states is an integral part 
of the UN’s punitive system. Rather, the UN order was created on the calculation that
149 Freedman, L. (2004). Prevention, Not Preemption.
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the cost of interstate war outweighed its previous benefits. The strategic imperative to 
prevent interstate war was arrived at through empirical observation of the post-1945 
situation. The legitimising institutions represent the socially-agreed values that were 
constructed around this material reality, in support of empirically-derived strategic 
imperatives.
Whilst rational and legitimate actions are qualitatively different, their correspondence 
is important to the maintenance of order. In the post-1945 era, the strategic imperative 
to prevent interstate war was supported by a UN order sustained by institutions that 
legitimised rational action — it was logical and legal to limit the use of force to reactions 
against external attacks. The international law codified in the UN Charter succeeded in 
having authority and control in international society because states perceived it as law 
and it succeeded to shape state behaviour, respectively.151 The Gulf War of 1990-1991 
showcased the UN order as authoritative and in control. The use of force by the US- 
led coalition against Iraq, acting under Chapter VII of the UN charter in reaction to 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, represented legitimate enforcement measures against an act 
of illegitimate aggression. The successful marriage of rationality with legitimacy in this 
case signalled that the UN order had authority and control in a material world in which 
the prevention of interstate war remained the strategic imperative.
Prevention in the Post-1945 and Cold War Situations
In conclusion of this section, the authority and control of the legal framework 
enshrining the UN’s coercive strategy, and the reactive mechanisms through which it 
was executed, left little room for states to use controlling strategies that involved pro­
active uses of force. In the 1950s, for instance, the Eisenhower administration 
entertained the notion of acting preventively against Moscow in order to stop the 
Russians from achieving a nuclear capability.152 The decision was made by the 
Americans that the potential costs of such a strategy outweighed the potential
151 Arend, A. C. (2004). International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force.
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benefits.153 Eisenhower was also evidently concerned that any preventive action against 
Russia would be construed as illegal aggression.154 A decade later, President John F. 
Kennedy deliberated over whether to use force against Beijing to prevent China from 
becoming a nuclear power.155 The Kennedy administration rejected such a move and 
condemned any other attempts by states, specifically the Soviet Union, to take 
preventive action to this end.156 In addition, during the tumultuous event o f the 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis, the option mooted by US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, of 
preventive action against the Soviet Union was not taken up, considering that 
members of the UNSC did not accept that ‘a necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation’ had been 
demonstrated.157 Indeed, the Ghanaian delegation of the UNSC contested at the time 
that ‘incontrovertible proof is not yet available as to the offensive character o f military 
developments in Cuba. Nor can it be argued that the threat was of such a nature as to 
warrant action on the scale so far taken, prior to the reference of this Council’.158
When preventive action was taken by a state, it was deemed illegitimate by the vast 
swathe of the international community. Israel’s pre-emptive action in 1967 against 
Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Syria, for instance, was heavily criticised by members of the 
UNSC as an illegal act of aggression.159 However, the action had a measure of support 
from pivotal states including the US and UK.160 The anti-/pro-Israeli divide in the 
UNSC over the Six Day War was principally political, with Moscow condemning pro- 
Western Israel and the West supporting a strategic partner in the Middle East.161 
Nevertheless, neither the US nor the UK pledged support for prevention as a viable 
strategic doctrine, and the UNSC, in general, did not accept the legitimacy o f Israel’s 
use of force in the interests of anticipatory self-defence against an alleged imminent
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Arab attack.162 Another preventive action by Israel, this time in 1981 against the Osirak 
reactor in Iraq, was again presented by Israeli delegates to the UNSC as anticipatory 
self-defence.163 The British delegate, Sir Anthony Parsons, was not convinced by the 
Israelis contention that Israel had reacted in self-defence out of necessity to an 
imminent threat. Sir Anthony reflected the general UNSC view by arguing that the 
Israeli action ‘was not a response to an armed attack on Israel by Iraq.’164 As such, 
there ‘was no instant or overwhelming necessity for self-defence’.165 Furthermore, 
Israel’s pro-action could not be ‘justified as a forcible measure of self-protection’.166 
Ultimately, Sir Anthony, in line with the general consensus of the UNSC, concluded 
that the ‘Israeli intervention amounted to a use of force which cannot find a place in 
international law or in the Charter and which violated the sovereignty of Iraq’.167
The controversy that surrounded Israel’s preventive actions against anticipated 
attacks shows that pro-action in the post-1945 and Cold War periods was the 
exception that proved the general rule that force could and should be used only in 
reaction to attacks that had already occurred.
SECTION THREE: THE POST-COLD WAR ORDER AND PREVENTION
At the end of the Cold War states observed a new strategic reality. The 1990s saw the 
emergence of security threats distinct from the threat posed by interstate war. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the disintegration of the Cold War rivalry 
between Washington and Moscow and the degradation of the threat posed by 
conventional as well as nuclear military conflict between East and West.
Threats
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The emergence of the US as the lone superpower in the post-Cold War international 
system created a military asymmetry.168 Unlike the symmetrical strategic reality of the 
Cold War, the post-Cold War strategic reality failed to naturally entail deterrence 
strategies. Instead of a fixed, nuclear-capable, superpower adversary sharing similar 
strategic imperatives, the US, and the international community at large, faced a range 
of threats including mobile, relatively small and weak, but dangerous non-state actors 
that challenged international stability across and from within state borders.169 Violent 
flashpoints that occurred underneath the umbrella of Cold War rivalry developed their 
own dynamics within a post-Cold War context, and fault lines suppressed by the Cold 
War situation, such as those in the former Yugoslavia, were activated by shifts in 
political and economic realities.170 By the early 1990s, ethnic conflicts within states 
were killing more civilians than soldiers, at an estimated rate o f 9 to 1, with belligerents 
deliberately targeting non-combatants including women and children.171 The 
proliferation of WMD within an asymmetric strategic environment riddled with 
conventionally weak actors posed its own problem. The logic of deterrence did not fit 
a strategic equation involving actors that might be inclined to use WMD to 
compensate for their inferior conventional capabilities. As such, the assumption that 
actors would not utilise WMD as a first strike weapon was less concrete. The need to 
prevent states from proliferating WMD became more urgent, considering this new 
strategic reality. In the post-Cold War world, conflict involving innocent civilians 
caused by non-state threats existing within and across state borders, as opposed to 
interstate war, represented the scourge that states and the UN sought to prevent.
In January 1992, the UNSC confirmed a perceivable new, post-Cold War strategic 
reality. A declaration issued at the level of Heads of State and Government read:
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The absence of war and military conflict amongst States does not in itself 
ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of 
instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have 
become threats to peace and security.172
In addition to economic, social, humanitarian and ecological threats to peace, the 
threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in an asymmetric, post-Cold War context 
was identified, alongside the threat posed by non-state terrorist groups:
The members of the Council express their deep concern over acts of 
international terrorism and emphasize the need for the international 
community to deal effectively with all such acts... The proliferation of all 
weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security.173
Rational Action
The strategy underpinning the post-1945 and Cold War order was irrational in a world 
in which non-state actors threatened states from within and across sovereign 
borders.174 The UN Charter dealt exclusively with states, and did not provide for action 
that aimed to control events and situations involving non-state actors that lay beyond 
classic balance of power politics. The value, therefore, of mechanisms that were 
designed to react to the use of force between states dwindled in the face of security 
challenges that were less likely to be posed by interstate war and more likely to be 
posed by intrastate war, proliferation issues and non-state actors. The strategic 
imperative to ensure security, therefore, was less likely to be served sufficiently by 
reactive strategies that depended on deterrable and coercible states; rather, pro-active 
strategies that sought to prevent violence by seeking to control situations inside and 
transcending state borders were more logical.
The rationality of preventive institutions in light of the strategic imperative to 
manage non-state threats and intrastate violence in the post-Cold War reality impacted
172 United Nations Security Council Statement S/23500, 31 January 1992
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on the fundamental principles of sovereign independence and the non-use of force, 
despite the fact that these principles remained integral to international order.175 Most 
markedly, the determination by the UNSC of threats to peace that emanated from 
within states challenged the concept of absolutely inviolable sovereign borders and the 
rationale of the self-defence institution.176
The Sovereignty Revolution
The reality of events and situations threatening international security from within state 
borders brought into question the rationale of the sovereignty principle, as enshrined 
in the UN Charter in 1945. In order to achieve strategic aims in the 1990s, states 
needed to be able to deal with threats occurring within states, as well as between states. 
Recognising the strict inviolability of sovereign borders, therefore, didn’t make sense 
within the new strategic context. The sanctity of the sovereignty precepts o f domestic 
jurisdiction and non-intervention became irrational in the post-Cold War reality, where 
international law enforcement and intervention were essential components of conflict 
prevention in the face of disruptive intrastate violence and transnational threats.
In the post-Cold War era, the sovereignty principle, which had evolved through time 
from a ‘dynastic’ to a ‘popular’ concept, adapted to its environment once more by 
becoming ‘internationalised’.177 States’ right to enjoy ‘sovereign impunity’ and do as 
they pleased within their own borders, irrespective of other sovereign powers, faced 
new limitations. In a more interdependent and volatile post-Cold War world, pressure 
was applied on state governments to behave in a manner that was conducive to the 
good of international society as a whole. The internationalisation of the internal aspect 
of sovereignty — self-determination -  affected the external aspect of sovereignty which 
precluded intervention in the domestic affairs of states.178 The duty for states to behave 
positively and in support of international order entailed the right for states to intervene 
in the affairs of states if internal situations were perceived to constitute a threat to
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international peace and security, or threaten the human rights of domestic populations. 
This ‘revolution’ in the sovereignty principle reflects a re-rationalisation of the 
sovereign rights and duties of states within the post-Cold War strategic reality, and 
opened up the possibility for states to conduct ‘humanitarian’ interventions and 
operations to address internal threats to stability.179
The principle of sovereignty in the 1990s has been characterised as, amongst other 
things, ‘contingent’ and ‘equilibrant’.180 Given the perception of threats emanating 
from within and across state borders, state sovereignty became conditional, rather than 
absolute. The sovereign right to self-determination was provided for only if the 
exercising of that right did not threaten other states or international order. The 
strategic imperative to address internal threats entailed this conditionality. NATO 
action against Serbia in 1999 over atrocities in the province of Kosovo, for instance, 
reflected state practice that was designed to respond to the breach o f this 
conditionality, rather than a material breach of the peace, conventionally understood as 
an attack by a state against another state under the terms of the UN Charter.181 Serbia 
had not attacked another state; NATO’s operation was characterised as an act o f crisis 
management. And, whilst equilibrium in the symmetrical Cold War international 
system was achieved through a balance of power between two coerced, risk-averse 
superpowers, equilibrium in the asymmetrical post-Cold War international system, in 
which intrastate phenomena succeeded in challenging international order, depended on 
states’ internal characteristics and the ability of states to control them if and when they 
were perceived to threaten international society. International order based on the 
mutual recognition of sovereignty was re-conceptualised in order to accommodate the 
strategic imperative to intervene in the internal affairs of states and prevent escalations 
o f conflicts that threatened, or had the potential to threaten, the security of other 
states. This internationalised version of sovereignty provided the basis o f the UN order 
in the post-Cold War period.
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Pro-active Self-defence
The declaration by the UNSC in 1992 that the ‘absence of war and military conflict 
amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security’ opened the 
door for a re-rationalisation of the self-defence institution.182 Given that the UNSC 
determined that non-state threats to peace and security exist, some argued, it made 
sense to adapt the right to self-defence to fit with threats that extended beyond the 
narrow description of interstate war. Indeed, as James Gow has argued, ‘a situation 
that can be identified as a threat to international security also constitutes a threat to the 
individual and common security of states’.183 As such, as well as the ability to defend 
itself against an armed attack, a state needed the ability to protect itself from ‘disorder 
and disruption emerging from within other states’.184 This ability was not about the 
duty to ‘do good things’ through acts of humanitarian intervention; it related to the jus 
cogens right of states to defend themselves against material security threats.185 
Considering that in the post-Cold War world, cases of ethnic conflict waged by non­
state actors within states quickly grew to outnumber cases of conflict between states, 
the right to self-defence encompassing action taken in response to threats posed by 
phenomena other than interstate war gained a level of rationality that was absent in the 
post-1945 and Cold War eras.186 Since the materialisation of post-Cold War threats was 
not demonstrable exclusively through the occurrence of an external armed attack, the 
use of force in self-defence could be construed to require pro-active strategies that 
could control events and situations occurring within the borders of other sovereign 
states that threatened the security of others.
Despite the re-rationalisation o f the self-defence institution in light of new threat 
perceptions, pro-action in the UN’s strategy of conflict prevention was strictly limited 
to the diplomatic sphere. The strategic imperative to prevent conflict caused by non­
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state actors through controlling strategies did not lead to the replacement o f reaction 
with pro-action as the defining rationale of the UN order. To the contrary, preventive 
doctrines in the 1990s reinforced the UN’s coercive strategy based on sovereign 
independence and the non-use of force, and complemented, rather than challenged, 
the reactive mechanisms of the self-defence and collective security institutions. The 
post-Cold War threats determined by the UNSC in 1992 were generally not perceived 
by the US or other great powers to require military prevention as a matter o f course. 
Rather, military force was conceived as a supporting component of diplomatic 
measures designed to contain conflicts, coerce adversaries and constrain actors 
through the enforcement of international law. Adversaries remained coercible and 
interested in maintaining the status quo. Indeed, state-centric threats still loomed large 
and remained subject to coercion, as the US policy of ‘dual containment’ towards Iran 
and Iraq demonstrated.187 Irresponsible states were still subject to the logic of 
deterrence, and non-state actors, many of whom acting violently to achieve statehood 
within state borders, remained explicable by theories predicated on the principle of 
sovereignty.
However, the rationality of limiting pro-action to diplomatic mechanisms faltered 
when diplomacy failed to achieve its stated strategic aim of preventing conflict, 
especially when the control of crises was observed to require military pro-action. When 
force was used to prevent the escalation of conflict within states, such as military 
action by NATO within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999, it 
was deemed controversial, given that it contravened the legal provisions of the self- 
defence and collective security institutions (see Legitimate Action below).188 Indeed, 
the rationality of pro-active military action in support of strategic aims in the face of 
threats that proved unconstrained by diplomatic coercion challenged the rationale of 
the reactive legitimising institutions of international order. To be sure, the post-Cold 
War asymmetrical strategic reality, and the imperative to prevent intrastate war, created 
an astigmatic relationship between strategic logic and legal legitimacy which entailed
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controversial state practice.189 However, military prevention never became a strategic 
doctrine per se. Forceful interventions in intrastate war for the purposes of conflict 
prevention in the 1990s were taken as a last resort in support of a coercive strategy 
against threats that were assumed to be constrainable. Pro-active military action served 
exclusively as the stick in support of the carrot of diplomacy. NATO action in 
Kosovo, although pro-active according to the logic of the UN Charter, occurred in 
reaction to ongoing conflict that diplomacy had failed to prevent. Prevention as 
defined in this thesis — a controlling strategy implemented to address unconstrained 
threats before they materialise through pro-active mechanisms — was not a strategy 
adopted in the post-Cold War situation. Military force was conceived primarily as a 
back-up for diplomatic initiatives seeking to prevent threats presented by constrainable 
actors that were capable of being negotiated with.
Preventive Diplomacy
Preventive diplomacy sought to utilise diplomatic mechanisms in order to prevent 
conflict within states from erupting, and enforce peaceful settlements if and when 
conflict arose. On 27 June 1992, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
presented to the UNSC ‘An Agenda for Peace’. The document acknowledged the 
existence of new strategic imperatives in a post-Cold War era and outlined ways of 
acting in accordance with them. The five-fold objective of ‘An Agenda for Peace’ was 
to:
1. ‘Seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, 
and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence 
results’;190
2. ‘Engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict’;191
3. ‘Preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in 
implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers’;192
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4. ‘Stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts’;193
5. ‘And, in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict’.194
Although preventive diplomacy sought to reinforce the long-standing rules and 
institutions of the UN Charter, it did introduce new mechanisms that attempted to 
facilitate rational state action in light of the strategic imperative to prevent conflict 
occurring within state borders. These mechanisms included confidence-building 
measures, to help prevent the root causes o f violence from taking shape, and ‘fact- 
finding’ missions, in order to fulfil the requirements for ‘timely and accurate 
knowledge of the facts’ and sufficient ‘understanding of developments and global 
trends, based on sound analysis’ on which preventive action depended195. Such fact­
finding missions also supported early warning systems that flagged up potential hot­
spots.196 Furthermore, preventive deployment of military forces, taken exclusively with 
state consent and in accordance with limited rules o f engagement, was provided for in 
order to keep and enforce peace settlements and establish demilitarized zones designed 
to keep belligerents apart.197
Conflict prevention through pro-active diplomacy represented a rational controlling 
strategy, limited to the diplomatic sphere, in the face of apparendy constrainable 
threats. However, preventive diplomacy suffered from severe limitations, and was not 
terribly successful in achieving its strategic aims. Threats that turned out to be 
unconstrained by diplomacy failed to be prevented. Ethnic conflict that broke out in 
places such as Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia failed to be constrained by diplomatic 
initiatives or preventive deployment of military forces with restrictive rules of 
engagement. By 1997, 39 intrastate conflicts around the world had claimed at least 
1,000 lives each, leaving hundreds of thousands dead and millions displaced.198 Some 
conflicts claimed more lives than others; in Rwanda, for example, the UN failed to 
prevent the deaths of around one million people during the Rwandan genocide of
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1994.1"  By 1995, over 100,000 people were killed and nearly 2 million displaced during 
ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.200 And, the UN-sanctioned, US-led Operation 
Restore Hope and other UN operations in Somalia failed to prevent 500,000 deaths and 
1.5 million people becoming displaced in Somalia between 1991 and 1994.201
Restrictive rules of engagement for troops deployed inside states to prevent conflict 
did not help the efforts of diplomats to coerce parties into peaceful settlements. UN- 
endorsed forces instructed to keep or enforce the peace were not permitted to carry 
out offensive operations without first acquiring specific approval.202 Troops were 
entitled, according to the rules, to fire only if fired upon, in line with the provisions of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.203 Moreover, troops were not allowed to retaliate to 
attacks; they were allowed only to defend themselves from attacks, having to cease fire 
when the attacker ceased fire.204 In Bosnia, this meant that hostile forces could ‘ratchet 
up their provocation to just under the threshold’ beyond which UN troops could use 
force, and ‘draw UN forces into a vulnerable position and then attack them’ without 
fear of retribution.205 These restrictive rules of engagement led many to question to 
efficacy of UN action to achieve conflict prevention aims and doubt the rationale of 
limiting pro-action to the diplomatic sphere, given the strategic imperative of 
preventing intrastate war often brutally waged by non-state belligerents commonly 
against non-combatant adversaries.
The rationality of limiting pro-action to diplomacy was challenged further 
considering that the major cases of intrastate war in Bosnia and Kosovo ended only 
after decisive use of military force in contravention of the UN’s rules of engagement 
and the institutions of international order. In 1995, NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force, 
aimed at Bosnian Serb positions and in response to Bosnian Serb shelling of the 
Sarajevo marketplace in August o f that year, was NATO’s first military operation since
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its inception in 1949. The military action succeeded in Bosnia where diplomacy had 
failed by forcing a peace settlement, which was finalised in Dayton, Ohio in December 
1995. NATO’s second ever operation, Operation Allied Force, was taken against 
Slobodan Milosevic’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 to end Serbian 
aggression against ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo, again achieving a 
strategic aim that diplomacy had consistently failed to accomplish. These actions did 
not demonstrate a strategic doctrine of military pro-action, but they did indicate the 
instrumentality of military force in strategies seeking to achieve the aim of preventing 
conflict within state borders and a level of international acceptance of pro-action as 
rational state practice that was absent in the post-1945 and Cold War eras.
Legitimate Action
Despite burgeoning acceptance of the rationality of military action extending beyond 
the remit of Article 51 of the UN Charter, the use of force against non-state threats 
remained governed by the legitimising institutions of self-defence and collective 
security as codified in the UN Charter. Irrespective o f the official identification of non­
state threats to peace and security and the scourge of intrastate war, states’ obligation, 
in accordance with the Caroline formula, to demonstrate the necessity of military action 
and act in proportion to the threat at hand remained crucial to the maintenance of 
international order. Military action taken in response to anything other than an external 
armed attack or without specific UNSC approval to restore international order 
remained illegitimate uses of force. Indeed, the UNSC’s 1992 statement reaffirmed the 
international community’s commitment to a UN order based on a coercive security 
strategy. The document reads:
The members of the Council pledge their commitment to international law 
and to the United Nations Charter. All disputes between States should be 
peacefully resolved in accordance with the provisions o f the Charter. The 
members of the council reaffirm their commitment to the collective 
security system of the Charter to deal with threats to peace and to reverse 
acts of aggression.206
(31 January 1992). Statement by the Heads of State and Government (S/23500).
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Accordingly, in the 1990s, the post-1945 values underpinning the UN order did not 
comfortably match the post-Cold War material reality. The value system enshrined in 
the UN Charter failed to legitimise action that was occasionally deemed rational in the 
face of new strategic imperatives. The empirical observation of threats in the 1990s 
was not accompanied by the construction of socially-agreed values in support of the 
empirically-derived strategic imperative to maintain order in the face o f disruption 
caused by non-state actors emanating from within and across state borders, as opposed 
to interstate war. Sovereign independence and the non-use of force, although re­
rationalised, remained at the heart of the UN order which continued to be maintained 
by the self-defence and collective security institutions which entitled state to use force 
only in the event of an external armed attack.
Post-Cold War astigmatism in the relationship between rationality and legitimacy 
weakened international order, but only to a point. As mentioned above, military pro­
action was not the strategic doctrine of any state in the post-Cold War period; 
prevention was limited to the diplomatic sphere, and threats were assumed to be 
constrainable through coercive strategies of which military force was only a 
component, although increasingly efficacious, part. The UN Charter retained authority 
because the vast majority o f states continued to perceive it as law, and, for the most 
part, it had control because it continued to shape state behaviour. The controversy 
surrounding NATO’s operation in Kosovo confirmed the authority and control of the 
UN Charter, despite some questions posed about its rationale given new strategic 
imperative of managing internal crises.
Nevertheless, NATO’s action over Kosovo arguably constituted defacto confirmation 
that pro-action had become acceptable state practice in the new security environment, 
especially in the absence of decisive UNSC action, despite the reactive de jure legal 
framework of the UN Charter.207 The controversy surrounding NATO’s Kosovo 
campaign arose precisely because of the clash between pro-action in support of 
strategic imperatives and reaction as the defining characteristic of legitimising
207 Arend, A. C. (2004). International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force.
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institutions. The self-defence criteria of necessity and proportionality were adapted by 
NATO to justify military action despite the absence of any demonstrable attack on a 
NATO member state and the lack of UNSC approval.
On the one hand, NATO’s argument for the necessity of Operation Allied Force was 
rooted in its perception of the situation in Kosovo as a threat to regional stability. The 
NATO Council stated on 5 March 1998 that ‘the international community have a 
legitimate interest in developments in Kosovo, inter alia because of their impact on the 
stability of the whole region which is of concern to the Alliance’.208 As such, NATO 
justified its action by appealing to its responsibility to maintain regional stability under 
Articles 2 and 4 of NATO’s charter. NATO also claimed, prior to the operation, that 
the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be consistent with 
UNSC resolutions 1160 and 1199, which condemned Serbian offences in Kosovo. 
NATO argued that the military campaign had limited objectives and was proportionate 
to what was necessary to removing the debilitating regional threat.209 On the other 
hand, critics of NATO’s intervention, including the UNSC permanent members Russia 
and China, claimed that the necessity of military action against FRY was not 
demonstrated and that the use of military force was far from proportionate.210 Kofi 
Annan, the UN Secretary-General, astutely presented the dilemma of the rational 
action/legitimate action astigmatism that created the controversy, by lamenting both 
the illegitimate NATO intervention and the failure of the UN to act rationally to 
achieve security aims:
On the one side, the question of the legitimacy of action taken by a regional 
organisation without a UN mandate; on the other, the universally 
recognized imperative of effectively halting gross and systematic violations 
of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences. The inability o f the 
international community in the case of Kosovo to reconcile these two 
equally compelling interests was a tragedy.211
(5 March 1998). NATO Council Statement.
Roberts, A. (1999). "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over Kosovo."
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The dysfunction of the UNSC was highlighted in the UN Secretary-General’s Report 
of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, otherwise known as the 
Brahimi report after the Panel’s chairman Lakhdar Brahimi. In it, the UN’s inability to 
fulfil the information collection and analysis requirements of preventive diplomacy, as 
set out in ‘An Agenda for Peace’ in 1992, was identified as an issue that needed 
resolving in a strategic reality that called for responses to threats that were 
demonstrable through the analysis of information regarding crises in progress, as well 
as through instances of external armed attack.212 The failure of the UNSC in making 
determinations of processes and situations that constituted threats to peace and 
security impaired the UNSC’s capacity to facilitate rational action to prevent conflict 
through the requisite legitimising institutions.
Prevention in the Post-Cold War Situation
In conclusion of this section, prevention in the post-Cold War era represented a 
strategic aim that relied on pro-action limited to diplomatic initiatives in the face of 
threats that were assumed to be constrainable through coercive strategies. Although 
the logic of controlling strategies executed through pro-active mechanisms gained 
currency within a strategic environment comprising non-state actors and the threat of 
intrastate war, the legitimising institutions of the UN order retained authority and 
control. As such, military pro-action that contravened the reactive mechanisms of self- 
defence and collective security remained controversial, despite the fact that the de facto 
use of force in support of conflict prevention aims indicated a growing acceptance of 
pro-action as a viable rationale.
SECTION FOUR: THE POST-9/11 ORDER AND PREVENTION
The attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 
confirmed the existence of a new strategic reality in the 21st century. The strikes by the 
terrorist organisation al-Qaida claimed 2,973 innocent lives and cost the US stock
212 (21 August 2000). Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
105
market $1.2 trillion in the space of one week.213 The use of commercial jet aircraft as 
mass-destructive weapons in co-ordinated suicide attacks against soft targets that 
aimed to cause utmost death and devastation signalled a new type of actor with 
motivations, methods and strategic aims that deviated wildly from those o f the UN 
order. The al-Qaida operation represented the mark of an unconstrained, non-state 
actor uninterested in maintaining international order based on the mutual recognition 
of sovereignty.214
Threats
The arrival of ‘new’ terrorism heralded a new challenge to international peace and 
security that was undeterrable in principle and unconstrained by pro-active 
mechanisms that sought to control threats through military-backed diplomacy.215 Al- 
Qaida is not a sovereign state with diplomatic representation or an evident willingness 
to engage in negotiation, unless in the event of the conversion o f its enemies to 
Islam.216 The group has no sovereign independence to preserve or borders to protect, 
thus no obvious vested interest in complying with an international order designed 
specifically to uphold sovereignty principles. As non-state actors uninterested in 
complying with the status quo, ‘new’ terrorists like al-Qaida, unlike ‘old’ terrorists and 
risk-averse states operating in the post-1945, Cold War and post-Cold War periods, are 
unafraid to gamble in their attempt to achieve strategic aims.217 As 9/11 showed, al- 
Qaida’s strategy is not dependent on cost-benefit calculations within the context of 
balance of power politics. Despite al-Qaida’s relatively inferior conventional strength, 
the group nonetheless chose to attack US targets irrespective of the US’s robust 
military capability to resist or retaliate against the attack. Indeed, the asymmetry of the
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post-Cold War environment was extended to new levels within a 21st century strategic 
reality consisting of mobile, non-state actors that used their non-sovereign status as 
strength. Al-Qaida exploits the territorial rigidity and behavioural constraint to which 
the US and other sovereign states operating in international society are subject.218 Al- 
Qaida’s attack on 9/11 represented the culmination of a transnational phenomenon 
with a ‘flock of birds’ organisational characteristic that was hard to pin-point and 
retaliate against.219 Furthermore, al-Qaida’s embracement of martyrdom invalidated the 
logic of deterrence, considering the irrationality o f assuming that an adversary that 
aims to die in an attack can be deterred with the prospect of death in the event of an 
attack taking place.220
In the face of conventionally weak, risk-taking adversaries that embraced death and 
sought to maximise casualties and destruction through indiscriminate attacks, the logic 
of mutually assured destruction was, likewise, effectively negated. The utility of WMD 
as offensive instruments became a viable proposition for terrorist groups that, unlike 
risk-averse states, were not driven by the overwhelming interest to survive. The 
incoercible nature of new terrorist groups triggered a fundamental shift in threat 
perceptions after 9/11, given that the ‘motivations of these new adversaries, their 
determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s 
strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass 
destruction’ created a new strategic reality in which ‘wanton destruction and the 
targeting of innocents’ constituted the scourge that required prevention.221
Rational Action
The assumption that an adversary will use force given the chance makes preventing 
that adversary from acquiring the means to do so a strategic imperative.222 This
218 Barber, B. R. (2002). Democracy and Terror in the Era of Jihad vs. McWorld..
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imperative is all the more important considering the prospect on an unconstrained 
actor utilising weapons of mass destruction. Whether the threat is deemed to be in the 
early stages of development or at the cusp of materialisation is irrelevant; what is 
important is the capability to control the threat and mitigate the risk of it coming to 
fruition.
Considering the strategic imperative to prevent violence caused by unconstrained 
non-state terrorist groups, the rational framework provided for by preventive 
diplomacy required overhauling after 9/11. The assumption that security threats could 
be coerced into complying with the status quo was irrational in the face of actors like al- 
Qaida that operated in contravention of the logic o f the UN order. After 9/11, 
controlling strategies were more urgently needed and pro-active mechanisms, as 
opposed to reactive ones, have become essential to the management of incoercible 
threats that are too dangerous to be allowed to materialise. Prevention of the 
terrorism-WMD threat nexus after 9/11 became more urgent than prevention of 
intrastate war during the post-Cold War period.
The Irrationality of the U N  Order
By failing to adequately describe the phenomena that threaten international security, 
the UN order based on sovereign independence and the non-use of force fails to 
sufficiently address post-9 /11 strategic imperatives. The threat posed by al-Qaida and 
other like-minded terrorists cannot be understood in terms of the framework of 
sovereignty that was constructed after World War Two and enshrined in the UN 
Charter. Other long-standing threats, such as the proliferation of WMD, have become 
more ominous given the existence of actors that are observed to act without normal 
constraints. As John Foster Dulles noted, the UN Charter is a ‘pre-atomic’ document 
and does not countenance the threat posed by WMD proliferation, especially amongst 
non-state actors.223 Terrorism did not feature in the minds of the authors o f the UN 
Charter when they were devising Chapter VII. The assumption of state-exclusivity and
223 Kacerauskis, V. (2005). "Can a Member of the United Nations Unilaterally decide to use Preemptive
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the threat of conventional interstate attack lay at the heart of the post-1945 UN 
system, and continued to be salient in the Cold War security landscape. In the post- 
9/11 world this assumption is unrealistic. As such, the rational framework entailing 
from the assumption doesn’t make sense.224 The Caroline formula, which defines the 
logical structure of the self-defence and collective security institutions, fails to explain 
the type of threat posed by the terrorism-WMD threat nexus or the type of behaviour 
that is rational in order to achieve security aims.
Firstly, necessity of action is difficult to demonstrate in the face of the murky threats 
o f terrorism and WMD proliferation. Terrorists and proliferators prefer to act in the 
shadows and deliberately conceal their activities from public view. It is extremely 
challenging for states, for example, to determine whether a state or terrorist group 
operating covertly has a WMD capability, and by the time an adversary acquires such a 
capability it could be difficult to defend against it, especially if it is a trigger-happy 
terrorist group that achieves the acquisition. Rather than demonstrating necessity 
through the observation of actual attacks, the onus is on states to demonstrate 
necessity through the analysis and assessment of information pertaining to potential 
attacks.225 This burden entails from the post-9 /11 imperative to pro-act to prevent 
attacks, as opposed to the post-1945/Cold War imperative to react only to their 
occurrence. The strategic requirement highlighted in the 2000 Brahimi report on UN 
conflict prevention for an information-based capacity to determine threats and 
demonstrate necessity of action became more urgent in the post-9/11 era against 
threats that states could not afford to let materialise.226 The requirement to 
demonstrate necessity extended to action that could be judged essential to the 
management of risk. In light of this new strategic imperative, the US national security 
strategy of 2002 argued that ‘[t]he greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction — 
and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, 
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place o f the enemy’s attack’.227
Glennon, M. J. (2003). "Why the Security Council Failed."
Mackmurdo, C. (2004). "Getting Facts: Intelligence and the UN." World Today 60(8/9): 23-25.
(21 August 2000). Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
(September 2002). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America: 15
109
Secondly, the Caroline formula’s proportionality requirement became more difficult to 
demonstrate in the post-9/11 strategic reality. Determining what sort of action and 
how much is needed to achieve what is necessary to maintain international security is 
trickier in the face of enduring and hidden terrorism threats. The ‘flock of birds’ nature 
of terrorist groups like al-Qaida and proliferators means that demonstrating the 
removal o f a threat is more complicated than in cases of state aggression, such as Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In that case, the eviction of Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti 
territory clearly indicated the reversal of the threat posed by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
and the achievement of the limited strategic aims of the military operation that was 
undertaken to restore peace and security. In the case of the ‘war on terrorism’, 
however, proportionality is less easy to demonstrate considering that the achievement 
of strategic objectives necessary to the elimination of terrorism is much harder to 
display.228
The impact of post-911 imperatives on the institutions of self-defence and collective 
security has been deep and far-reaching. The post-Cold War argument for an extension 
of the right to self-defence against non-state threats has been reinforced after the 9/11 
attacks. Indeed, the US—led operation in Afghanistan was described by the US as an act 
o f self-defence in response to the al-Qaida strikes.229 Hypothetically, if action against a 
terrorism threat perceived by a state is deemed to require the use of force, and the 
issue is not dealt with by the UNSC, then the only recourse available to that state is the 
right to self-defence. This eventuality is the rational outcome of the post-9 /11 strategic 
reality, in which judgements regarding the necessity o f action to address non-state 
terrorism threats extends beyond the framework o f interstate war in which threats are 
demonstrable exclusively through occurrences of attack. The implications for the 
rationale of collective security are likewise affected by the logical extension of the right 
to self-defence. The UNSC’s fulfilment of its unique responsibility to maintain 
international peace and security against the threat of terrorism requires that it is
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capable of determining threats that demand prevention through information 
assessment, and controlling them through pro-active mechanisms. The current 
collective security framework of limiting the use of Chapter VII measures to responses 
to actual state attack is irrational considering the strategic imperative to prevent threats 
to international peace and security posed by incoercible non-state actors.
Prevention as Rational Action
The perception of unconstrained threats to international peace and security has led to a 
re-rationalisation of security strategies at the state and UN levels. In light of the post- 
9 /1 1 situation, security strategies need to be controlling and executed through pro­
active mechanisms. Indeed, post-9/11 strategic imperatives and the rationality of 
prevention are acknowledged in a number of official security strategies, including those 
of the US, UK and the UN (which are examined in Chapter 5). The well-known and 
oft-cited 2002 US national security strategy sets out the ‘Bush Doctrine’ of pre­
emption, and multilateral organisations such as the EU describe the imperative to 
prevent as a central component o f strategic thinking. The 2003 EU security strategy ‘A 
Secure Europe in a Better World’, reads:
Our traditional concept of self-defence — up to and including the Cold War 
— was based on the threat o f invasion. With the new threats, the first line of 
defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of 
proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever 
more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are 
neglected — as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be 
ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat 
prevention cannot start too early.230
Indeed, the effect on international order by new strategic imperatives is 
demonstrated in the UN’s own strategy documents. The 2004 report o f the UN 
Secretary-General’s High Level Panel of Threats, Challenge and Change reads:
230 (2003). A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. Brussels, The European Union: 
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The attacks of 11 September 2001 revealed that States, as well as collective 
security institutions, have failed to keep pace with changes in the nature of 
threats... The primary challenge for the United Nations and its members is 
to ensure that, of all the threats in the categories listed [economic and social 
threats, environmental degradation, interstate conflict, internal conflict, 
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism, and 
transnational organised crime], those that are distant do not become 
imminent and those that are imminent do not actually become destructive.
This requires a framework for preventive action which addresses all these 
threats in all the ways they resonate most in different parts of the world.231
Legitimate Action
Despite state- and UN-level recognition of the rationality of prevention in the post- 
9/11 era, prevention remains an illegitimate strategy according to conventional 
understanding of the institutions of the UN order. The scope of the right to self- 
defence has not been extended to provide for action taken in anticipation of attacks, 
and the UN’s collective security machinery lacks the capability to determine threats 
based on information of potential attacks. The rational action/legitimate action 
astigmatism marked by NATO’s intervention over Kosovo during the post-Cold War 
period worsened after 9/11 as the imperative to prevent became more urgent and the 
gap between state practice and legitimising institutions widened. This astigmatism 
accounts for the emergence of preventive action in the post-9 /11 period that posed a 
direct challenge to international order. New rules have not been constructed around 
the material reality of the 21st century. This situation has eroded the authority and 
control of international law as enshrined in the UN Charter.
Legitimacy is essential to the maintenance of international order. In the post-9/11 
situation, the values enshrined in the UN Charter do not correspond with security 
imperatives; as a result, controversial patterns of behaviour ensue. The US and UK 
action against Iraq in March 2003 marked the most controversial case of state action 
that sought to control a threat posed by Iraq’s development of a WMD capability
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identified through the assessment of information through pro-active mechanisms 
involving the use of force.
US and UK action against Iraq
The Iraq War was, technically, illegal.232 Unable to claim the right to self-defence and 
without authorisation from the UNSC, the US and UK military action against Iraq 
contravened the legitimising institutions of international society. The use of force by 
the US and UK, as well as South Korea, Australia, Denmark and Poland which, along 
with 43 other supporting states, constituted a ‘coalition of the willing’, was not in 
response to an armed attack by Iraq.233 Opponents of the Iraq war within the UNSC 
claim that the necessity of military action had not been demonstrated, despite a 
presentation by US Secretary of State Colin Powell of evidence, based on intelligence 
material, of the Iraqi threat to the UNSC on 5 February 2003.234
The purpose of the presentation was claimed by Powell to share with the UNSC 
‘what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as well as 
Iraq's involvement in terrorism’.235 The intelligence claims made in the presentation 
included a long-running Iraqi campaign of denial and deception over WMD 
programmes and links between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida. The US ‘intelligence file’ 
on Iraq’s biological weapons programme was said to contain ‘first-hand descriptions of 
biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails’ which, in a matter of months, ‘can 
produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to 
have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War’.236 Intercepted conversations 
between Iraqi military officials were presented as evidence of a conspiracy to conceal 
chemical weapons activity. Powell also claimed that Saddam Hussein had ‘made 
repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminium tubes from 11
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different countries’ in an effort to develop a nuclear capability, which corroborated US 
‘intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high­
speed balancing machines’ for the purpose of enriching uranium.237 Furthermore, as 
evidence of a material breach of the conditions imposed on Iraq by UNSC Resolution 
687 (see below), Powell declared that the US had evidence of an Iraqi programme 
‘pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers’. 
Powell also rejected Iraqi denials of ties with al-Qaida as ‘simply not credible’, based on 
evidence of al-Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq and the assumption that ‘ambition and 
hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida could learn 
how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and 
enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons 
of mass destruction’.238 Faced with such a threat, Powell declared to the UNSC, ‘the 
United States will not and cannot run that risk for the American people. Leaving 
Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months 
or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world.’239
Although the UK did not present evidence of the Iraqi threat before the UNSC, it 
did publish a dossier on Iraq’s WMD based on intelligence material that sought to 
make a case for war. The September Dossier, fully entitled ‘Iraq's Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government’, was declared by Blair’s 
administration to show that ‘Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing 
weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq's regional power’, 
and that ‘that he does not regard them only as weapons of last resort.’240 Intelligence 
was said to substantiate judgements that Iraq continued to produce chemical and 
biological weapons, some of which were ‘deployable within 45 minutes of an order to 
use them’.241 The dossier also made the claim that Saddam Hussein had ‘sought
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significant quantities of uranium from Africa’ for the purposes of acquiring a nuclear 
capability.242
The remaining members of the UNSC, however, were not convinced by the 
evidence of an Iraqi threat. France, a permanent member of the UNSC, promised to 
veto a UNSC resolution that specifically authorised military action against Iraq, thus 
depriving the US and the UK of any prospect of UN authorisation.243 With the self- 
defence and collective security avenues unavailable, the invasion of Iraq was rendered 
illegitimate according to the provisions of the UN Charter.
Some, on the other hand, claim otherwise. The US, UK and their supporters 
appealed, prior to the invasion, to the combined legitimising effect o f UNSC 
Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441, as well as 13 other UNSC resolutions either 
reaffirming the need for weapons inspections or condemning Iraqi non-compliance 
with them.244 Resolution 678, issued in 1990, authorised ‘all necessary measures’ — UN 
code for Chapter VII mechanisms encompassing the use of force — to restore peace 
and security in the Gulf region in the face of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Resolution 678 
sanctioned the US-led military action during the Gulf War in 1990/91 and provided 
the roots for subsequent Iraq-related resolutions. One o f these subsequent resolutions, 
Resolution 687 o f 1991, established ceasefire terms and imposed the obligation on Iraq 
to destroy all ‘chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related 
subsystems and components and all research, development, support and 
manufacturing facilities’, as well as ‘ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 
kilometres’.245 Further down the line in 2002, Resolution 1441 declared that Iraq was in 
material breach of the ceasefire terms presented under the terms of Resolution 687; as 
such, ‘all necessary measures’ to restore international peace and security, as provided 
for by Resolution 678, became available. Thus, backers of the US and UK action
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against Iraq argue that the invasion was legally justified by the string of UNSC 
resolutions citing Iraqi non-compliance.
Ultimately, though, the Bush administration has not been shy in presenting Operation 
Iraqi Freedom as an act of prevention that represented the rational and responsible thing 
to do, in spite o f the limitations of the UN Charter.246 British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair also argued in the House of Commons that the risk o f the potential ‘coming 
together’ of WMD and terrorism required preventive military action, despite the failure 
of UK-driven efforts to secure specific authorisation from the UNSC.247 The 
determination of a threat posed by Iraq’s WMD programmes through the assessment 
of secret intelligence material provided the basis of a controlling strategy that sought to 
nip a developing threat in the bud through a pro-active use of force. The risk of 
inaction against the threat of irresponsible proliferation of WMD in the post-9/11 
context, considering the existence of unconstrained terrorist groups assumed to be 
seeking the chance to deploy WMD, was too great to entertain as a viable option.
Scholars, including Adam Roberts, have disputed the idea that the US and UK action 
against Iraq signified a controlling strategy, claiming that the legal authority provided 
by the string of UNSC resolutions succeeded in characterising the Iraq invasion as a 
controversial, but conventional, coercive operation.248 However, that the US and UK 
sought to control a situation, rather react to an actual attack, is indisputable — it was 
this strategic aim that provided the rationale of the invasion. Combined with the pro­
active use of force in the face of a threat determined through the assessment of 
intelligence, the aim to control a threat in order to prevent a potential attack rendered 
the US and UK operation qualitatively preventive. The US and UK, in the absence of 
UN authorisation and in contravention of Article 51, took action based on an 
overarching post-9/11 controlling strategy that seeks to address threats before they
246 (23 September 2003). "President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly." from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030923-4.html.
247 (18 March 2003). "Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate." from http://www.number- 
10.gov.uk/output/Page3294.asp.
248 Roberts, A. (2003). "Law and the Use of Force after Iraq."
116
materialise through pro-active mechanisms. Military action against Iraq was considered 
by US President Bush and British Prime Minister Blair, against the tide o f significant 
internal and external opposition, to present responsible, as well as rational, action in 
the face of an incoercible threat presented by a terrorism-WMD threat nexus.
Legitimacy and Intelligence-driven Action
In the wake of the Iraq war, however, it turned out that the available information on 
the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD programmes was wrong. In the US, a plethora of 
post-war reviews of US intelligence on Iraq’s WMD revealed fundamental failures in 
intelligence collection and drastic mistakes in intelligence analysis and assessment. 
David Kay, who led UN weapons inspections in Iraq after the first Gulf War, was 
appointed as head of the Iraq Survey Group in 2003. The ISG was an organisation 
spearheaded by members of the US Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense 
Intelligence Agency with British and Australian support, and tasked to unearth the 
predicted WMD programmes that had presented the casus belli. At the time of his 
resignation in January 2004, David Kay claimed that such WMD programmes had ever 
existed, telling the Senate Armed Services Committee that ‘we were all wrong’.249 
According to Kay’s testimony, ‘based on the intelligence that existed, I think it was 
reasonable to reach the conclusion that Iraq posed an imminent threat. Now that you 
know reality on the ground as opposed to what you estimated before, you may reach a 
different conclusion’.250 Charles Duelfer, who succeeded Kay as head of the ISG, 
began his tenure with the admission that the chances of finding Iraqi WMD 
programmes were ‘close to nil’.251 The prediction was confirmed in the Duelfer Report, 
as the final report of the ISG is commonly known, which declared that Iraq had no 
deployable WMD of any kind as of March 2003 and had no production since 1991.252 
Numerous reports by the US Senate Intelligence Committee, in addition to an
249 (28 January 2004). "Testimony of David Kay before the US Senate Armed Services Committee." from 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/KAY401A.html.
250 Ibid.
251 (24 January 2004). "US chief Iraq arms expert quits." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/americas/3424831 .stm.
252 (September 2004). Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, Central 
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independent report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, reject the veracity of pre-war 
intelligence claims of Iraqi WMD programmes and links between Saddam Hussein and 
al-Qaida.253
In the UK, similar scrutiny of the intelligence that made the case for war occurred. 
An inquiry by Lord Hutton into the apparent suicide of UK government official Dr. 
David Kelly, who had accused the Blair administration of ‘sexing up’ the September 
Dossier, concluded that ‘the wording of the dossier had been altered to present the 
strongest possible case for war within the bounds of available intelligence’.254 The 
Butler Report, the popular name given to the Review of Intelligence on Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, went further by claiming that the central judgements included in the 
September Dossier had stretched available intelligence ‘to the outer limits’, and that the 
desire to demonstrate the necessity of military action against Iraq meant that ‘more 
weight was placed on the intelligence than it could bear’.255
The controversy surrounding the pre-war and post-war situations in 2003 signals the 
extremely problematic relationship between rational action and legitimate action in the 
post-9 /11 era. The strategic imperative to prevent is widely recognised at state and UN 
levels. Rational action is dependent on observation of phenomena that are perceivable. 
In the post-9/11 strategic reality, these phenomena include unconstrained actors that 
have been observed to pose serious and potentially catastrophic threats to international 
peace and security. Rational action is defined by strategies that seek to control these 
threats and mitigate the risk of their materialisation through pro-action, including the 
option of military force. The problem is that controlling strategies depend on the 
determination of threats through information, most likely secret intelligence, not 
through occurrences of attack. Waiting to determine threats through occurrences of 
attack is irrational considering the strategic imperative to prevent unconstrained actors
253 See, for example, (9 July 2004). Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
254 (28 January 2004). Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David 
Kelly C.M.G. London, The Stationary Office.
255 (14 July 2004). Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report of a Committee of 
Privy Counsellors. London, The Stationary Office: 114
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from using force. In order to legitimise information-driven action, encapsulating the 
right to apply military force, against threats whose effects have yet to materialise, 
requires, in conjunction with the Caroline formula, the demonstration of necessity and 
proportionality. Moreover, trust in the information that purports to provide the casus 
belli is essential to achieving legitimacy for information-driven action. The 
demonstration of these conditions is more difficult when the information seeking to 
achieve it is open to interpretation and, in intelligence cases, normally closed to public 
scrutiny. Furthermore, there is no question that the Iraq war damaged the case for 
controlling strategies that rely on information that has a good chance of turning out to 
be wrong.256
Indeed, the demonstration o f necessity by information is based on context- 
dependent assessment. As such, as contexts change, assessments o f information that 
purport to indicate the necessity of action also change. This situation differs markedly 
from threats that are demonstrated through observations of attack: such threats exist 
because they are perceived, not because they are perceivable. In the post-9 /11 strategic 
reality, however, threats that operate covertly — such as unconstrained terrorist plotters 
— exist because they are perceivable, not because they are perceived. In order to act 
rationally against them, the onus is on states to empirically investigate their existence 
and determine their nature. Necessity of action in this strategic context is, therefore, 
demonstrable only through the assessment of information gleaned from empirical 
investigations.
The problem is that it cannot be known for certain whether the contexts within 
which these investigations take place are capable of providing information that is able 
to evidence clandestine threats beyond the threshold of reasonable doubt. As David 
Kay stated, the determination of Iraqi WMD ‘based on the intelligence that existed’ 
was reasonable; as such, the necessity of action within a post-9/11 strategic reality was, 
although open to argument, demonstrable. In the post-invasion context, however, 
empirical investigations produced information that supported a different conclusion. 
And this is the primary problem with demonstrating necessity through information:
256 See Suskind, R. (2006). The One Percent Doctrine. New York, Simon and Schuster.
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information depends on context, and context is changeable; therefore, information is 
changeable too. Necessity, as the term implies, is hard to demonstrate through context- 
dependent information on the reality of threats that is contingent, in principle, on 
observation.
Crucially, though, in line with Constructivist Realist theory, the fact that information 
is subjective does not mean that it is not realistic. It does mean, however, that trust in 
the veracity of information is a requirement for the legitimisation of controlling 
strategies that seek to prevent attacks whose effects are yet to be perceived. Trust is 
also vital to legitimising the proportionality of any action taken in anticipation of 
threats determined through the assessment of information, and is particularly 
important when such action involves the use o f force. The requirement of trust is a 
21st century addition to the 19th century Caroline formula, and is a crucial component of 
the social processes that bequeath legitimacy. Trust is essential in the post-9/11 
environment, where the focus on the empirical is fundamental and problems of 
perception of threats that ‘might be unperceived, but nonetheless perceptible in 
principle’, or ‘are perceived by some, but remain imperceptible to others, who might 
well be sceptical’, complicate threat determinations and make the role of intelligence in 
strategic planning and responses far more important than ever before257.
Prevention after 9/11
Prevention, in the post-9/11 material reality, is not, as James Gow contends, necessary. 
It is, nevertheless, rational. In order to facilitate and legitimise prevention, a better 
linkage between information and the legitimising institutions of international society is 
required so that unconstrained and dangerous threats demanding preventing can be 
determined and acted upon legitimately in conjunction with strategic imperatives. In 
light of the rationality of prevention and the failure of the UN Charter to maintain 
authority and control over de facto preventive state practice, the challenge for 
international society, as Gow rightly asserts, is ‘to work out the best possible terms for
257 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West: 35
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its emergence and satisfactory adoption’.258 A critical factor in meeting this challenge is 
accommodating the possibility of rationalising and legitimising preventive action 
through the assessment of information, most likely secret intelligence, of threats that 
are perceivable rather than perceived, as opposed to the perception of the occurrence 
of actual armed attack.
CONCLUSIONS
The existence of unconstrained actors led to the emergence of prevention as rational 
action in the post-9/11 world. Coercive strategies in the face of non-state gamblers 
that seek their own death through causing mass casualties and destruction do not make 
sense. Prevention — a controlling strategy that seeks to address unconstrained threats, 
at whatever stage of development, before they materialise through pro-active 
mechanisms - represents rational action in recognition of undeterrable and incoercible 
threats of potentially catastrophic magnitude. Enabling rational action in recognition of 
the post-9/11 strategic imperative to prevent threats depends on the acquisition and 
application of information. Moreover, legitimising prevention depends on the 
determination of threats and the demonstration of the necessity through the 
assessment of information. The power of intelligence to enable rational action and 
legitimise prevention is a feature of the post-9/11 era, and it is examined in Chapter 
three.
258 Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West: 132
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CHAPTER THREE 
Intelligence Power after 9/11
INTRODUCTION
The facilitation and legitimisation of post-9/11 controlling strategies, in line with the 
strategic imperative to prevent threats, depends on the acquisition and application of 
information on phenomena that are perceivable, but not necessarily perceived. In 
order to be able to act in advance to prevent expected threats from materialising, states 
must be capable of investigating and empirically verifying risk. Accordingly, controlling 
strategies that seek to prevent threats through pro-active mechanisms have strategic 
intelligence requirements. The determination of threats whose materialisation states 
can ill-afford to allow relies on the assessment of information on potential attacks, 
rather than observations of attacks that have already happened.
As an instrument of statecraft, intelligence power, as described by Michael Herman, 
is a facet of national power.259 States’ levels of intelligence power have traditionally 
varied according to the seriousness with which states have taken intelligence in 
achieving national security goals.260 States that have perceived vulnerability to threats 
have generally taken intelligence more seriously in national security efforts than states 
that have felt relatively secure.261 After 9/11, however, perceptions of a ‘new’ terrorism 
threat have universalized and the imperative to prevent terrorism threats has provided 
a new-found rationale for pro-active action against anticipated attack. International 
society as a whole, therefore, has a newly acquired interest in taking intelligence 
seriously, considering intelligence has the potential power to facilitate and legitimise
Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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pro-action by determining burgeoning, covert threats and demonstrating the necessity 
of preventive action in anticipation of attack.
To be sure, the post-9/11 strategic reality has affected the way in which Michael 
Herman’s concept of intelligence power — the use of intelligence by states to produce 
advantageous effects in the international system -  is understood.262 The possibility for 
states to facilitate and legitimise rational action, given the imperative o f prevention, 
through the assessment of information has made intelligence more important than ever 
to the maintenance of international peace and security.263 Intelligence has the potential 
power to enable states to act rationally by providing the means to investigate material 
realty and verify the existence o f fuzzy threats that, according Constructivist Realism, 
are perceivable, but not necessarily perceived. Intelligence also has the potential power 
to enable states to legitimise prevention by demonstrating the necessity of preventive 
measures that seek to manage unconstrained and incoercible threats identified through 
the assessment of information gleaned by empirical investigation. These new levels of 
potential intelligence power have brought pressure to bear on intelligence organisations 
by imposing roles on intelligence knowledge that transcend the traditional boundaries 
o f intelligence activity. For instance, efforts to meet the challenge to prevent threats to 
international peace and security have, despite severe limitations, entailed increased 
intelligence co-operation between states in order to promote rational government of 
unconstrained transnational threats.264
The role identified by Herman of intelligence organisations to enable rational 
government is explained by the Constructivist Realist conception of rational action as a 
product of social processes involving empirical investigation, in line with Positivist 
rationality. Indeed, Constructivist Realism succeeds in providing a theory of 
intelligence power by describing the power of intelligence in terms of Positivist 
rationality. In much the same way that empirical investigation has the power to bestow 
meaning on statements expressing verifiable facts, intelligence -  a social process
262 Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War.
263 Mackmurdo, C. (2004). "Getting Facts: Intelligence and the UN."
264 Herman, M. (2002). "11 September: Legitimising Intelligence?" International Relations 16(2): 227 -
241.
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involving empirical investigation — has the power to describe reality and enable rational 
government of phenomena that are perceivable, but not necessarily perceived.
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section one develops a theory of 
intelligence power based on Constructivist Realism. Section two examines the nature 
of Michael Herman’s concept of intelligence power, and explores how understanding 
of the concept has changed after 9/11. Section three looks at how the imperative of 
prevention has affected the nature of intelligence power and outlines the new 
international roles of intelligence. And, section four looks at how the need to co­
operate to prevent serious transnational threats has affected the nature of intelligence 
power and examines developments in, and the limitations of, intelligence co-operation.
SECTION ONE: A CONSTRUCTIVIST REALIST THEORY OF
INTELLIGENCE POWER 
The Lack of Intelligence Theory
Apart from providing a realistic and rational theory of international politics, 
Constructivist Realism succeeds in providing a much needed theory of intelligence 
power. Intelligence as a feature of the international system is notoriously under­
theorised, and attempts to create a theory of intelligence have been inadequate.265 The 
best conceptual framework for intelligence was developed by Michael Herman in his 
book Intelligence Power in Peace and War; which is examined in Section 2, below. Whilst 
his framework succeeds in elucidating the empirical evolution, structures, dynamics 
and effects of intelligence power, it doesn’t, however, make explicit the ontological or 
epistemological claims required for serious theory. The assumptions that are bundled 
in Herman’s concept of ‘intelligence power’ are avowedly Realist: Herman focuses 
exclusively on the State as the primary actor in a competitive international system in 
which intelligence, as an instrument of sovereign state power, is used to maximise
265 Andrew, C. (2004). "Intelligence, International Relations and 'Under-theorisation'." Intelligence and 
National Security 19(2): 170 -184.
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national interests and achieve strategic advantage.266 Nevertheless, Herman, as a former 
intelligence practitioner, is reluctant to locate intelligence in international relations 
theory fearing, as he informed me in an interview, of appearing ‘pretentious’ 267 For 
Herman, definitions of ‘intelligence power’ go far enough in providing a theoretical 
base, and this definitional basis has proved adequate for his purpose of raising 
awareness of intelligence as a subject worthy of academic study. Despite the lack of 
theoretical depth, Herman’s approach continues to provide the best practical 
framework for understanding intelligence as a feature of statecraft — but it doesn’t 
provide a robust academic theory of intelligence.
In order to fill the gap in intelligence theory, Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, in their 
book Intelligence in an Insecure World, sought to develop a systematic theoretical 
framework for intelligence with its own ontological and epistemological approaches.268 
Gill and Phythian reject Positivism and Post-modernism as being too evidence-reliant 
and too Reflectivist, respectively.269 On the one hand, according to Gill and Pythian, 
the apparently ‘Behavioualist’ ontology o f Positivism is inadequate because ‘it requires 
‘observability’ as a criterion for evidence and ‘actors’ who cause events’.270 As such, any 
‘attempt to develop a theory of intelligence is doomed if we can theorize only on the 
basis of what we can observe, whether or not it is from ‘official’ sources’.271 On the 
other hand, the inter-subjectivity of Post-modernism, such as the approach taken by 
James Der Derian’s ‘meta-theory5 on intelligence which examines ‘ambiguous 
discourse, not objective truth’, gets in the way of attempting to develop a useful 
framework within which to gain a practical understanding of intelligence.272 Post­
modern claims of subjective reality does not support Gill and Pythion’s purpose of 
seeking out ‘ways of understanding and explaining intelligence, including by way of 
analysing texts, believing that useful knowledge (that which has some real existence 
beyond the text) can be ascertained and made use of by those seeking to improve the
Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War.
Personal Interview with Michael Herman at Nuffield College, Oxford University on 5 November 2003
Gill, P. and M. Pythian (2006). Intelligence in an Insecure World. Cambridge, Polity.
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human condition’.273 In light of these concerns, Gill and Pythion setde for an approach 
that they call ‘Critical Realism’, which ‘avoids the major pitfalls of both positivism and 
post-modernism’.274 The basic ontological claim of their Critical Realism is that there 
‘is some ‘reality’ in the world, but the process of understanding it requires critical self­
reflection on how we understand’.275
Like Constructivist Realism, Gill and Pythion’s Critical Realism is a bold effort to 
reconcile Realist and Constructivist processes. However, unlike a Phenomenalist-based 
Constructivist Realism, Critical Realism is based on misguided ontology and 
epistemology and, therefore, suffers from problematic dilemmas. In addition, Gill and 
Pythion seek to explain the academic study of intelligence, not intelligence as a 
phenomenon of the international system. Consequently, it fails to provide a theory of 
intelligence and succeeds in merely establishing a methodological framework for 
research into intelligence that identifies the opportunities and limitations for 
researchers studying a secretive branch of government.276
There are five major problems with Gill and Python’s approach. Firstly, Gill and 
Pythion reject the requirement of ‘observability’ for evidencing the existence of 
phenomena. In terms of theory, Critical Realism is, according to Positivist standards of 
reasoning, meaningless nonsense. As David Hume would ask, does Critical Realism 
contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? 
According to Gill and Pythion, the answer is ‘no’, since facts are not discoverable -  
only ‘new connections and relations that are not directly observable and by which we 
can analyse already known occurrences in a novel way’ are available for discovery.277 
This is good example of a theory that can express only tautologies. As such, it is no 
theory at all because it is incapable of describing new facts about the world. That being 
the case, Critical Realism does not contribute to our knowledge of the world, because
273 Gill, P. and M. Pythian (2006). Intelligence in an Insecure World: 24-25
274 Ibid.: 26
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we are unable to learn anything that we can show to be true. A Constructivist Realist is, 
in this case, forced to commit Critical Realism to the flames.
Secondly, if facts do not require being observable in principle then they are free to be 
invented. This Post-modern ontology negates, rather than assists, Gill and Pythion’s 
attempt to construct a useful theory. Rather than synthesising Critical and Realist 
strengths to create a stronger theory, Gill and Pythion’s Critical Realism suffers from a 
bizarre ontology that confuses what they mean by ‘reality’ and prevents their theory 
from clarifying the ontological status of their objects of analysis. Indeed, it is 
unacceptable for serious theory to claim that there is ‘some reality in the world’. It is 
impossible for ‘some reality’ to be available for empirical testing and ‘some reality’ that 
is not. Seeking to create a theory that ‘distinguishes elements of reality that are 
relatively unchanging and exist independently of the scientific process from those that 
change more frequently, being produced (socially constructed) as part of the scientific 
process’ reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of scientific processes that seek to 
verify material realities through empirical investigations (social processes) of facts that 
are falsifiable through observation,278 A theory must either consider reality to be 
describable in empirically verifiable statements of fact or invented: it is impossible to 
consider both ontological situations to be equally valid without incurring fatal 
contradictions. The confused ontology of Gill and Pythion’s Critical Realism 
represents a significant weakness in the level of theoretical rigour that they claim is at 
the heart of their initiative to wed Realism with Critical thinking.
Thirdly, if facts do not require being observable to be real, then they are not 
falsifiable. This position is untenable for a theory that purports to seek to explain 
intelligence, since it does not allow for the discovery of facts. Gill and Pythion’s 
acceptance that ‘not all social phenomena can be observed’ directly contradicts Gill 
and Pythion’s mission to conduct research that must ‘therefore also seek out 
underlying mechanisms of events’.279 If these ‘underlying mechanisms’ are
278 Gill, P. and M. Pythian (2006). Intelligence in an Insecure World: 26-27
279 Ibid.: 26-27
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unobservable, then what is the point of carrying out the research when no facts are 
discoverable?
Fourthly, the confused and weak ontology of Critical Realism affects the theory’s 
epistemology and causation. In terms of Gill and Pythion’s epistemology, knowledge 
of the international system is unobtainable through empirical investigation, since 
unobservable phenomena are indescribable in statements of fact. N ot only does this 
epistemological approach negate the explanatory power of their theory, it also 
challenges the rationale of intelligence as a state instrument o f power designed to 
uncover phenomena that are perceivable, but not necessarily perceived. If  the world 
does not contain observable facts, then what is the point of intelligence as an 
instrument of statecraft? More crucially in terms o f the logic of Critical Realism, how 
can a theory that rejects the idea of observable reality explain the function of 
intelligence? Unfortunately for Gill and Pythion, it cannot. The same problem is at the 
centre of Critical Realism’s causation. If causal connections are assumed to be 
unobservable, in line with the idea of ‘secret connexions’ expounded by David Hume, 
then how can Critical Realism identify the efficacy of intelligence to cause anything or 
explain the function of intelligence to investigate phenomena that cause actors to 
collect, analysis and disseminate information in order to ensure security aims in the 
face of perceived threats? In assuming that material phenomena do not possess causal 
powers, Critical Realism is incapable of explaining intelligence’s function to investigate 
threats that are perceived to have the power to cause harm. As a theory that seeks 
‘ways of understanding and explaining intelligence’, Critical Realism is ill-equipped and 
inadequate.
Finally, although Gill and Pythion claim to want to understand and explain 
intelligence, their primary concern is to ‘suggest a framework for research into 
intelligence’.280 Critical Realism is more about explaining research methodology and the 
special nature of intelligence as a subject of academic study. The Critical Realist 
theoretical approach is adopted in light of the reality that studies into intelligence 
affairs are hampered by limited access to information. This information, as Gill and
280 Gill, P. and M. Pythian (2006). Intelligence in an Insecure World: 35
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Pythion attempt to theoretically put it, represents ‘new connections and relations that 
are not directly observable’. Indeed, as Gill and Pythion assert, ‘we shall never be able 
to theorize in a way that behaviouralists would regard as methodologically credible’.281 
This may be true considering the secrecy surrounding intelligence and the restrictions 
faced by academic outsiders who seek to research intelligence issues. However, this 
situation does not excuse theories that are not methodologically credible. A credible 
theory of intelligence that explains the function of intelligence in empirically verifiable 
statements of fact is possible and, in terms of filling the intelligence theory gap, 
essential. Gill and Pythion fail in their mission to provide a credible theory of 
intelligence because they do not believe that a credible theory of intelligence is 
possible.
Constructivist Realism: A Theory of Intelligence Power
Constructivist Realism succeeds where Critical Realism fails in providing a rigorous 
theoretical framework for Michael Herman’s concept of ‘intelligence power’. Whereas 
Critical Realism seeks to identify a framework of intelligence research methodology, 
Constructivist Realism seeks to explain the institution o f intelligence through 
empirically verifiable statements of fact that adhere to Positivist rationality. Indeed, 
Positivist rationality describes the nature of intelligence power and explains its function 
as an enabler of rational action within the international system. The Constructivist 
Realist conception of rational action explains the function of intelligence in facilitating 
rational government in the face of threats that are perceivable, but not necessarily 
perceived: empirically derived strategic imperatives are established through the 
investigation of material reality; the ability to act rationally within the material world 
depends on the capability to verify phenomena that exist independent of perception. 
This assertion follows the Phenomenalist logic that to act rationally is to understand 
reality, to understand reality is to describe facts, and, to describe facts is to be capable 
of verifying phenomena through empirical investigation. Intelligence power represents 
the capability of states to act rationally by understanding threats through the empirical 
investigation of material phenomena.
281 Gill, P. and M. Pythian (2006). Intelligence in an Insecure World: 22
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Moreover, the requirement to investigate the existence of fuzzy and complex 
phenomena in line with the post-9/11 strategic realty has bestowed even greater value 
on intelligence as an enabler of rational action in the contemporary international 
system.282 In the post-9/11 world, controlling security strategies that seek to prevent 
the materialisation of threats posed by unconstrained actors depend on intelligence 
power to investigate and verify phenomena, considering that rational action in the face 
of unconstrained actors requires the determination of threats through the assessment 
of information, rather than the perception of attacks that have already occurred. The 
potential power of intelligence in the post-9/11 strategic reality, therefore, amounts to 
more than the institutionalisation of Positivist rationality. The strategic imperative to 
prevent threats relies on intelligence power to facilitate and legitimise action taken in 
anticipation of attack, by providing the potential means of demonstrating the necessity 
of preventive action against threats that have yet to materialise. In the post-9 /11 era, 
rational action — encompassing the need to pro-act against risk o f attack — depends on 
intelligence power more than ever before.
As it was stated in Chapter 1, the assumption of phenomena in a material world that 
exist independently of perception demonstrates the value o f social processes involving 
empirical investigation in enabling rational behaviour. This is where Gill and Pythion 
are wrong to create a dichotomy between facts that are ‘real’ and social constructs that 
are produced. On the contrary, facts are real precisely because they are socially 
produced. As the Positivist motto goes, ‘the meaning of a proposition is its method of 
verification’. ‘Facts’ are accorded meaning because they are verified through social 
processes involving empirical verification. The relationship between empirical 
verification of phenomena and the ability to act rationally is intimate.
In the international system, the ability of states to act rationally in the face of 
clandestine and unconstrained challenges depends on their capability of investigating 
and verifying phenomena that represent risk-like ‘permanent possibilities’ of harm. The 
value of empirical investigation in enabling actors to construct rational institutions is of 
fundamental importance within a material international system that is perceivable but
282 Mackmurdo, C. (2004). "Getting Facts: Intelligence and the UN."
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not necessarily perceived. The a posteriori status of threats means that they cannot be 
understood or described through arm-chair contemplation. The requirement to 
construct a strategic ‘big picture’ through empirical processes represents the role of 
strategic intelligence in providing information of threats and challenges required to 
formulate and execute strategy, especially in the post-9/11 era when the strategic aim 
to prevent threats from materialising is imperative.
The construction of institutions within a material world also accounts for the 
potential power of intelligence to have a legitimising effect in international society. 
Whilst its function as an enabler of rational action is rooted in its status as a social 
process involving empirical investigation, intelligence power has played no role in 
legitimising action within a UN order based on a coercive strategy administered 
through reactive mechanisms. Indeed, intelligence is simply not recognised as part of 
the UN order, even after 9 /1 1.283 The post-9/11 UN agenda calling for states to meet 
the ‘challenge of prevention’ fails to recognise the importance of intelligence in 
facilitating rational action.284 Intelligence activities do not correspond with the values of 
openness and neutrality that underpin the UN organisation.285 As such, the UN 
organisation keeps its distance from intelligence activity.286 However, given the post- 
9/11 imperative to prevent threats to international peace and security, intelligence has 
the potential power to legitimise, as well as enable, rational action by demonstrating the 
necessity of pro-active mechanisms. The social construction of institutions caused by 
phenomena that threaten international order involve closer co-operation between 
states and a greater role of intelligence in supporting controlling strategies against 
unconstrained transnational threats. The potential power of intelligence to legitimise 
rational action and the increasing levels of co-operation between states in the 
intelligence field testify to the Constructivist Realist identification o f social processes 
that are constitutive of the international system, and constructed in response to 
empirical investigations of phenomena in line with Positivist rationality.
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Constructivist Realism furnishes Herman’s conceptual framework with the 
ontological and epistemological tools required to create a rigorous theory of 
intelligence power that provides analytical depth at no cost to the empirical. Indeed, 
the focus on the empirical is essential to understanding the nature o f intelligence and 
explaining the function of intelligence power within a world socially constructed by 
empirical processes.
SECTION TWO: THE CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE POWER 
The Nature of Intelligence Power
'Rational Government
In 1949, the American academic and government serviceman Sherman Kent 
introduced the term ‘strategic intelligence’ in his book Strategic Intelligence for American 
World Policy. In it, Kent outlined his vision of the challenges to US national security in 
the post-1945 world and the role of intelligence in meeting them. Principally, these 
challenges were the rise of communism and the protection of US interests without the 
help o f a stronger ally, since none existed after the toils of the Second World War.287 
America found itself in a situation where national security was threatened by events 
short of war, but also short of genuine peace.288 A requirement within this strategic 
context, wrote Kent, was ‘strategic intelligence’, or knowing the capabilities, intentions 
and movements of adversaries, so that rational policy could be formulated and 
executed to gain advantage over competitors, and mitigate, given the Cold War nuclear 
face-off, the risk of any MAD eventuality.289 Kent’s understanding of intelligence as a 
‘big picture’ component of rational government, above and beyond intelligence’s 
tactical role in scouting out enemy forces in military operations, provided the
287 Kent, S. (2000). Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University 
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philosophical blueprint for the US civilian intelligence community which remains at 
the heart of the Western model of intelligence.290
Clarifying the difference between strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence is 
important, considering the focus of this thesis is on strategic intelligence. Strategic 
intelligence is, as its name suggests, intelligence that supports strategy.291 The 
acquisition and application of strategic intelligence is conducted in order to facilitate 
rational statecraft and assist in the achievement of enduring political aims. An example 
o f strategic intelligence is information pertaining to the capabilities and intentions o f a 
competitor state in support of a national foreign and security policy towards it. Tactical 
intelligence, on the other hand, has operational, rather than strategic, value.292 Usually, 
tactical intelligence refers to information that assists in the achievement o f limited 
military objectives. Tactical intelligence supports decision-making in the battlefield. 
Examples of tactical intelligence include information indicating the number of enemy 
troops entering into battle, the type o f weaponry the enemy is deploying in battle or 
situation reports on the enemy’s movements in battle. In this thesis, it is ‘big picture’ 
strategic intelligence that will be examined. The Western intelligence model is central 
to the concept of strategic intelligence, and provides a framework within which 
intelligence and policy are separated 293 This policy-independent role of intelligence 
promotes the idea that effective intelligence must be free to provide policy-makers 
with bad news, not just with what they want to hear. The Western intelligence model 
reflects the Positivist function of intelligence as a social process that involves empirical 
investigation of material phenomena that lie beyond perception, rather than an 
invention that is defined by the perception of individuals, including policy-makers. The 
Western intelligence model is often contrasted with the Soviet intelligence model, 
which is claimed to have been more susceptible to serving the convictions of 
Communist leaders like Stalin rather than providing empirically-derived facts 
representing approximations of the truth.294
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In elucidating the nature of strategic intelligence, Kent proffered a three-pronged 
definition of intelligence as a type of knowledge, a type of organisation and a type of 
activity.295 As a type of knowledge, intelligence represents a ‘special category’ that deals 
with secret things and is itself, normally, secret.296 Intelligence is information normally 
associated with issues of national security, diplomacy, and defence, whose purpose is 
to support national policy-goals and governmental decision-making in these areas by 
providing knowledge of threats, and estimating future trends.297 As a type of 
organisation, intelligence institutions provide this special type o f knowledge, and the 
term ‘intelligence’ can be used to refer not only to information but also to the 
organisations that produce it, as in ‘British Intelligence’.298 As a type of activity, 
‘intelligence’ ranges from tasking, collection and covert action to processing, analysis, 
assessment and dissemination. Each activity possesses distinctive characteristics and 
serves individual purposes, but all are intimately entwined in the intelligence cycle that 
intelligence organisations follow in the acquisition and production of intelligence 
knowledge.299
In 1996, British ex-intelligence practitioner and academic Michael Herman developed 
Sherman Kent’s complex concept of strategic intelligence by introducing the concept 
of ‘intelligence power’.300 Whilst the knowledge and activity elements of Kent’s 
definition of strategic intelligence are essential to Herman’s description of intelligence 
power, it is the organisational element that Herman considers the most important.301 In 
terms of intelligence power, it is the intelligence organisation that possesses the 
‘capacity to produce effects that are more advantageous than would otherwise have 
been the case’, by providing the knowledge required to facilitate rational 
government.302 In Herman’s view, the term ‘intelligence’ is ‘based on a particular set of 
organisations with that name... Intelligence activity is what they do, and intelligence
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knowledge what they produce’.303 The capacity of intelligence organisations to conduct 
intelligence activity that produces intelligence knowledge which, in turn, causes 
advantageous effects, constitutes a particular type of state power: intelligence power.304
National Power
Intelligence power is a facet of national power, and it is ‘produced to influence 
government action, however remotely’.305 According to Herman, the primary purpose 
of intelligence is to ‘optimize national strength and international influence in peacetime 
and promote the effective use of force in war and other conflict.’306 Indeed, intelligence 
power is comparable to military power in this regard: it is dispensed by the State in 
order to gain advantage in a competitive international system. The organisations that 
undertake intelligence activities and produce intelligence knowledge are, like armed 
services, national entities, and in many states they constitute a fundamental part of 
national governmental machinery. The historian John Keegan has said that ‘the central 
importance of knowing, both in general and in particular’ is a crucial part of statecraft.307 
Knowing as a part of statecraft has been institutionalised and proven to be a growth 
industry since the end of World War Two, and today intelligence is a central pillar of 
many states’ foreign, security and defence policies, and a key factor in their success or 
failure.308
Although both military power and intelligence power are facets of national power, 
intelligence power is markedly different from military power in respects that make 
intelligence a truer expression of national sovereignty.309 Firstly, unlike the use of 
military power by a state in the international system, the use of intelligence power is
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not subject to international regulation. There are no international treaties covering 
either intelligence activity or organisations, there are just rules of the game tacitly 
approved, understood and enforced by its participants, and flexible bilateral 
arrangements.310 Intelligence often operates outside of the framework of international 
society by ignoring the international legal and political restrictions states ordinarily 
observe. This is not to say that states who subscribe to the UN Charter habitually 
operate in contravention of their international obligations through intelligence activity, 
it is to say that intelligence organisations and their activities are not covered by the UN 
Charter. States view intelligence as an area o f statecraft that lies outside of the normal 
jurisdiction of international convention. The controversial publicity surrounding the 
CIA renditions affair is a testament to the way in which states approach intelligence 
activity as an area which is not subject to normal international controls.311
Secondly, intelligence power is projected covertly and its effects are relatively ‘soft’ in 
comparison to the ‘hard’ effects of military power, which states project overtly to 
produce the effects of deterrence, compliance and containment in the international 
system. A central characteristic of intelligence activity and organisations is 
understatement, which is essential to the efficacy o f intelligence power. The capacity o f 
intelligence organisations to produce advantageous effects would be impaired if, for 
instance, intelligence sources and methods were not kept secret. The strategic 
requirement of intelligence to be discreet contrasts starkly with conventional and 
nuclear military strategic doctrine, which relies on public advertisement of military 
strength in order to deter and compel adversaries, and create the desired effects in the 
international system.
Thirdly, formal military alliances such as NATO, and joint military ventures such as 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), are not reflected by comparable 
intelligence partnerships. An Italian intelligence officer operating in Iraq would not 
answer to a British intelligence officer, in the way Italian troops, for example, report to
310 Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War.
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the British military command in Basra.312 Intelligence relationships between states take 
the form of ad hoc and flexible coalitions which are formed solely on the basis of 
national interests, not the policy objectives of a multilateral institution, however 
conceived. Trends in increased integration of military power amongst states have not 
been followed by integration of intelligence power. These factors explain why 
intelligence is often described as the last true expression of sovereignty in the 
international system: intelligence power is projected by states without the restrictions 
other facets of national power, including military power, are normally subject to.
National 'Entities
Intelligence organisations that produce intelligence power are exclusively national 
entities.313 There exists no multilateral or international organisation that produces 
intelligence power: intelligence organisations exist only at the national level as 
components of government. Despite this, intelligence activity and organisations are 
anomalous even within states. Only recently in the post-Cold War era have intelligence 
organisations in open and democratic states, such as the UK, been publicly avowed 
and legislated for. Employment terms and conditions for intelligence officers are 
different from those o f other public servants, including diplomats and military 
personnel, and these terms and conditions affect the limit to which unionisation can 
occur in the intelligence sector. Even pre-employment situations are unusual: whist the 
CIA and other US intelligence outfits have been relatively open in the way in which 
they recruit staff, the British SIS, for instance, waited until spring 2006 to create a 
website and allow prospective candidates to pro-actively apply for positions within the 
organisation, breaking its dependency on the shoulder-tap system of recruitment that 
SIS had used since its inception.314 Even though increasing openness of intelligence 
services within democratic societies has occurred, intelligence remains anomalous, 
given that it is not subject to the same level of public scrutiny as are other branches of 
government. Governments invoke traditions of ‘not commenting on intelligence
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matters’ and ‘neither confirming nor denying’ stories relating to intelligence activity. 
On the whole, populations tolerate this situation by acknowledging that intelligence 
occupies a unique, almost paradoxical position in democratic societies, predicated on 
the notion that the preservation of openness depends on the maintenance of secrecy.315
At the international level, the nature of intelligence organisations remains anomalous 
but is less obviously so, given that political discussions about intelligence are few and 
far between, or avoided altogether. The UN, for example, the arbiter of international 
law and order, whose Security Council is uniquely responsible for determining and 
addressing threats to peace and security, omits the term intelligence from any o f its 
debates and literature, preferring instead to use the term ‘information’.316 Intelligence 
knowledge, activities and organisations are shunned by the UN system. Intelligence’s 
association with secrecy, deception and spying has prevented the business of 
intelligence from entering into the legitimate political fold — and the stringently neutral 
and transparent UN, and the national governments who seek to retain tight control of 
their intelligence capabilities, are content keeping it this way.317 As such, the nature of 
intelligence power as a concept continues to be characterised as a national power 
produced by national entities.
National Objectives
As a national power produced by national entities, intelligence power inevitably serves 
national objectives.318 Intelligence is part of the state’s defences against internal and 
external threats to national security. During the Cold War, the primary intelligence 
target for Western intelligence organisations was the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold 
War world, intelligence targets have expanded to include terrorism, WMD 
proliferation, regional conflicts, the international narcotics trade and economic threats,
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as well as hostile states.319 In the mid-1990s, when Herman wrote, Herman claimed 
that intelligence’s devotion to national security had not weakened, agreeing with D. L. 
Boren that ‘[a]s the world becomes multipolar, more complex and no longer 
understandable through the prism of Soviet competition, more intelligence -  not less -  
will be needed’.320
Intelligence remains a force multiplier for state instruments in peace and war, and is 
particularly important in counter-terrorism efforts.321 The importance of intelligence’s 
national security role ‘depends upon threats and vulnerabilities and national 
perceptions of them’.322 States facing seriously big threats have the ‘biggest reasons for 
taking intelligence seriously’.323 Indeed, Herman claims that ‘[tjhreats and vulnerabilities 
are the most potent reasons for taking intelligence seriously’.324 States facing less 
serious threats to their national security, for example Japan, have reason to take 
intelligence less seriously, whilst states facing more serious threats, like the UK, which 
for decades countenanced aggression from Irish republican terrorism, have reason to 
take intelligence more seriously. Intelligence targets reflect threats to national security: 
states with more threats to national security have more intelligence targets, and bigger 
intelligence capabilities.
In this regard, intelligence and national security share a sort of symbiotic relationship: 
the work of intelligence organisations benefits state efforts to sustain national security, 
and state perceptions of threats to national security sustains intelligence organisations. 
This relationship does not extend to international security: according to Herman, cases 
where intelligence is used to support international action are nothing more than 
‘applications of national intelligence to serve national interests when these are 
identified with promoting international security’.325 A state will involve itself on an 
intelligence basis in international initiatives such as ‘co-operation on counter-terrorism
Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War.
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and limiting international transfers’ solely as a means to advance objectives narrowly 
conceived in the national interest, in response to perceived threats to national 
security.326
The Changing Nature of Intelligence Power
Perceptions and vulnerabilities after 91 11
The events on and since 9/11 changed the way in which states perceive threats and, 
therefore, the degree by which states take intelligence seriously. ‘New’ terrorism, 
defined here as the strain of violent Islamist extremism as practiced by al-Qaida and its 
affiliates and followers, is a serious transnational threat to which each member of the 
international community is vulnerable. Al-Qaida does not discriminate according to 
national boundaries: all states non-conducive to its campaign to establish a caliphate 
based on Sharia law is vulnerable to attack, including Muslim states.327 Influential 
Western powers, which symbolise the greatest enemies of Islamism, such as the US, 
Israel and UK, remain at the top of the al-Qaida hit-list, but many other non-Muslim 
and Muslim states are targets for al-Qaida. Christians, Jews and other ‘rejectionist’ 
religious groups that cross state lines such as Shia Muslims are also fair game for al- 
Qaida operatives.328
The West, comprising predominantly Christian-rooted and democratic states, is the 
principle ‘infidel’ and ‘crusader’ power that Usama Bin Laden targeted on 9 /1 1.329 
Attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005 demonstrate that Western 
states share a common terrorist threat. Friends and allies of the US and European 
states, such as Australia, Pakistan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Morocco, have also 
been subject to al-Qaida attack. O n the one hand, Australia, as a member of the 
Commonwealth and a democratic member of the international community, is
326 Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War: 362
327 Burke, J. (2003). Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. London, I.B. Tauris.
328 Ibid.
329 Corbin, J. (2002). The Base: In Search of al-Oaeda - the Terror Network that Shook the World. London, 
Simon and Schuster.
140
anathema to al-Qaida and a natural enemy in its own right. On the other hand, leaders 
of Muslim states like Pakistan and Jordan are ‘apostate’ regimes that are worthy of 
attack because of their association with the West and apparent abandonment of ‘true’ 
Islamic doctrine.330 Elsewhere in the Middle East, Israel’s perceived suppression of the 
Muslim Palestinian population gives cause for it to be an important target for al-Qaida. 
The UN, which is seen by Bin Laden as nothing more than a vehicle for Western 
power, has suffered attack and continues to be described by the al-Qaida leadership as 
a legitimate target.331 The UN system as a whole is an enemy of al-Qaida, and UN 
operations in Sudan, East Timor and Bosnia are proffered as examples by Bin Laden 
of a ‘Crusader-Zionist war’ against Islam, which are used to justify his calls for a 
violent global jihad.332 The threat posed by al-Qaida is not constrained geographically: 
it is reported that al-Qaida has cells in over 80 countries worldwide. The global reach 
and ambition of al-Qaida makes ‘new’ terrorism a serious transnational threat that has 
forced states to reconsider the meaning of national security.
As a threat of global reach, the activities of individuals in one country directly affect 
the security of another, as was seen on 9/11 and is being seen in the US, UK, Spain, 
Sweden, Bosnia, Australia and elsewhere across the world. In this fluid and dangerous 
international environment, the security of one state depends on the security of other 
states. Ensuring national security means ensuring international security.333
As a threat of global ambition, ‘new’ terrorism is not state-specific, nor is it 
conducive to the international system in which states thrive. Unlike the Soviet Union 
or Irish Republican terrorism, which threatened the US and her allies during the Cold 
War and the UK during much of the 20th century respectively, the perception of the 
threat posed by al-Qaida is not subject to the same degree of specification. The form
330 Benjamin, D. and S. Smith (2005). The Next Attack: The Globalization of Jihad.
331 (3 November 2001). "Bin Laden rails against Crusaders and UN." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1636782.stm.
332 (3 November 2001). "Bin Laden rails against Crusaders and UN."
333 See Hall, R. and C. Fox (2001). "Rethinking Security." NATO Review Winter.
141
of terrorism conducted by al-Qaida and related groups is recognised as a serious threat 
to international peace and security, not a matter of national security specific to any one 
state or group of states.334
Moreover, the threat posed by ‘new’ terrorism is different from the threats posed by 
the Soviet Union and the PIRA in that the nature, methods and objectives of al-Qaida 
do not fit with the character of the international system. The nuclear stand-off between 
the East and West defined the international system for almost 50 years, and it was 
based on the strategic logic of deterrence, survival and sovereignty that ‘rational’ states 
could understand and apply. Similarly, the Irish Republican causes of self- 
determination and statehood, although unwelcome, were causes the UK and the 
international community could at least understand. In contrast, the ‘flock of birds’ 
nature of a non-state and transnational al-Qaida organisation, which seeks to achieve 
its objective to overturn international order through a strategy o f causing mass- 
casualties based largely on suicide attacks, contradicts the strategic principles of 
deterrence, survival and sovereignty as conventionally understood. As such, al-Qaida 
challenges the international system in a way that neither the Soviet Union nor Irish 
Republicanism did, and thereby succeeds in forcing states to amalgamate national and 
international interests in a way that was not rational before 9/11.
The re-conceptualization of national security in light of the emergence of ‘new’ 
terrorism has impacted on the way in which other threats are assessed. In particular, 
considering the strategy of al-Qaida to cause mass-casualties through suicide attacks, 
the nature of the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has 
been reviewed by the US and UK.335 Faith in the logic of deterrence that governed the 
East-West nuclear stand-off during the Cold War, and continues to govern the 
contemporary international system, has dissolved in an era of non-state actors bent on
334 See (28 September 2001). UN Security Council Resolution 1373; Gow, J. (2005). Defending the West.
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killing as many people as they can, with no concern for their own survival.336 
Declarations of intentions by al-Qaida for a capability to mass-destruct have re-defined 
how states approach the issue of WMD proliferation.337 ‘New’ terrorism has prompted 
not only the amalgamation of national security with international security; it has also 
created a perception of a terrorism-WMD threat nexus against which states feel 
vulnerable. Related issues such as proliferators and ‘rogue’ states have also been re­
evaluated within the post-9/11 context.
States’ attitudes towards the importance of the role of intelligence in the post-9/11 
security environment remain, as Herman claimed, dependent ‘upon threats and 
vulnerabilities and national perceptions of them’. In the post-9/11 era, however, in 
contrast to the Cold War and the situation in the 1990s, most states have an interest in 
taking intelligence seriously, because most states face a common threat at a comparable 
level of seriousness. The nature of ‘new’ terrorism, and the perception of a terrorism- 
WMD threat nexus, means that it is no longer sensible to suggest that Japan, for 
instance, has less reason to take intelligence seriously than the UK, given differentials 
in state perceptions of serious threats to national security. Japan is vulnerable to the 
effects of al-Qaida as is the UK and has, indeed, been targeted, along with international 
institutions.338 Events such as the RUSI Japan-UK Security Co-operation Conference 
in July 2006 reflect this situation of universal vulnerability which has transformed the 
scope of intelligence power to produce effects that are advantageous to universal 
interests.
Intelligence Power after 9/ 11: Threats to International Security as Intelligence Targets
Given these post-9 /11 changes in states’ threat perceptions and vulnerabilities, 
Herman’s definition of intelligence power requires drastic revision. Intelligence co­
operation on issues such as counter-terrorism and WMD proliferation is now a 
strategic imperative, not a mere option when ‘applications of national intelligence’
Freedman, L. (2004). Prevention, Not Preemption.
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happen to ‘serve national interests when these are identified with promoting 
international security’. Although Herman accepts the rationality of countering threats 
abroad in order to protect security at home (this, indeed, is a primary function of 
intelligence), Herman follows Kent in describing intelligence as an exclusively national 
preserve that serves strictly national interests, as distinct from international ones. 
However, the amalgamation of national and international interests in the face of ‘new’ 
terrorism, as well the reassessment of the international issue o f WMD proliferation in 
line with the terrorism threat, has prompted the formulation of security strategies 
based on the imperative of prevention.339 These strategic imperatives have changed the 
object of intelligence power. The nature of intelligence power as a facet o f national 
power remains accurate, and intelligence continues to be produced by national entities. 
However, intelligence power after 9/11 serves international objectives, given the 
amalgamation of national interests with international interests. Intelligence targets have 
internationalised.
The internationalisation of intelligence targets alters the way in which the concept o f 
intelligence power, as described by Herman, is understood. Firsdy, the concept of 
intelligence power as a facet of national power is affected. In the face of serious 
transnational threats, one state’s security depends on the security of another. 
Accordingly, intelligence work that is carried-out in one state direcdy affects the level 
of intelligence power of another.340 This is new, and marks a departure from the way in 
which intelligence power was understood pre-9/11, when it was conceived as the 
purest form of national sovereignty. Intelligence probably remains the purest form of 
national sovereignty — it certainly remains a facet of national power — but it is no
339 See, for example, (2004). A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations; (2006). UN Resolution 60/288: The United 
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longer absolute: the imperatives of prevention and co-operation mean that intelligence 
organisations depend more on wider information exchanges than they did before 9/11.
Secondly, the concept of intelligence organisations as national entities is affected. 
The rationality of increased co-operation between intelligence organisations means that 
a state’s intelligence knowledge is increasingly produced by a multitude o f intelligence 
organisations.341 The interdependence among intelligence organisations stretch beyond 
the comfortable bilateral relationships, such as the close tie between the US and UK, 
enjoyed by states in the past. It is arguable that the US regards Pakistan or Saudi Arabia 
as equally important, or even more important, than the UK in terms of intelligence 
production, given the terrorism threat. This is new, and reflects the nature of the 
serious transnational threats of today, and the imperatives of prevention and co­
operation in security strategies. Although intelligence organisations do remain national 
entities, levels of national intelligence power are not solely dependent on national 
intelligence organisations, however capable they are, as they were in the past, when 
intelligence targets were more clearly defined and accessible to individual states.
Finally, and most markedly, the concept of intelligence power as a servant of national 
objectives is affected. The blurring of the line demarcating national security and 
international security affairs in the face of a terrorism-WMD threat nexus has 
propelled intelligence onto the international stage. Intelligence after 9/11 has the 
power to facilitate and legitimise international preventive security strategies — a 
function totally alien to the concept of intelligence power as described by Herman, 
which fulfilled no international role beyond that associated with narrow national 
interests. The publication of the September Dossier by the British government, for 
example, violated British national interests by exposing some of the UK’s intelligence 
assets, and occurred to bolster the case for international action against Iraq, preferably 
through the UN. A similar case of intelligence being used to influence international 
policy is Colin Powell’s presentation, in February 2003, of US intelligence on Iraq’s
341 Handley, D. (2006). Internationalising Intelligence Sharing. Transnational Terrorism: Defeating the
Threat, Royal United Services Institute.
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WMD capability to the UN Security Council. This aspect of intelligence power is new, 
and, despite significant constraints affecting the use of intelligence in multilateral fora, 
it, too, represents the imperatives of prevention and co-operation and the role of 
intelligence in post-9/11 security strategies.
Intelligence sources have also changed in the post-9/11 era. The strategic 
environment is information-rich, rather than information-scarce. The problem facing 
Western intelligence organisations during the Cold War was having too little 
information on the Soviet adversary. Today, the problem for Western intelligence 
organisations is having too much information to process.342 A major task for 
intelligence analysts is to make sense of the vast volume of information that is 
collected on a daily basis from open and secret sources.343 The use of the internet and 
other communication technologies by groups like al-Qaida has made monitoring the 
flow of information difficult, and turning information into intelligence even more so.344 
The data richness of the contemporary strategic environment has made intelligence 
analysis much more important than it has been in the past.345 Separating the wheat 
from the chaff is vital in order to receive a clear intelligence picture amongst the 
interference of innocuous everyday chatter.346 All-source analysis has become an 
essential component of intelligence activity, considering the abundance of salient 
information popping up on jihadi websites, chat-rooms and blogs and being 
transmitted over the public airways.347 The easy availability of open-source intelligence 
on the terrorism threat, especially broadcast communiques and the publication of 
jihadi literature, has opened the door to private intelligence companies to provide a 
valuable analysis service. Companies such as IntelCenter and specialist off-shoots such 
as BBC Monitoring conduct open source analysis services that governments can buy. 
However, despite the new premium on open-source intelligence, states still rely on
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secret intelligence to uncover the details of terrorist and other activities that are 
deliberately concealed form public view.348
The next section will examine more deeply how the strategic imperative of 
prevention and the need for closer intelligence co-operation have affected the nature 
o f intelligence power.
SECTION THREE: INTELLIGENCE POWER AND THE IMPERATIVE 
OF PREVENTION 
International Roles
Intelligence power after 9/11 has the potential power to prevent threats to 
international security. The intelligence targets of terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, which were previously discrete issues narrowly and 
differently perceived by states to threaten national security, constitute, in the post-9 /11 
era, a threat nexus that threatens the security of all states. The development of a 
terrorism-WMD threat nexus has universalised state perceptions of vulnerability, and 
has prompted a re-conceptualisation of threats to international security as intelligence 
targets.
The conceptualisation of threats to international security as intelligence targets is 
new, and is significant for three reasons. Firstly, it signifies the emphasis on prevention 
that has occurred in security strategies at the national and international levels. The 
strategic imperative of prevention has placed an onus on states to investigate and 
engage threats before they cause destruction, and this provides a challenge for both 
states and international institutions given the configuration of international law and 
convention. As it was explained in Chapter 2, the UN system does not authorise
348 See, for example, (29 January 2003). (29 January 2003). "Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect 
America." from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-12.html; Herman, M. 
(1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War.
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preventive security strategies involving the use of force: Articles 39 and 51 of Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, which provides for collective security and self-defence 
arrangements, respectively, are predicated on the logic of reactive security strategies, 
executed after, not in anticipation of, a material breach of the peace, such as an act of 
aggression involving armed force as witnessed, for example, by Iraq against Kuwait in 
1990. The widely acknowledged strategic imperative to prevent terrorism-related 
threats means that states and the UN have needed to re-conceptualise threats to 
international peace and security as potentialities as well as actualities, or as intelligence 
targets, rather than just those well-defined cases of material breaches, like Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait, that meet the criteria laid out in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
Secondly, in relation to the re-conceptualisation of threats to international security as 
potentialities taking the form of intelligence targets that require prevention, states and 
international institutions are faced with the challenge of determining and responding to 
threats based on information, rather than demonstrations of violence. Again, this 
requirement is not fulfilled by the current international system by which states operate. 
According to international law and convention, states are authorised to use force 
against perceived threats only ‘if an armed attack occurs’, and not before. Considering 
the imperative to prevent the potential fruition of the terrorism-WMD threat, the need 
for states and international institutions to base decisions on information, rather than 
demonstrations of violence, has arisen. This need for information to support rational 
decision-making in the face of the terrorism-WMD threat has empowered intelligence 
to determine, define and drive policies at national and international levels, in support 
of universal interests.
Thirdly, the requirement to promote and protect international interests by acting on 
information to prevent serious transnational threats, and the power o f intelligence to 
fulfil that requirement, has transformed the role of intelligence power in international 
affairs. The imperative of prevention means that intelligence targets have 
internationalised; accordingly, the object of intelligence power has internationalised, 
too. Whilst intelligence power remains a facet of national power and produced by 
national entities, intelligence has the potential power to produce advantageous effects
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for the international community as a whole. Intelligence organisations still serve the 
interests of the state of which they are integral parts, but the emergence of post-9/11 
threats to peace entails new international roles for intelligence power. States are acting 
to optimize national strength and international influence after 9/11 by using 
intelligence power to facilitate and legitimise prevention, form coalitions and influence 
international policy.
International Role 1: Facilitating Prevention
Intelligence has the potential power to facilitate prevention. Indeed, controlling 
security strategies that seek to prevent threats have strategic intelligence requirements, 
since prevention is necessarily intelligence-driven. To pro-act to prevent something 
means ‘acting in advance to deal with an expected difficulty’; therefore, the concept of 
‘prevention’ assumes a level of anticipation.349 To stop something that is not expected 
from happening is not an example of prevention; rather, that is accidental or incidental 
obstruction. As James Sutterlin has said, it is patently impossible to prevent something 
from happening if there is no knowledge that it might happen.350 ‘Prevention’ and 
‘anticipation’ share a tautological and, therefore, a necessary and indispensable 
relationship, and this relationship entails a vital role for intelligence that anticipates 
future action in facilitating preventive security strategies. Prevention is impossible 
without information that anticipates attacks that have not yet occurred. The universal 
requirement to prevent the terrorism-WMD threat has prompted intelligence-driven 
security strategies. This has extended the scope o f intelligence power to determine, 
define and drive policy, as opposed to support, refine and guide it, at both national and 
international levels.
Rational Government after 9/11
349 Definition of'proaction' from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dict.asp?Word=proaction.
350 Sutterlin, J. (1995). The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: A 
Challenge to be Met. Westport, Greenwood Press
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The facilitation role of intelligence has expanded intelligence’s core function of 
enabling rational government, as described by Kent and Herman, from the national 
sphere into the international sphere. For Kent writing in the 1940s, as for Herman 
writing in the 1990s, intelligence is understood as a fundamental requirement for 
rational government at the exclusively national level. Kent argued the importance of 
strategic intelligence for US national security by citing the strategic reality in which the 
US found itself in the wake of the Second World War, where it stood alone without 
allies of comparable strength, and at the cusp of the Cold War, where it was threatened 
by shadowy situations that fell short of war but also short o f peace, as well as potential 
Armageddon. US national decision-makers needed information in order to make 
rational policy and negotiate this precarious and hazardous strategic environment, in 
which a rival superpower loomed large. This strategic reality prompted other states, 
such as the UK and the Soviet Union, to develop strategic intelligence capacities o f 
their own, in order to facilitate rational decision-making capabilities. In the 1990s, 
Herman transplanted Kent’s ‘rational government’ model of intelligence into the 1990s 
to form the basis of his concept of intelligence power. The nature of intelligence 
remains in Herman’s eyes as a facet of national power produced by organisations in 
support of national objectives, but within a more complex post-Cold War strategic 
environment. Intelligence continues to be a facet o f national power in the 21st century, 
but the imperative to act rationally against post-9 /11 threats to international peace and 
security has engendered the need for global governance that requires intelligence 
support.
The emergence of serious transnational threats means that decisions made1 in one 
state directly affects the security of another. As such, a state’s own system of rational 
government is not enough to ensure national security, as it was generally perceived to 
be during the Cold War and 1990s. Considering the post-9/11 imperative of 
preventing the serious and transnational terrorism-WMD threat, the national security 
of one state depends on the capacities of other states to facilitate rational government 
based on their capabilities to empirically investigate and verify phenomena on a global 
scale. The capacity of the Pakistani national government, for instance, to make rational 
decisions in its fight against al-Qaida is critical not just to Pakistani national security,
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but also to the security of states elsewhere in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, Africa and 
America, who perceive al-Qaida-related threats. The practice of rational government is 
no longer an exclusively national requirement; the capacity to make rational decisions 
based on intelligence rather than acts of violence is essential to meeting the challenge 
o f prevention and the maintenance of international security.
Other than the international implications of a state’s capacity for rational 
government, the requirement of intelligence-driven decision-making in the face of 
serious transnational threats affects the work of international institutions like the UN 
Security Council. As the body uniquely responsible for determining and responding to 
threats to international peace and security, the UNSC is charged with facilitating 
international management of terrorism-WMD-related threats. Given the imperative of 
prevention, the UNSC, like individual states, requires the capacity to facilitate rational 
government by drawing on the capability to make decisions based on information. The 
UNSC’s lack of any strategic intelligence capability entails negative international 
implications, the principal of which is the bestowment o f responsibility onto 
intelligence-capable states to manage terrorism-WMD threats, and other threats to 
international peace and security that require prevention. The debacle in the UNSC 
over the decision to invade Iraq in 2002-2003, and the subsequent unauthorized 
U S/UK  action, reflects the requirement for a strategic intelligence capability at the 
international level to manage preventive security strategies. Whether or not intelligence 
on Iraq was wrong or right is not the point here. Indeed, the Iraq controversy does not 
negate the role of intelligence at the international level; it highlights the need for it, 
given the imperative to prevent threats to international peace and security rationally 
and legitimately.
National Government and Intelligence Differentials
Despite the requirement of rational government in the management of threats to 
international security, there exists no international government capable of making 
rational decisions in the face of serious transnational threats that require prevention. 
The UNSC has no strategic intelligence capability, and states remain sovereign actors.
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N ot all intelligence organisations are born equal; some states are more capable than 
others of facilitating preventive security strategies, because some states have greater 
national capacities than others to produce the information required to support rational 
decision-making about unconstrained threats that operate covertly.351
Changes in threat perceptions and vulnerabilities after 9/11 have not been 
accompanied by similar changes in levels of national intelligence power. Differentials 
in national intelligence powers remain. States who took intelligence seriously before 
9/11, due to the existence of serious threats to their national security, such as the US 
and UK, remain stronger intelligence players than, for instance, Japan, which did not 
share similar threat perceptions and senses of vulnerability.352 Given the imperative of 
preventing serious transnational threats, weak intelligence states are forced to take 
intelligence more seriously, but are often unable to fulfill the intelligence requirements 
of preventive security strategies of global scope. Although strong intelligence states are 
themselves increasingly dependent on other states to produce the requisite levels of 
intelligence knowledge, strong intelligence states have nonetheless become empowered 
considering the role of intelligence in facilitating the prevention of international 
threats. The intelligence knowledge of terrorist threats produced by highly capable US 
intelligence organisations, for instance, has the power to directly affect the national 
security of Japan, as well as other weaker intelligence states. These differentials in 
intelligence power have driven shifts in the international diplomatic landscape after 
9/11, as weak intelligence states seek to reposition themselves to cultivate better links 
with stronger intelligence states. Intelligence organisations drive diplomacy, and often 
conduct it.353 The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and Libya 
reflects, in US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s words, ‘the excellent co-operation 
Libya has provided to the United States and other members of the international 
community in response to common global threats faced... since 11 September, 2001’.354
351 Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War.
352 Ibid.
353 Scott, L. (2004). "Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy." Intelligence and 
National Security 19(2): 322 - 341.
354 Rice, C. (15 May 2006). "U.S. Diplomatic Relations With Libya." from 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/66235.htm.
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The strengthening of other relationships, such as that between the US and Pakistan 
have been driven by intelligence considerations.355
The international role of intelligence in facilitating prevention, and its influence on 
global diplomatic arrangements, indicates a new dimension of intelligence power that 
was not apparent before 9/11.
International Role 2: Legitimising Prevention
As well as facilitating prevention by driving pro-active security strategies that seek to 
control international threats, intelligence has the potential power to legitimise 
prevention by providing evidence of threats that require preventive action. 
Intelligence’s role to merely promote the effective use of force in war has been 
expanded to justify the preventive use of force, in light of the potential power of 
intelligence to determine the casus belli and demonstrate the jus ad bellum. The 
facilitation of controlling security strategies requires strategic intelligence; similarly, the 
legitimisation of controlling security strategies has intelligence requirements, given that 
threats and the justification of preventive responses to threats are based on 
information of potential violence rather than demonstrations of actual violence. This 
new power of intelligence to justify, as opposed to just promote, the effective use of 
force in war and conflict challenges the Western intelligence model by blurring the 
sacred line between intelligence assessment and political advocacy.356 Indeed, in the run 
up to the Iraq invasion in 2003, arguably the line between intelligence assessment and 
advocacy was crossed, especially in view of the creation of US Defence Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld’s ‘Office of Special Plans’, located in the Department of Defense, to 
push the case for war through dedicated intelligence collection and analysis.357 
However, in the same way as the facilitation of controlling security strategies is 
necessarily intelligence-driven, the legitimisation of controlling security strategies,
355 Hussain, T. (July 2005). U.S.-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond, United States 
Institute of Peace.
356 Herman, M. (2005). Problems for Western Intelligence in the New Century. Oslo, Norwegian Institute 
for Defence Studies.
357 Hersh, S. M. (12 May 2003). Selective Intelligence: Donald Rumsfeld has his own special sources. Are 
they reliable? The New Yorker.
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considering international law and convention, depends on the power of intelligence to 
determine anticipated threats and justify preventive action. The greater scope for 
policy-makers to use (and abuse) intelligence to advocate a course of action is a feature 
of the post-9/11 strategic reality, considering the imperative to prevent, and highlights 
the need for states and the international community as a whole to take steps to ensure 
that intelligence products are accurate, objective and as free from political pressure as 
possible in support of rational governance of post-9 /11 threats.358 These issues are 
discussed in Chapter 7.
Intelligence as Evidence
Intelligence after 9/11 has the potential power to determine threats to international 
peace and security. The UN Charter requires states to provide the UNSC with 
evidence of threats in order that any action taken to restore international peace and 
security may be legitimised.359 Since ‘evidence’ in the case of action undertaken 
according to the conventional mechanisms of collective security and self-defence is 
constituted exclusively by the occurrence of an armed attack, controlling security 
strategies that seek to pro-act against armed attacks rely on other legitimising 
processes. Intelligence constitutes the means by which controlling security strategies 
are legitimised, since intelligence is best placed to provide evidence o f threats that have 
yet to materialise. The post-9 /11 identification of intelligence as evidence in support of 
international legitimising processes is a dramatic departure from Herman’s description 
of intelligence power, which denied intelligence of a serious international role, 
emphasized the anomalous relationship between intelligence and international law and 
delineated sharply between intelligence assessment and political advocacy. Indeed, 
despite the internationalization of intelligence targets, Herman’s description of 
intelligence as a special facet of national power is still accurate, and stark differences 
between the natures of the concepts of intelligence and evidence create problems of 
compatibility and credibility for the use of intelligence for legitimisation purposes.360
358 Mackmurdo, C. (2004). "Getting Facts: Intelligence and the UN."
359 (December 2004). A More Secure World.
360 Herman, M. (2003). "Threat assessments and the legitimation of policy?" Intelligence and National
Security 18(3): 177.
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Firstly, the objects served by intelligence and evidence, as conventionally understood, 
are, to an extent, incompatible. On the one hand, the function of an intelligence 
organisation is, as Herman states, to create advantageous effects for national 
governments, and they do so by producing knowledge through secret intelligence 
activity. The knowledge that an intelligence organisation produces is on matters that 
are deliberately shielded from public scrutiny, and the information sources targeted, 
cultivated and exploited in intelligence operations are not always reliable. Indeed, 
intelligence knowledge can distort.361 Intelligence knowledge is acquired through the 
assessment of complex, vague and often contradictory information streams, and it 
purports to offer approximations of the truth, rather than the whole truth.362 
Intelligence leaves room for speculation, and assessments are constantly contested, 
reviewed and redrafted in light of new information.363 The purpose to provide 
approximations of truths, given the restrictions and complications inherent in 
intelligence production, means that intelligence, as British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
conceded in September 2002, ‘is not always right’.364 On the other hand, evidence for 
use in a court o f law must meet the strict standard of providing the truth ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’.365 Evidence information is collected openly and presented for public 
digestion with this standard in mind, considering it is used to advocate a certain line of 
argument with the object of convincing a jury or judge of the veracity of the facts. 
Intelligence, which is collected secretly and presented privately, and is used to provide 
estimates, not certainties, with the object of guiding policy-makers, is unable to achieve 
comparable levels of certainty, and it is not the task of intelligence organisations to do 
so.
Secondly, there are credibility issues when treating intelligence as evidence. 
Intelligence provides for reasonable speculation, as opposed to truth beyond
361 Herman, M. (2002). "11 September: Legitimising Intelligence?"
362 Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War.
363 Lowenthal, M. M. (2003). Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington, CQ Press.
364 (24 September 2002). "Prime Minister's Iraq statement to Parliament." from http://www.number- 
10.gov.uk/output/Pagel727.asp.
365 Shapiro, B. J. (1993). ""Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause": Historical Perspectives on 
the Anglo-American Law of Evidence." Law and History Review 11(2): 450-453.
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reasonable doubt; as such, intelligence is a poor instrument of advocacy within legal 
contexts, which require arguments to be proved rather than ‘shown’ or ‘indicated’, and 
untainted by the usual caveats that normally accompany intelligence assessments.366 
The presentation of intelligence as evidence to advocate preventive action, therefore, is 
problematic, because intelligence is inept at providing the proof required in 
determining the existence of threats that, beyond any reasonable doubt, require 
prevention, in the way the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, for instance, isn’t. 
Indeed, as President of the British Academy W. G. Runciman suggested with regard to 
the UK action against Iraq in 2003: ‘speculation, however reasonable, might be 
thought a questionably sufficient justification for taking the country into a pre-emptive 
war’.367
However, despite the significant problems in treating intelligence as evidence, these 
problems do not negate the fact that intelligence has the potential power to legitimise 
preventive security strategies. To repeat James Sutterlin’s maxim: ‘it is patendy 
impossible to prevent something from happening if there is no knowledge that it might 
happen’; likewise, it is patendy impossible to legitimise preventive action against 
something if there is no evidence of an anticipated threat. The potential power of 
intelligence in legitimising prevention has placed pressure on intelligence organisations 
to fulfill roles in two spheres that were positively alien to them before 9/11: the 
international sphere and the advocacy sphere. Whilst the amalgamation of national 
objectives and international objectives in the face o f serious transnational threats has 
presented intelligence with international roles, the power of intelligence to legitimise as 
well as facilitate prevention has resulted in intelligence organisations wading against the 
tide of normal intelligence practice. Involvement by intelligence organisations in 
advocacy in the pursuit of legitimising prevention not only breaches the impartiality 
aspect of the Western intelligence model, but it also compromises operational security 
and professional integrity by thrusting intelligence into the public domain for political 
purposes. This development signals another change in the nature of intelligence power
366 Runciman, W. G., Ed. (2004). Hutton and Butler: Lifting the Lid on the Workings of Power. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press: 25
367 Ibid.: 9
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after 9/11, and is driven by an increased need to accommodate the imperative of 
prevention within the framework of international law and convention, although it is a 
change that is being strongly resisted by intelligence organisations.368
International Role 3: Coalition-forming
Intelligence after 9/11 also has the potential power to form coalitions. Considering the 
difficulty of using intelligence as evidence in the rigid and formal legitimising processes 
provided for by the UN Charter, states seeking to execute controlling security 
strategies are using intelligence as a tool to foster loose and ad hoc coalitions that 
provide an alternative means of facilitating and legitimising preventive action. 
Intelligence after 9/11 has the potential power to enable states to persuade others to 
adopt a certain position on a specific issue, or influence the creation of alliances to 
push an issue forward in the face of political or institutional obstruction. For example, 
the US and UK used the power of intelligence to generate the basis of a coalition in 
the run up to the Iraq invasion in 2003, by convincing 47 other states of the existence 
of a threat posed by Iraqi WMD capabilities through the dissemination o f intelligence 
assessments.369 This coalition did not include France, Russia or China, the other 
permanent members of the UNSC; therefore, UN legitimisation for the US/UK 
preventive action failed. However, the 49-strong coalition that backed the use of force 
against Iraq was presented by the US and UK as a legitimiser for an intelligence-driven 
mission, and as an example of pragmatism in the management of serious transnational 
threats in accordance with the maxim that ‘it is the mission that defines the coalition, 
not the coalition that defines the mission’. The role of intelligence in the formation of 
political coalitions that are presented to facilitate and legitimise preventive missions is a 
new international role for intelligence, and demonstrates further the potential power of 
intelligence as a diplomatic instrument and political force multiplier.
368 See, for example, Wintour, P. (April 7 2004). MI6 anger over war intelligence. The Guardian.
369 Freedman, L. (2004). "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat." Survival 46 (2): 7 -  50; Hodson, M. (11 March 
2004). "Comical Ali and Friends (in the Australian Media)." from 
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cftn?ItemID=5132.
157
The role of intelligence in forming single-issue coalitions in support of preventive 
missions reinforces the problematic relationship between intelligence-driven 
controlling security strategies and international convention, and highlights how 
perceptions of rational government are affected by intelligence differentials. In the case 
of Iraq, the US and UK projected intelligence power in the desire to produce the effect 
of legitimising prevention; it was also projected to dismiss the rationale of the UNSC 
legitimising process. Considering that rational government of threats requiring 
prevention is necessarily intelligence-driven, strong intelligence states are in a position 
to challenge the capacity for rational government of institutions, like the UNSC, with 
no strategic intelligence capabilities, whilst asserting their own. Intelligence has the 
power to support collective security arrangements by presenting information that can 
be used as evidence before the UNSC; it also has the power to challenge rigid and 
formal legitimising processes by fostering the creation of looser and self-legitimising 
coalitions of strong intelligence states that bypass international convention — similar in 
terms to Beck’s concept of ‘sub-politics’ in risk society.370
International Role 4: Influence international policy
Another role of intelligence power after 9/11 is influencing international policy and 
bolstering national prestige. Problems in facilitating and legitimising specific cases of 
preventive action through intelligence power are significant, but sometimes states 
succeed in shaping international policy in areas such as counter-terrorism by using 
intelligence within international institutions to advance arguments and spread best 
practice.371 Other than producing the effect o f influencing policy, the projection of 
intelligence power by states provides states with the opportunity to showcase 
capabilities, bolster reputations and strike-up and consolidate diplomatic 
relationships.372
370 Beck, U. (1998). World Risk Society. Cambridge, Polity Press.
371 Mackmurdo, C. (24 March 2006). British Intelligence Power after 9/11. International Studies 
Association Annual Convention. San Diego, US.
372 Ibid.
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The prime example of how intelligence has been used by a state to produce these 
advantageous effects is British use of intelligence power within the European Union. 
By disseminating intelligence expertise within in the EU, the UK has been able to steer 
the development of EU counter-terrorism strategy in line with CONTEST, the UK’s 
counter-terrorism strategy based on prevention, pursue, protect and prepare.373 
Moreover, the UK has impressed weaker intelligence states in Europe with the quality 
of its intelligence product which is, to a significant extent, down to the UK’s close 
relationship with the US — a relationship other EU states, and the EU institutions, do 
not enjoy.374 As a result, British influence over intelligence-driven strategies and 
institutions at the European level is strong. The power of intelligence after 9/11 to 
produce these positive political effects is a consequence o f the new seriousness with 
which all states take intelligence, and reflects the impact that differentials in levels of 
national intelligence power is having on perceptions of national prestige.
SECTION FOUR: INTELLIGENCE CO-OPERATION
The imperative for states to prevent serious transnational threats has led to the need 
for greater collaboration amongst intelligence organisations. Intelligence-driven 
diplomacy is a feature of the post-9/11 world, and even traditionally powerful 
intelligence states depend on building and sustaining effective working relationships 
with other states in order to ensure security against threats of global scope and reach.
Considering that intelligence targets have internationalized, intelligence power after 
9/11 serves objectives shared by a multitude of states. The imperative of co-operation 
in achieving shared security objectives in the face of the terrorism-WMD threat nexus 
affects the concept of intelligence power primarily in three ways. Firstly, the 
sovereignty of national intelligence organisations is no longer absolute: the intelligence 
work carried-out by one state direcdy affects the level of intelligence power of another. 
Intelligence organisations are more dependent on information exchanges than they
Mackmurdo, C. (24 March 2006). British Intelligence Power after 9/11.
Ibid.
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were before 9 /1 1.375 Secondly, as a result of the dilution o f the independence of 
intelligence organisations in light of internationalized intelligence targets, the security 
o f one state increasingly depends on knowledge produced by intelligence organisations 
o f other states. British capacity to prevent 7/7, for instance, is thought to have been 
significantly impaired because crucial information possessed by Pakistan was not 
passed on to UK authorities.376 And, thirdly, given that one state’s capacity for rational 
government is often dependent on the intelligence knowledge produced by another, 
every state shares an interest in ensuring that the intelligence knowledge produced is 
good. The spread of intelligence ‘best practice’ and multilateral ‘intelligence working 
groups’ is a new feature of intelligence power that has been driven by the imperative to 
co-operate to prevent serious transnational threats.377
However, despite the impact of the imperative of co-operation on the nature of 
intelligence power, significant restrictions limit the degree to which intelligence 
organisations collaborate. The first restriction relates to operational security: 
intelligence organisations need to maintain a level of security in order to operate 
effectively, and this means protecting the sources and methods of intelligence 
collection by shielding information, assets and working practices. These practical 
considerations are not conducive to intelligence co-operation. Secondly, despite 
increased interdependence amongst intelligence organisations, intelligence 
organisations remain national entities and the purest expression of national sovereignty 
on the international stage. Even when international co-operation is rational in the 
intelligence field, international politicking serves to limit the extent to which 
intelligence collaboration occurs.
Developments in Intelligence Co-operation
Cases of Bilateral Co-operation
375 Herman, M. (2002). "11 September: Legitimising Intelligence?"
376 (May 2006). Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, Intelligence and Security 
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Relations between states (the US and UK especially) have been reconfigured in view of 
the need to fulfil intelligence requirements. Traditional intelligence alliances, such as 
the US-UK intelligence partnership, have been bolstered by developments such as the 
US-UK Joint Contact Group on terrorism-related matters.378 Day-to-day exchanges of 
intelligence between UK and US intelligence organisations have been made easier by 
common I.T. infrastructures and communication technologies.379 The intelligence 
product disseminated by the US National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK’s 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), for instance, is almost identical, 
due to the intimate working bond between the two organisations.380 This signals 
intelligence alliance between the US and UK encompasses Australia and Canada in the 
enduring UKUSA arrangement.381 Beyond its tie with the UK, the US after 9/11 is said 
to have constructed a network o f bilateral relationships with well over 400 intelligence 
organisations.382 The UK has consolidated ties with European partners such as 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain, and its number of bilateral relationships is said to 
exceed 120.383 Despite the UK’s increased stake in European intelligence partnerships, 
the country remains distinctly Atlanticist, and the close relationship with the US 
continues to constitute the bedrock of the British intelligence capability.384
Cases of Multilateral Co-operation
Although intelligence organisations prefer to work in loose, ad hoc bilateral 
relationships, more formal multilateral intelligence co-operation does occur. The Club 
of Berne, for example, is a multilateral intelligence forum established in 1971 that has 
strengthened after 9/11 to promote intelligence co-operation and exchanges of 
ideas.385 The Club originally consisted of only 6 agencies, including the UK Security 
Service, Sweden’s SAPO, the French DST and Germany’s BfV, but has been expanded
378 Loy, A. J. (9 December 2004). US Homeland Security, Royal United Services Institute.
379 Mackmurdo, C. (24 March 2006). British Intelligence Power after 9/11.
380 Ibid.
381 Richelson, J. T. and D. Ball (1985). The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Co-operation between the UKUSA
Countries. Sydney, Allen and Unwin.
382 Herman, M. (2002). "11 September: Legitimising Intelligence?"
383 Ibid.
384 Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War.
385 Aldrich, R. J. (2004). "Transatlantic Security and Intelligence Cooperation."
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to comprise 17 members.386 Furthermore, with the object of spreading best practice 
and facilitating joined-up analysis and assessment, the Club hosts intelligence working 
groups on transnational security issues.387
In addition to the Club of Berne, the EU Joint Situation Centre provides a successful 
example of a multinational intelligence outfit. The ‘SitCen’ was created in February 
2002 to bolster the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, under the leadership 
of the British diplomat William Shapcott.388 The need for an intelligence component to 
the CFSP had been quiedy acknowledged ever since the signing o f the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1993, but it was only after 9/11 that the will materialised amongst EU 
member states to increase intelligence co-operation in the face of serious transnational 
threats.389 The 2004 Madrid bombings intensified EU efforts to strengthen intelligence 
co-operation.390 The SitCen is made up of the Civilian Intelligence Capability (CIC), the 
Communications Centre and the Operations Centre. Seconded intelligence officers 
from the contributing EU member states, including the UK, France, Germany, Spain 
and Italy, constitute the CIC, whilst EU functionaries staff the Communication and 
Operation Centres.391 Only within the CIC is secret intelligence material 
disseminated.392 The SitCen requests information from intelligence officials within EU 
member states.393 The task of the CIC is to collate the information it receives and issue 
a joint EU assessment in support of a common EU security policy.394 The primary 
customer of the SitCen intelligence product is the EU High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana and his secretariat, although 
SitCen reports are disseminated back across the desks of national foreign and 
intelligence officials.395
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Limitations in Intelligence Co-operation
Operational Security Limitations
Developments in bilateral and multilateral intelligence co-operation have occurred after 
9/11, but the nature of intelligence as a facet of national power that operates secredy 
and deals with secret things means that levels of collaboration amongst intelligence 
organisations are severely limited. The most commonly cited concern about 
intelligence co-operation relates to ‘operational security’: intelligence organisations 
need to maintain a level of security in order to operate effectively, and this means 
protecting the sources and methods of intelligence collection by shielding information, 
assets and working practices.396 Succeeding in achieving this level of operational 
security means that national intelligence organisations are highly compartmentalized, 
with security-cleared officials working on a ‘need to know’ basis in order to prevent 
too many people knowing too much about any one thing at any one time.397 As special 
instruments of national power, intelligence organisations approach co-operation as an 
unnatural working practice. Intelligence organisations are dedicated to discovering the 
secrets of others, and protecting secrets of their own, so working with others brings 
about problems peculiar to the intelligence business.398
Considering the compartmentalization of information within national intelligence 
organisations, the level of compartmentalization required in intelligence enterprises 
comprising more than one national intelligence organisation is greater, even for those 
run exclusively by traditional intelligence partners. For example, security classifications 
such as Confidential, Secret and Top Secret that are used to restrict information flows 
within UK national organisations that deal with intelligence material are further refined 
in the UKUSA alliance by classifications such as UK Eyes Only, UK/US Eyes Only 
and UK/US/CAN/AUS Eyes Only.399 Multinational intelligence outfits are hindered 
by higher levels of compartmentalization of information that often render normal
396 (14 July 2004). Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction.
397 Ibid.
398 Herman, M. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and War.
399 Mackmurdo, C. (24 March 2006). British Intelligence Power after 9/11.
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intelligence practice impossible, since the level of compartmentalisation is sometimes 
so great that it effectively negates the purpose of the multilateral intelligence enterprise, 
especially if it involves organisations that consider themselves to be intelligence rivals. 
The EU SitCen is a good example of how operational security concerns of 
participating states limit the effectiveness of the SitCen as an intelligence body. The 
unwillingness of member states to disseminate high-grade intelligence through SitCen 
channels results in a self-fulfilling limitation that prevents the SitCen from becoming a 
high-grade intelligence organisation.400
International 'Politicking
Intelligence co-operation is limited by operational security restrictions, and even when 
co-operation does occur, politics are likely to affect the level and nature of intelligence 
collaboration. Indeed, the distinction between politics and intelligence, which is so 
vehemently protected in the Western intelligence model at the national level, dissolves 
at the international level. With apologies to Carl von Clausewitz, intelligence power 
after 9/11 has become an extension of international politicking by other means. 
Intelligence power is political currency; states use intelligence power to buy influence 
over the direction of international policy. How much influence a state can buy depends 
on how much its intelligence power is worth. Since not all national intelligence 
organisations are born equal, differentials in the intelligence power of states affect the 
political balance within multilateral fora and produce political ramifications. Weaker 
intelligence states risk jealously obstructing proceedings in order to regain control of 
the political agenda. Stronger intelligence states risk being self-regarding in multilateral 
organisations with a prevention agenda, or shunning multilateralism altogether to 
prevent threats they claim others are incapable of managing rationally.401 Colin Powell’s 
presentation of intelligence before the UN Security Council in February 2003 is an 
example of the use of intelligence to influence international policy, and the subsequent 
unauthorized action undertaken by the US and UK against Iraq in the face of political
Mackmurdo, C. (24 March 2006). British Intelligence Power after 9/11.
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obstruction by France, Russia and China represents the possible ramifications of this 
new brand of intelligence-driven international politicking.
Intelligence collaboration is affected by political forces resulting from differentials in 
intelligence power. These political forces have hindered, for instance, the work of the 
EU SitCen from its inception.402 Some states who wanted to join the SitCen at its 
foundation were refused on the grounds that their intelligence organisations were 
either heavily penetrated or incapable of bringing anything significant to the 
intelligence table.403 The appearance of intelligence exclusivity has engendered 
resentment amongst some EU member states, which adds to the frustrations, already 
inflicted on the SitCen, generated by the political and ideological conflicts that make up 
the everyday life of the over-arching EU project.404 Although the SitCen was set up to 
serve the European Council, there is no SitCen corporate identity, and seconded 
national intelligence officers are tasked by and serve their own states. SitCen officers 
pool the information they receive from their respective states to produce a joint EU 
assessment drafted by the CIC.405 Whichever state provides the best intelligence is able 
to exert the greatest influence on the CIC joint assessment, which will be used to shape 
EU policy.406 Strong intelligence states such as the UK have succeeding in influencing 
EU policy through effective intelligence inputs and risk appearing self-regarding; 
weaker intelligence states risk attempting to save face and exerting influence by acting 
jealously to disrupt the day-to-day work of the SitCen through political obstruction.
The UN Situation Centre, similarly, has been plagued by international politicking 
since its inception. Charged in 1993 with ‘supporting the decision-making process and 
connecting civilian, military and police flows of information at the strategic level’, the 
Situation Centre’s Information and Research Unit was dissolved largely because 
seconded intelligence officers used their posts to report back to their national 
governments on the activities of the UN and other UN member states, rather than
Mackmurdo, C. (24 March 2006). British Intelligence Power after 9/11.
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Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
165
provide a strategic intelligence capability for the UN Secretariat.407 An attempt to 
establish an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, which was proposed by 
Lakhdar Brahimi in 2000 to be charged with ‘accumulating knowledge about conflict 
situations, distributing that knowledge effectively to a wide user base, generating policy 
analysis and formulating long-term strategies’, as well as providing a ‘sharper tool’ for 
the UN Executive Committee for Peace and Security to ‘gather and analyse relevant 
information’, was scrapped when India and Nigeria succeeded in mobilising the G77 to 
oppose its creation over fears it would disenfranchise weaker intelligence states, 
promote acts of spying on UN member states and generally corrupt the neutral, 
objective and transparent character of the UN organisation.408 Allegations of British 
intelligence organisations targeting the UN Secretary-General and fellow members- 
states during UN debates on action over Iraq in 2002 and 2003 reinforce perceptions 
of the problematic relationship between intelligence as a facet of national power and 
multilateralism conducted through international institutions.409
CONCLUSIONS
Intelligence power represents a social process that involves empirical investigation and 
enables rational action. After 9/11, intelligence has the potential power to facilitate 
preventive security strategies by providing the information required to enable 
government of threats that are perceivable, but not necessarily immediately perceived. 
Intelligence also has the potential power to legitimise preventive security strategies by 
providing the evidence of threats that is required to justify preventive action. In 
addition, intelligence has the potential power to form coalitions and influence 
international policy. But because of the limitations of intelligence co-operation 
imposed by concerns for operational security, and because of differentials in state
407 (April 2004). Personal Interview with Kristina Segulja, Coordinator, UN Situation Centre; "Situation 
Centre." from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/sitcen/sitcentre.html
408 (May 2004). Personal Interview with Teresa Whitfield; (21 August 2000). Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations.
409 (26 February 2004). "UK 'spied on UN's Kofi Annan'." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk_politics/3488548.stm.
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levels of intelligence power, the projection of intelligence power can be detrimental to, 
as well as beneficial for, multilateralism.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Terrorism-WMD Threat
INTRODUCTION
The two separate threats presented by terrorism and WMD proliferation have come 
together after 9/11 to form a terrorism-WMD threat nexus. The al-Qaida attacks on 
11 September 2001 changed people’s understanding of terrorism: the transnational 
scope and reach of the organisation, objectives and methods of ‘new’ terrorism 
universalized vulnerabilities and collectivized state perceptions of threats to security by 
challenging international order, the global economy, governments and private citizens 
alike. The threat to security presented by the existence and spread of nuclear, 
radiological, chemical and biological weapons has been magnified by the unveiling of 
transnational proliferation networks and state programmes that defy international arms 
controls and risk providing, knowingly or otherwise, a possible force multiplier for 
terrorist organisations. The prospect of terrorism involving the use of WMD cannot be 
ruled out: the existence of serious transnational threats posed by proliferation networks 
like A. Q. Khan’s and ‘new’ terrorism groups like al-Qaida, has given rise to a 
terrorism-WMD threat nexus that has led to a re-conceptualization of international 
security challenges as threats that have potentially devastating effects.
This chapter has four sections. Section one examines the concepts of ‘risk’ and 
‘threat’ in an effort to define the term ‘threat’ used in this chapter. Section two 
examines the difficulty in defining the terrorism threat, and investigates how the 
concept o f terrorism has changed since the French Revolution. It then outlines the 
differences between concepts of terrorism before 9/11 and the concept of ‘new’ 
terrorism that emerged after 9/11. Section three examines the threat posed by WMD 
proliferation and efforts to control it, before outlining the WMD threats posed by the 
states of Iran and North Korea, and by the black market in the form of the A. Q.
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Khan network. Section four examines the coming together of elements of the 
terrorism threat and elements of the WMD proliferation threat to constitute a 
terrorism-WMD threat nexus.
SECTION 1: THREAT vs. RISK
In line with Constructivist Realism, threats are phenomena that are perceivable, but 
not necessarily perceived. Threats exist independent of perception; meaningful 
descriptions of them depend on empirical investigation. As phenomena, threats cause 
other phenomena. In the contemporary era, unconstrained terrorist threats cause states 
to act preventively in order to achieve security aims, especially given the prospect of a 
terrorist attack involving WMD. The strategic imperative to prevent threats that are 
both unconstrained and clandestine through controlling security strategies has given 
rise to risk-management. States are being prompted to act to manage the risk of 
potential attacks by terrorist groups whose activities are not always easy to scrutinize. 
Indeed, risk-management of potential damage caused by actual phenomena that 
operate beyond everyday perceptions characterizes the security agenda in the post- 
9711 material reality, in which international order is threatened by the risk of WMD 
terrorism attack.
The word ‘risk’ is defined in the Oxford Concise Dictionary as ‘a situation involving 
exposure to danger’ and ‘the possibility that something unpleasant will happen’.410 Both 
senses of the word succeed in describing the various aspects of the nature of the post- 
9 /1 1 strategic environment. Prevention is rational in this environment because of the 
strategic imperative to act in advance to deal with possible danger and unpleasantness 
caused by terrorism. The word ‘threat’, in contrast, means ‘an indication of something 
impending’.411 To describe terrorism as a threat would imply that a terrorist attack is in 
fruition. This is also an accurate description of the post-9 /11 reality. Prevention would 
not be rational given the assumption that terrorist attacks were incapable of 
materialising. As such, the post-9/11 terrorism threat exists as a potentiality and an
(1999). Oxford Concise Dictionary. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Ibid.
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actuality. The terms ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ refer to the same phenomena, but highlight 
different ontological and epistemological aspects of the relationship between the 
observer and the post-9/11 material reality. Ontologically speaking, ‘risk’ meaningfully 
describes the aspect of the terrorism phenomenon as a ‘permanent possibility’ of 
disorder, whereas ‘threat’ is useful in describing terrorism as actual disorder. 
Epistemologically speaking, ‘risk’ describes the relationship between observers and 
phenomena that are perceivable, but not necessarily perceived, whereas ‘threat’ 
describes the relationship between observers and phenomena in a post-9/11 material 
reality that have already been perceived to have actualised. The terms do not represent 
different phenomena. Both ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ refer to the same phenomena — ‘new’ 
terrorism — but designate different ontological and epistemological properties in a way 
that describes the complex Phenomenalist relationship between observers and 
phenomena that exist as potentialities and actualities.
To describe terrorism as a risk, therefore, is not to say that terrorism does not exist 
as a threat. It is to describe different aspects of the relationship between the observer 
and phenomena that are perceivable, but not necessarily perceived. To meaningfully 
describe the post-9/11 material reality, and therefore act rationally within it, requires an 
understanding o f what is meant by both ‘risk’ and ‘threat’. The imperative to act in 
anticipation of unconstrained terrorist threats means that the onus is on states to 
investigate the existence of potential attacks and mitigate the risk of their materialisation. 
The risky aspect of terrorism does not negate the reality of the terrorism threat. Rather, 
it identifies the rationale of the controlling strategies that are required to deal with 
perceivable phenomena that demand prevention, rather than reaction in the event of 
their coming about. Terrorism, as James Gow stated in Defending the West, is a fuzzy and 
complex threat; the risky aspects of the fuzzy and complex terrorism threat demand 
threat responses that are capable o f achieving the management of risk.
Moreover, risk is about inaction, as well as action. As Christopher Coker asserts, the 
emergence of threats such as terrorism in a globalised world ‘requires preventive action
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to reduce the risk to human safety and human lives’.412 In the post-9/11 world ‘instead 
of managing security, we manage insecurity (nuclear proliferation, terrorism etc.) 
through pre-emptive action if possible’.413 It is fear over the risk of inaction that, to a 
great extent, prompts preventive action.414 The contention by British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair that the danger of acting in Afghanistan in 2001 was outweighed by the 
danger o f inaction, for instance, testifies to this.415 The central message of the 2002 US 
National Security Strategy that ‘[t]he greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction — 
and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves’ 
also indicate a re-conceptualisation of threat responses to mitigate risk.416 The risk of 
not taking action in anticipation of terrorist attacks underpins the risk-management 
aspect of post-9/11 controlling strategies. The imperative to manage the risk of 
damage caused by unconstrained actors makes the future more important than the past 
in decision-making processes.417 States are motivated to colonise the future rather than 
react to the past, considering that states can ill-afford to let the threat of WMD 
terrorism materialise.418 The risk aspect of counter-terrorism is reinforced by the 
imperative to manage threats that are posed by clandestine terrorist groups whose 
point of impact is not necessarily the same as their point of origin. As such, terrorism 
threats appear ‘risky’, given that the activities of terrorist groups can appear invisible to 
everyday perceptions.419 In On World Risk Society, Ulrich Beck emphasizes that the 
concept of risk can be understood in terms of practices by which the future 
consequences of decisions are controlled in the present.420 This is an apt description of 
post-9 /11 controlling strategies. The imperative to manage risk, and thereby respond 
rationally to the terrorism threat, makes the future more important than the past in
412 Coker, C. (2002). Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management
of Risk. Oxford, International Institute for Strategic Studies: 53
413 Ibid.: 62
414 Ibid.
415 (7 October 2001). UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's statement on military action in Afghanistan, House
of Commons.
416 (September 2002). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America: 15
417 Adam, B., U. Beck, et al. (2000). The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory.
London, Sage.
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419 Ibid.
420 Beck, U. (1998). World Risk Society. Cambridge, Polity Press.
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decision-making processes, underpinning the notion that rational action today is 
defined by what is thought will happen tomorrow.
Coker is wrong, though, in suggesting that risk-management signals the 
abandonment of strategies that seek to positively manage security in the face of actual 
threats. As the 2002 US NSS remarked: ‘[t]he greater the threat, the greater the risk of 
inaction’. Risk is real because it is perceivable, not because, as the two leading 
exponents of risk society Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens claim, it is perceived.421 
The reality of risk is rooted in the impact it has, regardless of whether or not the risk 
was perceived.422 Although risk must be perceived in order to constitute a threat, the 
impact of risk occurs because of the fuzzy epistemological relationship between the 
observer and phenomena that are perceivable, but not necessarily perceived. This has 
been borne out in real world scenarios. The level of understanding of the risk of attack 
against the US mainland by al-Qaida rose after the 9/11 attacks occurred, despite the 
fact that the al-Qaida threat had existed before 9/11. Today, the impeding nature of 
the risk of terrorism is central to security strategies that seek to determine and control 
terrorism threats through pro-action based on information gleaned from empirical 
investigations of risk that exist independent of perception.
The requirement to become aware of threats in a ‘risk society’ is highlighted by Beck 
and Giddens. Risk-management demands that the future is colonised in order to avoid 
damage before it occurs by tackling potentialities.423 The pluralisation of modernity 
identified by Beck involving transnational interdependence and economic, political and 
societal globalisation renders risk a global challenge that affects decision-making on an 
international level.424 In the post-9/11 world, the wide acceptance of the existence of 
risk has led to the re-rationalisation of security strategies that seek to prevent threats 
that are demonstrable through information about future potentialities, rather than
421 See Giddens, A. (1990). Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge, Polity Press; Beck, U. (1992). Risk 
Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi, Sage.
422 Adam, B., U. Beck, et al. (2000). The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory.
423 Beck, U. (1998). World Risk Society.
424 Ibid.
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evidence of past actualities.425 The determination of threats in the post-9/11 situation 
means investigating the material world in order to be able to perceive risk that exists 
beyond everyday ranges of perception.
Indeed, Beck’s theory of ‘risk society’ contains concepts that are applicable to the 
post-9/11 strategic reality. One of the most useful is the concept of ‘subpolitics’. The 
concept of ‘sub-politics’ refers to forms of politics outside and beyond the 
representative institutions of the political system of nation-states, or ‘direct action’ that 
circumvents conventional political frameworks.426 The rational action/legitimate action 
astigmatism that is a feature of the post-9/11 strategic reality relates to the fact that the 
legitimising institutions of international society no longer have control over threats to 
public safety.427 The risk society concept of subpolitics explains patterns of rational 
post-9 /11 state behaviour that appear to be by-passing the institutions and often even 
lacking the protection of law, in recognition of the imperative to manage risk.428 Beck’s 
theory of ‘risk society’ itself, however, is not consistent with the Phenomenalist logic 
of Constructivist Realism, for the following reasons. Firstly, Beck regards politics as an 
invention, as advertised by the title of his seminal work The Reinvention of Politics — a 
Reflectivist position that falls short of Positivist standards o f rationality. Secondly, 
whereas Beck considers the disenfranchisement of the state from political decision­
making to be a fundamental feature of risk society, Constructivist Realism assumes the 
centrality o f the State. Thirdly, Beck relies on rhetoric, rather than facts, to substantiate 
his theory. This tendency of the risk society approach to resort to theoretical 
exaggeration in order to compensate for empirical deficiencies has been highlighted by 
Gabe Mythen.429
425 Coker, C. (2002). Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management 
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173
In conclusion to this section, the terrorism phenomenon can be described in terms 
of both ‘risk’ and ‘threat’. The terms ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ refer to the same terrorist 
phenomenon, but highlight different ontological and epistemological aspects of the 
relationship between the observer and the terrorist phenomenon in the post-9 /11 
strategic reality. For the sake of clarity, however, I shall refer to the terrorism 
phenomenon as the terrorism ‘threat’. This is to avoid any confusion caused by the 
interchange of the terms ‘threat’ and ‘risk’, but it should not be construed that I am 
positing the term ‘threat’ as an alternative to, or in opposition to, or to the exclusion 
of, phenomena described by the term ‘risk’. Terrorism threats entail risk and cause the 
construction o f security strategies that seek to manage risk, and the term ‘terrorism 
threat’ used here should be understood as a term that describes these phenomena.
What follows in this chapter is a description of the terrorism threat that has caused 
the construction o f controlling security strategies in the post-9/11 strategic reality. In 
order to describe the phenomenon fully, this chapter examines the changing nature of 
terrorism and the emergence of ‘new’ terrorism, the nature o f the threat posed by 
WMD proliferation, and the nature of the post-9/11 terrorism-WMD threat nexus that 
presents the face of the unconstrained and potentially catastrophic threat which 
demands prevention.
SECTION 2: THE TERRORISM THREAT 
Problems of Definition
Terrorism is notoriously difficult to define, predominantly because of the problem of 
interpretation summed-up by the well-know phrase, ‘one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom fighter’. The international community has managed for over a decade 
to maintain agreement that a terrorism threat to international security exists, without 
ever reaching an agreement on what a terrorism threat actually means.430 As a result,
430 (31 January 1992). Statement by the Heads of State and Government (S/23500), UN Security Council,
expresses ‘deep concern over acts of international terrorism’.
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there exists a range of definitions of the term ‘terrorism’, and understanding of the 
term differs not only between national governments, but also between national 
agencies within the same governmental bureaucracy. For example, the US Central 
Intelligence Agency, together with the US State Department, uses the definition of 
terrorism provided by Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d), which 
reads:
Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience.431
On the other hand, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as:
The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.432
Clearly, there are common elements to the two definitions of terrorism used by the 
CIA and FBI. Each interpretation shares the sense that terrorism is politically- 
motivated, violent and designed to intimidate and coerce. However, each definition 
reflects the particular interests and functions o f the party that uses it.433 Whilst the CIA 
and State Department focus on the nature and role of terrorists as actors within the 
international system, the FBI emphasises the criminal and subversive aspects of 
terrorism, and describes the phenomenon within the context of the judicial system.434 
Such discrepancies are symptomatic of complications in the subjective interpretation 
of terrorism that extend beyond national bureaucratic organisations into the wider 
world of sovereign states.
In the UK, a single definition of terrorism is used by all branches of the British 
Government, but its interpretation has transformed markedly since the 1989
431 Hoffman, B. (2003). Defining Terrorism. Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New 
Security Environment. R. D. Howard and R. L. Sawyer. Guildford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin: 19
432 Ibid.: 19
433 Ibid.
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Prevention of Terrorism Act. In that Act, terrorism is defined as ‘the use of violence 
for political ends, and for the purpose of putting the public or any section of it in fear.’ 
The introduction of the Terrorism Act in 2000, which replaced the 1989 Prevention of 
Terrorism Act as the primary piece of UK counter-terrorism legislation, brought with 
it a significant expansion of what constitutes an act o f terrorism. According to the 
2000 Terrorism Act, ‘terrorism’ means ‘the use or threat of action’ where ‘the use or 
threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section 
of the public’, and, ‘the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious or ideological cause’.
Subsection two of Section one of the 2000 Terrorism Act further describes terrorism 
as action which involves ‘serious violence against a person’, ‘serious damage to 
property’, ‘endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the 
action’, or ‘creates a serious threat to the health or safety of the public or a section o f 
the public’, or action that is ‘designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt 
an electronic system’. Subsection three of the Act goes on to say that the use or threat 
o f action which involves firearms or explosives constitutes an act of terrorism, whether 
or not it is intended to influence the government or intimidate the public. The sheer 
extent of the UK’s definition both highlights the complexity of terrorism as a 
communicable concept and the change in attitude towards terrorism as an act that 
takes the form of criminal and reckless behaviour not necessarily designed to scare 
governmental or public audiences, as was previously considered to be the case.
The problem of definition intensifies at the international level because a broader 
spectrum of interpretation means more definitions and a greater challenge to 
demarcating a clear-cut ‘terrorist/freedom-fighter’ divide. In a 1988 study of 109 
definitions of terrorism in common usage, 83.5% of them were shown to cite violence 
as an inherent characteristic of terrorism, meaning that almost 1 in 6 o f the definitions 
in use did not consider violence as a definitional element of terrorism.435 Terrorism as a 
political act was a central characteristic of 65% of the definitions; ‘threat’ was central to
435 Schmid, A. P., A. J. Jongman, et al. (1988). Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors. Authors.
Cocepts. Data Bases. Theories, and Literature. New Brunswick, Transaction Books: 3-5
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47%; ‘intimidation’ central to only 17%; and ‘criminal’ central to a just 6%.436 These 
statistics show that the basic elements of the US and UK definitions of terrorism -  
such as ‘political’, ‘threat’, ‘intimidation’, and ‘criminal’ — do not correspond universally 
with how terrorism is understood elsewhere in the world.437 Understandably, the UN, 
therefore, has not been able to formulate a universally-acceptable definition of 
terrorism. However, in the report ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’, 
produced in December 2004 by the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, a description of the nature of the terrorism threat was finally agreed-upon and 
published. The report declares that:
Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the 
United Nations: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that 
protect civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful 
resolution of conflict.438
In addition, the report takes into account the changed nature of terrorism. Similar to 
the UK’s revision of the definition o f terrorism, the UN has been prompted to 
reconsider the type of threat states currently face from terrorist activity since the end 
of the Cold War. The report concludes that:
Al-Qaida is the first instance - not likely to be the last - o f an armed non- 
State network with global reach and sophisticated capacity. Attacks against 
more than 10 Member States on four continents in the past five years have 
demonstrated that Al-Qaida and associated entities pose a universal threat 
to the membership of the United Nations and the United Nations itself;439
and, that
the threat that terrorists - of whatever type, with whatever motivation - will 
seek to cause mass casualties creates unprecedented dangers... controlling 
the supply of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials and 
building robust global public health systems are central to a strategy to 
prevent this threat.440
436 Schmid, A. P., A. J. Jongman, et al. (1988). Political Terrorism: 3-5
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The identification of terrorism as a threat to the UN system was officially made on 
31 January 1992. At this time, the UN Security Council, at the level of heads o f state 
and government, expressed their ‘deep concern over acts of international terrorism’ 
and emphasised ‘the need for the international community to deal effectively with all 
such acts’.441 The 12 conventions on terrorism, ranging from the 1963 Convention on 
Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, to the 1999 
Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, has largely forgone 
efforts to foster agreement on a shared definition of terrorism. Indeed, Paul Pillar 
argues that practical steps to address terrorism do not depend on strict universal 
agreement on what terrorism precisely means.442 Moreover, problems o f definition did 
not prevent the UN Security Council from unanimously adopting Resolution 1368, 
passed the day after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York, 
Washington and Pennsylvania, which declared that any act of international terrorism 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security.443
Terrorism before 9/11
Propaganda by Deed
Terrorism has not always been considered a threat to international security. In fact, 
during the time of the French Revolution, terrorism was far from being considered a 
bad thing in itself; it was certainly not equated with the FBI’s view of terrorism as ‘the 
unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
Government’. Rather, terrorism was considered by the revolutionary state as a means 
by which order could be restored following the tumultuous uprisings o f 1789.444 
Instead of being conceived as action directed against the people for the purposes of 
coercing and intimidating society, terrorism was associated with action for the people
441 (31 January 1992). Statement by the Heads of State and Government (S/23500)
442 Pillar, P. R. (2003). The Dimensions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment. R. D. Howard and R. L. Sawyer. 
Guildford, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin.
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and against the enemies of the French civil state.445 Within this context, the concept of 
terrorism is connected with the virtues of justice and democracy. The French 
revolutionary leader Maximilien Robespierre articulated the nature of this connection 
when he claimed that ‘[t] error is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is 
therefore an emanation of virtue’.446
A century later, in 1878, the organisation Narodnaya Volya (literally translated as 
People’s Will or Freedom) was established in Russia with the mission of removing 
from power Tsar Alexander II. After eight failed attempts, Narodnaya Volya 
succeeded in assassinating the Tsar in 1881, following a ferocious campaign of violence 
and intimidation based on the principle, first formulated by the Italian republican 
extremist Carlo Piscane, of ‘propaganda by deed’.447 This modus operandi was predicated 
on the assumption that it was violence that was necessary to set people free, not 
protestation undertaken through the spoken or written word.448 Narodnaya Volya 
carefully targeted figures associated with the Tsarist regime to attack the symbols of 
the autocratic state rather than the Russian people, for which members o f Narodnaya 
Volya considered themselves to be fighting.449 Later, in 1881, anarchists in London 
founded a network called Black International (or Anarchist International) based on the 
principle of ‘propaganda by deed’, which was comprised by modular cells of extremists 
that would carry out covert operations independently. The existence of Black 
International and the impact its philosophy had on individual radicals (such as the 
Hungarian Leon Czolgocz, who assassinated US President William McKinley in 1901) 
spread fear and discomfort amongst regimes across the world.450 The effect of this 
movement on international affairs was significant: it was the action of a member of the 
radical group Young Bosnians (a close affiliate of the Serbian organisation the Black 
Hand), Gavrilo Princip, who targeted and killed the Habsburg Archduke Franz
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Ferdinand in 1914, which is said to have triggered a chain of events that contributed to 
the outbreak of World War One.451
Terrorism as State Regime
With the rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, the connection between terrorism and the 
revolutionary philosophy of ‘propaganda by deed’ was corroded. ‘Terrorism’ came to 
be understood to mean something instituted by repressive regimes against the people, 
rather than something instituted by the people against repressive regimes.452 ‘Terrorist 
regimes’ also emerged in Stalinist Russia and fascist Italy. Each regime sought to 
remove political opponents and ‘cleanse’ society of individuals of particular ethnicities 
and political inclinations through instruments of murder, coercion and intimidation 
(Mussolini referred to this programme of victimisation as ‘social hygiene’).453 During 
the post-WWII era, regimes throughout the world used ‘terror’ to govern and purge, 
including dictatorships in Greece, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, El Salvador and 
Iraq.454
The distinction, however, between state-implemented ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ 
conducted by non-state actors became important in the latter half of the 20th century, 
when a resurgence of action inspired by the principle of ‘propaganda by deed’ occurred 
during the anti-colonial struggles in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.455 The 
establishment of organisations such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
and Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the growing strength of the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) led to a debate centred on the terrorist/freedom-tighter 
dichotomy. The modern international political principle of self-determination bolstered 
those who sought to wage what they considered to be legitimate campaigns of 
violence, coercion and intimidation in order to force change and achieve national
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statehood in the face of foreign oppression, much like Narodnaya Volya had done 
against autocratic rule in Tsarist Russia almost a century before.
456
457
458
State-sponsored Terrorism
The 1980s heralded a new dimension to terrorism that extended beyond both ‘terror’ 
as a form of governance and revolutionary ‘propaganda by deed’. The emergence of 
state-sponsored internationalised terrorism signalled the development of a type of 
unconventional, clandestine and, therefore, deniable method of warfare that was 
conducted by states to strike at conventionally more powerful rivals. Terrorism, as a 
form of warfare, emerged as the extension of politics by other means. One o f the most 
notorious cases of state-sponsored terrorism was the 1988 explosion on board Pan Am 
flight 103, which killed 259 passengers and crew and eleven residents of the Scottish 
village of Lockerbie. The US and UK blamed Libya for the bombing. Diplomatic 
relations between the UK and Libya were reinstituted only in August 2003, when the 
Libyan government wrote a letter to the UN Security Council accepting blame for the 
Pan Am 103 disaster.456 The US re-established diplomatic ties with Libya in May 
2006.457 This new expression of terrorism corresponded with neither state ‘terror’ nor 
the principle of ‘propaganda by deed’: terrorism, as a surrogate form of warfare, was 
not used as an overt instrument of state governance (its nature was essentially covert 
and its role was to enable its sponsor to deny association with any damage caused), and 
the terrorists themselves did not discriminate between ‘symbolic’ figures — carefully 
selected and targeted for a specific objective — and innocent civilians, as the Lockerbie 
case testifies.
The asymmetric warfare element of terrorism became a central pillar of the national 
defence doctrines of states such as Iran. Indeed, Iran is considered by the US and 
others to head the list o f state sponsors of terrorism, which includes North Korea, 
Cuba, Sudan and Syria.458 Indeed, the revolutionary zeal that drove the establishment
Seenan, G. (15 August 2003). Lockerbie deal to end Libya's isolation. The Guardian.
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of the Islamic Republic in 1979, as well as Iran’s constitution, offers evidence of Iran’s 
predisposition to support subversion and terrorist acts against perceived ‘oppressors’. 
Article 3 of the Iranian constitution contains two clauses that draw particular attention 
within the context of international terrorism: Clause 5, which establishes the goal of 
achieving ‘the complete elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign 
influence; and, clause 16, which establishes the goal of ‘framing the foreign policy of 
the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and 
unsparing support to the mustad'afiin [the Muslim oppressed] of the world.*459 It has 
also been said that other than revolutionary zeal and constitutional goals, political 
considerations make terrorism an attractive method for Iran to maximise interests in 
the international system against stronger adversaries. Since terrorism is clandestine and 
deniable, Iran is in a position to take the fight to its enemies whilst mitigating the 
threat of reprisal.
Iran’s links with international terrorist groups is said to be controlled by the 
Revolutionary Guards and the Intelligence and Security apparatus, which, according to 
the US State Department, ‘continue to be involved in the planning and support of 
terrorist acts and continue to support a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue 
their goals’. The type of support provided by Iran includes funding, safe havens, 
weapons and training, and indications are that the terrorist groups with which Iran 
collaborates include Hizballah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular 
Liberation Front for Palestine.460
International Terrorism
459 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran
460 (16 February 2005). Testimony of Matthew A. Levitt: Iranian State Sponsorship of Terrorism: 
Threatening US Security, Global Stability and Regional Peace. Joint Hearing of the Committee on 
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The emergence of al-Qaida in the 1990s developed the concept of ‘international 
terrorism’ as a phenomenon distinct from either ‘state terror’ or ‘propaganda by deed’: 
the brand of terrorism propagated by al-Qaida, headed by Saudi dissident Usama bin 
Laden, was of global scope and reach, and but wasn’t dependent on state-sponsorship 
or conducted through discriminatory use of force for limited political purposes. The 
advent of al-Qaida in the 1990s represented the emergence of a network of individuals 
driven by a philosophy based on a virulent strain of extreme Islamism, which 
transcended any state policy.461 The specific mission of al-Qaida to force the removal 
of all US forces from Saudi Arabia soon evolved to encompass the much more 
ambitious aim of establishing a world order based on the principles o f their extremist 
interpretation of Islamic doctrine.462 Rather than conducting discriminative campaigns 
based on the principle of ‘propaganda by deed’ or ally with states with whom it shared 
powerful enemies within the international system, al-Qaida sought to eliminate any 
entity that stood in the way of the accomplishment of its vision of an Islamist order, 
including the ‘crusader’ and ‘infidel’ West and ‘apostate’ Muslim regimes, by invoking a 
jihad, or holy war, on both private citizens and governments alike — a phenomena that 
is described by the term ‘new terrorism’.463
Terrorism after 9/11: New* Terrorism
The attack by al-Qaida against targets in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania on 
11 September 2001 transformed how the international community understood 
terrorism. The organisation, objectives, methods and scope of ‘new’ terrorism presents 
states with a new type of security challenge that universalized vulnerabilities and 
collectivized state perceptions o f threats to national and international security.
What ‘New’ Terrorism Is N ot
Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, Univirsity of Pennsylvania Press.
Burke, J. (2003). Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror.
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‘New’ terrorism is not an example of ‘Propaganda by Deed’, for three reasons. Firsdy, 
exponents of ‘new’ terrorism are not members of any revolutionary state that is using 
violence as a means to impose a new national order. In contrast with the French 
regime after 1789, organisations such as al-Qaida are non-state actors that are seeking 
to re-institute an old, pan-state Islamic order, rather than revolutionize an existing 
order with a view to instituting something new. The basis of al-Qaida’s argument with 
the West and apostate Muslim regimes is rooted in infidelity and betrayal, respectively, 
with regard to Islamic tradition and Sharia law.464 ‘New’ terrorism is violence intended 
to overthrow modem systems of government, such as democracy, in order to re- 
impose ancient, Islamist models of governance. This situation contrasts starkly with 
the view of terrorism as a servant of democracy, as taken by the French 
revolutionaries. Secondly, ‘new’ terrorism does not discriminate between 
legitimate/symbolic and iUegitimate/non-symbolic targets. Unlike Narodnaya Volya, 
al-Qaida does not limit its operations to political leaders in order to make political 
points. Rather, al-Qaida seeks to inflict mass-casualties, and makes no distinction 
between governments and ordinary citizens.465 Although comparisons could be made 
between the cellular organisational characteristics of al-Qaida and Black International, 
their methods and objectives share little in common, considering that Black 
International sought to revolutionize international politics by targeting specific, 
symbolic figures of power. Thirdly, unlike Irish Republican PIRA and the Basque 
separatist ETA, al-Qaida does not foster debate around the terrorist/freedom-fighter 
dichotomy at the international official level, even though al-Qaida propagates its ‘single 
narrative’ of a war between Islam and the West to radicalise and recruit vulnerable 
individuals at the street level.466 The objective of ‘new’ terrorism, as opposed to so- 
called ‘old’ terrorism, is to force change for the purposes of destroying the concepts of 
national statehood and popular sovereignty that underpin international order, rather 
than achieving them.467
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‘New’ terrorism is not an example of state terror, for two reasons. Firstly, and 
simply, ‘new’ terrorism is conducted by non-state entities, not state governments. 
Secondly, as non-state entities, ‘new’ terrorists do not govern over people and, 
therefore, have no means to control populations through repressive instruments of 
national power, in the way that the Nazi and the Mussolini regimes controlled, and 
‘cleansed’, the German and Italian populations, respectively.
And, finally, ‘new’ terrorism is not an example o f state-sponsored terrorism, for two 
reasons. Firstly, the operational strength of al-Qaida and affiliate groups is the ‘flock of 
birds’ nature o f their organisation, facilitating autonomous and self-financing cells that 
are difficult to track, target and engage.468 Al-Qaida’s relationship with states is more 
akin to the relationship between a parasite and a host, which is symbiotic whether or 
not the relationship is mutually beneficial. Where the relationship is not mutually 
beneficial, such as the relationship between al-Qaida and the US, UK, and the vast 
majority of the sixty states worldwide which reportedly accommodate al-Qaida 
operatives, the state will take action to eliminate the al-Qaida cells. Where the 
relationship is mutually beneficial, such as the relationship between al-Qaida and 
Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, the state will seek to protect al-Qaida cells. 
Considering the attitude held by Iran towards terrorism as a form of deniable, 
asymmetric warfare in support of ‘oppressed’ Muslims world-wide, the symbiotic 
relationship between Iran and ‘new’ terrorism is being scrutinised by intelligence 
services (see below). Secondly, given that organisations that practice ‘new’ terrorism 
are non-state actors, ‘new’ terrorism is not used to promote or express national policies 
in the way state-sponsored terrorism is understood to do. As such, ‘new’ terrorism 
represents the sharp end of a global extremist Islamist movement that transcends 
states and challenges existing principles of international order.
‘New* Terrorism: The Nature of Al-Qaida
468 Cogan, C. (2004). "Hunters not Gatherers: Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century." Intelligence and 
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The word ‘Qaida’, which is rooted in the Arabic term ‘qaf-ayn-dal’, literally means 
‘base’, but can also be translated to mean ‘method’.469 The term ‘al-Qaida’, therefore, 
refers to a base of operation (an organisation) and a method of operation. ‘Al-Qaida’ 
can be understood to mean three separate but interconnected phenomena. Firsdy, ‘al- 
Qaida’ is an organisation, commonly referred to as ‘al-Qaida Core’, comprising 
leadership figures such as Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, with its own 
objectives and methods of operation.470 Secondly, it refers to a network of groups and 
individuals that share, broadly speaking, al-Qaida Core’s objectives and methods. And, 
thirdly, ‘al-Qaida’ represents a movement encapsulating global jihad against the West 
and apostate Muslim regimes.471
Al-Qaida Core
The al-Qaida organisation is headed by Usama bin Laden, who is supported closely by 
his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaida was bom  out of the mujahideen’s resistance 
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s, which served as a 
rallying point for militant extremists from around the world, and a breeding ground for 
jihadists seeking to engage in armed struggle against foreign powers interfering in 
Muslim affairs.472 The radicalisation and battle-hardening of Islamic extremists in 
Afghanistan was aided further by the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 
1989, which the mujahideen took as a grand victory and proof that their methods of 
warfare were effective in the face of larger and more powerful adversaries.473 Usama 
bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi who earned a high reputation during the Afghan resistance, 
used the victory against the superpower to inspire and radicalise newcomers, as well as 
recruit veteran fighters, to form al-Qaida.474 The al-Qaida organisation became the base 
from which a global jihad (a struggle encapsulating the use of armed force in defence
469 Burke, J. (2003). Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror.
470 Burke, J. (11 March 2007). Al-Qaeda: the second coming. The Guardian. London.
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of the Islamic faith) would be waged using the same methods that had succeeded in 
defeating the Soviet Union.475
Objectives
The objectives of the al-Qaida organisation are global in scope and reach. Al-Qaida’s 
objective in the early 1990s was to force the removal of US troops from Saudi Arabia, 
the sacred land of the Holy Mosques, after the Gulf War of 1990-91.476 However, this 
specific objective evolved throughout the 1990s to encapsulate a more ambitious aim 
to unify all Muslims in Dar al-Islam (the land of Islam), extending from Spain, the 
Balkans and North Africa, to Central and Southern Asia and the Middle East.477 Any 
territory outside of this area is designated Dar al-Harb, or ‘the land o f war’. Al-Qaida 
believes the Ummah — the Islamic term for the Muslim community — should be ruled 
under the power of a caliph, in strict accordance with a literal interpretation of Islamic 
law.478 Realising this vision of a caliphate means engaging in violent struggle with the 
West, whose presence in Islamic lands is viewed by bin Laden as a breach of Sharia 
Law.479 Muslim states that are not instrumental to the re-establishment of Dar al-Islam 
are also legitimate targets.480 Al-Qaida has taken the fight to the ‘enemy’s land’, as was 
seen by terrorist attacks in the US in 2001, in Spain in 2004, the UK in 2005, and 
Jordan, where Islam in the state religion, in 2005.481
Methods
The method favoured by al-Qaida is clandestine, co-ordinated, simultaneous, 
indiscriminate and surprise attacks, most commonly suicide bombings, designed 
primarily to achieve the greatest possible number of casualties — attributes associated
Corbin, J. (2002). The Base: In Search of al-Oaeda - the Terror Network that Shook the World.
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with the concept of ‘new terrorism’, as distinct from the politically-symbolic, 
discriminate and limited attacks committed by ‘propaganda by deed’ groups. The 
hijacking and use of aircraft in the attack launched by al-Qaida against mass-casualty 
targets in the US on 11 September 2001 typifies this method o f attack. Since 9/11, 
however, political reasons as well as the desire to cause mass-casualties have provided 
cause for al-Qaida to launch suicide attacks, indicating a measure of evolution in its 
methodology.482 The four suicide bombers that launched attacks on London on 7 July 
2005, which killed 52 and injured 700, were apparendy designed to cause maximum 
casualties, disruption and media exposure. The attack also intended to deliver the 
political message, as voiced in a video by the leader of the bombers Muhammad 
Sidique Khan, that a state of war exists between Muslims and ‘oppressors’ world­
wide.483 Although it is thought that al-Qaida Core was not direcdy involved in the 
London attacks, the appearance of Zawahiri on the same video can be seen as an 
attempt by al-Qaida Core to associate itself with these types of attacks. Indeed, the 
kidnappings and beheadings in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which aim to make political 
points rather than cause mass casualties, also signals a development in the methods 
used by al-Qaida, which increasingly involves spreading propaganda via the internet 
and its media organisation, the Global Islamic Media Front (GMIF).
Affiliates
As al-Qaida’s campaign to wage global jihad gained momentum in the 1990s, change in 
the international political landscape led to the forging of new alliances between jihadist 
groups operating in different parts of the world. Unlike al-Qaida Core, whose aim is to 
establish a caliphate and wage war against ‘non-believers’ in a global theatre of 
operation, some jihadist groups have geographic-specific objectives. For example, the 
terrorist groups Jamaah Islamiyah, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Tawhid 
and Jihad, focus on cementing Islamic rule in South Asia, Central Asia and Iraq, 
respectively.484 Each has cultivated mutually convenient relationships with al-Qaida
482 Benjamin, D. and S. Smith (2005). The Next Attack: The Globalization of Jihad.
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Core that form a network in which localised operations are conceptualised and 
conducted under the umbrella of global jihad.485 This network has created the effect of 
a global jihad, centred on al-Qaida, serving to end the oppression of Muslims the 
world over. Terrorist attacks in Bali, Madrid, London, Delhi, Doha, Istanbul, Pakistan, 
Israel and Riyadh have suffered attacks at the hands of groups affiliated to al-Qaida.
Perhaps the most interesting and significant affiliation is that of al-Qaida Core and 
the Iraq-focused, Tawid and Jihad. In October 2004, Tawhid and Jihad, led by the 
Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed by US forces on 7 June 2006, 
pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden and the al-Qaida leadership. The strength of 
the pact between these groups is reflected in the changing of Tawhid and Jihad’s name 
to the al-Qaida Organisation in the Land of the Two Rivers, or, as it is better known, 
al-Qaida in Iraq. Whilst it is thought that the relationship between al-Qaida Core and 
al-Qaida in Iraq was forged on mutually-beneficial grounds, it appears that the strategic 
linkage between the two organisations has been problematic ever since Zarqawi, in 
September 2005, declared war against Shia Muslims.486 Zarqawi’s anti-Shia campaign 
breaches al-Qaida Core’s clear vision of the strict separation between Dar al-Islam and 
Dar al-Harb, its £US first’ strategy to target Western interests inside and outside of Iraq, 
and its objective to promote popular support amongst Muslims for the global jihad 
enterprise.487 In November 2005, Zarqawi’s group launched bomb attacks in Amman, 
killing Muslims from Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and the Palestinian 
Authority. Zarqawi defended the attacks and threatened further violence against 
Muslim countries with ties to the West, and promised an increase in attacks against 
targets outside of Iraq, including Europe.488
The al-Qaida franchise is expanding. Organisations claiming to be branches o f al- 
Qaida exist in Libya, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir and Lebanon. In
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January 2007, the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), changed 
its name to ‘al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb’.489
Global Jihad
The al-Qaida network encompasses individuals and groups who do not have 
operational affiliation with al-Qaida Core, but share the same motivation, aims and 
methodology. The Madrid and London bombings are thought by authorities to have 
been executed by individuals inspired by, if not directly sanctioned by, the al-Qaida 
leadership.490 As well as the 7 /7  group led by Muhammad Sidique Khan, examples of 
‘self-starters’ that embark on acts of ‘global jihad’ include Andrew Rowe, who was 
sentenced in the UK for 15 years in September 2005 for possessing items linked to
491terrorism.
The threat posed by self-starting global jihadists transcends state boundaries. O n 9 
November, Muriel Degauque, from Charleroi in Belgium, killed herself in a failed 
suicide bomb attack against US soldiers in Iraq.492 Fourteen people were arrested 
across Belgium on 30 November 2005 in connection with an investigation into her 
case.493 That investigation reported that four Iraqis and a Syrian have been arrested in 
connection with the theft o f 1500 passports from the Italian consulate in Liege, which 
could have been used to facilitate terrorists to travel to Iraq. Degauque’s case 
highlights problems of radicalisation and terrorist networks in Belgium in particular 
and within Western societies in general, and demonstrates the existence of terrorist 
networks in the West, particularly al-Zarqawi’s group, that aim to recruit Westerners as 
‘clean skin’ suicide bombers, who are less likely to grab the attention of security
494services.
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Similarly, on 12 January 2006, suspected al-Qaida operative, Omar Nakhcha, was 
arrested in Spain.495 He is believed to have headed a number of terrorist cells in Spain 
responsible for recruiting and dispatching suicide-bombers from Spain to Iraq.496 The 
cells are also suspected of providing support to al-Qaida affiliate groups the Moroccan 
Islamic Combatant Group and the Algerian-based Salafist Group for Call and Combat, 
and maintaining links with al-Qaida cells in France, Belgium and Holland.497 These 
arrests, and the parallel investigations into terrorist cells in France, Belgium, and 
Holland, and elsewhere in Europe, reveal a trend in the strategy of Zarqawi-related 
groups towards taking the ‘fight to the enemy’s land’, by exploiting recruits and basing 
operations within European states.
Statements by al-Qaida figures have demonstrated the reach o f the threat posed by 
global jihad. In February 1998, Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri proclaimed 
jihad against ‘Jews and crusaders’, and ordered every Muslim to fulfil their ‘individual 
duty’ to ‘kill the Americans and their allies, civilians and military’.498 On 19 January 
2006, al-Zazeera broadcast an audiotape of Usama bin Laden claiming that the reason 
there has not been an attack in the US since 9/11 is not because o f US security 
measures, but because operations in the US ‘need preparations’.499 Bin Laden is also 
heard celebrating the Madrid and London bombings, and threatens the US with 
further attacks on its soil. Since then, targets of global jihad have been extended to 
include Muslims and international organisations.500
On 23 April 2006, an audiotape of bin Laden catalogues a list o f events that 
supposedly provides evidence of a Western ‘Crusader-Zionist war’ against Islam. 
Rulers of Islamic states that are friendly with the West are also condemned.501 The 
Danish cartoons lampooning the Prophet Muhammad, Western rejection of the
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http://www.cnn.com/2006AVORLD/europe/01/12/spain.arrests/index.html.
496 Ibid.
497 Ibid.
498 Bergen, P. (2006). The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader. The Free Press.
499 (19 January 2006). "Text: 'Bin-Laden tape'." from
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/4628932.stm.
500 Ibid.
501 Whitlock, C. (24 April 2006). On Tape, Bin Laden Warns of Long War. Washington Post.
191
Hamas administration, UN involvement in Sudan, Bosnia, Somalia, East Timor, and 
Russian involvement in Chechnya are used as examples of the manifestation of an 
international crusade against Muslims.502 Bin Laden appeals to these events to justify 
the imperative of jihad, and repeat the call to all Muslims to engage in conflict with the 
West in the defence of Islam. This indicates Bin Laden’s desire to portray al-Qaida as 
the bulwark against an infidel international system, as opposed to just individual states, 
and to inspire attacks against international institutions. On 29 April 2006, al-Zawahiri 
appeared in a video describing the leaders o f Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq as 
traitors, and urging Muslims to ‘confront them’.503 The bulk of the 16-minute video is 
dedicated to the situation in Pakistan. He accuses Musharraf of throwing the country 
into a civil war in return for American bribes and he urges Pakistanis ‘to remove this 
traitor from power’.504 On 25 April, Abu-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi made his first public 
appearance for three years publicising the newly formed Mujahadin Shura Council, 
which represents eight jihadi groups including al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaida in Iraq.505 He 
reiterates his call to Sunnis to fight the ‘rejectionist’ Shia and the West and, in addition, 
reminds all Muslims of the importance of Israel in the Jihadist movement and the need 
to reclaim it.506 Each statement serves as a rally-cry to Muslims to engage in global 
jihad, and a warning to the West that ‘war is still raging’.507
The global scope and reach of the al-Qaida threat was further reiterated when, on 19 
May 2006, the supposedly Iranian-supported terrorist organisation Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad broadcast a communique that underscored the association between al-Qaida and 
the concept of global jihad.508 The message of solidarity was aimed at the PIJ’s 
‘brothers’ in Chechnya and Iraq, and praised the newly formed Mujahideen Shura 
Council in Iraq and Usama bin Laden’s leadership as the most effective vehicles of
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Muslim struggle.509 The extremist Islamic preacher Sheikh Abu-Nur al-Maqdisi, who 
delivered the audio message, described global jihad as the only means for Muslims to 
defend themselves, and bin Laden as the natural leader of a world-wide campaign of 
violence.510 The Sheikh stressed that action was imperative, considering that the US, 
being stretched in Iraq, is vulnerable to attack. In addition, he targeted the UN as a 
legitimate target and condemned Arab and Islamic leaders ‘fifth column of hypocrites’ 
within Muslim countries.511 Sheikh Abu-Nur claimed that the attacks o f 9/11 destroyed 
‘the myth o f the US superpower’ and that ‘the enemy’ was at a disadvantage because 
they could not bear heavy losses, in contrast with Muslims who were secure in the 
knowledge that they would go to Paradise.512 He further urged bin Laden and al- 
Zawahiri to teach the US, which he describes as a ‘rogue state’, a lesson.513 The 
message, which lasted 45 minutes, ended in an exhortation to Palestinians to put their 
faith in bin Laden as their ‘only hope.’514
Economic jihad
The threat posed by the al-Qaida-led global jihad is universally dangerous not only 
because it targets a vast range of Western and apostate states and international political 
institutions; global jihad also threatens the global economy. Economic jihad targets 
economic centres, most notably oil-related targets, which are essential to Western 
states and the health of global economic systems on which all states depend.
On 24 February 2006, the al-Qaida affiliate group al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula 
attacked ARAMCO’s oil processing installation at Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia.515 Although 
the attack was generally considered unsuccessful, it represents the sharp end of an 
established strategy spearheaded by Usama Bin Laden to ‘bleed America to
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bankruptcy’ by striking economic infrastructure.516 The Abqaiq attack destabilised 
global oil markets, triggered a sharp increase in the price of oil and prompted oil 
companies and installations to improve security.517 A successful attack that managed to 
disrupt or shutdown a target comparable to Abqaiq would cause severe damage to 
global markets and states’ economic wellbeing. Credit for the attack against Abqaiq 
was swifdy taken by al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, in a statement published on the 
Internet on 25 February 2006. The attackers claimed that the operation was ‘part o f the 
project to rid the Arabian Peninsula of the infidels’ and intended to stop the ‘pillage of 
oil wealth’ from Muslims by destroying a facility that ‘provides the Crusaders with 
oil’.518
The strikes against the Pentagon and World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 
were described by bin Laden as an attack on ‘America's icons of military and economic 
power’.519 In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden promised that ‘Jihad against 
America will continue, economically and militarily’, and urged Muslim youths ‘to find 
more of America's economic hubs’, because the ‘enemy can be defeated by attacking 
its economic centres’.520 One year after 9/11, on 6 October 2002, the French oil tanker 
Limburg was attacked 3 miles off the coast of Mina al-Dabah. Bin Laden highlighted 
the specific targeting of the Limburg as an economic target by claiming that the attack 
‘was not an incidental strike on a passing tanker, but a strike on the international oil- 
carrying line in the full sense of the word’.521 In March 2004, then leader of al-Qaida in 
the Arabian Peninsula, Abd al-Aziz al Muqrin, wrote in Mu’askar al-Battar (‘al-Battar 
Training Camp’, an al-Qaida affiliated website) calling for ‘strikes against the stolen raw 
materials from Muslim countries’.522 The rally-cry by Al-Muqrin, who was killed by 
Saudi security forces in Riyadh in June 2004, highlights the status o f oil-producing
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Muslim Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, as viable targets in the economic war against 
the West. Furthermore, on 15 June 2004 Saudi cleric Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser al- 
Rashid published a book entitled ‘The Laws of Targeting Petroleum-Related Interests 
and a Review of the Laws Pertaining to the Economic Jihad’. In it, he stated that 
striking oil targets was a legitimate means of waging economic jihad. He also claimed 
that it was acceptable to destroy Muslim property if it had fallen into the hands of 
‘infidels’.
This description o f ‘new’ terrorism demonstrates how the post-9 /11 threat 
challenges the vast range of states, international institutions, international order, the 
global economy, and governments and private citizens alike. The complex and fuzzy 
phenomenon of al-Qaida constitutes a threat that is perceivable, but not necessarily 
perceived; as such, it entails potential risk of disorder as well as actual disorder. The 
organisation of al-Qaida is difficult to perceive, and its methods and ideology drive a 
death-embracing movement that is neither available to normal modes of negotiation 
nor subject to the logic of deterrence.
SECTION 3: THE WMD THREAT 
The Nature of the Threat
The existence and spread of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
Nuclear Weapons
Given that an estimated combined total of 214,000 people were killed in the US 
nuclear bomb attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the destructive power 
of nuclear weapons means that their continued proliferation remains a principle 
security issue.523 In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was
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established to advance US President Eisenhower’s ‘atoms for peace’ agenda that arose 
from growing fear over the destructive power o f nuclear energy, and its development 
and utilisation by an increased number of states.524 The Treaty on the N on­
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was approved in 1968 and set the limit on 
the number of states allowed to possess a nuclear arsenal to five. These five states — 
the US, UK, France, Russia and China -  comprise the permanent membership of the 
UN Security Council. Today, seven states (the original five plus India and Pakistan) are 
known to have tested nuclear weapons; Israel and North Korea are suspected of 
having nuclear weapons; and, Iran is suspected of developing nuclear weapons.525
Radiological, Chemical and Biological Weapons
Radiological weapons — weapons that disperse radioactive materials on detonation — 
present a different kind of threat than that posed by nuclear weapons. The destructive 
capacity of a ‘dirty bomb’ is limited to that o f a conventional explosive, and the 
physical level of damage caused by the radioactive material is also limited.526 However, 
the psychological and political impact of the threat or use of a radiological weapon is 
high: panic, fear and uncertainty amongst the public and officials are likely to produce 
more harmful effects than the dirty bomb itself.527 This has lead James Gow to coin 
the category ‘W M D /I’ — the ‘I’ standing for the ‘impact’ these weapons produce that 
extends beyond the level of the destruction they cause.528 Chemical and biological 
weapons share this fear-inducing impact, but the level of destruction these weapons 
can cause is much higher than that of a dirty bomb. It is estimated that a single attack 
using 1 gram of weapons-grade smallpox could produce up to 1 million deaths.529 
Moreover, of the 70,000 metric tons of chemical weapons agents required to be 
destroyed by the Chemical Weapons Convention, only 9,600 tons have been verified
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destroyed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.530 The danger 
of the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is increased with the 
development of genetically-modified agents that resist existing antidotes and possess a 
greater corrosive power. With around 6,000 chemical plants worldwide, the possibility 
of terrorists acquiring agents such as ricin, which has no known antidote and can kill a 
human in miniscule amounts, presents a significant threat.531
The Non-proliferation Regime
In the wake of World War One the US, UK, Japan, France and Italy signed the 
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 that imposed limits on the number and size of naval 
armaments possessed by the signatory powers. After World War Two, the 
development of nuclear weaponry led to negotiations between the major powers to 
limit the proliferation of strategic arms. After the NPT was signed in 1968, the Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) was signed by the US and USSR in 1972, outlawing the 
deployment on either side of offensive strategic nuclear missiles. The Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks Agreement (SALT) imposed new limits on strategic ballistic missile 
systems of the two Superpowers and was put into effect in 1971; SALT II, negotiated 
between 1972 and 1979, sought to curtail the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In 
1991, START (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) was signed by the US and USSR, 
and START II, which prohibited the use of multiple independently-targetable re-entry 
vehicles (MIRVs), was signed in 1993. Beyond nuclear assurances between the two 
Cold War superpowers, multilateral regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
were established to control and limit the proliferation of WMD. The mission to 
regulate nuclear exports remains the preoccupation of the NSG, which currently has 
45 members, including the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council. The 
IAEA continues to maintain responsibility for enforcing the NPT and other elements 
of the international non-proliferation regime.
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The proliferation o f chemical weapons is primarily controlled by the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), which was signed in 1993 and came into force in 1997. 
The CWC is administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, and prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical 
weapons. The CWC builds on the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, currendy 
signed by 132 states, which prohibits only the use of chemical (and biological) 
weapons. Similarly, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which was signed in 
1972 and came into force in 1975, augments the Geneva Protocol by prohibiting the 
development, production, stockpiling and use of bacteriological and toxin weapons. 
Unlike the CWC, the BWC is not administered by a devoted organisation.
Current WMD Threats: Iran and Black Markets
Iran
In February 2006, the IAEA Board o f Governors voted 27-3 to back a joint UK- 
France-Germany measure to report Iran to the UN Security Council for its 
development o f a nuclear programme. Despite Iranian declarations o f peaceful intent, 
there exists widely-held suspicion that Iran intends to acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability.532 On 11 April 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced 
that Iran had enriched uranium to 3.5% using over one hundred centrifuges, making 
Iran a member of club of nuclear states.533
Iran first purchased a research nuclear reactor from the US in 1959; the pre­
revolution Shah planned to manufacture 23 nuclear reactors by the 1990s. The forced 
exile of the Shah in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s disrupted Iranian 
nuclear plans, but these have now been resurrected: the current Iranian regime intends
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to construct seven 1000 megawatt nuclear reactors by 2025.534 Iran argues that their 
national nuclear project is necessary to fulfil increasing domestic energy requirements, 
and free-up the oil and gas sectors to generate foreign income.535 Many international 
observers find this reasoning fallacious, and, in addition to Iran’s desire to enrich 
uranium beyond the 3.5% required for nuclear power, it signals Iranian intentions to 
build a nuclear capacity that extends beyond providing just a fuel resource.536
Suspicions of an Iranian nuclear programme for weapons purposes have also been 
fostered by Iran’s attempts to cover-up uranium enrichment and plutonium-related 
activities, as well as dealings with A. Q. Khan (see below). In 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh 
of the National Council of Resistance of Iran exposed clandestine nuclear sites at 
Natanz and Arak.537 Although pressure from the EU-3 (the EU, UK, France and 
Germany) in 2004 persuaded Iran to suspend enrichment activities, Iran resumed its 
conversion of uranium at its Isfahan facility in the summer of 2005, and announced 
3.5% levels of enrichment in 2006.538 The 2005 US National Intelligence Estimate on 
Iran judges that it will be ten years before Iran will be in possession of a nuclear
539weapon.
North Korea
On 28 August 2003, North Korea announced that it was ready to ‘declare itself 
formally as a nuclear weapons state’, following its withdrawal from the NPT in January 
2003 and the suspension o f the 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and 
the US that provided for the abandonment of North Korea’s plutonium production 
programme in exchange for the construction of two light-water nuclear plants, oil and
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economic co-operation.540 This announcement was augmented by a declaration by 
North Korea on 10 February 2005 confirming that it possessed nuclear weapons.541 At 
the same time, North Korea suspended its participation in Six Party talks designed to 
facilitate the short-term dismandement of North Korea’s uranium enrichment and 
plutonium-related activities and eventual return o f IAEA inspectors to monitor long­
term dismandement o f all WMD programmes, in exchange for security guarantees.542
US estimates in 2004 suggested that North Korea had probably reprocessed most of 
the 8,000 nuclear fuel rods they claim to be working on at the formally abandoned 
nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and may have produced 4 — 6 atomic bombs from 
them.543 Considering alleged relations between Pyongyang and A. Q. Khan, suspected 
actual or possible North Korean involvement in black market activity — whereby it sells 
nuclear expertise, components, material or weapons to the highest bidder — constitutes 
another significant security threat associated with a North Korean nuclear capability.
At the time of writing, media outlets are reporting that a deal has been reached at six- 
party talks in Beijing. The deal involves North Korea being given 50,000 tonnes of 
energy aid in return for shutting down its nuclear facilities. North Korea would receive 
more energy supplies for disabling them completely.
Black Market
Non-state ‘black market’ networks also challenge the non-proliferation regime. The 
most significant transnational proliferation network was spearheaded by Pakistani 
scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. A.Q. Khan, commonly referred to as the father of 
Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, which successfully contravened international controls to sell 
the equipment and expertise needed to produce nuclear weaponry to a number of
540 (28 August 2003). "US upbeat on N Korea talks." from http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia- 
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countries hostile to the non-proliferation regime, including, it is alleged, Libya, Iraq, 
Iran and North Korea.544 The extent of the threat posed by the network prompted 
then CIA director George Tenet to describe A. Q. Khan as being ‘at least as dangerous 
as Osama bin Laden’.545 Other than the desire to make money by exploiting 
weaknesses in NPT and NSG controls, the motivation of A. Q. Khan was to promote 
a pan-Islamic power and challenge Western WMD regulation regimes by disseminating 
nuclear weapons expertise, technology and materials to states hostile to the West — a 
major concern considering the post-9 /11 terrorism threat.546
The proliferation network was unravelled in 2003 with the seizure of the ship BBC 
China, whose cargo of uranium enrichment gas-centrifuge components was destined 
for Libya.547 Further information about the proliferation network was gleaned through 
revealing interviews with individuals involved with transactions with A. Q. Khan’s 
organisation, when Libya renounced nuclear weapons programmes in January 2004.548 
A. Q. Khan was arrested in Pakistan in February 2004, was swiftly pardoned by 
President Musharraf and today remains under house arrest. However, it is unclear 
whether remnants of his network exist or other similar networks are operating in the 
nuclear ‘underworld’.549
The scope of A . Q  Khan’s Network
A. Q. Khan’s proliferation network was a transnational organisation that had 
succeeded in operating under the non-proliferation regime’s radar since the 1980s.550 
Pakistan was the main hub of the operation.551 Indeed, since 1976, A. Q. Khan had 
been head of the Engineering Research Laboratories at Kahuta (later renamed Khan 
Research Laboratories) that had played the central role in enriching uranium for
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Pakistan’s national nuclear weapons programme: it was from this platform that A. Q. 
Khan based his dealings with international clients.552 However, as A. Q. Khan’s 
business grew throughout the 1980s and 1990s, bases of operation were established in 
- Switzerland, the UK, the UAE, Turkey, South Africa and Malaysia.553 His organisation 
employed a large number of experts and cultivated strong working relations with 
companies, suppliers and workshops that primarily produced PI and P2 centrifuges 
used for uranium enrichment.554 The running o f A. Q. Khan’s business involved 
participants in a number of different countries; the director of the IAEA, Mohamed El 
Baradei, claimed in 2004 that ‘nuclear components designed in one country could be 
manufactured in another, shipped through a third (which may have appeared to be a 
legitimate user), assembled in a fourth, and designated for eventual turnkey use in a 
fifth’.555 Information discovered in Libya identified around six workshops located 
across Africa, Asia and the Middle East that made centrifuge components.556 The 
centrifuge components found on the ship BBC China were made in the Scomi 
Precision Engineering (SCOPE) facility in Malaysia.557
The Reach of A.. Q. Khan’s Network
The network developed by A. Q. Khan in the 1980s became a ‘one-stop shop’ in the 
1990s for states unhappy with Western control of WMD regimes, and it reached 
customers far and wide who sought to produce nuclear weapons programmes in 
defiance of international convention.558 Clients of A. Q. Khan are thought to have 
included Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya and, even, al- 
Qaida.559 The ramifications of A. Q. Khan’s business dealings have been serious for 
contemporary security issues. Firstly, suspicions about Iraq’s nuclear capability, which 
were used by the US and UK to justify pre-emptive action against Iraq in March 2003, 
were sown by information obtained by the IAEA in the 1990s showing that A. Q.
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Khan had offered to help Baghdad produce gas centrifuges and design nuclear 
weapons.560 Secondly, it is thought that Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, which 
constitutes a principle security issue in 2006, is the result of transactions initiated 
between Tehran and A. Q. Khan in the 1980s.561 Thirdly, North Korean, whose 
continuing nuclear development programme remains a preoccupation of the US, is 
suspected of receiving centrifuge designs and components from the network in the 
1990s.562 Evidence points to other significant transactions. Syria, Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt are all considered to have been approached by A. Q. Khan’s organisation.563 
Libya, which renounced nuclear weapons in 2004, had ordered a gas-centrifuge plant 
powerful enough to produce ten nuclear weapons on an annual basis.564 Documents 
detailing information Pakistan received in China in the 1980s suggest that the A. Q. 
Khan network provided Libya with information that enabled them to build a nuclear 
weapon.565 Many questions about the extent of A. Q. Khan’s network remain, as do 
suspicions that the network helped al-Qaida to obtain information on nuclear weapons 
prior to the fall o f the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, when he visited the country 
together with 17 others during the period 1997 — 2003.566
Amendments to the Non-proliferation Regime
The exposure of the transnational A. Q. Khan network and increased understanding of 
the scope and reach of its operation prompted changes in the international non­
proliferation regime. Three key developments occurred. Firstly, the US-led 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), consisting o f 15 core countries including the UK, 
France, and Russia, as well as a network of 60 associated states, which established by 
US President Bush in 2003, was strengthened to improve efforts to interdict shipments 
of WMD-related materials and components.567 The success of the PSI in catching the 
BBC China exposed the merits of international co-operation to control shipping, but it
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also exposed failures in intelligence sharing. In view of A. Q. Khan’s clandestine 
activities, the PSI incorporated better relations with Interpol in order to reinforce an 
intelligence-led law enforcement initiative to seize WMD materials and freeze the 
assets of proliferators.568 Secondly, on 28 April 2004, the non-proliferation regime 
expanded to include non-state actors when the UN Security Council passed resolution 
1540, banning non-state actors from attempting to ‘develop, acquire, manufacture, 
possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their 
means of delivery’, and, in turn, criminalizing attempts by states to proliferate to non­
state actors.569 The introduction o f these provisions reflects international concern 
generated by A. Q. Khan’s reported trips to terrorist havens such as Afghanistan and 
his pan-Islamic ideology shared, in a virulent form, by al-Qaida. And, thirdly, the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group has reviewed its guidelines for exporting nuclear technology. 
In May 2004, the NSG introduced two measures obligating states to develop a ‘catch­
all’ export control mechanism that targets dual-use items for export and implement the 
IAEA Additional Protocol requiring states to report all nuclear imports and exports to 
the IAEA.570
SECTION 4: THE TERRORISM-WMD THREAT NEXUS 
The Threat of Terrorism involving WMD
In June 2005, the Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses, authored by 
US Senator Richard G. Lugar, was published. The purpose of the survey was to 
investigate ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in the face of the ‘new’ 
terrorism threat, especially in recognition of the existence and potential impact o f the 
A. Q. Khan proliferation network.571 The Lugar Survey was predicated on the notion 
that the international community ‘must anticipate that terrorists will use weapons of 
mass destruction if allowed the opportunity’, and concluded that the bottom line for
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the US and other states is that they ‘face an existential threat from the intersection of 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction’.572
The survey, which posed questions to an international group of over 85 experts in 
the field of WMD proliferation, sought to ‘discover consistencies and divergences in 
attitudes’ about future WMD threats.573 Survey responses to questions addressing the 
terrorism-WMD threat nexus painted an interesting picture of future trends. For 
instance, given the choice between ‘terrorists’ and ‘government’, 67 out o f the 85 
respondents answered that if a nuclear attack occurs during the next ten years, it is 
more likely to be carried out by a terrorist group than by a government.574 
Furthermore, in answer to the question ‘What is the most likely method for terrorists 
to acquire nuclear weapons or material?’ 63 out o f the 83 respondents selected a 
method involving the black market, either exclusively or in combination with state 
assistance or crime (theft).575 Other than the threat of nuclear terrorism, the survey 
group concluded that the proliferation threat in most need of attention is ‘the possible 
terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons’.576
The results o f the Lugar Survey signaling a terrorism-WMD threat nexus chime with 
the conclusions of other experts in the field of WMD proliferation. In terms of 
terrorist acquisition of WMD through a combination of the black market and state 
assistance, the CIA has reported that WMD-capable states ‘may follow North Korea’s 
practice of supplying specific WMD-related technology and expertise to other 
countries or non-state actors’.577 On the other hand, the US Congressional Research 
Service Report ‘Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options’ 
outlines the danger of state sponsors o f terrorism providing ‘the terrorist organisations 
that they support with WMD materials or weapons’.578 The severity of the terrorism-
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WMD threat nexus, the report continues, depends on whether terrorist groups that 
have the intention o f acquiring WMD, such as al-Qaida, are presented with the 
opportunity of gaining access the nuclear materials or weaponry, whether through 
theft, purchase or assistance from states or black market profiteers.579
According to Jessica Stern, the threat of terrorist use of WMD is low, but it has 
increased for 5 reasons. Firstly, the desire for ‘new’ terrorists to achieve divine 
retribution through the killing o f a large number of people, in line with the Islamic 
tenet ‘an eye for an eye’, has redefined the utility of weapons of mass destruction. 
Terrorists seeking revenge harbour different motivations from states seeking to 
support traditional political objectives. Terrorists therefore value the utility of WMD to 
inflict revenge, as opposed to deter or compel states in defence of territorial or political 
integrity.580 Secondly, fanatical religious terrorist groups like al-Qaida ‘appear more 
likely than the terrorists o f the past to commit acts o f extreme violence’ — the desire of 
‘new’ terrorists to acquire WMD is matched by their willingness to deploy them, which 
presents a threat associated with WMD proliferation that was mitigated by the 
motivation of states to survive during the Cold War.581 This point is developed by 
Lewis A. Dunn in his paper ‘Can Al-Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear 
Weapons?’, in which he outlines the assumption of US policy-makers that the 
acquisition by al-Qaida of WMD ‘is tantamount to their employment’, given the 
apparent cause of al-Qaida to wreak mass destruction against the West, and the 
readiness of al-Qaida operatives to die for that cause.582 Thirdly, the break-up of the 
Soviet Union contributed to the formation of a black market that offers expertise, 
materials, components and weapons, and it is vulnerable to theft and profiteering 
entrepreneurs.583 At least eight thefts o f materials ‘that could be used to make nuclear 
weapons have been confirmed’. Unsecured Soviet nuclear weaponry is also vulnerable 
to theft.584 Fourthly, chemical and biological weapons are proliferating within states
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that are known to sponsor terrorism.585 Finally, developments in information and 
communications technology, such as the internet, have made it easier for terrorists to 
acquire the knowledge to construct WMD weaponry and deploy it through the use of 
suicide bombers recruited via the web.586
The threat of terrorism involving the use of WMD cannot be ruled out. As Jessica 
Stern states, ‘while the probability o f WMD terrorism is low, its expected costs — in 
lives lost and in threats to civil liberties — is potentially devastating’.587 The existence of 
serious transnational threats posed by proliferation networks like AQ Khan’s and ‘new’ 
terrorism groups like al-Qaida have given rise to a terrorism-WMD threat nexus that 
has led to a re-conceptualization o f international security challenges.
The Nature of the Terrorism-WMD Threat Nexus
In the post 9/11 world, the two distinct threats posed by terrorism and WMD 
proliferation have come together to form the new phenomenon of a terrorism-WMD 
threat nexus. ‘New’ terrorism presents a security challenge that seeks to cause mass 
destruction and is not subject to the conventional logic of deterrence. Transnational 
WMD proliferation networks, such as the one administered by A. Q. Khan, represent a 
black market of global scope and reach that circumvents international non­
proliferation regimes and constitutes a potential force-multiplier for terrorist groups 
bent on maximizing casualties and levels of impact. If  one adds into the mix the 
suggestion of a common ideological connection between proliferators such as A. Q. 
Khan and extreme Islamists such as al-Qaida who seek to cause mass destruction, then 
the terrorism-WMD threat nexus constitutes a pillar o f the global jihadist threat that 
presents a serious threat to international security. In order to effectively combat the 
threat of terrorism and prevent the worst WMD terrorism scenario, the proliferation 
o f WMD must also be combated; likewise, in order to effectively combat the threat
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posed by WMD proliferation, preventing terrorist groups from acquiring the capability 
to carry out their intentions to utilize WMD is strategically imperative.
Considering the type of targets that are of interest to groups such as al-Qaida, 
mitigating the threat of WMD terrorism is widely acknowledged as the most urgent 
international security priority. The security strategies of the UK, US, EU and UN 
reflect the seriousness with which the international community takes the terrorism- 
WMD threat nexus and its potential impact.588 The severity of the threat of terrorism 
involving WMD can be understood by revisiting attacks already launched by al-Qaida, 
and imagining the consequences had WMD been utilized. Two examples are useful in 
illustrating the potential use of WMD as a force multiplier for terrorist attacks. Firstly, 
the effects of the 2001 attacks against the World Trade Centre involving passenger jets 
could have been even greater had the suicide attackers included a radiological, 
chemical, biological or nuclear element in their arsenal. Since the al-Qaida operatives 
had no concern for their own survival and their objectives are thought to have been to 
cause mass casualties, destruction and disruption, as well as create a spectacular impact, 
then it is reasonable to conclude that the use of WMD would have added, not 
retracted, value to the attack’s effects. In other words, there is no reason to believe that 
the terrorists would not have used WMD on 9/11 given that nature of the attack had 
they had the means to do so.589
Secondly, the AQAP attack against the Abqaiq oil installation in February 2006, 
which was purportedly intended to knock-out the installation’s capacity to process oil 
for Western consumption, signals a potential threat to the stability of international oil 
markets which could have significant negative effects on the global economy. 
Although causing serious disruption to a large oil facility with a level of protection 
comparable to Abqaiq would be extremely difficult with conventional weaponry, an 
attack involving a nuclear device would achieve a level of damage that would cause not
588 See (2004). (2003). Defence White Paper: Delivering Security in a Changing World; (2006). The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America; (2003). A Secure Europe in a Better World: 
European Security Strategy; (2004) A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility; (2006). UN 
Resolution 60/288: The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
589 Lugar, R. G. (2005). The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses.
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only mass casualties, but the destruction of a target through a single attack that would 
trigger severe global economic ramifications.
Al-Qaida and WMD
Given al-Qaida’s aim to cause maximum numbers of casualties, its use of suicide 
attacks and its zero-sum strategic doctrine, it is thought that al-Qaida will attempt to 
acquire and utilise CBRN materials, if it hasn’t already done so.590 In the past, al-Qaida 
affiliate groups have attempted to execute ‘poison plot’ attacks in Europe using 
chemical warfare agents.591 In another case, documents discovered in an al-Qaida 
training camp in Afghanistan contained a diagram of a crude nuclear device, as well as 
instructions on how to manufacture mustard agent, sarin, and VX.592 Moreover, 
interest shown in crop dusters by 11 September attack leader Mohammad Atta and the 
so-called ‘20th hijacker’ Zacharias Moussaoui raises concerns that al-Qaida 
contemplates using such instruments to disseminate biological warfare agents.593 Levels 
o f security surrounding nuclear power plants in the UK, US and Australia have also 
been stepped up after reports that terrorists are targeting them. The arrest of 20 people 
in Australia in 2005, including the extremist Islamic preacher Abdul Nacer Benbrika 
from Melbourne, Australia, for targeting the Sydney nuclear power plant for ‘terrorist 
purposes’, suggests terrorist interest in nuclear-related targets.594 The possible liaison 
between A.Q. Khan and al-Qaida in Afghanistan sometime during the period 1997- 
2003 also heightens the level of concern over the possibility of al-Qaida obtaining 
some form of WMD capability.
Religiousjustification for WMD
Throughout the 1990s, al-Qaida desired a WMD capability, including nuclear weapons, 
ostensibly in order to deter an attack by the United States. As late as November 2001,
590 Scheuer, M. (2006). "New York Subway Plot and al-Qaeda's WMD Strategy." Terrorism Focus 3(24).
591 (24 March 2006). "Accused 'talked of poison plot'." from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk/4841314.stm.
592 (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report.
593 Ibid.
594 Stanley, T. (2 December 2005). "Australian Anti-Terror Raids: A Serious Plot Thwarted." Terrorism 
Monitor 3(23).
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Usama bin Laden was highlighting the defensive nature of WMD, claiming in an 
interview with Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir that: ‘If America used chemical and 
nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. 
We have the weapons as a deterrent’.595
In the early 1990s, al-Qaida operative Abu Hafs al-Masri was placed in charge of an 
al-Qaida programme to acquire a nuclear capability, purportedly for deterrence 
purposes.596 The earliest alleged attempt by al-Qaida to acquire CBRN materials 
occurred around the beginning of 1994, when Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl (who testified in 
2001) was sent by the al-Qaida leadership to purchase uranium in Sudan.597 It is 
suspected that al-Qaida's plan to acquire uranium in the 1990s was in part botched by 
al-Qaida's lack of expertise in distinguishing between weapons-grade and other 
materials.598 Al-Qaida is thought to have approached Pakistani scientists for assistance - 
possibly Bashirrudin Makmood and Abdul Majid, currently under house arrest in 
Pakistan.599 The involvement of outside experts in al-Qaida's nuclear programme was 
indicated in documents allegedly found in Afghanistan containing bomb designs based 
on specifications that were not openly sourced.600 In 1999, al-Qaida established a 
biological weapons programme under the direction of Abu Hafs al-Masri and Abu 
Khabab, which involved experimentation with anthrax bacteria.601 It is suspected that a 
chemical weapons programme was also established around this time.602
The destruction of al-Qaida's base of operations in Afghanistan after 9/11 meant the 
disruption of al-Qaida's nuclear, chemical and biological programmes.603 Al-Qaida lost 
its in house production capability, and was forced to encourage other groups to
595 (10 November 2001). "Bin Laden 'has nuclear weapons'." from
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/1648572.stm.
596 Wesley, R. (2005). "Al-Qaeda's WMD Strategy Prior to the US Intervention in Afghanistan." Terrorism 
Monitor 3(19).
597 Ibid.
598 Ibid.
599 Ibid.
600 Ibid.
601 Ibid.
602 Ibid
603 Wesley, R. (2005). "Al-Qaeda's WMD Strategy After the US Intervention in Afghanistan." Terrorism 
Monitor 3(20).
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develop WMD capabilities possibly as a means to coerce the US and her allies.604 Since 
2001, al-Qaida has provided religious justification for the use of WMD as offensive 
weapons, rather than as a deterrent, in line with the logic of 'an eye for an eye'.605 
WMD is perceived to provide the means to avenge the deaths of thousands of 
Muslims by causing the deaths of thousands of 'oppressors'.606
Indeed, the use of WMD in the waging of global jihad has received religious 
justification after much wrangling amongst Islamic clerics about the legitimacy over 
mass-casualty attacks. After the 9/11 attacks, for instance, Usama bin Laden was 
severely criticized by Islamist scholars for failing to satisfy religious requirements for 
waging a just war.607 The criticism pointed to three pitfalls o f the 9/11 operation: 
insufficient warning of the attacks; failure to offer Americans the chance to convert to 
Islam; and, inadequate religious authorization to kill so many people.608 Bin Laden 
embarked on a series of lectures in 2002 to satisfy his Islamist critics that his next 
strike against the US mainland will conform to Islamic tradition.609 In terms of the 
religious authorization to cause mass casualties, bin Laden received the necessary fatwa 
from Sheikh Hamid bin al-Fahd, who, on 21 May 2003, published ‘A Treatise on the 
Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against Infidels’. In this fatwa, 
bin al-Fahd concluded that each of the four schools of Sunni Islam permitted the 
Mujahideen to use weapons of mass destruction in the pursuit of causing the deaths of 
millions of Americans, in accordance with the principle of ‘an eye for an eye’.610 Bin al- 
Fahd stated that ‘anyone who considers America's aggression against Muslims and 
their lands during the last decade will conclude that striking her is permissible merely 
on the rule of treating one as one has been treated’.611 The cleric continued by claiming
604 Wesley, R. (2005). "Al-Qaeda's WMD Strategy After the US Intervention in Afghanistan."
605 Ibid.
606 Ibid.
607 Scheuer, M. (3 March 2005). "Al-Qaeda's Completed Warning Cycle - Ready to Attack?" from 
http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=96.
608 Ibid.
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Islamist Ideology. H. Fradkin, H. Haqqani and E. Brown, The Hudson Institute. 2.
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that ‘some brothers have totaled the number of Muslims killed directly or indirectly by 
their [America’s] weapons and come up with the figure of nearly ten million.612
A number of statements made by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri since 2002, including 
bin Laden’s offers of truces to Europe and the US in 2004 and 2006, have been 
interpreted as communiques intending to satisfy the requirement to offer infidels the 
chance to convert to Islam before being attacked, and to provide warning of such an 
attack if the chance is not taken.613 These statements and the fatwa authorizing the use 
of WMD in waging jihad give ground for concern over the possibility o f a planned 
terrorist attack against the UK, Europe or the US involving weapons o f mass 
destruction.614 Nuclear weapons and materials are unsecured in sites across the Former 
Soviet Union. Usama Bin Laden wrote to Mullah Omar in 2002 to claim that 'the 
[FSU] Islamic Republics region is rich with significant scientific experiences in 
conventional and non-conventional military industries, which have a great role in the 
future jihad against the enemies of Islam'.615
Other jihadists have talked about the legitimacy and strategic utility of WMD. Al- 
Qaida operative Suleiman Abu Gheith asserted in 2002 the right of Muslims to ‘kill 4 
million Americans, 2 million of them children... and cripple them in the hundreds of 
thousands’.616 Furthermore, he claimed it was Muslims’ ‘obligation to fight them with 
chemical and biological weapons, to afflict them with the fatal woes that have afflicted 
Muslims because of their chemical and biological weapons’.617 In 2005, Sheikh Abu 
Bakar Ba'asyir said that Muslims must embrace nuclear weapons for strategic purposes. 
He claimed that 'in places like London and New York there must be other calculations 
[than conventional attacks]. In battle it is best to cause as many casualties as 
possible'.618 Likewise, al-Qaida-linked jihadist, Abu Musab al-Suri (a.k.a. Mustaf Sit- 
Maryam, Omar Abd al-Hakim - arrested in Pakistan late 2005), claimed in his 1600
612 Scheuer, M. (3 March 2005). "Al-Qaeda's Completed Warning Cycle - Ready to Attack?."
613 Ibid.
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page treatise Callfor the Islamist Global Resistance that CBRN materials 'may be used even 
if they annihilate all the infidels'.619 In addition to calls by Abu Yehia al-Libi to acquire 
nuclear weapons for waging global jihad, in 2006 the new al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu 
Ayyub al-Masri issued a statement requesting CBRN expertise in Iraq.620 Moreover, 
suspected al-Qaida operative Adnan Shukrijumah is reported to have smuggled nuclear 
materials into the US through Mexico during the period 2004 -  2006 for possible 
terrorist purposes.621
Al-Qaida appears determined to increase the levels o f attacks in order to force the 
US to change its policies towards the Muslim world, and be seen to surpass its 
previous achievements. Strikes involving WMD might be seen as the next level of 
attack. The alleged plot to target the New York subway with cyanide in 2003 was 
purportedly terminated by Ayman al-Zawahiri for failing to be a sufficiendy grand 
follow-up to the 9/11 attacks.622 To encourage jihadists to think in WMD terms, a web 
site on the al-Firdam Forum is dedicated to providing detailed instructions on how to 
make nuclear, dirty and biological bombs. The web site first appeared in October 2005; 
by November 2005 it had received 57,000 hits. A physics professor at Imperial College 
London has claimed that it looks like a 'proper instruction manual'.623
Terrorism and Iran
Reason to suspect a link between Iran and terrorism adds further concern over a 
terrorism-WMD threat nexus, considering the declared intention of Iran to develop a 
nuclear capability and the numerous public statements made by Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad threatening to annihilate Israel, a target at the top of al- 
Qaida’s hit-list. In addition, Iranian religious authorities have issued fatwas sanctioning
619 Wesley, R. (2005). "Al-Qaeda's WMD Strategy After the US Intervention in Afghanistan": 2
620 (29 September 2006). Zarqawi Successor Exhorts Scientists; Tape Urges Experts to Join Fight in Iraq. 
Washington Post.
621 Wesley, R. (2006). "Assessing Shukrijumah's Nuclear Plot Against the United States." Terrorism 
Monitor 4(19).
622 Scheuer, M. (2006). "New York Subway Plot and al-Qaeda's WMD Strategy."
623 Scheuer, M. (28 June 2006). Al-Qaeda's nuke plot: Facts and failures. Asia Times.
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the use of both WMD and suicide bombers against the enemies of Islam.624 In 2006, 
Mullah Mohsen Gharavian, a close affiliate of hardliner Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi 
Mesbah-Yazdi, claimed that it is ‘only natural’ for Iran to have nuclear bombs and that, 
within the context of a nuclear-riddled world, ‘the use of nuclear weapons may not 
constitute a problem according to Sharia law’.625 Prior to this WMD fatwa, Ayatollah 
Mesbah-Yazdi authorised the use o f suicide bombers in defence of Islam, and it has 
been reported that Iran has formed battalions of suicide bombers, including the Special 
Unit for Martyr Seekers in the Revolutionary Guards, which have, amongst other 
items, ‘Britain’s demise’ on its agenda.626 Western intelligence reports detailing the 
existence of a clandestine nuclear weapons facility under the control of the 
Revolutionary Guards indicates the possibility of a Revolutionary Guards-led 
combined programme of suicide-bombers and nuclear R&D that, conceived within the 
context of the Iranian fatwas and the al-Qaida-led global jihad, raises concern over 
trends in Iranian ‘asymmetric warfare’ defence doctrine.627 Although unlikely given the 
level and nature of rivalry between Sunni and Shia Islamic practitioners, the 
opportunity for the Sunni Muslims o f al-Qaida and the Shia Muslims of the Iranian 
elite to join forces to hit shared US and Western targets could conceivably succeed in 
consolidating pan-Islamic support for a global jihad and possibly facilitate acts of 
suicide bombings that utilize WMD.
Indeed, the Sunni-Shia rivalry appears to have not prevented al-Qaida from dealing 
with Iran in the past. The 9/11 Commission found evidence that al-Qaida received 
support, advice and training from Iranian-supported Hizballah and Iran prior to the 
9/11 attacks, even though there is no evidence that either Hizballah or Iran possessed 
knowledge of the 9/11 operation.628 Iran is thought to have taken great steps to 
cultivated stronger links with al-Qaida after the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and 
facilitated covert transit of al-Qaida operatives through Iran and across the Iranian-
624 Freeman, C. and P. Sherwell (19 February 2006). Iranian fatwa approves use of nuclear weapons. The
Daily Telegraph.
625 Ibid.
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Afghani border (Iranian border controllers were ordered not to stamp the passports of 
al-Qaida travellers).629 Moreover, over half o f the total number of Saudi al-Qaida 
members directly involved in the 9/11 plot travelled to or from Iran between October 
2000 and February 2001.630
Iran’s nuclear programme, the asymmetric warfare pillar of Iran’s defence doctrine 
and its support for terrorist groups have been reconceived after 9/11, given the 
terrorism-WMD threat nexus and the amalgamation of counter-terrorism strategies 
with counter-proliferation strategies. O n the one hand, Iran’s publicly-declared nuclear 
programme, as well as the possibility of a clandestine nuclear programme, heightens 
the threat of terrorists acquiring the means to cause mass destruction. On the other 
hand, Iran’s support for terrorist groups increases danger presented by its potential 
development of a nuclear capability. In particular, the 19 May 2006 communique by 
the purportedly Iranian-backed organisation Palestinian Islamic Jihad describing the 
necessity of global jihad, calling on Muslims to pledge allegiance to Usama bin Laden 
and urging attacks on the US adds a new dimension to the status of the Iran as a state- 
sponsor of terrorism and raises questions about the Iranian regime’s relationship with 
‘new’ terrorism.631
CONCLUSIONS
The organisation, objectives and methods o f ‘new’ terrorism presents a serious 
transnational threat to international security, and suggestions of terrorist intentions to 
acquire and use WMD adds an alarming dimension to the terrorism threat. The A. Q. 
Khan network was dangerous not just in terms o f its scope and reach; signals o f an 
ideological connection between A. Q. Khan and global jihadists gives rise to the 
concern that politico-religious motivations, as well as money, provide a basis for 
disseminating WMD to state and non-state actors that seek to acquire them. Likewise, 
the threats posed by the suspected nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran
(2004). The 9/11 Commission Report.
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prompt serious review considering the emergence of nuclear black markets and an 
extremist Islamic cause that legitimises the use of WMD and suicide bombings, 
respectively.
TMew’ terrorism threats are phenomena that are perceivable, but not necessarily 
perceived. The terrorism-WMD phenomenon can be described in terms of both ‘risk’ 
and ‘threat’, considering that it represents a ‘situation involving exposure to danger’, 
‘the possibility that something unpleasant will happen’ and ‘an indication of something 
impending’ that requires prevention. ‘Fuzzy and complex’ terrorist threats to 
international peace and security are intelligence targets: many terrorist activities and 
actors exist independent o f perception, and meaningful descriptions of them depend 
on empirical investigation conducted by intelligence organisations. The risk of 
terrorism involving WMD has prompted the construction o f controlling security 
strategies that seek to pro-act against terrorist threats in order to mitigate the risk of 
catastrophic attack. In order to effectively address anticipated threats determined 
through the assessment o f information, rather than observation of actual attacks, 
actors need to be capable o f fulfilling the intelligence requirements of controlling 
security strategies.
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CHAPTER FIVE
UK, US and UN Capabilities to 
Fulfil the Intelligence Requirements 
of Controlling Security Strategies
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the real-world relationship between 
intelligence power and the controlling security strategies of the UK, US and UN, 
considering the evident transition from pre-9/11 coercive security strategies to post- 
9/11 controlling security strategies, in line with the imperative to prevent terrorist 
attacks in the post-9/11 strategic reality. Indeed, after 9/11, the UK, US and UN have 
each adopted the logic of controlling security strategies that seek to meet the challenge 
of prevention through pro-active mechanisms. Unlike pre-9/11 coercive strategies, 
post-9 /11 controlling strategies are intelligence-driven: a strategy that aims to prevent 
threats through pro-action depends on information in order to anticipate attacks. The 
controlling security strategies of the UK, US and UN, therefore, each have vital 
intelligence requirements. In order for the UK, US and UN to execute controlling 
security strategies, they must be capable of fulfilling these intelligence requirements. 
This chapter examines the capabilities of the UK, US and UN to fulfil these strategic 
intelligence requirements. The implications of the intelligence power differentials 
demonstrated in this chapter are examined in Chapter 6.
The UK, US and the UN have been chosen as case studies for two reasons. The first 
reason is to effectively highlight the rational action/legitimate action astigmatism that 
is a current feature of the post-9/11 strategic reality. The U S/UK  pro-action against
217
Iraq in 2003, in which intelligence was presented to provide the casus belli, represents 
state practice in line with the aims of a controlling security strategy but, considering it 
was neither a reaction to the occurrence of an armed attack nor authorised by the 
UNSC, in contravention of the UN Charter. Indeed, Chapter 2 of this study has 
shown that the UN Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, judged that U S/UK  
action against Iraq was illegitimate, whilst the UK and US argued that the use o f force 
was the rational and responsible thing to do in the face of a threat identified through 
intelligence assessments. The purpose of this case study is not to apportion blame or 
establish the wisdom or otherwise o f the Iraq invasion; it is to ascertain whether or not 
the UNSC, which is uniquely responsible for facilitating and legitimising responses to 
threats to international security, is capable, at present and in future, of implementing a 
controlling security strategy that seeks to prevent threats and, thereby, resolving the 
rational action/legitimate action astigmatism. This chapter describes the respective 
capabilities of the UK, US and UN to fulfil the intelligence requirements of controlling 
security strategies; Chapter 6 discusses the implications of differentials in the 
capabilities of the UK, US and UN for the rational action/legitimate action
t
astigmatism, along with other issues of international order and intelligence affairs. The 
second reason is practical, given that information on the intelligence requirements and 
capabilities of the UK, US and UN are the easiest to come by, in view of the relatively 
large quantity o f publicly accessible official documentation (including inquiries and 
reviews) before and after 9/11.
This chapter has three sections. Section one looks at the UK’s capability to fulfil the 
intelligence requirements of its post-9 /11 controlling security strategy. Sections two 
and three similarly describe the capabilities of the US and UN, respectively. To achieve 
perspective on the changing relationship between intelligence power and post-9 /11 
controlling security strategies, each section in this chapter briefly outline the 
organisations that underpinned the pre-9/11 intelligence capabilities of the UK, US 
and UN, respectively, before addressing the main issues in relation to post-9/11 
developments.
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SECTION ONE: UK CAPABILITY TO FULFIL THE INTELLIGENCE 
REQUIREMENTS OF A CONTROLLING SECURITY STRATEGY
632
633
634
Pre-9/11 Strategic Intelligence Capability
The UK’s pre-9/11 coercive security strategy required intelligence that supported 
diplomatic and expeditionary military engagement in the face of the challenge posed by 
regional instability in the post-Cold War period, not an unconstrained and potentially 
catastrophic terrorism threat. Indeed, the UK’s Strategic Defence Review, as well as 
Intelligence and Security Committee reports of the 1990s, describes terrorism as a bi­
product of strategic effects, not as a strategic threat itself.632 Irish terrorism constituted 
the most serious terrorism threat to the UK in the pre-9/11 era.633 Tackling 
international terrorism — involving the activities of extreme Islamist groups such as al- 
Qaida — was not a UK strategic priority. As such, intelligence on international 
terrorism was not considered a vital requirement for the effective implementation of 
UK security strategy. In line with the logic of coercion, British intelligence 
organisations reacted to occurrences of terrorist attack and their activities were 
essentially diplomatic in nature. The ‘clear duty’ to assist friends and allies in combating 
the terrorism scourge, referred to below, reflects the UK’s perception that international 
terrorism was essentially a foreign problem, and that the fight against it had a 
diplomatic, rather than a strategic, rationale:
In recent years, terrorist attacks of all kinds world-wide have averaged 
almost 60 a month. In the UK, we have all too long an experience of 
terrorism. 'Elsewhere [my italics], there is increasing concern over Islamic 
terrorist threats. Whilst we may not have been so affected ourselves by 
these groups, some of them have used Britain and their base to raise funds 
and equipment and recruit new members. We have been significantly 
helped by many other countries in countering Irish terrorism, and we have 
a clear duty to help them in return.634
(July 1998). Strategic Defence Review, UK Ministry of Defence.
(1998). Annual Report 1997-1998, Intelligence and Security Committee.
Ibid.: 2
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The UK’s pre-9/11 coercive security strategy sought to react rapidly to ongoing 
violence in ‘dangerous and untested territory’ overseas; this meant intelligence was 
required to help decision-makers understand a foggy strategic reality and execute 
rational policy within it.635 The task o f fulfilling these intelligence requirements fell to 
the organisations of the British intelligence community, consisting o f the three 
intelligence collection agencies — SIS, MI5 and GCHQ — as well as the DIS and the 
JIC, supported by the Cabinet Office Assessment Staff, which analyse and assess 
intelligence. Brief descriptions of these organisations follow.
Secret Intelligence Service
SIS, based at Vauxhall Cross in London, is primarily responsible for collecting human 
intelligence (HUMINT) and mounting operations overseas. Founded in 1909 as the 
Foreign Section of the Secret Service Bureau, the agency started life under the control 
of the War Office.636 Its foundation served the purpose of filling the intelligence gap in 
Europe, which was identified in 1907 when the Committee on Imperial Defence was 
shocked to discover that Britain did not have a single intelligence agent on the 
European continent.637 In 1910, the Foreign Section of the Secret Service Bureau was 
placed under the auspices of the Admiralty.638 Six years later it returned to War Office 
control and was renamed MI-1(c) — section 1(c) of the Military Intelligence 
Department -  to provide military cover.639 After the First World War, the Foreign 
Office assumed control of the agency and, in 1921, renamed it the Secret Intelligence 
Service, whilst allowing military cover — provided by the more popular label MI6 — to
• 640remain.
As described in the 1994 Intelligence Services Act, SIS serves the two basic functions 
of collecting foreign intelligence and undertaking covert action overseas. These
635 (1998). Annual Report 1997-1998, Intelligence and Security Committee: 2
636 Richelson, J. T. and D. Ball (1985). The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Co-operation between the UKUSA
Countries. Sydney, Allen and Unwin.
637 Ibid.
functions are executed ‘in the fields o f national security with particular reference to the 
government's defence and foreign policies’, ‘in the interests o f the economic well-being 
of the UK’, and ‘in support o f the prevention or detection of serious crime.’641
SIS consists of five directorates, each with its own area of responsibility and sub­
divisions.642 The Directorate o f Regional Affairs is comprised o f four Controllerates: 
Middle East and Africa, Eastern and Central Europe, Western Hemisphere and the Far 
East, and Western Europe. The Directorate of Global Issues is made up of three 
sections: Counter Terrorism, Counter Proliferation, and Counter Narcotics and 
Serious Crime. The three remaining Directorates — Personnel, Training and Finance, 
Security and Public Affairs, and Information Technology -  are divided into groups 
covering individual areas o f specialisation. An Assistant Chief and a Secretariat 
consisting of a Private Office and a Historical Section support ‘C’, the Chief of SIS.
Security Service
The Security Service, based at Thames House in London and known also as MI5, is 
the UK’s security intelligence agency responsible for collecting HUMINT and 
mounting operations in protection of national security. MI5 started life as the Home 
Section of the Secret Service Bureau, established in 1909, under the control of the War 
Office.643 In 1916, the Section became part o f the new Military Intelligence 
Department and renamed MI-5 — Military Intelligence section 5.644 The agency became 
formally known as the Security Service in 1931, when the scope of its responsibility 
was widened to include assessing and countering threats posed by international 
communism and fascism, and it became directly accountable to the Prime Minister.645 
In 1951, the Maxwell Fyfe Directive — named after the then Home Secretary -  made
641 (1994). Intelligence Services Act.
642 For details of SIS’s organisational structure, see Smith, M. (2004). The Spying Game: The Secret 
History of British Espionage. London, Politico's: 241
643 Richelson, J. T. and D. Ball (1985). The Ties that Bind.
644 Ibid.
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650
the Security Service responsible to the Home Secretary, but retained the Security 
Service Director-General’s right to direct access to the Prime Minister.646
As described in the 1989 Security Service Act, MI5 serves the three core functions of 
protecting national security through intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, 
safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, and supporting the 
activitie! of police forces and other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and 
detection of serious crime. MI5 consists o f 5 branches, each with its own area of 
responsibility.647 These are: A Branch, Intelligence Resources and Operations; B 
Branch, Personnel, Training and Office Services; D Branch, Non-Terrorist Threats 
and Protective Security; G Branch, Counter-Terrorism (International) and Counter 
Proliferation; H Branch, Strategy, Planning Finance and Information Management; 
and, T  Brach, Counter-Terrorism (Irish and Other Domestic). The Director-General is 
supported by two Deputy Directors (Intelligence and Corporate), a Director and Co­
ordinator of Intelligence for Northern Ireland, Legal Advisors, and a Secretariat.
Government Communications Headquarters
The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), based in Cheltenham, is 
the UK’s signals intelligence agency, responsible for collecting and analysing signals 
intelligence (SIGINT), electrical transmissions intelligence (ELINT) and 
communications intelligence (COMMINT); GCHQ also protects government 
communications capabilities.648 GCHQ was born out of two military bureaus operating 
during the First World War: Room 40 of the Naval Intelligence Division, and MI-l(b) 
of the Military Intelligence Department.649 In 1919, the Government Code and Cipher 
School was created on the back of these bureaus and transferred to the Admiralty, 
before being attached in 1923 to SIS (whose Chief became Director o f GCCS).650 By 
the time GCCS had been renamed as GCHQ in 1946, the Foreign Office had assumed
Richelson, J. T. and D. Ball (1985). The Ties that Bind.
For details of MI5’s organisational structure, see Smith, M. (2004). The Spying Game: 130 
(1994). Intelligence Services Act.
Richelson, J. T. and D. Ball (1985). The Ties that Bind.
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control.651 According to the 1994 Intelligence Services Act, GCHQ fulfils its functions 
in support of, amongst other things, ‘the prevention or detection of serious crime.’
Defence Intelligence Staff
In 1964, the intelligence branches of the British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air 
Force, and the Joint Intelligence Bureau, came together to form the Defence 
Intelligence Staff (DIS).652 The overall mission of DIS is to guide the UK MoD’s 
strategic decision-making processes, inform operational decision-making in theatre, 
and contribute to national intelligence machinery.653 A main function performed by 
DIS is horizon scanning, which involves projecting future requirements against threats 
that might emerge.654 Other than exploiting the HUMINT and SIGINT capabilities of 
the British armed services, DIS uses imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and 
signature intelligence (MASINT) and open source intelligence (OSINT) to collect 
information.655 The Defence Geospatial Intelligence (DGI) branch produces a wide 
range of imagery and geographic intelligence support.656 The Strategic Assessments 
Directorate, alongside the Defence Intelligence Regional Group and the Scientific and 
Technical Directorate, is responsible for producing intelligence assessments in support 
of decision-making and policy formulation.657
Joint Intelligence Committee
The terms o f reference for the JIC were first established in 1939, and were updated in 
1955 to fit a post-war environment.658 At the start of the Cold War, the JIC was 
responsible for intelligence production, the management of intelligence machinery,
651 Richelson, J. T. and D. Ball (1985). The Ties that Bind.
652 Ibid.
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liaison with Commonwealth and foreign intelligence organisations, and ‘defence 
security’.659 The list o f responsibilities of the JIC has not changed much over 50 years, 
although its responsibility for ‘defence security’ has been expanded to include the task 
to ‘monitor and give early warning of the development of direct or indirect foreign 
threats to British interests, whether political, military or economic’, and ‘on the basis of 
available information, to assess events and situations relating to external affairs, 
defence, terrorism, major international criminal activity, scientific, technical and 
international economic matters.’660 The primary role of the JIC is to ‘bring to the 
attention of Ministers and Departments, as appropriate, assessments that may appear 
to require operational, planning or policy action.’661
The JIC meets each week to discuss and agree intelligence assessments, 
requirements, priorities and tasking. The JIC operates on a consensual basis, and 
disseminates one agreed intelligence assessment of events and situations of concern. 
Other than the JIC Chairman and the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator, there are 
11 members of the JIC drawn from the Cabinet Office Assessment Staff, the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, DIS, Home Office, the 
Department for Trade and Industry, HM Treasury, No. 10 Downing Street, MI5 and 
SIS.662 Analysts working in the Cabinet Office Assessment Staff draft JIC papers for 
circulation around the intelligence community and discussion at JIC meetings.663
Post-9/11 Controlling Security Strategy
The strikes by al-Qaida against the US mainland on 11 September 2001 prompted 
the British Government to re-evaluate security realities and strategic imperatives. The 
9/11 attacks demonstrated the capability of conventionally weak and non-state 
‘asymmetric actors’ to achieve ‘strategic effect’ in a state-centric international system.664
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This reality triggered a re-rationalisation of security strategy. A TMew Chapter’ of the 
Strategic Defence Review was published in 2002 in light of a post-9/11 strategic 
reality. In it, two UK strategic aims with respect to the terrorist phenomenon were 
established. The first objective was to engage the enemy at long range and pre-empt 
attacks on the UK mainland, in order to prevent terrorism at home.665 The second 
objective was to be ready and willing to deploy significant forces overseas to act against 
terrorists and those who harbour them.666 These two security objectives serviced the 
overarching strategic aim to achieve ‘knowledge superiority’ over international 
terrorists in order to ‘anticipate their plans and ensure the most effective combination 
of effects to counter their attacks’.667 This strategic aim reflected the official UK policy 
to ‘seek intelligence on terrorist groups and to disrupt their activities, where possible, 
through prosecutions, by the intelligence and security agencies working closely with 
law enforcement’, and underpinned the UK’s post-9/11 controlling security strategy to 
pro-act against anticipated risk associated with a recognised ‘new’ terrorism threat.668
Indeed, the recognition of an observable new terrorism threat entailed fundamental 
shifts in the UK’s assessment of the strategic landscape. In 2003, the terrorism-WMD 
threat nexus was explicitly identified in both the MoD’s defence white paper 
‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’, and the Foreign and Commonwealth’s first 
ever strategy document ‘UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO’. Each 
document set out the UK’s strategic aims in the face of terrorism and other security 
challenges. In striking contrast with the Strategic Defence Review, published only five 
years previously, ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’ identified terrorism as the 
pre-eminent threat to UK security.669 Whilst confirming terrorism as a strategic threat, 
the document established an analytical framework that connected terrorism with the 
threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Whilst degrading 
terrorists’ capabilities was seen as an essential part of counter-terrorism efforts,
665 (July 2002). Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter.
666 Ibid.
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‘preventing the potential passage of WMD knowledge or weapons from states to 
terrorist groups’ was also a ‘key part of the counter-proliferation challenge’.670
British understanding of a terrorism-WMD threat nexus as a post-9 /11 phenomenon 
led to the development of a controlling security strategy that sought to anticipate and 
pro-act against terrorist threats. In addition to the five military objectives of ‘prevent’, 
‘deter’, ‘coerce’, ‘disrupt’ and ‘destroy’ established in the SDR ‘New Chapter’, three 
new objectives — ‘stabilise’, ‘contain’ and ‘defeat’ — were introduced to form a list of 
eight strategic objectives in ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’.671 These 
objectives aimed to stabilise conditions to allow for political and economic action to 
tackle the root causes of terrorism, contain crises when they occurred, and reduce the 
effectiveness o f adversaries so that they were no longer capable of conducting combat 
operations (i.e. defeat the enemy, but not destroy it).672 In the terminology used by 
Lawrence Freedman, British security strategy aimed to both ‘pre-empt’ and ‘prevent’ 
imminent and developing terrorism threats, respectively, through the application of 
military force.
The Foreign and Commonwealth strategy document ‘UK International Priorities: A 
Strategy for the FCO’ corroborated the MoD’s controlling strategic framework. The 
purpose of the FCO strategy paper was to clarify UK foreign policy objectives within 
the post-9/11 strategic reality, in which ‘[ijnternational terrorism and the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction have emerged as potentially the most catastrophic 
dangers to our national security...’.673 The imperative to ‘understand them and to act to 
neutralise them’ was set out in the document, alongside a list of eight post-9/11 
strategic priorities.674 At the top o f the list o f issues stood Strategic Priority 1: to 
achieve ‘[a] world safer from global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction’.675 The 
accompanying analysis explained the rationale:
670(December 2003). Delivering Security in a Changing World: 4
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The use of WMD against us, and terrorist attacks on western targets 
around the world, now constitute the most potentially catastrophic threats 
to UK security. The major western countries will need to tackle these 
threats assertively using a wide range on instruments. Preventing states 
from acquiring or spreading WMD will remain a top priority. The highest 
concern of all will be to prevent international terrorist groups acquiring 
nuclear or biological weapons.676
In April 2004, the UK’s post-9/11 controlling security strategy entered its third 
significant phase of construction, when the UK Government announced that its 
counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, would be reconfigured to meet 
broader intelligence and policy requirements.677 CONTEST — the key aim o f which is 
to reduce the risk from terrorism and allow British people to ‘go about their business 
freely and with confidence’ — is based on the four ‘P’s of ‘prevention’, ‘pursuit’, 
‘protection’ and ‘preparedness’.678 The then Home Secretary David Blunkett outlined 
CONTEST during a speech to Harvard Law School on 8 March 2004, when he 
emphasized the need for a multi-pronged pro-active strategy. In his speech, Blunkett 
described ‘prevention’ as engagement with ‘the communities most directly being 
abused by the terrorist cells and their agents, so that they can become our eyes and 
ears’.679 The ‘pursuit’ strand was said to require ‘sharing information, fully engaging 
with those countries who unwillingly harbour terrorists and themselves are at risk from 
the network’, which, alongside terrorists, included ‘money launderers, organised 
criminals, people traffickers and other smugglers, those exploiting the international 
banking system, drug barons and racketeers’.680 Blunkett defined ‘protection’ as the 
equivalent of US ‘homeland security’, and said that ‘preparedness’ meant ‘preparing for 
the consequences of terrorism’.681
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The overall aim of CONTEST was, and remains to this day, to prevent terrorism 
through pro-active action that targets developing as well as imminent threats. Indeed, 
the CONTEST framework is reiterated in the British Government’s document 
‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’, which was 
published in July 2006. The focus on pro-action in the ‘prevent’ and ‘pursuit’ strands is 
warranted considering the assumption that UK interests cannot be protected against 
unconstrained groups like al-Qaida through deterrence strategies alone, and that the 
impending risk of harm associated with the terrorism phenomenon means preparing 
for the materialisation of expected terrorist attacks, potentially involving WMD.
The enduring nature of the threat posed by the terrorism-WMD threat nexus and the 
rationality of the UK’s post-9/11 controlling security strategy were elucidated further 
when the FCO updated its 2003 strategy paper. In 2006, ‘Active Diplomacy for a 
Changing World: The UK’s International Priorities’ cited the amalgamation of counter­
terrorism and counter-proliferation strategies in support o f the number one strategic 
imperative to prevent a WMD terrorism attack. The FCO strategy document 
maintains:
[Tlhe threat from international terrorism is o f a new order because of the 
willingness of small groups to inflict mass casualties in pursuit of radical 
objectives... The spread of weapons of mass destruction and their possible 
use, including by terrorists, remains a major security threat in its own right. 
Preventing terrorist groups from obtaining nuclear, radiological, biological 
or chemical weapons will be a key task. Strengthening efforts to combat the 
spread of these weapons will be critical in the next decade as the 
technology and materials needed become more accessible and regional 
tensions and other factors drive proliferation. Preventing states, in 
particular Iran and North Korea, from acquiring or spreading WMD, and 
ensuring more effective global non-proliferation mechanisms, will be a top 
priority.682
682 (March 2006). Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK’s International Priorities, Foreign and 
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Post-9/11 Strategic Intelligence Requirements
After the 9/11 attacks, UK security strategy became intelligence-driven. In contrast 
with the UK’s pre-9/11 coercive security strategy that aimed to react to eruptions of 
violence, the UK’s post-9/11 controlling security strategy seeks to pro-act against 
threats with the aim of preventing their materialisation, in line with an observable 
terrorism-WMD threat nexus. Considering that prevention depends on the ability to 
anticipate attacks, the UK’s controlling security strategy has vital intelligence 
requirements. The strategic aim of ‘knowledge superiority’ remains central to the UK’s 
capability to ‘anticipate [terrorists’] plans and ensure the most effective combination of 
effects to counter their attacks’.683 The SDR ‘New Chapter’ clearly argues that 
‘knowledge is the starting point’ for tackling post-9/11 threats, and that by 
‘understanding the threat posed by international terrorism, we can undertake focussed 
law enforcement action and implement effective protective security measures’.684 The 
vital role of intelligence in facilitating the UK’s controlling security strategy by 
increasing understanding of the terrorism threat reflects the Positivist rationality 
underpinning the Constructivist Realist identification of intelligence power as a social 
process that enables rational action through empirical investigation of phenomena. As 
the UK’s official counter international terrorism strategy document testifies, the role of 
intelligence is vital to the UK’s post-9/11 approach:
By their nature, terrorists operate in secret. Intelligence is therefore vital to 
defeating terrorism. All disruption operations depend upon the collection 
and exploitation of information and intelligence that helps identify terrorist 
networks, including their membership, intentions, and means of 
operation.685
Post-9/11 Strategic Intelligence Capability
The UK’s post-9/11 controlling security strategy is intelligence-driven: the imperative 
to prevent terrorist attacks demands an intelligence capacity that is capable of
683 (July 2002). Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter: 9
684 (July 2002). Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter: Supporting Information and Analysis, UK
Ministry of Defence: 5
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facilitating rational action through the provision of information on anticipated threats. 
A number o f developments occurred within the British intelligence community to 
adapt to the post-9/11 strategic reality and fulfil the intelligence requirements o f a 
controlling security strategy that seeks to prevent threats through pro-active 
mechanisms. What follows is a description o f these developments.
JTA C
The UK intelligence capability has undergone drastic reform, in light of weaknesses 
identified by the surprise 9/11 attacks and the comprehensive intelligence failure over 
Iraqi WMD, as exposed by the findings of the Iraq Survey Group and other 
investigations. With respect to the shock o f 9/11, in order to address weaknesses in 
counter-terrorism analytical capabilities, the UK Government established the Joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) in 2003 as a hub for inter-agency and cross- 
departmental information assessment on the ‘new’ terrorism threat. JTAC replaced 
MI5’s own Counter-Terrorism Analysis Centre (CTAC), which was created in reaction 
to the 9/11 attacks, when it became clear that something more substantial was 
needed.686 Still based at MI5’s headquarters in Thames House, JTAC ‘analyses and 
assesses all intelligence relating to international terrorism, at home and overseas’.687 
The eleven-strong group o f agencies and departments that constitute the JTAC 
organisation ‘sets threat levels and issues warnings o f threats and other terrorist-related 
subjects for customers from a wide range o f government departments and agencies, as 
well as producing more in-depth reports on trends, terrorist networks and 
capabilities’.688 By the end of 2003, JTAC boasted 100 officials drawn from across 
intelligence agencies, policy departments, the police and armed forces, and had 
analysed and assessed roughly 60,000 items o f intelligence.689 JTAC continues to focus
686 (26 February 2003). "MI5 rethinks terror threat warnings." from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml7xmWnews/2003/02/26/uterror.xml.
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688 Ibid.
689 (17 March 2005). Cats' Eyes in the Dark. The Economist.
230
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
on the al-Qaida threat, while the JIC deals with problems beyond the specific terrorism 
remit — including the proliferation of WMD, an issue that became a topic of public 
debate prior to the invasion of Iraq by US and UK forces in 2003.690
The JIC and the Butler Report
With respect to the intelligence failure in Iraq, UK intelligence organisational reform 
has been focused on re-configuring existing resources, rather than creating new 
institutions. This reform has largely been taken to improve the JIC assessment process 
and bolster UK analytical capabilities, with the aim o f avoiding a repeat of ‘group- 
think’ mistakes that were evidently made over Iraq.691
On 3 September 2002, British Prime Minister Tony Blair commissioned the JIC to 
compile an assessment o f Iraq’s WMD capability. The purpose of the assessment, 
according to the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, was to ‘meet the demand for 
intelligence-based information about Iraq and to make a case for the world to 
recognise the importance of the issue’.692 Dr Hans Blix, head of UNMOVIC, regarded 
the assessment as an argument for the case for further inspections of Iraq’s WMD 
programmes.693 The JIC itself perceived the assessment to provide no case for anything 
at all: John Scarlett, then JIC Chairman, considered the role of the JIC was limited only 
to ‘to put into the public domain and to share, as far as it could be done safely, the 
intelligence assessment on this issue which was being provided to the Prime Minister 
and the Government.’ 694 Scarlett claimed that ‘in no sense, in my mind, or in the mind 
of the JIC, was it a document designed to make a case for anything.’ 695 However, the 
‘more proactive’ approach o f the UK, as identified by the Butler inquiry, to the issue of 
Iraq encapsulated the option of using force.696 The function of an intelligence 
assessment to provide a case for war, to be released for public consumption, was made
(17 March 2005). Cats' Eyes in the Dark.
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plain by the then British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon.697 The job o f publicly 
demonstrating the case for war was unfamiliar to the UK’s intelligence establishment: 
no JIC product had ever been made public before, let alone for the purposes of 
determining a threat to international peace and security, and providing justification for 
a response involving the use o f force.698
As it turned out, the JIC assessment of Iraqi WMD, as published in the public 
document ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British 
Government’, was wrong. Lord Butler, who led a group that reviewed the state of 
British intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, claimed that in being tasked 
to ‘bring to the attention’ assessments of Iraqi WMD programmes that appeared to 
‘require operational, planning or policy action’, more weight was placed on the British 
intelligence capability ‘than it could bear’.699 UK Government cuts in intelligence 
spending during the 1990s are thought to partially account for the poor JIC picture in 
the Iraqi WMD case: resources for SIS were slashed by 25% and senior management 
was reduced by 40%, depriving the SIS Board of Directors of the analytical role of the 
Requirements division.700 The amalgamation o f SIS’s Middle East and North Africa 
Controllerates made it even harder for spies to collect and control the quality of 
human intelligence from the Middle East, a weakness that contributed to the 
erroneous assessments of Iraq’s WMD capability that justified the invasion of Iraq in 
2003.701 Indeed, the role of the JIC — and that of the entire British intelligence 
machinery below it — to provide assessments for policy purposes was stretched during 
the run up to the invasion of Iraq by UK and US forces in March 2003.702
Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis
In response to the conclusions of Lord Butler’s report, the UK Government set about 
reconfiguring the UK intelligence machinery. The post of Professional Head of
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Intelligence Analysis was created to improve the assessment process within the UK 
intelligence machinery.703 The principle task of the PHIA and her team based in the 
Cabinet Office is to ‘advise in the security, defence and foreign affairs fields on gaps 
and duplication in analyst capabilities, on recruitment of analysts, on their career 
structures and on interchange within and beyond Government’, as well as to ‘advise on 
analytical methodology across the intelligence community; and to develop more 
substantial training than hitherto on a cross-Government basis for all analysts working 
in these fields’.704 To assist in this endeavour, the PHIA team is also overseeing the 
formalisation o f cross-Whitehall committees that are responsible for implementing 
joint training, career development and best practice programmes designed to break 
down barriers and strengthen links between that various members of the UK 
intelligence community.705 The PHIA is running training courses that develop 
community-wide competencies for analysts at the FCO, DIS, JTAC, and the Cabinet 
Office Assessment Staff, as well as their colleagues in the collection agencies.706 The 
PHIA team is also looking at ways of developing the Requirements stream at SIS to 
beef up the analysis capability that was undermined by re-organisation in the 1990s.707 
A ‘challenge team’ in the Cabinet Office Assessments Staff has been formed to 
promote ‘red cell’ thinking that pits evidence against assumptions, and tests the 
conventional wisdom generated by the JIC assessments process.708
Agency Reforms
Organisationally, the UK Government has decided not to create new bureaucracies, 
but invest more heavily in existing structures in order to shore up capabilities. The 
DIS, for instance, has bolstered its horizon scanning capacity with a new computer 
database that provides information on countries at risk of instability, emerging threats, 
international factors including globalisation, state failure and regional instability, and,
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indicators and warnings. This database will be available to customer departments on 
the SCOPE highly-classified government intranet system, due to be rolled out in late 
2007.709 The threats that take up most horizon-scanning resources are international 
terrorism, WMD and conventional weapons proliferation, missiles and novel 
technologies. The new Joint Environment Directorate, established in April 2004, 
provides an umbrella for all IM INT capabilities dedicated to surveying and measuring 
environmental topography.710 The threat o f international terrorism has also affected 
MI5 and SIS. As of 2006, international counter-terrorism activity takes up over 87% of 
the MI5 resources.711 The number of Security Service staff -  roughly 2,800 — has risen 
by 50% since 9/11, and is due to be twice the size of its 9/11 capacity by 2008.712 MI5 
officers are monitoring 200 groups comprising over 1600 individuals determined to be 
actively engaged in ‘plotting, or facilitating’ terrorist acts in the UK and overseas. There 
are said to be currendy around 30 terrorist plots targeting the UK, many with 
international links.713 In line with the need to determine and act against terrorist actors 
that originate and operate abroad, SIS has unprecedented numbers o f officers abroad 
identifying and collecting information on terrorist threats across the globe.714
SECTION TWO: US CAPABILITY TO FULFIL THE INTELLIGENCE 
REQUIREMENTS OF A CONTROLLING SECURITY STRATEGY 
Pre-9/11 Strategic Intelligence Capability
The post-Cold War reality heralded new strategic thinking in Washington. The US 
considered itself the victor in its 40-year ideological tussle with the Soviet Union, and 
assumed a leadership role in international society that entailed increased engagement in
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foreign affairs.715 However, the opportunity to shape international society through 
assertive leadership was accompanied by a range of new challenges to US hegemony, 
including ‘rogue’ states, unregulated WMD proliferation within the former Soviet 
space and international terrorism.716 In response to this strategic reality, US National 
Security Strategy of 1991 aimed to establish of a US-led international coercive regime 
o f law and order, whilst acknowledging that the ‘unprecedented scope and pace of 
change in today’s world’ and ‘the increasing number of actors now able to threaten 
global peace’ highlighted ‘the need for reliable information and a sophisticated 
understanding of events and trends’.717 The role of intelligence in the post-Cold War 
strategic reality was declared to be ‘crucial not only to our own security, but also to our 
leadership role in responding to international challenges’, including regional instability, 
terrorism and drug trafficking.718 ‘Regional turmoil’, the strategy document concluded, 
placed ‘growing burdens on intelligence collection, processing and analysis’, whilst 
addressing transnational threats meant that US intelligence organisations ‘must track 
the threats posed by narcotics trafficking, terrorism and the proliferation of advanced
> 719w eapons.
In 1999, the Clinton administration published ‘A National Security Strategy for a 
New Century’, in which the opportunities and challenges of the post-Cold War world 
set out in the 1991 document were developed further. At the cusp of the 21st century, 
US engagement in global affairs had prompted ‘globalization’, or, as the 1999 strategy 
document put it, the ‘process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural and 
political integration’, in which a ‘growing number of nations around the world have 
embraced America’s core values of democratic governance’.720 However, whilst 
claiming that the US-driven process o f globalization had created opportunities for 
greater peace through increased interdependence, the 1999 US security strategy 
recognised the downsides. Among the most pressing security concerns listed in the 
document are ‘oudaw states’ and ethnic conflict, weapons of mass destruction,
715 (August 1991). National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House.
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terrorism, drug-trafficking and international crime.721 The dangers associated with 
globalisation stiffened America’s intention to ‘maintain our information advantage in 
the international arena.’722 This ‘information advantage’ supported the US’s coercive 
security strategy of reacting rapidly to the eruption of crises through effective 
surveillance of threats worldwide.
The organisations tasked with ensuring American ‘information advantage’ in the 
post-Cold War world were products of the Cold War situation. The requirement to 
monitor post-Cold War threats in the 1990s was fulfilled by intelligence services that 
had been developed over time in light of Soviet adversity — by the mid 1990s, members 
of the US intelligence community numbered fourteen, six of which were national 
organisations whilst the remaining eight were branches o f either the armed services or 
federal policy departments.723 Five organisations have evolved over the latter half of 
the 20th century to constitute the core of the US intelligence community: the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA); the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); and, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). During the 1990s, the National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) were 
responsible for supporting combat operations and contributing to national intelligence 
collection efforts through the provision of IMINT and GEOINT.724 Brief descriptions 
of the five core organisations follow.
Central Intelligence Agency
The unexpected raids by the Japanese air force against Pearl Harbour in 1941 
prompted the US Government to consider strengthening American intelligence 
capabilities to support US post-1945 strategic interests and mitigate the risk of another
721 (December 1999). A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House: 1
722 Ibid: 5
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surprise attack.725 At the end of World War Two, the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS), which served as the American central intelligence organisation during the war, 
shut down, and its component parts were distributed amongst federal departments.726 
However, in response to perceived post-1945 national security needs, President 
Truman sought to centralise US intelligence machinery.727 To this end, the CIA was 
created by the National Security Act of 1947 to ‘correlate and evaluate intelligence 
relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such 
intelligence.. A728
Beyond its principle function of collecting of HUMINT overseas, the CIA was also 
charged with performing covert operations — a task that was elucidated upon by the 
National Security Council in its Directive on Office of Special Projects on 18 June 
1948. The Directive instructs the CIA to:
Plan and conduct covert operations which are conducted or sponsored by 
this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of 
friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and conducted 
that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to 
unauthorised persons and that if uncovered the US Government can 
plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.729
The CIA is based in Langley, Virginia, consisting o f three main directorates: 
Operations, Intelligence and Science and Technology.
National Security Agency
The NSA, based at Fort Meade in Maryland, is responsible for SIGINT, COMMINT 
and ELINT activities. Its roots can be traced back to the Armed Forces Security 
Agency (AFSA), which was established in 1949 to direct the COMMINT and ELINT
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activities of armed service intelligence units after World War Two.730 In response to 
CIA perceptions of ineffective AFSA performance in this area, in 1952 the Brownell 
Committee recommended the establishment of a national organisation that operated 
beyond a narrow military remit.731 President Truman agreed, and the NSA was formally 
created on 24 October 1952 by National Security Council Intelligence Directive 9 as an 
organisation within the Department of Defense, but, considering its national and 
civilian functions, not part o f the Department of Defense.732 In 1958, NSCID 6, 
entitled ‘Communications and Electronics Intelligence’, was issued in confidence, 
apparently detailing all the functions of the NSA. In 1972, the publicly known NSCID 
6, entitled ‘Signals Intelligence’, can be seen to direct the NSA to produce 
communications, signals and electronic intelligence ‘in accordance with objectives, 
requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence and the 
United State Intelligence Board’ -  as provided for by Executive Order 12333 in 1981, 
which is considered to be the ‘charter’ for the NSA and other US intelligence
733agencies.
Defense Intelligence Agency
In the spirit o f post-war centralisation, the US administration sought to tighten up the 
military intelligence effort that was managed by the loosely connected intelligence units 
of the three separate armed services, the Army, Navy and Air Force.734 In 1958, the 
Defense Reorganisation Act attempted to centralise military intelligence machinery 
under the Unified and Specified Command.735 However, in response to perceptions of 
unclear intelligence functions and poor performance, a Joint Study Group in 1960 was 
charged with coming up with a better way to organise American military intelligence 
activities.736 In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara decided to establish the
Richelson, J. T. and D. Ball (1985). The Ties that Bind.
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Defense Intelligence Agency under the auspices o f the Department o f Defense.737 The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff published DoD Directive 5105.21, entided ‘Defense Intelligence 
Agency’, on 1 August, and the DIA became operational on 1 October 1961.738
The DIA comprises four primary directorates.739 Each has specific responsibilities. 
The Directorate for Human Intelligence (DH) is responsible for producing HUMINT, 
whilst the Directorate for Technical Collection (DT) collects MASINT (measurement 
and signature intelligence) involving, amongst other techniques, the use of radar, 
acoustic and laser intelligence gathering methods.740 The Directorate for Analysis (DI) 
is tasked with analysing and disseminating all-source intelligence products that focus 
on military issues for the DoD  and the wider intelligence community, and the 
Directorate for Intelligence Joint Staff (J2) provides the Joint Chiefs of Staff with 
foreign military intelligence for defence policy and war planning purposes.741 The DIA 
also runs the Joint Military Intelligence College.
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
INR is a relatively small bureau in the US State Department tasked with analysing 
information in support of US diplomatic efforts. The group has been known as INR 
since 1957, when it’s previous designation as the Interim Research and Intelligence 
Service — a direct descendent o f the OSS Research and Analysis branch — was replaced. 
INR is responsible for producing all-source assessments of issues important to the 
work of the Secretary of State and the State Department, but also contributes to the 
National Intelligence Estimates process and other intelligence community-wide
742projects.
737 Richelson, J. T. and D. Ball (1985). The Ties that Bind.
738 Ibid.
739 "Organisation of the Defense Intelligence Agency." from http://www.dia.mil/thisisdia/intro/chart.htm.
740 (2006). Strategic Plan 2007-2012: Leading the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, Defense Intelligence 
Agency.
741 Ibid.
742 "Bureau of Intelligence and Research." from http://www.state.gOv/s/inr/.
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Federal bureau of Investigation
The FBI, based in the J. Edgar Hoover building in Washington, is responsible for 
investigating and countering a range of threats to US national security. Founded by 
Attorney General Charles Joseph Bonaparte in 1908 as a force of Special Agents, the 
FBI came into being proper in 1935.743 Its continuing mission is to ‘protect and defend 
the United States against terrorist and foreign threats, to uphold and enforce the 
criminal laws o f the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice 
services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners’.744
Although pre-dominantly a law enforcement agency, the FBI has intelligence 
functions. Indeed, in 1940, President Roosevelt tasked the FBI to collect non-military 
intelligence in the Western Hemisphere.745 The FBI formed the Special Intelligence 
Service (SIS) for that purpose. Although the FBI’s SIS closed down after World War 
Two, the FBI maintained Legal Attaches in embassies abroad in order to collect 
foreign intelligence.746 In 1981, Executive Order 12333 codified the FBI’s intelligence 
functions by granting the FBI the power to:
Conduct within the United States, when requested by officials o f the 
intelligence community designated by the President, activities undertaken 
to collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection 
requirements of other agencies within the intelligence community.
The FBI’s foreign intelligence functions were increased in the post-Cold War 
environment in light of the burgeoning threats posed by the global proliferation of 
WMD and international terrorism. The creation of the National Security Threat List, 
which identified all countries that presented a threat to the United States, marked a 
change in the FBI’s approach in line with President Clinton’s view that ‘national 
security now means economic security’ in a globalised world.747 By July 1994, the FBI
743 "Timeline of FBI History." from http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/historicdates.htm.
744 "About Us—Quick Facts." from http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm.
745 "Timeline of FBI History." from http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/historicdates.htm.
746 Ibid.
747 "National Security Threat List." from
http://www.ntc.doe.gov/cita/CI_Awareness_Guide/Tlthreat/Nstl.htm.
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had opened an FBI Legal Attache Office in Moscow and by 1995 it had 21 Legal 
Attache offices overseas and stronger international links in the fight against 
terrorism.748 The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York City by 
Ramzi Yousef prompted the FBI to take a lead in investigations into the emerging 
Islamist terrorist threat.749 Up to the year 2001, the FBI adjusted to the increasing 
internationalisation of national security threats with the assistance of a $1.27 billion rise 
in budget and the recruitment of 5,029 new agents.750
Post-9/11 Controlling Security Strategy
The oft-cited 2002 US National Security Strategy was, like the UK’s SDR TSJew 
Chapter’, a response to the post-9/11 strategic reality. The task, the document claimed, 
to protect US security changed after 9/11 from addressing ‘great armies and great 
industrial capabilities’ of competing states to tackling ‘shadowy networks of 
individuals’ that had the capacity to ‘bring great chaos and suffering to [US] shores for 
less than it costs to purchase a single tank’.751 The aim o f the US’s post-9/11 security 
strategy was, evidently, to control threats through pro-active mechanisms, rather than 
coerce threats through reactive mechanisms. As President Bush declared in the preface 
to the 2002 US National Security Strategy:
We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we 
must be prepared to defeat our enemies’ plans, using the best intelligence 
and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who saw 
this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the 
only path to peace and security is the path of action.752
The US’s post-9/11 controlling security strategy enveloped other security issues that 
featured in the post-9/11 world. Hostile states, WMD proliferation and regional
748 "History of the FBI: Rise of a Wired World: 1993-2001." from 
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/wiredworld.htm.
749 Ibid.
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instability became fronts in an all-encompassing, so-called ‘war on terror’.753 The 2002 
national strategy document was quick to identify a terrorism-WMD threat nexus that 
incorporated hostile states and regional instability. Talk of regional instability as 
‘terrorism drivers’ and ‘new deadly challenges’ emerging from ‘rogue states and 
terrorists’ underpinned the imperative to ‘be prepared to stop rogue states and their 
terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction 
against the United States and our allies and friends’.754 This imperative to pro-act 
against a terrorism-WMD threat nexus influenced the construction of the ‘Bush 
doctrine’ that focused on America’s ability to ‘forestall or prevent such hostile acts by 
our adversaries4, and ‘act pre-emptively... in an age where the enemies of civilization 
openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies’.755 It also provided 
the rationale for President Bush’s controversial policy of making ‘no distinction 
between terrorists and those who knowingly harbour or provide aid to 
them’.756Although the focus of the 2006 US National Security Strategy reverts back to 
the concept of democratisation in continuation of the strategic theme established by 
the 1991 and 1999 strategy documents, the imperative to prevent a terrorism-WMD 
threat nexus remains at the core of contemporary US controlling strategy, and is 
reflected in the two security aims seeking to ‘[strengthen alliances to defeat global 
terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends’ and ‘[p]revent our 
enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass 
destruction’.757
Post-9/11 Strategic Intelligence Requirements
America’s post-9/11 controlling security strategy seeks to prevent rather than react to 
the observable terrorism-WMD threat, and depends on ‘using the best intelligence and 
proceeding with deliberation’ in the fuzzy and complex world of covert terrorist
(September 2002). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
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networks.758 According to the 2002 US national security document, using the best 
intelligence entails ‘increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis... and 
more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on 
threats, wherever they may emerge’.759 Indeed, the surprise attacks of 9/11 shocked the 
American people and exposed fatal gaps in America’s strategic intelligence capability. 
Two major intelligence requirements were identified, in the areas of intelligence 
organisation and activity, respectively: firstly, to transform intelligence capabilities and 
‘build new ones to keep pace with the nature o f these threats’; and, secondly, to 
‘strengthen intelligence warning and analysis to provide integrated threat 
assessments’.760
Other US strategy documents highlighted intelligence requirements for a post-9/11 
controlling security strategy, considering the terrorism-WMD threat nexus. The 2002 
‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction’, for instance, claimed 
that a ‘more accurate and complete understanding of the full range of WMD threats is, 
and will remain, among the highest US intelligence priorities’ in the post-9/11 
environment, where the ‘ability to obtain timely and accurate knowledge of adversaries’ 
offensive and defensive capabilities, plans, and intentions is key to developing effective 
counter- and non-proliferation policies and capabilities’.761 Moreover, the 2003 
‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’ set the objective to ‘know the enemy’, 
especially considering the ‘global reach or aspirations to acquire and use WMD’ for 
terrorist purposes, and deploy ‘decisive military power and specialized intelligence 
resources to defeat terrorist networks globally.’762 The 2002 US National Strategy for 
Homeland Security describes the essence of the intelligence requirements for 
America’s post-9/11 controlling security strategy thusly:
(September 2002). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America: 5
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Terrorism depends on surprise... It follows that the United States must 
take every appropriate action to avoid being surprised by another terrorist 
attack. To secure the homeland, we must have an intelligence and warning 
system that is capable o f detecting terrorist activity before it manifests itself 
in an attack so that proper preemptive, preventive, and protective action 
can be taken.763
Post-9/11 Strategic Intelligence Capabilities
The 9/11 attacks were widely interpreted in America as a failure of US intelligence. 
This intelligence failure was compounded by US intelligence failure over Iraqi WMD. 
The requirements to reform US intelligence organisations and adapt intelligence 
activity in light of the post-9/11 strategic reality have led to significant changes in US 
intelligence capabilities. The 9/11 Commission, which reviewed US intelligence 
capabilities prior to the al-Qaida attacks on 11 September 2001, concluded that the 
intelligence capabilities that supported America’s Cold War effort were ill-equipped to 
control 21st century terrorism threats. The 9/11 Commission report reads:
Before 9/11, the United States tried to solve the al Qaeda problem with the 
capabilities it had used in the last stages of the Cold War and its immediate 
aftermath. These capabilities were insufficient. Little was done to expand or 
reform them. The CIA had minimal capacity to conduct paramilitary 
operations with its own personnel, and it did not seek a large-scale 
expansion of these capabilities before 9/11. The CIA also needed to 
improve its capability to collect intelligence from human agents. At no 
point before 9/11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the 
mission of countering al Qaeda, even though this was perhaps the most 
dangerous foreign enemy threatening the United States.764
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, which issued its report in March 2005, reached 
conclusions similar to those contained in the 9/11 report. The debacle over Iraq 
signalled the failure of US intelligence capabilities to fulfil the requirements o f a 
security strategy that sought to mitigate risk. The WMD Commission’s report reads:
(July 2002). National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security: viii
(2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: Executive Summary
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The demands of this new environment can only be met by broad and deep 
change in the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community we 
have today is buried beneath an avalanche of demands for ‘current 
intelligence’—  the pressing need to meet the tactical requirements of the 
day. Current intelligence in support o f military and other action is 
necessary, of course. But we also need an Intelligence Community with 
strategic capabilities: it must be equipped to develop long-term plans for 
penetrating today’s difficult targets, and to identify political and social 
trends shaping the threats that lie over the horizon. We can imagine no 
threat that demands greater strategic focus from the Intelligence 
Community than that posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons.765
US governmental responses to the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq debacle, and the reports 
of the respective relevant inquiries, have been focused on creating new structures with 
the aim of reforming the US intelligence community to fulfil the requirements of 
America’s post-9/11 controlling security strategy. A description o f post-9/11 
developments in the US intelligence capability follows.
Department of Homeland Security
In the immediate aftermath o f 9/11, President Bush announced the establishment of 
the Office of Homeland Security, which was to be responsible for the co-ordination of 
efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks within the United States.766 The first head of the Office, Governor 
Tom Ridge, was granted the title o f ‘Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security’.767 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established by the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002. Tom Ridge was duly named Secretary o f Homeland 
Security in January 2003.768 Marking the largest government reorganisation since the
765 (March 2005). Report of The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington D.C.: 5
766 (8 October 2001). "Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security." from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/text/20011008-2.html.
767 Ibid.
768 (24 January 2003). "Ridge Sworn In as Secretary of Homeland Security: Remarks by the President at 
Swearing-In of Tom Ridge, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security." from
http://63.161.169.137/news/releases/2003/01/20030124-5.html.
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creation of the Department of Defense in 1947, DHS currently employs 180,000 
people under a new secretary, Michael Chertoff.769 In line with the imperative of 
prevention, DHS aims to ‘gather and fuse’ all terrorism related intelligence, conduct 
analysis and coordinate the dissemination of information on anticipated threats.770
National Clandestine Service
Another immediate development after 9/11 was the creation of the National 
Clandestine Service (NCS), responsible for co-ordinating the American human 
intelligence capability.771 NCS represents the operational amalgamation of the CIA's 
Directorate of Operations and HUMINT elements of the FBI and DoD intelligence 
capabilities.772 The current Director of NCS, Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr., reports to the 
Director of the CIA.773 The aim of the NCS is to bolster intelligence collection 
capabilities after 9/11 and improve joined-up collection activities across the US 
intelligence community.774
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention A ct of2004
The most significant piece o f legislation that reflects the drive for change in US 
intelligence capabilities is the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. 
In accordance with the recommendations of the reports of the 9/11 and WMD 
commissions, the Act created a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to direct and 
manage the activities of the entire US intelligence community, and serve as the 
principle advisor to the US president on intelligence matters. The Act also established 
an operationally independent National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC), which had
769 (3 March 2005). "President Thanks DHS Secretary Chertoff at Swearing-In Ceremony." from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050303-l.html.
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been originally created as the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TOC) within the 
CIA, in 2003.775 NCTC, the rough equivalent to the UK’s JTAC, is responsible for 
analysing all terrorism-related intelligence and disseminating threat reports.776 The Act 
also created a National Counter-proliferation Center within the FBI to bolster the 
FBI’s intelligence capability.
Director of National Intelligence
The Director of National Intelligence, currently Mike McConnell, is responsible for 
serving as the principal adviser on intelligence matters to the US president, the 
National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council.777 The D NI also serves 
as the head of the US intelligence community and directs the US National Intelligence 
Program.778 The creation of a D N I reflects the awareness after 9/11 and the Iraq 
invasion of a weakness in leadership and co-ordination at the top of the US intelligence 
community. The 9/11 and WMD commissions both highlighted poor intelligence 
structures and woeful levels of co-operation between various intelligence agencies.779 
The D N I is designed to bring together the disparate elements of the US intelligence 
capability within a more coherent structure and in line with a universal intelligence 
National Intelligence Strategy, so that informational flows are optimised and existing 
dots, where they exist in the different corners of the US intelligence community, can 
be joined.780
According to the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Office 
of the D N I is tasked to:
775 (2 August 2004). "Fact Sheet: Making America Safer by Strengthening Our Intelligence Capabilities." 
from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040802-7.html.
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779 See (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: 399-410; (March 2005). Report of The Commission on the 
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1. Ensure that timely and objective national intelligence is provided to the President, 
the heads o f departments and agencies of the executive branch; the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs o f Staff and senior military commanders; and the Congress;
2. Establish objectives and priorities for collection, analysis, production, and 
dissemination of national intelligence;
3. Ensure maximum availability o f and access to intelligence information within the 
Intelligence Community;
4. Oversee coordination of relationships with the intelligence or security services of 
foreign governments and international organisations;
5. Ensure the most accurate analysis o f intelligence is derived from all sources to 
support national security needs.781
Two years after the establishment of the DNI, the jury is still pondering over the 
amount of good achieved by the creation of the post. O n the one hand, commentators 
view the Office of the D N I as an unnecessary and cumbersome level of bureaucracy 
that stifles, rather than facilitates, required improvements in the areas of intelligence 
co-operation and adaptability. Paul Pillar, former deputy director of the CIA's 
Counter-Terrorism Center, rejects the idea that the effects produced by the D N I 
signify a ‘net improvement’ in US intelligence capabilities.782 Whilst the 9/11 
Commission recommended the creation o f a D N I to get a grip on a fragmented 
American intelligence community, Tim Roemer, who was a member o f the 9/11 
Commission, claims that he and other Commission members are unhappy with the 
size of the D N I structure.783 When John Negroponte was sworn in as the first D N I in 
April 2005, it had been envisioned that his Office would comprise of around only 80 
staff, but it soon grew to number over 1,500.784 When Negroponte resigned in 2007 to 
become Deputy Secretary of State, it is reported that he described the D N I 
organisation as an ‘unwieldy mess’.785
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On the other hand, others claim that the creation o f the D N I was needed to drive 
through the required post-9/11 improvements. Greg Treverton, senior analyst on 
intelligence policy at the RAND Corporation and former vice-chair of the US National 
Intelligence Council, claims that the fundamental weakness of the existing D NI 
structure is that it isn’t powerful enough, especially considering that the Department of 
Defense is refusing to surrender existing levels of influence over major intelligence 
organisations, including NSA, DIA and the revamped National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency (NGA).786 Treverton claims that competition between the DoD and the DNI 
could impair much-needed cohesion in the US intelligence community, in which case it 
might be wise to consider bestowing the D N I with greater authority.787
The development of the D N I is bound to be controversial and riddled with 
complexities, considering the vast magnitude of the US intelligence community and the 
wide diversity of the roles performed by the assortment of agencies and departments 
that count themselves as members. Whilst it is too early to meaningfully conclude 
whether the D NI has improved US intelligence capabilities after 9/11, the sheer fact of 
the enterprise reflects the seriousness with which the US is taking intelligence as a 
component of its post-9/11 controlling security strategy.
National Counter-Terrorism Center
Along with the DNI, the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
created the NCTC. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TOC), the CIA pre- 
curser to the NCTC, was established on 1 May 2003 in response to recommendations 
made by the 9/11 Commission.788 The TTIC became the NCTC to serve as the central 
organisation responsible for analysing and assessing terrorism threats in support o f US 
counter-terrorism strategy.789 During Admiral John Scott Redd’s confirmation at the 
US Senate, he stated that NCTC ‘is a central element of Congress’s plan to strengthen 
US intelligence capabilities and to mobilize all government agencies in the war on
Thomas, G. (11 October 2006). "Terror Spurs U.S. Intelligence Reform."
Ibid.
(2 August 2004). "Fact Sheet: Making America Safer by Strengthening Our Intelligence Capabilities."
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terrorism’.790 NCTC is comprised of a number of members of America’s intelligence 
community, including the CIA, FBI, and the Departments of State, Defense, and 
Homeland Security. NCTC’s to lea the ‘counterterrorism enterprise in strategic 
operational planning and counterterrorism intelligence for USG in order to diminish 
the ranks, capabilities and threats o f terrorists to the US and its interests’.791
As an organisation that brings together different intelligence agencies, a major task of 
NCTC is to improve intelligence sharing across the US intelligence community and 
with foreign partners in international efforts to prevent the common terrorist threat. In 
its ‘Progress Report’ published in September 2006, NCTC provides a summary of 
improvements it claims to have made in intelligence sharing fives years on from 9/11. 
Prior to 9/11, NCTC claims that no governmental organisation in the US ‘had access 
to the full range o f terrorism information available to the various Federal agencies and 
departments’.792 In 2006, NCTC boasted having ‘access to dozens of networks and 
information systems from across the intelligence, law enforcement, military, and 
homeland security communities, containing many hundreds of data repositories.793 
These systems contain foreign and domestic information pertaining to international 
terrorism and sensitive operational and law enforcement activities’.794 In an attempt to 
increase awareness of the terrorist threat ‘either across the US Government or with 
foreign partners’, NCTC has developed the means to host ‘counterterrorism 
community-wide secure video teleconferences (SVTCs) three times daily to ensure 
broad awareness of ongoing operations and newly detected threats’ and contributes to 
the Presidents Daily Brief.795 NCTC also disseminates its own products: the daily 
National Terrorism Bulletin, the Senior Executive Threat Report, the Threat Matrix, 
twice-daily terrorism situations reports, as well as ‘numerous special analysis reports,
790 (21 July 2005). "Statement of Admiral John Scott Redd Before the Senate Select Committee on 
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792 (September 2006). NCTC and Information Sharing: Fine Years since 9/11: A Progress Report, National 
Counter Terrorism Center: 5
793
794
795
Ibid.: 5 
Ibid.: 5 
Ibid.: 6
250
796
797
798
799
800 
801 
802
spot commentaries, threat alerts, advisories, and assessments summarizing the latest 
intelligence reporting related to terrorism threats’.796
Moreover, the NCTC ‘classified repository, NCTC Online (NOL)’, is said to serve as 
the ‘counterterrorism community’s library of terrorism information’ and enable the 
elimination of barriers that compartmentalized such information before 9 /1 1.797 The 
Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT), which meets on a monthly 
basis at NCTC, has more than 100 members and allows for the free-flow of 
information between different parts of the intelligence community that fly in the face 
o f Cold War restrictions.798 The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) is 
the single all-source database on international terrorist identities that is available to all 
members of the US counterterrorism community and in support of the work done by 
the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).799 NCTC claims that TID E contains the names 
and aliases of over 300,000 individuals.800 These improvements in shared information 
provision are built upon by a newly-established Program Manager for the Information 
Sharing Environment, which is ‘tasked to improve terrorism information sharing 
among Federal and non-Federal entities’.801 NCTC also liaises with foreign partners, 
and provides sanitised versions of counterterrorism intelligence products on top of 
‘hosting conferences, and forward-deploying NCTC officers as warranted’.802
SECTION THREE: UN CAPABILITY TO FULFIL THE INTELLIGENCE 
REQUIREMENTS OF A CONTROLLING SECURITY STRATEGY 
Pre-9/11 Intelligence Capability
Subsequent to the meeting of the UN Security Council at the level of heads of state 
and government on 31 January 1992, at which it was declared that the ‘absence o f war
(September 2006). NCTC and Information Sharing: 6
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and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and 
security’, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched ‘An Agenda for 
Peace’. This agenda provided the blueprint for the U N ’s coercive security strategy of 
preventive diplomacy that sought to maintain international peace and security through 
pro-active engagement with post-Cold War threats. The purpose of preventive 
diplomacy was to prevent instances of conflict that were occurring within sovereign 
state borders. The ambition of the UN to prevent conflict was made clear in the 
document:
United Nations operations in areas of crisis have generally been established 
after conflict has occurred. The time has come to plan for circumstances 
warranting preventive deployment, which could take place in a variety of 
instances and ways.803
The U N ’s coercive strategy to prevent conflict through diplomatic mechanisms 
consisted of five major components: measures to build confidence, fact-finding, early 
warning, preventive deployment and demilitarized zones.804 The post-Cold War 
strategic reality o f intrastate war entailed the imperative to prevent conflict waged by 
non-state belligerents that targeted unarmed civilian populations and challenged 
regional and international stability (See Chapter 2).
The UN system of collective security, which was constructed in the post-1945 era in 
the face of the threat posed by inter-state war, is not designed with an intelligence 
component in mind. The threats conceived by the architects of the UN Charter were 
demonstrable exclusively through the perception o f an actual armed attack. The 
reactive mechanisms of the UN ’s coercive security strategy, therefore, have no need to 
be capable of anticipating attacks in order to work properly. In the post-Cold War 
strategic environment, however, the UN’s coercive security strategy evolved and 
sought to prevent anticipated escalations of conflict. As such, the UN required an 
intelligence capability in order to achieve its strategic aims. Whilst preventive 
diplomacy remained a coercive security strategy — threats were identified through
803 (17 June 1992). An Agenda for Peace.
804 Ibid.
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perceptions of actual conflict, not through information assessments indicating 
potential conflict — achieving the aim to prevent bad situations from getting worse did 
require the capability to gather and analyse information on future trends.805
In ‘An Agenda for Peace’, in line with the U N ’s cautious approach to intelligence, 
the intelligence requirements of preventive diplomacy were described in vague, but 
discernable, terms. In support of a UN fact-finding capability, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ 
reads:
Preventive steps must be based upon timely and accurate knowledge of the 
facts. Beyond this, an understanding o f developments and global trends, 
based on sound analysis, is required.
Similarly, the case for an early warning capability to supplement a UN fact-finding 
capacity was made:
In recent years the United Nations system has been developing a valuable 
network of early warning systems concerning environmental threats, the 
risk of nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, 
the threat of famine and the spread of disease. There is a need, however, to 
strengthen arrangements in such a manner that information from these 
sources can be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a 
threat to peace exists and to analyse what action might be taken by the 
United Nations to alleviate it.806
On 21 August 2000, the report o f the High Level Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations, known as the ‘Brahimi report’ after the chair of the Panel, Lakhdar 
Brahimi, was published. In it, the intelligence requirements of the UN’s post-Cold War 
coercive security strategy were described in more robust terms, given the UN’s failure 
to prevent conflicts in, amongst other places, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and 
Somalia. A strategic intelligence requirement was identified by the Panel’s review o f the 
UN’s strategy o f preventive diplomacy. In their report, the Panel built upon the fact­
finding and early-warning requirements identified in ‘An Agenda for Peace’, and
805 Dorn, W. A. (2004). Early and Late Warning by the UN Secretary General of Threats to the Peace: 
Article 99 Revisted. Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality. A. Schnable and D. Carment, Lexington 
Books: 305 - 344.
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recommended ‘more effective collection and assessment o f information at United 
Nations Headquarters, including an enhanced conflict early warning system that can 
detect and recognize the threat or risk of conflict or genocide.’807 Under the section 
entitled ‘Doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations’, the Panel 
insisted that the UN ‘m ust... fine-tune its analytical and decision-making capacities to 
respond to existing realities and anticipate future requirements.’808 The following 
provides brief descriptions of the organisations (or, in the case of the EISAS, below, 
an unrealised proposal) charged with fulfilling the UN’s strategic intelligence 
requirements before 9/11.
Situation Centre
The UN’s Situation Centre (SC) was established in 1993, when it was tasked with 
‘supporting the decision-making process and connecting civilian, military and police 
flows of information at the strategic level.’809 Born as part of the UN Secretariat 
Information Management System, the Situation Centre was created to satisfy the 
demands of the UN’s ‘Agenda for Peace’, and to support the fact-finding, early 
warning and preventive deployment elements of the preventive diplomacy 
programme.810 It continues to support the UN’s peacekeeping activities and is currendy 
located in the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The SC’s role is to co­
ordinate contact between the UN Secretary-General and peacekeeping operations, as 
well as to disseminate information to the UN Secretariat and the 60,000 plus personnel 
employed in the field by the UN system.811
The SC operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and has a specific ‘dark hours’ 
capacity.812 There are 2 desks, each with 5 members of staff. ‘Desk 1’ is responsible for 
peacekeeping operations in Africa, and ‘Desk 2’ for peacekeeping operations elsewhere
(21 August 2000). Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: 1
Ibid.: 2
"Situation Centre." from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/sitcen/sitcentre.html.
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in the world.813 Because of an increase in workload, the SC is hoping to add a third 
desk to manage the 15 ongoing peacekeeping operations, 14 of which are mandated by 
the Security Council. Staff members are recruited from member states around the 
world, and each stays for a maximum of 5 years.814 In addition to the 10 members of 
staff, 3 military liaison officers from the leading Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) 
stay for a maximum of 3 years.815
The SC produces two products: the ‘morning situation report’ and the ‘afternoon 
brief.816 The morning situation report contains reports from the peacekeeping mission 
on the ground.817 These reports are broken up into political, military and humanitarian 
assessments.818 The afternoon brief is disseminated to the relevant UN specialist 
agencies and draws on the situation reports and other open-source information, 
including media reports, which are sourced.819 The brief also has some maps and 
cartographic graphics produced with GIS software, which is being introduced more 
widely within the UN.820 The SC has a ‘town-hall meeting’ on Thursday afternoons 
with the TCCs.821 This is not a Q&A session, but a briefing session by the SC to 
update TCCs on peacekeeping missions.822 The SC meets with key states, including 
France and the UK, on Fridays and goes through the cables and situation reports and 
discusses issues with them.823 These Friday sessions involve the Assessments and 
Projects Unit (APU), the successor of the Information and Research Unit (IRU), 
which was dissolved in 1997 when the supply o f gratis personnel from member states 
stopped flowing.824 Before 1997, the IRU employed intelligence officers from member 
states who provided research and analysis for the UN Secretariat, but also used their 
posts to report back to their national governments on the activities of the other
(15 April 2004). Personal Interview with Kristina Segulja.
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member states.825 Unsurprisingly given the Cold War context, the Americans and 
Russians were permanent members of the IRU and exploited the platform to gather 
intelligence on each other, rather than contribute to any serious UN analytical effort.826 
Today, APU assesses the strategic requirements of peacekeeping operations, but falls 
short of providing the strategic analysis capability that the IRU supposedly fulfilled in 
the 1990s.827
Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS)
In March 2000, Algerian Lakhdar Brahimi led a High Level Panel to review the UN’s 
peace and security activities. As noted in Chapter 4, the Brahimi report identified the 
requirement for an information-gathering, information analysis, and strategic planning 
capability to support the UN’s conflict prevention agenda. An Information and 
Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), which would provide this capability, was 
proposed as one of the ‘sharper tools’ to aid the UN ’s Executive Committee for Peace 
and Security to ‘gather and analyse relevant information’, in order to allow ECPS ‘to 
fulfil the role for which it was created’ -  that role being to function as ‘the nominal 
high-level decision-making forum for peace and security issues’.828 The EISAS would 
be responsible for ‘accumulating knowledge about conflict situations, distributing that 
knowledge effectively to a wide user base, generating policy analysis and formulating 
long-term strategies.’829 It would also ‘strengthen the daily reporting function of the 
DPKO [Department of Peace-keeping Operations] Situation Centre, generating all­
source updates on mission activity and relevant global events’.830
Although the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan agreed to implement the 
recommendations of the Brahimi report, EISAS never came to fruition. The main 
reason that plans for EISAS were scuppered was concern expressed by some member 
states over the power of EISAS to monitor and intrude in their internal affairs; an
(15 April 2004). Personal Interview with Kristina Segulja.
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unwanted situation in its own right, but particularly problematic considering the 
politically neutral and bureaucratically transparent nature of the UN organisation.831 
India and Nigeria harboured the most intense ill-feeling about the project, and 
succeeded to mobilise the G77 to oppose the creation of EISAS, although not every 
G77 member state stood against its development.832 Among the other fears o f the 
states that did oppose EISAS was the worry that EISAS would cream off the top 
people in the UN and leave nothing for anyone else to do, just as the superpower-led 
joined-up D PA /D PK O  super-unit did during the Cold War.833 These fears were not 
shared by DPA, and its head Kieran Prendergast was keen to build a strategic 
information system to support the UN prevention agenda that worked better than the 
existing set-up, which was acknowledged to be wholly inadequate.834 However, the 
G77 pressure proved too great for DPA to push through the plans for EISAS, and no 
serious efforts to create a similar capability outside of the UN have been made.835
UNSCOM and UNM OVIC
The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and its successor the United 
Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC) are the UN 
agencies most commonly compared with a UN intelligence capability.
UNSCOM was established under Chapter VII by UN Security Council resolution 
687 in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, in April 1991. The provisions of resolution 
687 called for the eradication of Iraqi WMD weapons, programmes and facilities, and 
UNSCOM was created to enforce Iraqi compliance with them, in cooperation with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the nuclear field.836 Membership of 
UNSCOM comprised the permanent 5 members o f the Security Council, plus 15 other 
states. On 9 June 1991, UNCSOM inspectors entered Iraq for the first time to
831 (2001). Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi Report on UN Peace
Operations, International Peace Academy and the Center on International Cooperation.
83 (24 June 2004). Personal Interview with Teresa Whitfield.
833 (15 April 2004). Personal Interview with Andres Salazar, Special Assistant to UN Assistant Secretary
General for Political Affairs.
834 Ibid.
835 Ibid.
836 (3 April 1991). UN Security Council Resolution 687.
257
837
838
839
840
841
842
implement resolution 687, in accordance with a three-pronged strategy to assess, 
destroy, and monitor and verify the elimination of Iraqi WMD capabilities.837 
UNSCOM operated in Iraq until all UN personnel were withdrawn in December 1998 
in the face of Iraqi non-compliance, which was met with the commencement of 
military action by a US-led coalition.838
The strategic intelligence function of UNSCOM was to provide the Security Council 
with information it required to formulate policy regarding the threat posed by Iraq’s 
WMD capability. UNSCOM represented for the first time the institutionalization of 
intelligence power within the framework of the UN: the capability of the Security 
Council to function as a decision-maker and to exercise its responsibilities to enforce 
resolution 687 depended entirely on information provided by UNSCOM. The scope 
and nature of UNSCOM’s work was unprecedented. UNSCOM enjoyed active 
relationships with intelligence services in the US, UK and Israel, which aided 
UNSCOM’s work in securing written declarations on the status of Iraqi WMD 
programmes, obtaining the sampling and identification of biological warfare agents, 
monitoring suspect facilities, conducting aerial surveillance and gathering human 
intelligence.839 This adventure into the intelligence world was, and remains to this day, 
an anomaly in the work of the UN, which takes great strides to shun any association 
with intelligence activity.
Indeed, UNSCOM enjoyed close links with Western intelligence services. The UK 
provided support to UNSCOM and the IAEA through a DIS outfit known as 
Operation Rockingham.84° For most of the 1990s, Rockingham briefed and advised 
members of UNSCOM and IAEA inspection teams, and processed information 
obtained by UN inspections.841 Additionally, Rockingham advised UK policy 
departments on whom from the UK to second to the UNSCOM and the IAEA 
inspection teams.842 A Rockingham officer detached to Bahrain staffed an organisation
Blix, H. (2004). Disarming Iraq.
Ibid.
Ibid.
(14 July 2004). Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Ibid.
Ibid.
258
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
known as GATEWAY to liaise with UN inspection teams as they crossed into and out 
of Iraq.843 In 1998, as UNSCOM ground to a halt, the capacity of Rockingham was 
reduced and performed exclusively monitoring activities.844
Although tasked by the Security Council with its own intelligence mission, 
UNSCOM’s association with intelligence activity has triggered criticism by those who 
regard UNSCOM to have been a Trojan horse for the intelligence services of the US, 
UK and Israel, rather than acting for the legitimate purposes of the UN. Dr. Hans Blix, 
who headed UNMOVIC, the successor of UNSCOM established in 1999, claimed that 
rather than providing the UN with an intelligence capability, UNSCOM became 
‘infiltrated’ by national intelligence services, which used the commission to gather and 
disseminate intelligence for national purposes, rather than the purposes of resolution 
687 and the Security Council.845 As such, the integrity of UNSCOM suffered, as did its 
ability to operate objectively and independently; the UN was forced to withdraw 
UNSCOM staff from Iraq in 1998 and put an end to its operation.846
In December 1999, Security Council resolution 1284 established the Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission to continue the work of UNSCOM in Iraq, 
free from any debilitating association with intelligence activity.847 UNMOVIC is staffed 
by UN-employed international civil servants, rather than national secondees.848 Indeed, 
although Operation Rockingham was reactivated to provide UK support to UNMOVIC, 
no institutional linkage between UNMOVIC and DIS occurred, despite the fact that 
Rockingham continued to provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA with UK intelligence 
assessments on Iraq’s WMD programmes and installations.849
Post 9/11 Controlling Security Strategy
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Two and a half weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the UN Security Council passed 
resolution 1373, which reaffirmed the status o f any act of international terrorism as a 
threat to international peace and security, and highlighted the ‘need to combat by all 
means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international 
peace and security caused by terrorist acts’.850 This ‘need’ encapsulated the imperative 
for states to ‘prevent and suppress terrorist acts’ and for the intensification of the 
‘exchange of information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist 
persons or networks... and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass 
destruction by terrorist groups’.851 The identification of a possible terrorism-WMD 
threat nexus was made by the UNSC quickly. Indeed, the framework for a UN 
counter-terrorism approach constructed by resolution 1373 was extended in April 
2004, when UNSC resolution 1540 called upon states to ‘prohibit any non-State actor 
to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical 
or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist 
purposes.. ,’.852 It was at this point that the terrorism-WMD threat nexus was legislated 
for at the international level as a threat to peace and security, and UN counter­
terrorism strategy became inexplicably linked with UN counter-proliferation efforts.
However, the construction o f a UN controlling security strategy reflecting the post- 
9 /1 1 strategic reality has been an extremely difficult process, considering that the logic 
of controlling security strategies contradicts the provisions of the UN Charter. In 
October 2001, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in an attempt to develop a realistic 
approach to the terrorism-WMD threat nexus, established the Policy Working Group 
on the United Nations and Terrorism. On 6 August 2002, it published its report. In it, 
the Group laid out the possible basis of a prospective UN counter-terrorism strategy. 
The three pillars of this strategy aimed to dissuade disaffected groups from embracing 
terrorism, deny groups or individuals the means to carry out acts of terrorism; and, 
sustain broad-based international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism.853
850 (28 September 2001). UN Security Council Resolution 1373.
851 Ibid.
852 (28 April 2004). UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
853 (6 August 2002). Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, United 
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Despite these strategic aims, the Group claimed that they did not believe that the 
‘United Nations is well placed to play an active operational role in efforts to suppress 
terrorist groups, to pre-empt specific terrorist strikes, or to develop dedicated 
intelligence-gathering capacities’ required to enable the UN to adopt and execute a 
controlling security strategy that sought to prevent terrorist attacks through pro-active 
mechanisms.854
In the wake of US-UK intelligence-driven preventive action against Iraq in March 
2003, Kofi Annan announced the establishment of a High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change whose task it was to look into collective security arrangements 
in the post-9/11 strategic reality. The major theme of the Panel’s report, ‘A More 
Secure World: A Shared Responsibility’, is ‘the challenge of prevention’ — how to 
control unconstrained threats in line with the UN Charter.855 The Panel identified a 
new, post-9/11 strategic reality, concluding that ‘[t]errorism is a threat to all States, and 
to the UN as a whole’.856 The panel also identified new strategic imperatives entailing 
from the post-9/11 reality and the existence o f an observable terrorism-WMD threat 
nexus, by accepting that ‘[n]ew aspects of the threat — including the rise of a global 
terrorist network, and the potential for terrorist use o f nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons — require new responses’.857
Indeed, the High Level Panel declared that ‘[m]eeting the challenge of today’s threats 
means getting serious about prevention; the consequences of allowing latent threats to 
become manifest, or of allowing existing threats to spread, are simply too severe’.858 In 
doing so, it demonstrated a shift in thinking away from the logic of coercive security 
strategies that seek to react to actual attacks, towards the logic of controlling security 
strategies that seek to pro-act to prevent potential attacks. Considering the imperative
854 (6 August 2002). Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism: 4
855 (December 2004). A More Secure World.
856 (December 2004). A More Secure World, Executive Summary: 3
857 Ibid.: 3
858 Ibid.: 2
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of prevention in the post-9/11 strategic reality, the Panel concluded that the UN’s 
security strategy requires pro-active mechanisms in order to achieve its aims:
In the world of the twenty-first century, the international community does 
have to be concerned about nightmare scenarios combining terrorists, 
weapons of mass destruction and irresponsible States, and much more 
besides, which may conceivably justify the use of force, not just reactively 
but preventively and before a latent threat becomes imminent.859
As a consequence of the strategic imperative to prevent threats through a 
controlling security strategy, the report claimed that the UNSC will ‘need to be 
prepared to be much more proactive on these issues, taking more decisive action 
earlier, than it has been in the past.860 And, in an effort to reconcile the rationale of 
controlling security strategies with the legitimising institutions of the UN Charter, 
states that determine ‘distant threats have an obligation to bring these concerns to the 
Security Council’.861
In response to the recommendations of the Panel’s report, the UN General 
Assembly, for the first time, adopted a UN counter-terrorism strategy on 8 September 
2006, which builds on Kofi Annan’s report ‘Uniting against Terrorism: 
Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ of 2 May 2006. The UN’s 
plan of action against the terrorism threat provides for ‘measures to prevent and 
combat terrorism’ that seek to deny terrorists ‘access to the means to carry out their 
attacks, to their targets and to the desired impact o f their attacks’.862 Measures to ‘build 
States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the 
United Nations system’ are also established.863
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Controlling security strategies require intelligence in order to work effectively. The UK 
and US, as described above, have vital intelligence requirements for their respective 
post-9/11 controlling security strategies that seek to prevent anticipated attacks. The 
UN, in identifying the strategic goal to ‘meet the challenge of prevention’, also seeks to 
prevent anticipated attacks. Likewise, the UN’s post-9 /11 controlling security strategy 
has vital intelligence requirements. Indeed, the intelligence requirements for UN 
security strategy identified in the Brahimi report in 2000 are more urgent after 9/11, 
considering the imperative to prevent the terrorism-WMD threat.
The UN’s High Level Panel for Threats, Challenges and Change found it extremely 
difficult to broach the subject of intelligence during its considerations.864 However, it 
did manage to declare the need to underpin UNSC enforcement activity with ‘credible, 
shared information and analysis’, and recommend that the ‘ability of the Security 
Council to generate credible information about potential instances of proliferation 
should be strengthened’. In the area of counter-terrorism specifically, the Panel’s 
report suggests that improved counter-terrorism instruments should involve 
‘intelligence-sharing, where possible’.
Significantly, the Panel does address the potential legitimising power of intelligence 
in collective security arrangements. In considering ‘collective security and the use of 
force’, the Panel sets out guidelines for the legitimate use of force in line with the 
imperative to prevent threats through pro-active mechanisms.865 The presentation of 
evidence is a central requirement for the legitimisation of controlling security strategies 
that seek to use pro-active military force. The panel regards that anticipatory self- 
defence — action taken under Article 51 of the UN Charter — is legitimate only if  the 
Security Council is able to assess the information that determines the threat and 
demonstrates necessity o f action.866 The Panel’s report states:
864 The difficulty if the intelligence issue was described to me by Dr. Bruce Jones, Deputy Director of 
Research for the High Level Panel, whilst I was a Visiting Scholar at New York University’s Center on 
International Cooperation, March -  July 2004.
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If  there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good 
evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, 
which can authorize such action if it chooses to.867
Moreover, the potential power of intelligence to legitimise prevention extends 
beyond the limited parameters of the right to self-defence, according to the Panel’s 
report. In situations where preventive military action is contemplated under Article 42 
of the UN Charter, rather than Article 51, the Panel states that the credibility of 
evidence will determine whether or nor pro-active measures should be taken. The 
Panel’s report states:
Questions of legality apart, there will be issues of prudence, or legitimacy, 
about whether such preventive action should be taken: crucial among them 
is whether there is credible evidence of the reality of the threat in question 
(taking into account both capability and specific intent).. ,868
Indeed, the UN’s global counter-terrorism strategy has specifically highlighted the 
need for an improved intelligence capability. In the section entitled ‘Measures to 
prevent and combat terrorism’, the UN strategy aims to ‘intensify cooperation, as 
appropriate, in exchanging timely and accurate information concerning the prevention 
and combating of terrorism’.869 UN security strategy, therefore, requires intelligence 
not only to facilitate rational action in the face of covert and unconstrained threats to 
international peace and security, but to provide the evidence that is needed in order to 
legitimise controlling security strategies, in accordance with the UN Charter.
Post-9/11 Strategic Intelligence Capability
Counter-Terrorism Committee
After 9/11, the UN’s conflict prevention agenda hardened. Security Council resolution 
1373, passed on 28 September 2001, required member states to share ‘information,
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especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks... and the 
threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups’ in 
order to ‘prevent and suppress terrorist acts’. A UN Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(CTC) was established pursuant of resolution 1373 to fulfil this requirement. The role 
of the CTC is to enforce the provisions of resolution 1373, including the exchange of 
information in support of action to prevent terrorist attacks, as well as to uphold the 
12 conventions on international terrorism.870 The CTC has the universal support of 
UN member states, and it represents the 15 members of the Security Council on
871terrorism issues.
In discharging its responsibilities, the CTC has a ‘cycle’ consisting of 3 stages.872 
Firstly, states report to the CTC on what they are doing in support of the 12 
conventions and the requirements established by 1373.873 Secondly, experts recruited 
by the CTC identify gaps in the performance of states in fulfilling these 
requirements.874 And, thirdly, the CTC reports back to states on what further steps 
need to be taken in order to fulfill the requirements of 1373 and the terrorism 
conventions.875 The failure of the CTC to meet the demands of the new UN terrorism 
regime soon became apparent. In December 2003, a ‘Problems’ report was published 
by the Chairman of the CTC, which identified a broad range of weaknesses in the 
CTC’s structure and procedures that impeded the effective implementation and 
enforcement o f resolution 1373.876 Among the problems was the issue o f poor 
information-sharing amongst CTC member states.877 Indeed, the problems facing the 
CTC over the matter of information-sharing are legion. Firstly, there are legal 
impediments that prevent the UN, an independent political body, from exchanging
870 (28 September 2001). UN Security Council Resolution 1373.
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information with other international and regional organisations.878 Such impediments 
are unique to the UN; the G8 Counter-Terrorism Action Group, for example, which is 
not a single political body but, rather, a loose association of like-minded states, can 
share information in ways that the UN’s CTC cannot.879 The sensitive nature of the 
terrorism subject, and the need for secrecy, means that member states and the UN as 
an organisation are reluctant to share information.880 However, the most debilitating 
problem is that the CTC has no teeth, and what leverage it has is not applied: states are 
‘encouraged’ to provide the required information in support of resolution 1373, but 
any state that refuses to comply will not be named and shamed.881
Even when information flows, it is restricted to the Permanent 5 members of the 
Security Council, the US, UK, France, Russia and China.882 The flow of information 
usually follows a route starting with the ‘Permanent 2’, the US and UK, through 
France, to Russia, and ending with China.883 N ot only does this information route 
create tension amongst the P5, it also generates a resentment amongst the excluded 
non-permanent members that often slows down the work of the Security Council.884 A 
prime example of this is the negotiations over the content of resolution 1540 
concerning terrorism and WMD proliferation, which were prolonged because 
obstinate non-permanent Security Council members obstructed proceedings by 
refusing to engage in talks, angered as they were residing outside the terrorism/WMD 
information loop, which circulated according to the usual P2-France-Russia-China 
route.885
As for an intelligence capacity, the CTC has none. The job of the CTC is to gather 
and use ‘information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or 
networks... and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by
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terrorist groups’, in order to ‘prevent and suppress terrorist acts’.886 Despite this and 
the fact that the CTC is a committee operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
to implement the provision of Security Council resolution 1373 and the terrorism 
conventions, the CTC is said to be ‘not concerned with intelligence or law 
enforcement.’887 The CTC does operate in secret, but the secrecy of the CTC’s work is 
due to legal and political considerations, rather than the need to protect knowledge of 
intelligence sources and methods, which the CTC does not possess.888 States are 
reluctant to share intelligence with other member states within the UN framework. 
Firsdy, as discussed in Chapter 3, despite the internationalization of intelligence targets, 
intelligence power is viewed by many to be the last pure expression of national 
sovereignty, and great efforts are made to ensure that it is not deferred or 
compromised through uncontrolled dissemination of sensitive material.889 The UN 
employs international staff with allegiances to national governments, so any UN 
intelligence capability will inevitably be contaminated by state politics.890 The UNSC 
would continue to find it difficult to reach agreement on issues even with an in-house 
UN intelligence capability, because o f the political nature of the UN decision-making 
process. The UN is a political organisation, and all decisions reflect the national 
interests of states, not the veracity o f intelligence material. As one UN official put it, 
‘there is no added value in involving the UN Security Council in intelligence matters’.891
Secondly, aside from the issue of intelligence as an expression of national 
sovereignty, the UN as an organisation is not well placed to deal with intelligence. The 
Security Council does not like ‘standing groups’ that exist as permanent fixtures in the 
UN furniture, which a UN intelligence organisation would most probably have to 
be.892 Bestowing the CTC with an intelligence capability would set a precedent that 
Security Council members would rather avoid, preferring as they do temporary, ad hoc 
and flexible committees build on merit, fit for purpose, and adaptable and flexible to
886 (28 September 2001). UN Security Council Resolution 1373.
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their wills.893 Were the CTC to become responsible for dealing in intelligence matters, 
the nature of its character and parameters would scrape against the grain of UN 
tradition, and restrict the freedom to move so valued by Security Council members.894 
For these reasons, the UN in general and the CTC in particular have not raised the 
issue of intelligence, despite the fact that the CTC requires and desires much better 
information-sharing processes, and higher quality of information relating to terrorism 
and WMD threats. Security Council resolution 1535, passed on 24 March 2004 sought 
to revitalise the CTC, and created an Executive Directorate headed by a Director 
charged with supervising the ‘collection of all information for the follow-up o f the 
implementation of UNSCR 1373’. However, resolution 1535 does not address the 
issue of intelligence in support o f a controlling security strategy under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.
'Resolution 1540
Resolution 1373 laid down the requirement for ‘information, especially regarding 
actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks... and the threat posed by the 
possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups’.895 However, it wasn’t 
until 28 April 2004 that the issues of terrorism and WMD proliferation were brought 
together to form an identifiable threat matrix. Resolution 1540 declares that the 
Security Council is:
1. Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State 
actors... may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons and their means of delivery; and,
2. Gravely concerned by the threat o f illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials, 
which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons 
and also poses a threat to international peace and security.896
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The resolution also states the recognition o f the ‘need to enhance coordination of 
efforts on national, sub-regional, regional and international levels in order to 
strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international 
security’.897 In light of these concerns and requirements, resolution 1540 imposes three 
major obligations on states. These are:
1. To refrain from providing any support to non-state actors who are attempting to 
manufacture, possess, transport or use WMD and their means of delivery;
2. To prohibit in their domestic law any such activities by non-state actors, 
particularly for terrorist purposes, and to prohibit any assistance or financing of 
such activities;
3. To adopt domestic measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their means of 
delivery and related materials, including by accounting for and physically protecting 
such items; establishing and maintaining effective border controls and law 
enforcement measures; and reviewing and maintaining national export and trans­
shipment controls (with appropriate criminal or civil penalties).
Just as the CTC was established to implement resolution 1373, the ‘1540 committee’ 
was created to enforce the provisions of resolution 1540, on a mandate lasting 2 years. 
The prospect of the 1540 committee had brought hope to those associated with 
terrorism issues at the UN that a better information system could be instituted.898 
However, the 1540 committee is struggling to overcome the problems with 
information sharing and intelligence co-operation experienced by the CTC, hampering 
the development of a credible UN controlling security strategy in the face o f a 
terrorism-WMD threat to international peace and security.899
CONCLUSIONS
After 9/11, the UK, US and UN aim to meet the challenge of prevention through pro­
active mechanisms in the face of a perceivable terrorism-WMD threat nexus. The 9/11 
attacks highlighted the need to bolster intelligence capabilities to fulfil the requirements
897 (28 April 2004). UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
898 (5 May 2004). Personal Interview with Axel Wennmann.
899 Ibid.
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of controlling security strategies that seek to prevent threats prior to their 
materialisation. The Iraq fiasco reinforced the importance of intelligence assessments 
in decision-making processes in view of terrorism-WMD threats to international peace 
and security. The capabilities of the UK, US and UN to fulfil the intelligence 
requirements o f controlling security strategies, however, vary in significant degrees. 
The UK has attempted to fulfil the intelligence requirements of a post-9/11 
controlling security strategy by improving its established intelligence machinery with 
the creation of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, intelligence agency reforms and 
the creation of a Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis, which spearheads the 
UK’s efforts to strengthen its intelligence analysis and assessment capabilities. The US 
has created new institutions to adapt the US intelligence community to the post-9/11 
strategic reality, including the National Clandestine Service, which seeks to address 
intelligence collection weaknesses, and the NCTC, which is intended to boost analysis 
and assessment capabilities in the face of the ‘new’ terrorism threat. The appointment 
of a US Director of National Intelligence provides direction for a national intelligence 
strategy that aims to underpin the US effort to prevent attacks. The UN, however, 
whilst maintaining its Situation Centre, fails to fulfil the intelligence requirements of a 
controlling security strategy that seeks to meet its challenge of prevention. The UN 
Counter-Terrorism and 1540 committees lack any serious intelligence capability to 
support decision-making processes in view of an acknowledged terrorism-WMD threat 
to international peace and security.
270
CHAPTER SIX
Intelligence Power and Prevention: 
Implications for International Order 
and Intelligence Affairs
INTRODUCTION
The differentials in the levels of intelligence power between the UN and states such as 
the UK and US entail significant implications for international order. The UN is 
uniquely responsible for legitimising responses to international security threats, and has 
adopted a controlling security strategy to pro-act against threats that demand 
prevention. However, its lack of any serious strategic intelligence capability means that 
the UNSC is unable to implement a serious controlling security strategy, considering 
the intimate relationship between information and prevention: an actor is incapable of 
preventing what it is incapable of anticipating. With no means of assessing information 
o f threats prior to their materialisation, the UNSC has no means of acting pro-actively 
in order to prevent acts of aggression. Given the imperative to prevent acts of 
terrorism, especially considering the risk of terrorism involving WMD, the UNSC is 
not well placed to determine and respond to the pre-eminent threats to international 
peace and security today.
States, like the UK and US, with established and adaptive strategic intelligence 
capabilities are better placed to make decisions based on the assessment of information 
o f threats, and respond to them pro-actively in line with the aims of their respective 
controlling security strategies. However, they are not well placed to legitimise 
controlling security strategies. Unilateral intelligence-driven state practice that seeks to
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prevent threats through pro-active mechanisms contravenes the logic of the Caroline 
formula and the provisions o f the UN Charter. Rational action in the post-9 /11 
strategic reality, therefore, does not mean legitimate action. This rational 
action/legitimate action astigmatism undermines international order by creating 
discord between action undertaken in line with security goals entailed by material 
reality and what is socially acceptable behaviour, as prescribed in international law. In 
the post-9/11 world, values have not been constructed around material realities and, 
consequently, international order has been weakened. International law has lost the 
authority and control over state practice, because legitimising institutions are incapable 
of facilitating rational action in the face of threats that demand prevention.
Intelligence-driven controlling state practice that bypasses the UNSC and 
contravenes international law represents rational responses to strategic realities that fail 
to fit into existing legitimising processes. Without the capability to legitimise pro-action 
based on the assessment of information o f potential attacks, as opposed to reaction 
based on observation of actual attacks, the UNSC is incapable o f facilitating rational 
action in the post-9/11 strategic reality. The UNSC is incapable of acting in 
accordance with the aims of its own controlling security strategy. The consequences of 
this incapability are increased unilateralism and a decline in the power of the UNSC to 
constrain state behaviour. In order for international order to be maintained in the post- 
9 /1 1 strategic reality, the UNSC needs to develop an intelligence-assessment capability 
that will help to enable it to facilitate and legitimise pro-action against anticipated 
threats in line with its and other states’ strategic goals.
Differentials in levels of intelligence power also entail significant implications for the 
role of intelligence in the maintenance of international order. The power of intelligence 
to facilitate and legitimise prevention has direct consequences on intelligence 
knowledge, activity and organisation. In order to facilitate prevention o f threats to 
international security, intelligence knowledge needs to be international in scope: 
international dots require the drawing of international lines if they are to be joined and 
responded against effectively. This expansion of intelligence knowledge requires an 
increase in levels of international co-operation in the intelligence sphere. Indeed, as
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David Handley has claimed, the post-9/11 world is an era o f intelligence 
interdependence.900 In terms of activity, state-based collection activities need to be 
complemented by international analytical and assessment activities, so that the 
appropriate type of intelligence knowledge is produced. The dissemination of 
intelligence assessments to international customers, including the President of the 
UNSC and the UN Secretary-General, also needs to occur as part of collective 
intelligence machinery that supports international decision-making processes. This 
collective intelligence machinery requires new organisational structures at the 
international level. And, in order to legitimise prevention, intelligence material will 
need to be able to provide evidence for UNSC threat determination purposes, and be 
credible in the eyes of its international and public customers.
This chapter has two sections. Section one examines the implications of intelligence 
power differentials for international order considering the imperative of prevention, 
focusing on the impact intelligence power differentials have on the rational and 
legitimate management of threats that demand prevention through pro-active 
controlling security strategies. The case of the 2006/07 Ethiopian invasion o f Somalia 
is examined, as well as the threat posed by Iran’s suspected proliferation of WMD. 
Section two examines the implications of the imperative of prevention on intelligence 
power, focusing on the way in which the need to facilitate and legitimise prevention of 
threats to international security has impacted on the role of intelligence power, as well 
as issues of intelligence co-operation and credibility.
SECTION 1: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
Implications for Rational Action
The assumption that an adversary is undeterred by the provisions of international law 
entails a security strategy that seeks to control risk through pro-action. Controlling
900 Handley, D. (2006). Internationalising Intelligence Sharing.
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security strategies that aim to prevent attacks by apparently incoercible threats depend 
on information to determine threats that have yet to fully materialise. Anticipating 
threats is a core function of intelligence organisations, and controlling security 
strategies have vital intelligence requirements. The capability to control unconstrained 
threats and mitigate the risk o f attacks is essential to actors’ ability to act rationally in a 
post-9/11 strategic reality, in the face of threats that appear to have no intention of 
complying with the status quo. The framework provided for by the Caroline formula, 
which defines the logical structure of the self-defence and collective security 
institutions, fails to furnish states with the mechanisms required to act rationally 
against perceivable security threats. The constraints imposed by the Caroline formula 
are encouraging states to undertake unilateral action to promote security goals, 
considering the UNSC’s lack of intelligence-assessment capability. The onus is on 
states to demonstrate necessity through the analysis and assessment of information 
pertaining to potential attacks, rather than actual attacks, and act proportionately 
against risk that is hard to quantify in strategic terms. Proportionality is less easy to 
demonstrate considering that the achievement o f strategic objectives necessary to the 
elimination of a transnational, ideologically-driven terrorist threat is much harder to 
display.
Real-world consequences o f the problematic nature of the Caroline formula in the 
face of the post-9/11 terrorist threat were revealed at the end of 2006 and the start of 
2007, when Ethiopia invaded Somalia to prevent an attack by the Union of Islamic 
Courts (UIC).901 The threat posed by the UIC was determined through the assessment 
of information, not through the observation of an actual attack by UIC militants 
against the Ethiopian state. The Ethiopian action, which was initially bolstered by US 
troops and later accompanied by a US military campaign inside Somalia, was pro-active 
in the face of intolerable risk that demanded controlling.902 The Ethiopian and US
901 (24 December 2006). "Ethiopia admits Somalia offensive." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/6207427.stm.
902 (9 January 2007). "Why US fears Somali 'terror' ties." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/6243907.stm.
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action was strictly in contravention of the self-defence and collective security 
institutions: the invasion of Somalia was not in reaction to an attack that had already 
occurred, and the UNSC had not authorised the use of force. However, Ethiopia, the 
US and the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), as well as a host of 
international leaders and organisations, sympathised with the rationality of the action in 
light of the nature of the UIC threat.903 The necessity and proportionality o f the 
Ethiopian/US pro-action is difficult to ascertain, considering that no UIC attack had 
occurred.
The Case of Ethiopia's Invasion of Somalia
Somalia’s Union of Islamic Courts was formed in 2000 as an umbrella organisation for 
a number of Islamic courts and groups that rivalled Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government. By June 2006, the UIC controlled most of southern Somalia and the vast 
majority of its population, including Somalia’s capital Mogadishu.904 The leader o f the 
UIC, Hassan Dahir Aweys, is listed as a terrorist by the US Department of State. 
Aweys is the former head of the al-Qaida-linked terrorist group al-Itihaad al-Islamiya 
(ALAI), which, according to US authorities, was involved in the 1998 al-Qaida 
bombing of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.905 The UIC has been accused 
of sheltering al-Qaida operatives, including three individuals suspected of carrying out 
the 1998 US embassy bombings, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan 
and Abu Taha al-Sudani.906 In July 2006, Aweys called on the Somali people ‘to wage a 
holy war against Ethiopians in Somalia’.907 On 9 October 2006, Aweys’ declaration of 
jihad extended to the country of Ethiopia itself.908 And, on 21 December 2006, Aweys,
903 (26 December 2006). "Ethiopia action in Somalia backed." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/6209325.stm.
904 (28 December 2006). "Somali troops enter capital city." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/6214379.stm.
905 (9 January 2007). "Why US fears Somali 'terror' ties."
906 Ibid.
907 (21 July 2006). "Somali Islamist orders 'holy war'." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/5204212.stm.
908 (9 October 2006). "Somalis vow holy war on Ethiopia." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/6032907.stm.
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declared that Somalia was in a state of war, and urged all Somalis to ‘take part in this 
struggle against Ethiopia’.909
O n 24 December 2006, in anticipation o f a UIC attack, Ethiopian Information 
Minister Berhan Hailu declared that the Ethiopian government had taken ‘self- 
defensive measures’ against the Union of Islamic Courts and ‘foreign terrorist groups’ 
in Somalia.910 A day after Ethiopian troops crossed into sovereign Somali territory, the 
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi claimed that the invasion was ‘completely 
legal and proportional’ and ‘forced by the circumstances’.911 The situation was 
described as ‘complex’ by US acting ambassador to the UN Alejandro Wolff.912 Indeed, 
after speedy Ethiopian success in driving UIC forces out of Mogadishu and the other 
major cities, the US added further to the complexity of the situation by entering into 
the conflict. On 8 January 2007, the US began conducting air strikes in Somalia based 
on ‘credible intelligence’ of al-Qaida leaders operating in the region.913
The link between the UIC and al-Qaida was made publicly available for the world to 
see on the 5 January 2007, when al-Qaida deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri was heard in an 
audio message encouraging the Somali Islamists to fight on, and calling on all Muslims 
to wage jihad in Somalia. Al-Zawahiri appealed to ‘the lions of Islam’ in Yemen, the 
Arab Peninsula, Egypt, Sudan, the Arab Maghreb, and ‘everywhere in the Muslim 
world to rise up to aid their Muslim brethren in Somalia’.914
The reaction of the African Union to the Ethiopian invasion was generally 
sympathetic to Ethiopia. On 26 December 2006, Patrick Mazimhaka, the deputy 
chairman of the AU's Commission, told the BBC that the African Union would not
909 (24 December 2006). "Ethiopia admits Somalia offensive."
910 Ibid.
911 (5 December 2006). "Ethiopia PM admits Somalia action." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/afhca/6208373.stm.
912 (28 December 2006). "Somalia peace hopes stalled at UN." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/afhca/6213341.stm.
913 (9 January 2007). "US 'targets al-Qaeda' in Somalia." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/6245943.stm.
914 (5 January 2007). "'Al-Qaeda' call for Somalia jihad." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/afhca/6234167.stm.
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criticise Ethiopia as it had ‘given us ample warning that it feels threatened by the UIC’, 
adding that ‘it is up to every country to judge the measure of the threat to its own 
sovereignty’. 915 Mazimhaka admitted that the AU had failed to act in time to prevent 
the threat posed by the UIC.916 The UNSC was equally wrong-footed by the Ethiopian 
action. On 28 December 2006, the UNSC failed for a second time to agree on a 
statement calling for the withdrawal of Ethiopian and other foreign forces from 
Somalia.917 Positive statements were made by some leaders in support of Ethiopian and 
US action in Somalia. British Prime Minister Tony, for instance, claimed that 
Ethiopia’s pro-action was justified because the ‘extremists who have been using 
methods of violence in order to get their way in Somalia pose a threat not just to the 
outside world but to people in Somalia as well’, before declaring that ‘we should be 
there standing up and supporting those who are combating that terrorism and giving 
people the chance to live in better circumstances’.918 Somalia’s interim President, 
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, said the US had the right to bomb those who had attacked its 
embassies.919
However, the controversial Ethiopian and US action attracted criticism. Italian 
foreign minister Massimo d'Alema said the Italian government opposed the ‘unilateral 
initiatives that could spark new tensions’.920 The newly-installed UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon expressed ‘concern’ that the air strikes could lead to an escalation of 
hostilities.921 In addition, Salim Lone, the UN spokesman in Iraq in 2003, condemned 
the ‘illegal war of aggression’ by Ethiopian and US forces.922 Lone claimed that the 
invasion was ‘a clear violation of international law’.923 The US administration dismissed
915 (26 December 2006). "Ethiopia action in Somalia backed."
916 (26 December 2006). "African Union tested over Somalia." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/6209583.stm.
917 (28 December 2006). "Somalia peace hopes stalled at UN."
918 (10 January 2007). "In quotes: Reaction to Somali strikes." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/6248847.stm.
919 (9 January 2007). "US 'targets al-Qaeda' in Somalia."
920 (10 January 2007). "In quotes: Reaction to Somali strikes."
921 Ibid.
922 Lone, S. (30 December 2006). International lawlessness. The Guardian.
923 Ibid.
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the international criticism, claiming that it was imperative ‘to defend the US and the 
international community from further al-Qaeda attacks’.924
The Ethiopia vs. UIC case demonstrates unilateral state practice to control security 
threats that are not currendy manageable by existing UN processes. Without the 
capability to determine threats based on the assessment of information, the UNSC is 
incapable of facilitating pro-active responses to prevent potential attacks by aggressive 
non-state actors that have no interest in observing the rules of international society. In 
the post-9/11 strategic reality, the right to self-defence has been extended de facto in the 
face of new threats to international peace and security posed by extremist transnational 
networks that slip through the net of the existing machinery of collective security. The 
extension of the right to self-defence to include pro-active mechanisms that seek to 
prevent anticipated attacks signifies the inefficacy of the UN security institutions to 
promote security goals. It also undermines the control and authority of international 
law over state practice, and encourages unconstrained unilateralism at a time when 
transnational threats demand a multilateral response that protects, rather than 
challenges, international order.
The Case of Iran's WMD Threat
The rational action/legitimate action astigmatism affects cases where action might 
need to be taken in the future. In 2005, a US National Intelligence Estimate indicated 
that Iran's military is conducting clandestine work, through its energy programme, to 
acquire and master technologies that could assist in the development of nuclear 
bombs.925 At the time, the media reported that a senior intelligence official familiar 
with the 2005 N IE on Iran, the latest since 2001, said that ‘it is the judgement of the 
intelligence community that, left to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear 
weapons’.926 Sources of the Washington Post said that US intelligence considers 2015 
to be a realistic date to expect Iran to achieve nuclear fission, in line with British and
924 (10 January 2007). "US denies southern Somali attacks." from
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/6247111 .stm.
925 Linzer, D. (2 August 2005). Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb.
926 Ibid.
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Israeli estimates.927 On 1 July 2005, a leaked intelligence assessment, drawing on 
British, French, German and Belgian reporting, concluded that Iran has developed an 
extensive network of front companies, official bodies, academic institutes and 
middlemen dedicated to purchasing the expertise, training, and an assortment of 
equipment required for the development of nuclear, chemical and biological 
programmes, including deployment systems.928 The assessment reported that ‘Iran 
continues intensively to seek the technology and know-how for military applications of 
all kinds’, concentrating on improving the specifications and range of its Shahab-3 
missile, which currently has a range of 750 miles.929 Even at its present range, the 
Shahab is capable of reaching Israel, which Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
has said should be ‘wiped off the map’.930
In the words of Timothy Garton Ash: ‘Now we face the next big test of the west: 
after Iraq, Iran’.931 In the face of a perceivable threat posed by Iran’s suspected 
development of a WMD programme, the necessity and proportionality of a response 
will need to be demonstrated through the assessment o f information. In order to 
satisfy the legitimisation processes of international society, the threat posed by Iran 
and any response against it will need to be determined by the UNSC. To avoid a repeat 
of the Iraq fiasco, the UNSC must be capable of empowering its decision-making 
process with an intelligence assessment capacity so that any pro-action that might be 
deemed rational has the opportunity to be legitimised, or rejected on credible grounds. 
It is no good for the UNSC to rap Tehran ‘over the knuckles’ and impose ineffective 
sanctions only for Iran to continue to enrich uranium in defiance of international 
will.932 This situation will serve to further undermine the credibility and efficacy of the 
UN in the post-9/11 strategic reality, and encourage unilateralism in the face of
927 Linzer, D. (2 August 2005). Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb.
928 Cobain, I. and I. Traynor (4 January 2006). Secret services say Iran is trying to assemble a nuclear 
missile. The Guardian.
929 Ibid.
930 (27 October 2005). "Iran leader's comments attacked." from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/4378948.stm.
931 Ash, T. G. (January 12 2006). Let's make sure we do better with Iran than we did with Iraq. The 
Guardian.
932 Ibid.
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perceivable threats that demand prevention, in the manner o f the Iraq invasion in 
2003.
933
934
Indeed, the situation involving US action against Iran could possibly be even graver 
than the current Iraq situation. In 2006, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh claimed 
that the Bush administration is planning to use nuclear weapons against Iran, in order 
to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear capability.933 The use of tactical nuclear weapons, 
Hersh claimed, was due to the lack o f reliable intelligence about Iranian underground 
facilities, which was fuelling pressure for tactical nuclear weapons to be included in the 
strike plans as the only guaranteed means to destroy all the sites simultaneously.934 
Indeed, the need to focus on intelligence is urgent in order to facilitate rational 
responses to the Iranian crisis, and constrain actors whose responses might be 
irrational.
Implications for Legitimate Action
Legitimising rational responses, and increasing the chance o f averting irrational 
responses, to challenges such as Iran’s WMD programme depends on the integration 
of intelligence in collective security machinery. The existence o f intelligence 
differentials between states means that capabilities to anticipate threats are not evenly 
distributed. Currently, the UNSC has no or very limited capability to anticipate threats, 
and this has led to a serious deficiency in UN security strategy which has, in turn, 
undermined the role of the UN in international security affairs after 9/11 and 
encouraged unilateral, intelligence-driven pro-action against threats that the UNSC is 
unable to determine and manage effectively. In line with the imperative of prevention 
is the imperative to collate intelligence that has the potential power to facilitate and 
legitimise prevention. In the case of Iran, it is vital that states share intelligence so that 
common analysis of the issue is achieved and a collective assessment of the threat 
reached, preferably under the auspices of the UNSC. As Garton Ash has remarked, 
European states have much intelligence to offer a US administration that is apparently
Hersh, S. M. (17 April 2006). The Iran Plans. The New Yorker.
Ibid.
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starved of intelligence assets in Iran.935 In light of wrong US and UK assessments of 
Iraqi WMD programmes, increased intelligence co-operation at the international level 
is essential to challenging conventional wisdom, avoiding ‘group-think’, and 
promoting, as far as it is possible, accurate, informed and objective conclusions. Given 
that in 2005, General Michael V. Hayden, then director of national intelligence, said 
that N IE process would have ‘a higher tolerance for ambiguity’, a greater degree of 
consultation with intelligence partners is required in cases where intelligence has the 
potential power to facilitate and legitimise preventive responses to threats to 
international peace and security.936
The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia bypassed the legitimising processes of the UN 
Charter, because neither the self-defence nor the collective security institutions are 
configured to legitimise controlling security strategies. However, legitimacy is essential 
to the maintenance of international order. Socially-agreed values need to fit with 
security strategies that aim to achieve material goals. At the current juncture, the 
socially-agreed Caroline formula does not fit with the imperative of prevention, and the 
security institutions of international order are unable to facilitate and legitimise 
controlling security strategies that seek to pro-act against threats in line with the 
imperative of prevention. The UNSC, with no intelligence capacity capable of 
anticipating attacks, is badly-poised to undertake pro-active action in the face of threats 
that demand prevention. The consequence of this situation is an increase in 
unilateralism that is succeeding in challenging international order, considering the 
existence of a UN framework that is losing control and authority over state practice 
that aims to prevent anticipated threats from materialising. The case of Iran’s WMD 
threat is set to further challenge the international community to resolve the rational 
action/legitimate action astigmatism in order to facilitate an effective response to a 
threat in development.
Ash, T. G. (January 12 2006). Let's make sure we do better with Iran than we did with Iraq.
Linzer, D. (2 August 2005). Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb.
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The case of the US/UK invasion o f Iraq has been used in this study as an example 
o f illegitimate, intelligence-justified state practice that sought to prevent a perceivable 
threat, in line with post-9/11 strategic goals. Although the rationality of the US/UK 
pro-action is understandable within the context of the post-9/11 strategic reality, the 
bypassing of UN legitimisation processes challenged international order and split 
international opinion. The fact that the intelligence that provided the rationale for the 
2003 Iraq war turned out to be wrong intensified the level of controversy surrounding 
the case. However, the intelligence that indicated that Iraq was conducting WMD 
activity was widely believed before an unfettered survey o f Iraqi WMD programmes 
was possible after military action had taken place.937 As David Kay stated, the 
determination of Iraqi WMD ‘based on the intelligence that existed’ was reasonable.938 
As such, the necessity of pro-action was arguably demonstrable. A major problem of 
legitimising prevention arises with the credibility o f information pertaining to potential 
threats. The requirement of trust is a 21st century addition to the 19th century Caroline 
formula, and essential in the post-9 /11 environment where problems of perception of 
threats that, as Gow claims, ‘might be unperceived, but nonetheless perceptible in 
principle’, or ‘are perceived by some, but remain imperceptible to others, who might 
well be sceptical’, complicate threat determinations.
Indeed, the role of intelligence in determining threats in the post-9/11 world, and 
differentials in capabilities to do so, has significant implications for the UN’s 
legitimisation processes. Firsdy, despite the tarnished record of intelligence given the 
Iraq fiasco, just because threats are determined through the assessment of intelligence 
doesn’t mean threats do not exist. As the authority uniquely responsible for 
determining and responding to threats to international peace and security, and given 
the UN’s recognition of the imperative pro-act to prevent threats, the UNSC must be 
capable of determining threats prior to their materialisation. One of the reasons for the 
controversy over Iraq was the U N ’s lack o f systematic procedure to deal with 
intelligence that indicated a perceivable threat to international peace and security. And,
937 (28 January 2004). (28 January 2004). "Testimony of David Kay before the US Senate Armed Services 
Committee."
938 Ibid.
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secondly, cases similar to Iraq will likely arise again. It is tempting to think that Iraq 
was a one-off case fuelled by a neo-conservative agenda. However, the Ethiopian 
invasion of Somalia indicates that controlling security strategies that seek to mitigate 
risk is a feature of the post-9/11 world, rather than a neo-conservative programme. 
Indeed, the case of the suspected threat posed by Iran’s WMD programmes closely 
mirrors the case of Iraq, and the UN must be capable o f dealing with intelligence 
matters in order to be better placed to constrain unilateral pro-action, facilitate rational 
action in the face of ambiguous threats and reassert the control and authority of 
international law.
Collective Security: Collective Intelligence?
The imperative to prevent threats to international peace and security after 9/11 
establishes a new dimension to collective security. No longer adequate as an exclusively 
reactive mechanism, collective security needs to be pro-active in order to achieve 
strategic aims and promote security goals in the face of perceivable unconstrained and 
incoercible threats. Collective security machinery that lacks the capacity to anticipate 
threats is incapable of pro-acting against threats that demand prevention in the post- 
9 /1 1 world and, therefore, less able to assert control and authority over state practice 
that seeks to mitigate risk. In order for collective security to function in light of the 
imperative of prevention, collective security machinery needs to have an intelligence 
dimension. After 9/11, collective security means collective intelligence.
Arguments for a UN intelligence capability are not particularly new. In 1997, Walter 
Dorn, who has written prolifically on the subject, argued for an early warning system 
to support UN peacekeeping operations in his article ‘An Ounce o f Prevention: UN 
Early Warning System Needed’. Even in 1997, Walter Dorn remarked on the strategic 
dysfunction of the UN in light of its agenda o f preventive diplomacy:
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The UN currently functions as a reactive body and not a proactive one. Its 
limited capability is used to follow current events, not anticipate future 
ones. The UN practice has been to wait for conflicts to escalate before 
reacting. Instead, the world community, centred on and working through a 
strengthened UN, should get involved earlier.939
In the volume Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future, Pauline Neville- 
Jones, former chair of the JIC, provided a forward in which she led a charge of essays 
highlighting the requirement o f operational intelligence in peacekeeping missions, 
claiming that ‘[t]he more ambitious the multinational operation and/or hostile the 
environment in which it takes place, the more the forces involved will need to be able 
to rely on effective intelligence co-operation’.940 O ff the back of this, Neville Jones also 
identified the importance of intelligence co-operation in the post-9/11 era:
In the so-called war against terror, the level of active international co­
operation among civilian authorities and intelligence agencies has been 
stepped up considerably, including between governments not traditionally 
thought of as natural partners in such matters. Such co-operation no doubt 
increases the risk of compromise of sources, but has to be accepted in the 
interests of effective action.941
Requirements for tactical intelligence for multinational peacekeeping operations, like 
any other military operation, are obvious and have been well highlighted by advocates 
such as Walter Dorn, Robert David Steele, David Charters, Hugh Smith and Paul 
Johnston, as well as Michael Herman and others.942 However, despite the relevance of 
these arguments, this thesis is primarily concerned with the UN’s overall strategic, not 
simply operational, intelligence capabilities. Whilst there are intelligence requirements 
for UN peacekeeping operations that support coercive security strategies, the focus of 
this study is on the unfulfilled strategic requirements o f the UN’s controlling security 
strategy, and its impact on collective security machinery. What is new is the 
requirement of intelligence within collective security machinery that supports strategic,
939 Dom, W. A. (1997). "An Ounce of Prevention: UN Early Warning System Needed." SGI Quarterly
ue  jong, B., W. Platje, et al., Eds. (2003). Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future. 
Oakton, OSS International Press: vi 
941 Ibid.: vi
rather than tactical, decision-making in light of the imperative of prevention and the 
emergence of controlling security strategies that aim to prevent anticipated threats, 
potentially through the pro-active use of force.
Indeed, the potential power o f intelligence to facilitate and legitimise prevention has 
already internationalised intelligence in a number of ways. Firstly, as this study has 
argued, threats to international peace and security, the management of which is the 
business of the UNSC, have become intelligence targets. Considering the imperative of 
prevention, information on international security threats is required in order to manage 
threats to international peace and security. Secondly, the roles of intelligence power 
have internationalised intelligence knowledge, activity and organisation. Controlling 
security strategies operating at the international level require intelligence knowledge of 
threats to international peace and security that is produced by analysis and assessment 
achieved by intelligence organisations that are international in scope. As Pauline 
Neville-Jones commented, international intelligence co-operation has reached 
unprecedented levels after 9/11, in view of the realisation that no single state is capable 
of ensuring its security alone.943 In the post-9/11 strategic reality, intelligence 
requirements, as well as intelligence targets, have internationalised.
What hasn’t internationalised is intelligence power, as demonstrated by the existence 
of intelligence power differentials between states like the UK and US, and the UN. 
The UN has collective security machinery, but it has no collective intelligence 
machinery that has the capacity to facilitate and legitimise controlling security 
strategies. There is, therefore, a disjunction between the strategic aims of the UN and 
the strategic capabilities of the UN, which has undermined the credibility and efficacy 
of collective security machinery and encouraged unilateralism. This is despite increases 
in international intelligence co-operation in the face of the internationalisation of 
intelligence targets and intelligence requirements. What is needed in the post-9/11 
world is the institutionalisation of existing international intelligence co-operation, so 
that rational action that serves strategic aims and the legitimisation processes of 
international society can be effectively joined. An international intelligence capability
943 De Jong, B., W. Platje, et al., Eds. (2003). Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future.
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that is institutionalised at the UN level is required to empower collective security 
machinery to facilitate and legitimise controlling security strategies that seek to pro-act 
against threats in line with the imperative of prevention.
The first essential development that needs to take place, however, is not 
organisational, it is cultural. The UN has been forced by the post-9 /11 security reality 
to take intelligence seriously, and view intelligence positively in terms of decision­
making support. Intelligence has changed remarkably since the days o f the Cold War, 
and the attitudes of the UN must reflect this change. Robert David Steele, an erstwhile 
CIA official and currently an energetic campaigner for intelligence reform, provides a 
useful framework to understand the ‘new intelligence paradigm’ that involves an active 
UN role.944 Whilst the old intelligence paradigm of the Cold War emphasised unilateral, 
mostly secret and mostly technical intelligence collection driven by policy, the new 
intelligence paradigm of the 21st century emphasises multilateral, mostly public and 
mostly human intelligence analysis that drives policy.945 According to Steele, the UN’s 
approach to ‘toe-tip forward ‘information’ functions in a vain attempt to achieve 
intelligence, while refusing to take seriously the value of intelligence as a craft, as a 
process, and as an emerging profession’ is ‘one of classic denial’.946 In light of the aims 
of its controlling security strategy, the UN depends on embracing the power of 
intelligence to facilitate the effective management of international security and 
shedding the skin of its past relationship with intelligence practice.
Organisational changes are, however, vital. In order for the legitimisation of 
controlling security strategies and the maintenance of international order in the post- 
9711 strategic reality, intelligence needs to be organised at the international level and 
integrated into collective security machinery. As the report of the UN High Level 
Panel for Threats, Challenges and Change concluded, the security institutions of 
international order do not require substantial tweaking: Chapter VII o f the UN Charter
944 Steele, R. D. (2003). Information Peacekeeping and the Future of Intelligence. Peacekeeping 
Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future. B. De Jong, W. Platje and R. D. Stelle. Oakton, OSS 
International Press.
945 Ibid.
946 Ibid.: 212
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allows for action taken in anticipation of attacks, providing the UNSC is capable of 
determining threats through the assessment of evidence.947 The problem currently is 
the incapacity of the UNSC to determine threats through the assessment of 
information. The injection of intelligence into the arm of the UNSC will strengthen 
collective security machinery, in line with the aims of its controlling security strategy, 
and increase the chance of resolving the rational action/legitimate action astigmatism 
in the face of threats that demand prevention.
A number of suggestions have been made about how to organise intelligence at the 
international level. Saudi Arabia has called for an International Counter-Terrorism 
Centre to facilitate international exchanges of intelligence in support of responses to 
terrorism that adhere to the principles of the UN Charter. At the Riyadh Conference 
on Terrorism in February 2005, the case for UN action in the face of the global 
terrorism threat was discussed, and a document released in August 2005 outlined a 
proposal for an International Counter-Terrorism Centre established ‘independently 
under the principles of the UN and its relevant resolutions and committees’.948 The 
opening paragraph of the document reveals the purpose o f such a centre:
Combating terrorism is a collective responsibility that requires the highest 
levels of co-operation and co-ordination among states and complete 
readiness to exchange real time intelligence and security data as fast as 
possible among relevant agencies through secure means.949
Other proposals of international intelligence machinery envisage internal UN 
centres. Robert David Steele, for one, supports the establishment of a United Nations 
Open Decision Information Network (UNODIN), which would underpin a World 
Intelligence Centre that would provide ‘actionable intelligence decision-support to the 
United Nations leadership’.950 Like the Saudi-proposed International Counter- 
Terrorism Centre, not much detail is offered about how the UNODIN would fit into 
existing UN collective security machinery.
947 (December 2004). A More Secure World.
948 (28 August 2005). Creating an International Counter-Terrorism Center: The Case for UN Action,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: 2
949 Ibid.: 3
950 Steele, R. D. (2003). Information Peacekeeping and the Future of Intelligence: 217
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In the opinion of this author, a UN intelligence capability should follow existing 
models o f successful multilateral intelligence co-operation that seek to inform 
international decision-making processes. The EU Joint Situation Centre is the best 
example of intelligence co-operation in support o f a collective security apparatus in the 
face of common security threats, including the terrorism-WMD threat nexus. As 
described in Chapter 3, the SitCen was created to fill intelligence gaps produced by the 
construction of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The 2004 Madrid train 
bombings called for urgent action to provide a strategic intelligence capability within 
the EU ’s collective security machinery that seeks to prevent the occurrence of attacks. 
The task of the SitCen to collate information it receives from intelligence organisations 
across the EU and issue joint EU assessments in support of a common EU security 
policy is an example of state practice that reflects the power of intelligence in the post- 
9 /1 1 strategic reality. The primary customer o f the SitCen intelligence product is not a 
nation-state, but the EU High Representative for the CFSP and the supporting 
secretariat. There is no reason why this model of intelligence co-operation in support 
o f multilateral decision-making cannot be applied at the UN level. The international 
community faces a common threat, including a terrorism-WMD threat nexus. The 
UN ’s controlling security strategy, considering the imperative of prevention, provides 
the rationale of the UN’s collective security strategy after 9/11 that seeks to prevent 
the occurrence of attacks. The task of a UN intelligence organisation should be to 
collate information from member states and issue UN assessments in support o f a 
common UN strategy to pro-act against post-9/11 threats. The customer of the UN 
intelligence product should be the UNSC and the UN Secretary-General, as well as 
national leaders and the public at large.
O f course, the UN is on a far larger scale than the EU, and whilst the potential 
benefits would be greater so would the potential problems. UN member states might 
be unwilling to disseminate high-grade and useful intelligence to a UN intelligence 
outfit, thereby preventing a UN ‘SitCen’ from becoming a high-grade and useful 
intelligence organisation. Additionally, in light of intelligence power differentials, some 
UN member states will possibly be refused from joining a UN intelligence organisation 
on the grounds that their national intelligence organisations are either penetrated or
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incapable o f bringing anything significant to the intelligence table. This would probably 
engender resentment amongst some UN member states, and create a situation that 
challenges the very idea of an open, transparent and inclusive UN. There is also still 
the risk that states would use a UN intelligence capability to gain national advantage 
and exploit it unilaterally, which is suspected to have been the case with the 
Information and Research Unit o f the UN’s own Situation Centre in the 1990s. 
Moreover, differentials in intelligence power between states could create perceptions 
o f disproportionate levels of influence over UN decision-making processes. Whichever 
state provides the most intelligence is able to exert the greatest influence on UNSC 
deliberations on intelligence-determinable threats. This again could encourage 
perceptions of a challenge to the principles o f fairness and inclusiveness of the UN, 
although it is arguable that the structure of the UNSC, with its veto-wielding 
Permanent 5, demonstrates existing power differentials that already challenge such 
principles. Even so, strong intelligence states could seek to use UNSC processes to 
legitimise their own intelligence-driven security agendas, and weaker intelligence states 
could attempt to exert influence by acting to disrupt the work of the UNSC through 
political obstruction.
The situation is indeed complex. However, the potential benefits of a UN 
intelligence capability far out-weigh the potential problems. The maintenance of 
international order in the face of threats to international peace and security that 
demand prevention requires the facilitation and legitimisation of pro-active controlling 
security strategies. The security strategies have vital intelligence requirements, and they 
must be fulfilled at the international level in order for collective security to work in the 
post-9/11 world.
SECTION 2: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS
The potential power of intelligence to facilitate and legitimise controlling security 
strategies that seek to prevent threats to international peace and security has 
implications for intelligence practice. Intelligence knowledge, activities and 
organisation, like the legitimising processes that underpin international order, need to
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adapt to changing strategic realities. In the post-9/11 world, intelligence organisations 
face pressure to perform new international roles that have transformed the way in 
which intelligence knowledge is collected, processed and used.
Facilitating Prevention
In order to facilitate the prevention of threats to international security, intelligence 
knowledge needs to be international in scope. International dots require the drawing of 
international lines if they are to be joined and responded against effectively.
Dare to Share’
The international role of intelligence in facilitating the prevention o f common threats 
challenges some long-standing assumptions and conventions that lie at the heart of 
intelligence practice. In the face of a post-9/11 strategic reality in which no single state, 
however strong in intelligence power, can ensure its security alone, the imperative to 
prevent perceivably incoercible, unconstrained and transnational threats has led to the 
imperative for states to share information in order to determine and respond to threats 
effectively. In this strategic environment, the intelligence maxim ‘need to know’ has 
changed to ‘dare to share’. The assumptions underpinning the operational imperative 
to jealously guard information, which served its purpose to protect information and 
national securities in the days of intrusive Cold War rivalry, need to be revised so that 
the intelligence partnerships required for ensuring national and international security 
after 9/11 are constructed and exploited to achieve shared security goals.
Zalmai Azmi, the FBI’s chief information officer, has written o f the need to share 
information within the US intelligence community, in light of imperative to prevent 
terrorist attacks against US targets. Azmi claims that the ‘old philosophy o f clinging to 
information no longer applies. The need for flexibility and agility far outweighs that of 
need-to-know hoarding when our enemies already outpace us in the ability to operate
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without restraint’.951 Azmi concluded that US intelligence agencies ‘must dare to share, 
and we must effect the cultural changes that will allow that to happen’.952 Indeed, like 
the challenge of developing an international intelligence capability under UN auspices, 
national intelligence reform means cultural reform -  and this can occur in a number of 
ways. Unlike the American endeavour to drive cultural change through the creation of 
new intelligence structures, the British approach is geared to improving processes 
within existing structures, with a view to growing new organisations from a freshly 
cultivated soil, if required. Either way, both the US and UK recognise the need to 
address the issue of cultural change based on the post-9/11 assumption that it is better 
to share information than not.
The ‘dare to share’ maxim operates at the international, as well as the national, level. 
N ot only do organisations within states need to share information with each other in 
order to effectively manage post-9/11 threats, states need to share information with 
other states. In the post-9/11 security reality, knowledge of what is happening within 
the borders of one state directly affects the ability of another state to promote security 
goals. Equally, in the face of serious transnational threats, one state’s security depends 
on the security of another. Intelligence work that is carried-out in State A directly 
affects the security of State B. Sharing intelligence to facilitate security overseas is in 
the interests of a state seeking to protect security domestically, considering the 
transnational nature of post-9/11 security challenges. The rationality of international 
intelligence co-operation means that useful and reliable intelligence knowledge is 
increasingly an international product. Indeed, the imperative of international 
intelligence sharing has given rise to intelligence independence between states that goes 
beyond the previous confines of intelligence co-operation. The international ‘dare to 
share’ principle underlines the mutual dependency states have on each other’s 
information in the face of common threats and shared security aims. Intelligence 
practice will need to evolve in line with the post-9/11 strategic reality and operate in 
closer accordance with the ‘dare to share’ maxim at the international level, in order to
Azmi, Z. (2 October 1006). Dare to Share Information. The Federal Times.
Ibid.
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facilitate the pro-active controlling security strategies that are required to manage 
threats to international peace and security effectively.
'Share and Compare’
Another maxim that affects intelligence practice after 9/11 is ‘share and compare’. As 
David Handley, Director of Group Strategic Analysis at BAE Systems and former 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office official, argues, intelligence organisations need to 
disseminate and compare analyses of common issues.953 Acknowledging and managing 
intelligence interdependency effectively must be the first priority of all states, 
considering the imperative to prevent the transnational terrorist threats.954 Knowledge 
produced through the joining of international dots has the potential to lead to the early 
identification of threats, but the production of such knowledge depends on the 
exploitation of the full range of data available to the international community.955 
Indeed, intelligence can be created from data, and dots can be joined through a process 
of improved data handling made possible through increased co-operation.956
The role of intelligence in facilitating prevention has implications on the way in 
which intelligence organisations work with and relate to each other. Intelligence power, 
an instrument traditionally uniquely associated with national power, needs to 
internationalise in line with the internationalisation of intelligence targets and 
intelligence requirements. Whilst there are perceived costs that limit the extent to 
which states co-operate in intelligence matters (see Chapter 3), these have become 
overshadowed by the perceived benefits o f co-operation after 9/11, in light of 
intelligence interdependence. As a result, states are constructing new institutions that 
are facilitating greater rates of information exchange that impact on intelligence 
activities. Mechanisms for intelligence sharing between governments at international 
level, which have previously been anathema to normal intelligence practice, are now 
essential instruments for making the most out of intelligence collection and analysis. 
Pauline Neville Jones’ elucidations on the construction of bilateral intelligence
Handley, D. (2006). Internationalising Intelligence Sharing.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
292
processes in response to common security concerns can be extended to the 
international level:
It is not the case, in my view, that intelligence is so uniquely a one nation 
activity that it cannot be shared with any other. Were this the case, the 
British-American intelligence community, which includes the shared 
generation and use of intelligence, would never have come into existence...
Such as situation did not, o f course, come into being fully fledged. It 
sprang out of particular circumstances in the mid twentieth century and has 
developed over time.957
Likewise, in accordance with Constructivist Realist theory, international intelligence 
co-operation has sprung out of the particular circumstances in the 21st century, and will 
no doubt develop over time. Closer integration of intelligence organisations is required 
to enhance states’ abilities to deal with ambiguity and promote action in the face of 
complex threats and the complex intelligence issues that arise from their management. 
Rather than compromising the effectiveness o f intelligence, sharing and comparing 
intelligence, in David Handley’s view, serves as a force multiplier for intelligence 
organisations acting in the post-9/11 environment.958
Another reason to share and compare intelligence on an international scale is to 
promote accurate and objective intelligence assessments, and mitigate the risk of 
‘group-think’. Rational responses to anticipated threats require rational intelligence 
assessments that are empirically-rooted and available for verification by other 
assessments. The intelligence debacle surrounding the 2003 Iraq invasion was in part 
created by wide acceptance of conventional wisdom that Iraq was running WMD 
programmes. Sharing and comparing intelligence could encourage competitive analysis 
of common issues and challenge any conventional wisdom that stifles the achievement 
of informed, objective and accurate conclusions.959 Horizontal and vertical 
dissemination of intelligence could also have the effect of improving the tasking and 
collection activities of states, as well as analysis activities, in light of the identification
957 De Jong, B., W. Platje, et al., Eds. (2003). Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the
Future: v
958 Handley, D. (2006). Internationalising Intelligence Sharing.
959 Mackmurdo, C. (2004). "Getting Facts: Intelligence and the UN."
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of intelligence gaps that require filling. Moreover, as well as promoting the best 
possible intelligence product for decision-makers at the national and international 
levels, the processes involved in sharing and comparing intelligence could inform and 
spread best practice in the intelligence profession on a global scale, which is in the 
interests of every state considering the importance of intelligence power in facilitating 
effective responses against terrorism threats wherever they are detectable.960
Legitimising Prevention
A significant implication of any increased role o f intelligence in legitimising prevention 
is the legitimisation of intelligence. Intelligence, traditionally considered as a pariah 
state activity and ignored by international law, has grown in status since the 
construction of post-9/11 controlling security strategies. New international roles 
performed by intelligence have brought it further into the international fold. The 
emergence of threats that demand prevention after 9/11 has meant more states take 
intelligence more seriously, and the UN itself has signalled its own strategic intelligence 
requirements in meeting the challenge of prevention.
In 2002, Michael Herman wrote an article entitled £11 September: Legitimising 
Intelligence?’ in which he suggested that the 9/11 attacks accentuated the post-Cold 
War trend to a new intelligence paradigm, which is ‘targeting ‘non-state’, ‘partial state’ 
or ‘rogue state’ entities rather than ‘decent’ states; serving ‘good causes’ rather than 
competitive state advantage; supporting multinational action in actions with 
international endorsement. As such it has gained increased legitimacy’.961 The 
establishment of intelligence as an activity undertaken in accordance with patterns of 
state behaviour that aim to achieve good in international society is, indeed, a product 
of the construction of controlling security strategies that seek to prevent threats to 
international peace and security. The recognition of intelligence as positive state 
practice that advances international goals marks the arrival of new attitudes towards 
intelligence that veer away from conceptions o f illegitimate acts o f espionage and
960 Mackmurdo, C. (2004). "Getting Facts: Intelligence and the UN."
961 Herman, M. (2002). "11 September: Legitimising Intelligence?": 227
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embrace the idea of intelligence as decision-making support. The emergence of the 
post-9/11 imperative of prevention rationalised controlling security strategies and went 
far to legitimise intelligence activities that have the potential power to facilitate them.
The potential power of intelligence to legitimise controlling security strategies has 
significant implications for intelligence knowledge and activity that complicate the 
work of intelligence organisations. In order to justify pro-action against anticipated 
threats to international peace and security determined through the assessment of 
information, intelligence knowledge needs to be credible in the eyes of those who are 
tasked to make policy decisions and the public at large, especially if intelligence-driven 
decisions lead to the use of force.962 In line with the Caroline formula’s requirement to 
demonstrate necessity and proportionality, intelligence power after 9/11 needs to be 
perceivable as capable o f providing evidence of threats that can be brought before the 
UNSC, in line with the UN’s legitimisation processes. As explained in Chapter 3, the 
use of intelligence as evidence raises some difficult issues, and these issues affect the 
degree to which intelligence can satisfy the requirement to demonstrate the necessity of 
pro-action and meet the demands of the security institutions that underpin 
international order.
The role of intelligence in providing evidence of anticipated threats in support of 
controlling security strategies is a dramatic departure from previous conceptions of 
intelligence power. The purpose of intelligence is not to provide information that 
demonstrates truth beyond reasonable doubt; it is to provide reasonable speculation in 
view of the available information, which could turn out to be wrong.963 The 
implications for intelligence of the requirement to evidence the necessity of pro-action 
are fundamental and far-reaching. Firstly, in order to satisfy that requirement, 
intelligence knowledge will need to achieve levels o f certainty that surpass that which is 
usually contained in conventional intelligence assessments, which are normally heavily 
caveated. Secondly, intelligence assessments that purport to provide knowledge at a 
satisfactory level of certainty need to be credible in the eyes o f decision-makers and
Herman, M. (2005). Problems for Western Intelligence in the New Century.
Herman, M. (2003). "Threat assessments and the legitimation of policy?": 178.
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populations. N ot only does this mean that intelligence knowledge must achieve a level 
of certainty, it means that intelligence assessments need to be products of international 
processes of analysis and agreed upon by a number of different intelligent experts. It 
also demands the dissemination of intelligence beyond the usual customers. Decision­
makers at the international level, including the UN Secretary-General and the president 
o f the UNSC, will need to consume intelligence in order to legitimise any action that is 
intelligence-driven. Moreover, in cases such as Iraq where the option of armed force is 
involved, members of the general public will need to be considered intelligence 
customers, a consideration that entails significant operational security problems for 
intelligence services. Thirdly, the requirement to demonstrate the necessity of pro­
action risks blurring the line between intelligence assessment and political advocacy. 
The use of ‘cherry-picked’ intelligence to justify pro-action that aims to prevent 
anticipated threats, as exemplified in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion, invites 
accusations of international politicking and intelligence abuse.964
Nevertheless, the potential power of intelligence to legitimise controlling security 
strategies after 9/11 means that intelligence must be integrated into legitimising 
processes, so that the institutions of international order can be upheld in the face of 
threats that demand prevention. As such, intelligence credibility issues that arise from 
the requirement to evidence threats need to be addressed. International intelligence co­
operation could help increase the degree of certainty contained in intelligence 
assessments by encouraging competitive analysis and promoting the achievement of 
informed, objective and accurate conclusions. N ot only does the international sharing 
and comparing of intelligence ensure the best possible intelligence product, a 
systematic multilateral analysis procedure, ideally under UN auspices, has the potential 
function of serving as a legitimising process for assessments that claim to represent the 
views of the international community. Social-agreement at an international level of 
intelligence assessments is crucial to bestowing credibility on material that purports to 
provide evidence that is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ o f threats to international peace 
and security.
964 Herman, M. (2003). "Threat assessments and the legitimation of policy?": 177.
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In terms of dissemination issues, the cultural changes at national level, driven by the 
imperative to ‘dare to share’, should extend to the international level. Decision-makers 
in the UN will need to become intelligence customers if controlling security strategies 
are to become legitimised, in line with the institutions of international order. In order 
for this to happen, national governments will need to take seriously the prospect of 
disseminating intelligence to the UN when required, and UN leaders will need to be 
educated about the uses and limits of intelligence to ensure proper handling of 
intelligence at the international level. The creation of international intelligence 
machinery could expedite the development of a UN culture that embraces intelligence 
and facilitates these changes. Moreover, a collective analytical and assessment 
capability at the UN could alleviate pressure on national intelligence services to stray 
into the realm of policy advocacy and mitigate the risk of compromising the 
operational security of national collection agencies by releasing to the public sanitised 
collective assessments through UN, not national, channels.
The requirement to demonstrate credibility is a post-9/11 addition to the Caroline 
Formula. The ability to demonstrate the necessity o f controlling security strategies that 
seek to prevent threats through pro-action requires the ability to demonstrate the 
credibility of information that purports to evidence threats prior to their 
materialisation. The power of intelligence to legitimise prevention depends on social 
processes that can lead to agreement on intelligence assessments of threats that are 
perceivable, but not necessarily directly and immediately perceived.
CONCLUSIONS
The potential power of intelligence to facilitate and legitimise prevention, as well as 
differentials in levels of intelligence power within the international system, has 
implications for international order and intelligence affairs. Controlling security 
strategies that aim to prevent attacks by apparently incoercible threats depend on 
information to determine threats prior to their materialisation. The framework 
provided for by the Caroline formula, which defines the logical structure of the self- 
defence and collective security institutions, fails to furnish states with the mechanisms
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required to act rationally against perceivable security threats. The UN’s collective 
security machinery lacks the capacity to anticipate threats and is, therefore, incapable 
of pro-acting against threats that demand prevention In order for collective security to 
function after 9/11 collective security machinery needs an intelligence assessment 
capacity. The imperative of prevention has transformed the way in which intelligence 
knowledge is collected, processed and used. In order to facilitate the prevention of 
threats to international security, intelligence knowledge needs to be international in 
scope. And, in order to justify pro-action against anticipated threats to international 
peace and security, intelligence knowledge needs to be credible in the eyes of those 
who are tasked to make policy decisions and the public at large, especially if 
intelligence-driven decisions could lead to the use of force.
This study has sought to increase understanding of the nature and role of intelligence 
in international security affairs after 9/11. Four issues have been important in this 
endeavour. Firstly, the development of a new and robust theory of Constructivist 
Realism successfully bridges the gap between Realism and Constructivism, and 
provides a framework in which socially constructed phenomena can be made available 
to empirical verification with logical contradiction, and rational action can be 
understood in line with Positivist standards o f reasoning. To act rationally is to 
understand reality; to understand reality is to describe facts; and, to describe facts is to 
be capable of verifying statements by observing phenomena that exist independent of 
perception.
Secondly, the development of a new and robust theory of intelligence power, based 
on the logical structure of Constructivist Realism, succeeds in explaining Michael 
Herman’s concept of ‘intelligence power’. The Constructivist Realist conception of 
rational action explains the function of intelligence in facilitating rational government 
in the face of threats that are perceivable, but not necessarily perceived. The ability to 
act rationally within a material world depends on the capability to verify phenomena 
that exist independently of perception. Intelligence power represents the capability of 
states to act rationally by understanding threats through the empirical investigation of 
material phenomena. This theory of intelligence power is able to explain Michael
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Herman’s original concept, as well as changes to it in the post-9/11 strategic reality 
where controlling security strategies require intelligence to determine anticipated 
threats to international security, rather than threats that have already occurred.
Thirdly, the examination of the transition from pre-9 /11 coercive security strategies 
that sought to react to coercible threats to post-9 /11 controlling security strategies that 
seek to pro-act against incoercible threats demonstrates shifts in thinking towards 
prevention as a strategic imperative. The emergence of the strategic imperative of 
prevention after 9/11 prompted the construction of controlling security strategies, at 
national and international levels, which have vital intelligence requirements in the face 
of threats that are perceivable, but not necessarily perceived.
Fourthly, the description of the terrorism-WMD threat in terms of both ‘threats’ and 
‘risk’ explains the ‘fuzzy and complex’ nature of post-9/11 security challenges. ‘New’ 
terrorism, and its potentially catastrophic WMD dimension, represents a looming 
threat to international security, as well as a ‘situation involving exposure to danger’ and 
‘the possibility that something unpleasant will happen’. The risk of inaction against 
apparently incoercible and unconstrained threats underscores the rationale of 
controlling security strategies that seek to prevent attacks, and the utility of intelligence 
power to empirically investigate the existence of phenomena that are perceivable, but 
not necessarily perceived.
Finally, the identification of a rational action/legitimate action astigmatism provides 
a framework in which to understand the implications of intelligence power differentials 
amongst actors, specifically the UK, US and UN, considering varying capabilities to 
fulfil the intelligence requirements of controlling security strategies. The motivation for 
this study is provide a level of theoretical rigour to ‘intelligence studies’ and a focus on 
the issue of intelligence and international peace and security after 9/11. Further 
research needs to be done to support practical steps to ensure that the UN’s 
legitimising processes can facilitate controlling security strategies that aim to prevent 
anticipated threats to international peace and security through the assessment of 
intelligence material.
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